Southern Economic Journal Research Articles

Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs

Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs

The Effects of Government Regulation on Teenage Smoking

We examine the impact of three sets of government regulations on the demand for cigarettes by teenagers in the United States. These are: (1) the excise tax on cigarettes, (2) the Fairness Doctrine of the Federal Communications Commission, which resulted in the airing of anti-smoking messages on radio and television from July 1, 1967 to January 1, 1971,and (3) the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1970, which banned pro-smoking cigarette advertising on radio and television after January 1, 1971.Teenage price elasticities of demand for cigarettes are substantial and much larger than the corresponding adult price elasticities. The teenage smoking participation elasticity equals -1.2, and the quantity smoked elasticity equals -1.4. It follows that, if future reductions in youth smoking are desired, an increase in the Federal excise tax is a potent policy to accomplish this goal. The contention of the proponents of the advertising ban that the Fairness Doctrine failed in the case of teenagers is incorrect. According to our results, the doctrine had a substantial negative impact on teenage smoking participation rates. Extrapolations suggest that the advertising ban was no better or worse a policy than the Fairness Doctrine.

The Rhetoric and Reality of Redistribution

It is customary when giving a presidential address to begin by remarking on how happy you feel. I have an even stronger reason for being happy than most presidents. It will at long last permit me to break into the Southern Economic Journal. Up to this point, referees of that august institution have always rejected everything that I sent them. Finally, however, I am privileged to put an unrefereed paper in the Journal and, hence, do not have to worry about this one being rejected. The audience may feel that although it is nice for me it is hard on the Journal, but under the sacred traditions of the Southern Economic Association, the editors and referees can do nothing about it. The blame, if there is any, has to be laid on me and not on the management of the Journal.' In a way, the fact that I will not face referees is important because in this paper I propose to violate a number of implicit taboos in the discussion of income redistribution. Indeed, I propose to argue that most of the current discussion of income redistribution is drastically defective. This will not only include Rawls, it will include what most members of the economic profession normally say on the subject and presumably what the potential referees of this paper would have thought. Let me very briefly survey the existing economic, as opposed to the philosophic, literature on the redistribution of income. Firstly, a good many economists have said simply that economics can say nothing about the subject because somebody gains and somebody loses, but we can't say whether this is a good or a bad thing with our apparatus. Hochman and Rodgers [9] have started another tradition of dealing with income redistribution in which the government is seen as simply organizing what is essentially a voluntary transfer from the better off American citizens to the less well off American citizens. Why the government should be used as an instrumentality for this kind of transfer was, interestingly enough, first explained by Milton Friedman [6, 191-92]. Such redistribution has the interesting characteristic that it does not actually involve redistribution because the people who make the gift are maximizing their own utility and, hence, are better off. It is a case in which human preferences are so arranged that a given dollar of income benefits two people a full dollar's worth. The donor gains a dollar from expending money at its best use to him, i.e. making a gift to the poor, and the poor gain the dollar. In a somewhat metaphysical sense, it can be said here

Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription Drug Advertising

THE economic and welfare effects of advertising have been extensively studied over the last half-century. However, these efforts have not led to a consensus either as to the effects or the value of advertising. Economists continue to reach polar conclusions that appear to be derived mainly from preconceptions of the social desirability of advertising. On the one hand is research that emphasizes promotion's ability to create "artificial" product differentiation and thereby produce informational confusion.1 This line of research stresses the empirical association of extensive advertising with high concentration and high accounting profits-evidence judged to support increased market power and entry barrier effects.2 A contrary body of research emphasizes the value of advertising in providing information and, hence, in promoting competition.3 The empirical findings most consistent with this view are that prices paid by consumers in (selected) markets are lower with advertising than without it.4

Population and Economic Change in Developing Countries

An extremely important book which contains a number of uniformly excellent papers on a variety of topics relating, to various degrees, to the nexus of demographic-economic interrelationships for presently developing countries.—William J. Serow, Southern Economic Journal An important landmark in the growing field of economic demography.—Dudley Kirk, Journal of Developing Areas

Homogenizing Deconcentration: Estimation and Simulation

Asch, Peter, and Joseph J. Seneca, Is Collusion Profitable? this REVIEW 58 (Feb. 1976), 1-12. Block, M. K., F. C. Nold and J. G. Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, Technical Report ISDDE-1-78, Hoover Institution, Dec. 1978. Clabault, James M., and John F. Burton, Jr., Sherman Act Indictments, 1955-1965 (New York: Federal Legal Publications, 1966). Feinberg, Robert M., Structure and Employment Instability, this REVIEW 61 (Nov. 1979), 497-505. , The Lerner Index, Concentration, and the Measurement of Market Power, Southern Economic Journal 46 (Apr. 1980), 1180-1186. Guth, Louis A., Robert A. Schwartz, and David K. Whitcomb, The Use of Buyer Concentration Ratios in Tests of Oligopoly Models, this REVIEW 58 (Nov. 1976), 488-492. Hay, George A., and Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price-Fixing Conspiracies, Journal of Law and Economics 17 (Apr. 1974), 13-38. Lustgarten, Steven H., The Impact of Buyer Concentration in Manufacturing Industries, this REVIEW 57 (May 1975), 125-132. , The Use of Buyer Concentration Ratios in Tests of Oligopoly Models: Reply, this REVIEW 58 (Nov. 1976), 492-494. Omstein, Stanley I., Industrial Concentration and Advertising Intensity (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977). Palmer, John, The Profit-Performance Effects of the Separation of Ownership from Control in Large U.S. Industrial Corporations, Bell Journal of Economics 4 (Spring 1973), 299-302. Trade Regulation Reporter, Vol. 4, New U.S. Antitrust Cases (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, 1979).

Import Targets and the Equivalence of Optimal Tariff- and Quota-Structures

(1975) Urban Economic Problems (New York: Harper and Row) Nadiri, MI. and S. Rosen (1973) A Disequilibrium Model of Demandfor Factors of Production (New York: Columbia University Press) North, D.C. (1955) 'Location theory and regional economic growth.' Journal of Political Economy 63, 243-58 Olvey, L.D. (1970) 'Regional growth and interregional migration their pattern of interaction.' Unpublished PH D dissertation, Harvard University Ontario Department of Municipal Affairs (various years) Municipal Directory (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario) Rabenau, B. and D.A. Hanson (1979) 'The provision of public goods in a growing urban economy.' Regional Science and Urban Economics 9, 1-20 Simon, H.A. (1953) 'Causal ordering and identifiability.' In W.C. Hood and T. Koopmans, eds, Studies in Econometric Method (New York: Wiley) Statistics Canada (October 1978) Canadian Statistical Review (11-003) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer) (1977) National Income and Expenditure Accounts 1926-76 (13-201) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer) (various years) Manufacturing Industries of Canada, Province of Ontario (31-206) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer) (various months) Employment, Earnings and Hours (72-002) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer) (various years) Review of Employment and Payrolls (72-201) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer) (1963) Census of Canada, Employment Status by Sex (94-533) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer) Steinnes, D.N. (1978)'Causality and migration: a statistical resolution of the chicken or egg fowl-up. ' The Southern Economic Journal 45, 218-26 Tiebout, C.M. (1956) 'Exports and regional economic growth.' Journal of Political Economy 64, 160-4

The Family Life Cycle: An Alternative Approach

the Value of Time, Southern Economic Journal, 45, 1254-60. Davisson, Charles M., and Taggart, Herbert B. (1974), Financial and Operating Characteristics of Automobile Dealers and the Franchise System, in Two Studies in Automobile Franchising, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Ford Motor Company (1977-1979), Dealer Guide Group Averages, Lincoln-Mercury Division, Dealer Business Management Department, Dearborn, MI: January 1977-March 1979. Pindyck, Robert S., and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1976), Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.

On the Consistency of Non-Profit-Maximizing Behavior with Perfect Competition

In a recent article in the Southern Economic Journal, Robert Feinberg considers whether or not profit-maximizing firms (PMs) and non-profit-maximizing firms (NPMs) can exist side by side over the long run in a competitive market [2]. One suggestion for why a firm showing a loss of $500 can co-exist with firms showing nonnegative profits is that there may be nonpecuniary benefits to the entrepreneur worth more than this $500 economic loss.' The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that Feinberg's results can be generalized into a model which analyzes PMs and NPMs as high-price and low-price producers. Furthermore, it is shown that a utility-maximization goal need not be consistent with profit maximization as was suggested by Olsen [3].

Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting

LAWS may be passed because of self-interest or because of ideology. All national laws are ultimately passed by Congress; therefore, an analysis of the factors which determine the way in which congressmen vote can be used to determine the extent to which each of these factors is involved in passage of legislation. Because of the development of statistical tools such as logit analysis, which enable the analyst to handle situations in which the dependent variable is dichotomous, determinants of voting have recently been examined using roll-call voting data. The basic technique in this work has been to define the vote by a congressman on a bill as the dichotomous dependent variable and to use economic factors associated with the district as independent variables. But if this research is to proceed, it is necessary to separate out the factors-self-interest, logrolling, and ideology-which actually determine voting. This separation is the purpose of this paper. Kau and Rubin' and Silberman and Durden2 have analyzed voting on minimum wages; Danielsen and Rubin3 have examined voting on energy issues; Davis and Jackson4 have examined voting on income redistribution; and Kau and Rubins have examined the effect of public-interest lobbies such as Common Cause on the legislative process. Thus, statistical analysis of roll-call voting has been, and is likely to continue to be, a useful tool. This work in economics has differed somewhat from related work by political

The Cost of Mating

The Cost of Mating

Reasons for Journal Rejection: An Analysis of 600 Manuscripts

The rejection of manuscripts by journals is clearly the norm in the social sciences. For example, in 1976 about 700 manuscripts were submitted to the American Economic Review and more than 500 were rejected; the American Sociological Review rejected more than 500 of about 600 submitted; and of the 525 manuscripts reviewed by the American Political Science Review, almost 500 were rejected. To be sure, these are the top journals in their disciplines; but other respectable journals display the same pattern for that year: the Southern Economic Journal turned down well over 400 of the 500 manuscripts received; the Social Science Quarterly rejected about 425 of the almost 500 received; and the American Journal of Political Science received about 320 and rejected 270. That a perusal of the editorial reports of other journals would yield comparable findings is documented by a survey of 72 economics journals which collectively reported a rejection rate of 77 percent.

Reasons for Journal Rejection: An Analysis of 600 Manuscripts

The rejection of manuscripts by journals is clearly the norm in the social sciences. For example, in 1976 about 700 manuscripts were submitted to the American Economic Review and more than 500 were rejected; the American Sociological Review rejected more than 500 of about 600 submitted; and of the 525 manuscripts reviewed by the American Political Science Review, almost 500 were rejected. To be sure, these are the top journals in their disciplines; but other respectable journals display the same pattern for that year: the Southern Economic Journal turned down well over 400 of the 500 manuscripts received; the Social Science Quarterly rejected about 425 of the almost 500 received; and the American Journal of Political Science received about 320 and rejected 270. That a perusal of the editorial reports of other journals would yield comparable findings is documented by a survey of 72 economics journals which collectively reported a rejection rate of 77 percent.

Exchange rate changes, profitability, and direct foreign investment. Steven W. Kohlhagen, Assistant Professor, University of California, Berkeley. Abstract from Southern Economic Journal, July 1977, p. 43

The International ExecutiveVolume 19, Issue 3 p. 14-15 Research Roundup Exchange rate changes, profitability, and direct foreign investment. Steven W. Kohlhagen, Assistant Professor, University of California, Berkeley. Abstract from Southern Economic Journal, July 1977, p. 43 First published: Autumn (Fall) 1977 https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.5060190309AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume19, Issue3Autumn (Fall) 1977Pages 14-15 RelatedInformation

Labor Productivity and the Elasticity of Factor Substitution in West German Industries 1950-1960

Abramovitz, M., and P. A. David, Reinterpreting Economic Growth: Parables and Realities, American Economic Review 63 (May 1973), 428439. Arrow, K., H. B. Chenery, B. Minhas, and R. M. Solow, Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency, this REVIEW 43 (Aug. 1961), 225-250. Baer, W., and M. E. A. Herve, Employment and Industrialization in Developing Countries, Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (Feb. 1966), 88-107. Behrman, J. R., Sectoral of Substitution between Capital and Labor in a Developing Economy: Time Series Analysis in the Case of Postwar Chile, Econometrica 40 (Mar. 1972), 311-326. Dhrymes, P. J., and P. Zarembka, Elasticities of Substitution for Two-Digit Manufacturing Industries: A Correction, this REVIEW 52 (Feb. 1970), 115-117. Diamond, P. A., and D. McFadden, Identification of the Elasticity of Substitution and the of Technical Change: An Impossibility Theorem, Working Paper No. 62, University of California (Berkeley), 1965. Fuchs, V., Capital-Labor Substitution: A Note, this REVIEW 45 (Nov. 1963), 436-438. Gupta, S. B., Some Tests of the International Comparisons of Factor Efficiency with the CES Production Function, this REVIEW 50 (Nov. 1968), 470-476; Reply by Archen Minsol (ACMS), 477-479. Kelley, A. C., J. G. Williamson, and R. J. Cheetham, Dualistic Economic Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). Lucas, R. E., Jr., Labor-Capital Substitution in U.S. Manufacturing, in A. C. Harberger and M. J. Bailey (eds.), Taxation of Income and Capital (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969), 223-274. Moroney, J. R., Identification and Specification Analysis of Alternative Equations for Estimating the Elasticity of Substitution, Southern Economic Journal 37 (Jan. 1970), 287-299. Nerlove, M., Recent Empirical Studies of the CES and Related Production Functions, in M. Brown (ed.), Theory and Empirical Analysis of Production (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 55-122. Ranis, G., Sector Labor Absorption, Economic Development and Cultural Change 21 (Apr. 1973), 387-408. Sato, K., Production Functions and Aggregation (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1975). Schydlowsky, D. M., and M. Syrquin, The Estimation of CES Production Functions and Neutral Efficiency Levels Using Effective Rates of Protection as Price Deflators, this REVIEW 54 (Feb. 1972), 78-83. Sveikauskas, L., Bias in Cross-Section Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution, International Economic Review 15 (June 1974), 522-528. , The Productivity of Cities, Quarterly Journal of Economics 89 (Aug. 1975), 393-413. United Nations, Textile Industry in Latin America (New York, 1963). United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Textile Industry (New York, 1969). Zarembka, P., On the Empirical Relevance of the CES Production Function, this REVIEW 52 (Feb. 1970), 47-53.

Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance: Some Additional Evidence

Previous articleNext article No AccessConfirmations and ContradictionsHousehold Allocation of Time and Church Attendance: Some Additional EvidenceStephen H. Long and Russell F. SettleStephen H. Long Search for more articles by this author and Russell F. Settle Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 85, Number 2Apr., 1977 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/260572 Views: 11Total views on this site Citations: 25Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1977 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Ronald B. Larson , International Journal of Market Research 61, no.55 ( 2019): 534.https://doi.org/10.1177/1470785318805305Imam Alam, Shahina Amin, Ken McCormick Income, Education, and Three Dimensions of Religiosity in the USA, Eastern Economic Journal 44, no.44 (Sep 2017): 501–518.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41302-017-0101-6 References, (Jan 2018): 307–468.https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-805371-3.16001-7Michael A. Kortt, Todd Steen, Elisabeth Sinnewe Church attendance, faith and the allocation of time: evidence from Australia, International Journal of Social Economics 44, no.1212 (Dec 2017): 2112–2127.https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSE-05-2016-0140Madalena Abreu Nonprofit Marketing: A European Perspective on Donations and Religiousness, (Oct 2015): 347–356.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24148-7_106Christofer Edling, Jens Rydgren, Love Bohman Faith or Social Foci? Happiness, Religion, and Social Networks in Sweden, European Sociological Review 30, no.55 (Aug 2014): 615–626.https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcu062Professor Masudul Alam Choudhury, Nicholas Tuszynski, Walter E. Block The principal – agent problem between the Pope and God: how the printing press saved the papacy, Humanomics 30, no.33 (Aug 2014): 275–284.https://doi.org/10.1108/H-07-2013-0044Dr. Annie Tubadji, Professor Joachim Mo, Maria J. Perez-Villadoniga, Juan Prieto-Rodriguez, Javier Suarez-Pandiello Willingness to work and religious beliefs in Europe, International Journal of Manpower 35, no.1/21/2 (May 2014): 147–165.https://doi.org/10.1108/IJM-03-2014-0068Pablo Brañas-Garza, Teresa García-Muñoz, Shoshana Neuman Intergenerational transmission of ‘religious capital’. Evidence from Spain, Revista Internacional de Sociología 69, no.33 (Jul 2011): 649–677.https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2010.06.28Maryam Dilmaghani Religiosity, human capital return and earnings in Canada, International Journal of Social Economics 39, no.1/21/2 (Dec 2011): 55–80.https://doi.org/10.1108/03068291211188875Chun-Ping Chang, Chien-Chiang Lee, Jia-Hsi Weng Is the secularization hypothesis valid? A panel data assessment for Taiwan, Applied Economics 43, no.66 (Mar 2011): 729–745.https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840802599826Anca Cojoc After the fall: the impact of government regulation on church attendance in Eastern Europe, 1990–2004, Public Choice 142, no.3-43-4 (Oct 2009): 485–496.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9541-9Timothy Tyler Brown Rational praying: The economics of prayer, The Journal of Socio-Economics 38, no.11 (Jan 2009): 37–44.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2008.07.006Johan Graafland, Corrie Mazereeuw-Van Der Duijn Schouten The Heavenly Calculus and Socially Responsible Business Conduct: An Explorative Study among Executives, De Economist 155, no.22 (Jun 2007): 161–181.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-007-9053-2Charles M. North, Carl R. Gwin Religious Freedom and the Unintended Consequences of State Religion, Southern Economic Journal 71, no.11 (Jul 2004): 103–117.https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2004.tb00626.xSuzanne Heller Clain, Charles E. Zech A Household Production Analysis Of Religious., American Journal of Economics and Sociology 58, no.44 (Oct 1999): 923–946.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1999.tb03401.xSamuel Cameron Faith, frequency, and the allocation of time: a micro level study of religious capital and participation, The Journal of Socio-Economics 28, no.44 (Jan 1999): 439–456.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-5357(99)00047-5John W. Sawkins, Paul T. Seaman, Hector C. S. Williams Church attendance in Great Britain: An ordered logit approach, Applied Economics 29, no.22 (Oct 2010): 125–134.https://doi.org/10.1080/000368497327209Ian Smith The Economics of Church Decline in Scotland, International Journal of Social Economics 20, no.1212 (Dec 1993): 27–36.https://doi.org/10.1108/03068299310045776Brooks B. Hull, Frederick Bold Towards an Economic Theory of the Church, International Journal of Social Economics 16, no.77 (Jul 1989): 5–15.https://doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000000444Shoshana Neuman Religious observance within a human capital framework: theory and application, Applied Economics 18, no.1111 (Jul 2006): 1193–1202.https://doi.org/10.1080/00036848600000072Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana Neuman Economic behavior, marriage and religiosity, Journal of Behavioral Economics 15, no.1-21-2 (Mar 1986): 71–85.https://doi.org/10.1016/0090-5720(86)90059-8Holley Ulbrich, Myles Wallace Church attendance, age, and belief in the afterlife: Some additional evidence, Atlantic Economic Journal 11, no.22 (Jul 1983): 44–51.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02303367F. Reed Johnson The Mormon Church as a Central Command System, Review of Social Economy 37, no.11 (Apr 1979): 79–94.https://doi.org/10.1080/00346767900000006 Ronald G. Ehrenberg Household Allocation of Time and Religiosity: Replication and Extension, Journal of Political Economy 85, no.22 (Oct 2015): 415–423.https://doi.org/10.1086/260573

Legislative Size and Voting Rules

Previous articleNext article No AccessLegislative Size and Voting RulesW. Mark Crain and Robert D. TollisonW. Mark Crain Search for more articles by this author and Robert D. Tollison Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 6, Number 1Jan., 1977 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467569 Views: 8Total views on this site Citations: 11Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1977 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:George R. Crowley The Law of 1/n Revisited: Distributive Politics, Legislature Size, and the Costs of Collective Action, Southern Economic Journal 86, no.22 (Jul 2019): 667–690.https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12388Bernard Grofman, Thomas Brunell, Scott L. Feld Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent, Public Choice 152, no.1-21-2 (May 2012): 147–161.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9859-yKeith L. Dougherty, Julian Edward Conclusion, (Feb 2011): 97–113.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0_7Andreas P. Kyriacou Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union, European Journal of Law and Economics 27, no.22 (Dec 2008): 143–158.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-008-9086-2Mark Thornton, Marc Ulrich Constituency Size and Government Spending, Public Finance Review 27, no.66 (Aug 2016): 588–598.https://doi.org/10.1177/109114219902700602W. MARK CRAIN, ROBERT D. TOLLISON, THOMAS H. DEATON The Price of Influence in an Interest-Group Economy, Rationality and Society 3, no.44 (Nov 2016): 437–449.https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463191003004004Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen, Scott L. Feld Thirteen theorems in search of the truth, Theory and Decision 15, no.33 (Sep 1983): 261–278.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125672 Janet Kiholm Smith Production of Licensing Legislation: An Economic Analysis of Interstate Differences, The Journal of Legal Studies 11, no.11 (Oct 2015): 117–137.https://doi.org/10.1086/467695Kenneth Koford Optimal voting rules under uncertainty, Public Choice 38, no.22 (Jan 1982): 149–165.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127716 W. Mark Crain Cost and Output in the Legislative Firm, The Journal of Legal Studies 8, no.33 (Oct 2015): 607–621.https://doi.org/10.1086/467624 W. Mark Crain , and Robert D. Tollison Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Perspective, The Journal of Legal Studies 8, no.11 (Oct 2015): 165–175.https://doi.org/10.1086/467605

The Effect of Broadcasting on Political Campaign Spending: An Empirical Investigation

Previous articleNext article No AccessCommunicationsThe Effect of Broadcasting on Political Campaign Spending: An Empirical InvestigationBurton A. Abrams, and Russell F. SettleBurton A. Abrams Search for more articles by this author , and Russell F. Settle Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 84, Number 5Oct., 1976 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/260498 Views: 14Total views on this site Citations: 13Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1976 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Dmitry Shapiro, Arthur Zillante Contribution Limits and Transparency in a Campaign Finance Experiment, Southern Economic Journal 84, no.11 (Apr 2017): 98–119.https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12220Enrique García Viñuela, Joaquín Artés Caselles Reforming campaign finance in the nineties: a case study of Spain, European Journal of Law and Economics 25, no.33 (Feb 2008): 177–190.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-008-9044-zJoaquín Artés, Enrique García Viñuela Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an empirical analysis, Public Choice 133, no.1-21-2 (May 2007): 41–55.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9176-7Gil S. Epstein, Raphaël Franck Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections, Public Choice 131, no.3-43-4 (Jan 2007): 469–489.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9130-0 W. Mark Crain , and Brian L. Goff Televising Legislatures: An Economic Analysis, The Journal of Law and Economics 29, no.22 (Oct 2015): 405–421.https://doi.org/10.1086/467125Gregory A. Caldeira, Samuel C. Patterson Bringing home the votes: Electoral outcomes in state legislative races, Political Behavior 4, no.11 (Jan 1982): 33–67.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987118W. P. Welch Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model, Public Choice 36, no.22 (Jan 1981): 209–234.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123781Burton A. Abrams Political power and the market for governors, Public Choice 37, no.33 (Jan 1981): 521–529.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133749W. P. Welch The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups, Public Choice 35, no.11 (Jan 1980): 97–120.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00154752William A. Luksetich, William B. Riley The effects of economic factors on presidential elections: 1900–1972, Journal of Behavioral Economics 7, no.22 (Dec 1978): 11–25.https://doi.org/10.1016/0090-5720(78)90003-7Burton A. Abrams, Russell F. Settle Broadcasting and the political campaign spending “Arms Race”, Journal of Broadcasting 21, no.22 (May 2009): 153–162.https://doi.org/10.1080/08838157709363825Burton A. Abrams, Russell F. Settle A modest proposal for election reform, Public Choice 28, no.11 (Dec 1976): 37–53.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718456Russell F. Settle, Buron A. Abrams The determinants of voter participation: A more general model, Public Choice 27, no.11 (Sep 1976): 81–89.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718949

Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Unionization in the United States

State right-to-work laws, the subject of considerable controversy in the industrial relations field, typically state that no person will be required to become a union member or, conversely, be required to abstain from union membership as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment. Little hard evidence exists on the effect of right-to-work laws. Meyers (1955) concludes that in Texas the law does not appear to have had a noticeable impact on union strength. Kuhlman (1955) finds that the Virginia law has caused little change in hiring practices, and he cites lack of enforcement as a major cause. Novit (1969), in examining Indiana as the only state to pass a right-to-work law and subsequently repeal it, argues that the law was ineffective because unions found ways to circumvent its restrictions. During the period 1957-65 when the law was in force in Indiana, there was a dramatic increase in the agency shop which allows nonunion workers but which requires all employees to pay union dues. A Fortune (1957) survey of employers and union leaders in states with right-to-work laws concluded that the laws had little effect on overall union strength. In many states the laws were not being enforced, and in some instances employers were unwilling or unable to avoid de facto union shops. For example, in Arizona it was reported that the