Southeast Asian States Research Articles

The protection of submarine cables in Southeast Asia: The security gap and challenges and opportunities for regional cooperation

This article argues that Southeast Asian states’ efforts to promote resilience on submarine cables should move beyond facilitating cable deployment and repair to encompass cooperation on the protection of submarine cables from intentional damage given recent incidents highlighting the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure. While protection of submarine cables from damage (routine or non-routine) requires a broad range of legal and policy measures taken by states, industry and other relevant stakeholders, this article focuses on intentional damage to submarine cables and the measures highlighted in the 2023 General Assembly Resolution on Oceans and Law of the Sea, namely, cooperative measures by states aimed at the detection, prevention and suppression of threats to submarine cables consisting of (1) monitoring; (2) prevention and response; (3) the enhanced sharing of information; and (4) the adoption of national laws on the prosecution of offenders. The analysis views intentional damage to submarine cables through the lens of maritime security and examines challenges and opportunities for regional cooperation between Southeast Asian states on these four measures. It also explores the role that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the primary intergovernmental organization in the region, can play in facilitating cooperation on the protection of submarine cables, and makes recommendations on areas of possible cooperation on the protection of submarine cables.

Charting waters: the private sector’s evolving governance role in Southeast Asian maritime security

ABSTRACT Southeast Asian states are frequently viewed as jealously guarding their sovereignty and unwilling to delegate authority to multilateral organisations or private actors. In the contemporary response to regional piracy and armed robbery at sea (PAR), however, insurers and shippers have come to occupy a central governance role while the fortunes of private security actors (PSAs) have declined. Why? This paper conducts a qualitative case study analysis examining the evolving role of shipping and insurance companies and PSAs in the development and implementation of anti-PAR policies in Southeast Asia today. It argues that while the role of PSAs has diminished due to growing regional governance capacities, regional countries and multilateral regulatory frameworks have enlisted insurers and shippers as governance stakeholders, elevating them from beneficiaries of good order at sea to active shapers of this maritime order. The diverging experiences of PSAs and insurers/shippers demonstrate that the regulatory power relationship between states and private actors is not necessarily zero-sum as the role of insurers and shippers has grown even as state capacities have expanded. Ultimately, the paper illustrates the need to go beyond state- and PSA-centric analyses of maritime governance mechanisms in contemporary Southeast Asia.

A tale of two Southeast Asian states: media governance and authoritarian regimes in Singapore and Vietnam

Political scientists have crafted intricate taxonomies to classify nations beyond liberal democracy, positioning these societies along an authoritarian continuum. Despite the pivotal role of journalists in accelerating political dynamics, there exists a lack of comparative research on media governance in these regimes. Consequently, this study scrutinizes the media governance ecosystems in Vietnam and Singapore. Vietnam is a one-party authoritarian state, whereas Singapore represents a hybrid political system. However, both countries exhibit a stable and uninterrupted rule by the respective ruling party. Our research uncovers the nuances of Singapore’s media regulation, which embeds trusted stakeholders with financial interests in key press roles to reinforce the implicit political norms. Conversely, Vietnam employs a more direct, coercive, and state-centric approach. Media actors in both nations occasionally test the boundaries of acceptable discourses, with each government’s responses being shaped by specific contexts and broader history. Reforms in Vietnam, embracing privatization and commercialization, mirror Singapore’s integration of capitalism, public ownership, and commercial interests when governing media. These findings highlight diverse yet effective authoritarian media governance strategies, unique features, and commonalities in both systems. Overall, media structures in these Southeast Asian countries have undergone profound evolutions towards more sophisticated regulatory tools to manage societal and political transformations.

Coming Back Down to Earth: A Grounded Look at Space Cybersecurity in Southeast Asia

This paper aims to open discussion regarding the absence of cybersecurity efforts for space systems in Southeast Asia and its implications. Although there is a consensus on the need for action, Southeast Asian states have not taken any concrete steps to address the challenge of space cybersecurity. Lacking sovereign capabilities, regulatory structures, and initiatives to tackle complex accidents that are waiting to happen, Southeast Asia is not adequately equipped to deal with the growing risk of attack on its space ecosystem. With increasing militarization of space programs, exponentially growing dominance of private sector, and reduced barriers of entry for malicious non-state actors, delaying any action for strengthening space cybersecurity can produce detrimental impact given the necessity of space sector for civil, commercial, and national sustenance in the region. Southeast Asia is in a unique position where the nascency of space sector and lack of rigid structures allows flexibility to learn, translate, and adapt existing initiatives and frameworks. To be on a path to bridge the gap between reality and the ideal, the region should focus on articulating principles and guidelines. The author proposes realistic policy recommendations and directions Southeast Asian states and the region at-large should pursue for promoting medium and long-term sustainability and usability, and for maintaining cybersecurity of space assets.

Locating the Evolving Vietnam–India Security Partnership in Hanoi’s Hedging Strategy with Major Powers: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Vietnam has consistently strengthened its security ties with India. However, notable gaps remain in theorizing the burgeoning security partnership in the context of Hanoi’s foreign policy decision-making. Common arguments revolve around structural, material, and utility-maximizing motivations. However, these overlook the dynamism of Vietnamese foreign policy vis-à-vis the emerging structural power dynamics and the motivations behind domestic-level decision-making. While the role of structural forces has been irrefutable given Hanoi’s desire to hedge with major powers since the Cold War period, they are not enough to determine the nature, motivations, speed and scope of the Southeast Asian state’s strengthening security ties with India since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Therefore, through a neoclassical realist analysis, this article seeks to explain how enhancing security ties with India fits in Hanoi’s overarching hedging strategy since the mid-twentieth century in ways beyond utility-maximizing models.

From poppy to pill: A comprehensive strategy to combat illicit synthetic drug production in Southeast Asia

AbstractThe production of illicit synthetic drugs has undergone a significant shift from China to the Golden Triangle, profoundly impacting Southeast Asia's legal systems, drug enforcement and public health. This paper reviews the production, distribution and use of illicit synthetic drugs in the region, explaining their alignment with regulatory policies in China and Southeast Asia. The public health effects resulting from the increased production and use of synthetic drugs in Southeast Asia are reviewed, emphasizing the importance of public health protections such as harm reduction, treatment and rehabilitation. This study also discusses legal mechanisms to enhance control over illicit drug activities, mainly compound‐wide legislative prohibitions targeting present and future fentanyl and methamphetamine analogues. Moreover, it underscores the urgency for collaborative efforts between China and Southeast Asian states to mitigate the influence of Chinese cartels operating in the region. By elucidating the multifaceted challenges posed by the shifting drug production landscape, this paper highlights the importance of a comprehensive approach encompassing regulatory, law enforcement and public health measures.

The Effect of Thailand’s Subcultures on Other Southeast Asia States’ Countercultures

Southeast Asia (SEA) is geographically divided into two sub-regions, mainland and insular. This region consists of 11 states that consistently oppose social liberal changes and uphold traditional values. Conservatism in politics, economy and society, including the legal realm, is always favoured in this region. However, recent developments in Thailand could test the conservative beliefs and practices in this region. In June 2022, Thailand decriminalised the cultivation and consumption of cannabis. This new law allows people in Thailand to consume marijuana edibles, marijuana-infused drinks and use marijuana for medical purposes. This is not the first time Thailand has liberalised its laws. For example, unlike other SEA countries, Thailand does not regulate the use clothing in private spaces; therefore, there has been a significant increase in the number of clothing-optional resorts in Thailand over recent years. Meanwhile, in 2015, Thailand became the first SEA country to recognise and protect the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) individuals. Such laws and tolerance have now become part of Thailand's practices and subculture but remain taboo in other SEA states. Hence, this research has investigated the impact of developments in Thailand’s subculture on the SEA sub-regions, with a particular focus on cannabis law reform. Therefore, this research addresses the primary research question: in the context of ‘weed tourism’, could Thailand's recent cannabis culture impact other Southeast Asian countries? Due to the infancy of this research, a qualitative and digital ethnographical research method was chosen. The thematic analysis was adopted from the secondary government-published data by eliciting key themes. The findings revealed that weed tourism activities would encourage the people in this region to understand, respect, or even practice Thailand's subculture themselves. The mainland states may tend to accept and observe Thailand's cannabis subculture in their states. However, the insular states will not accept such subcultures and will always consider such activities as countercultural.

Asian conceptions of international order: what Asia wants

Abstract How do major Asian states regard the current international security order? Do they agree or disagree among themselves? This is an introduction to a special section on ‘Asian conceptions of international order: what Asia wants’. It draws on articles analysing the stances of China, India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam towards the existing international security order usually described as a liberal international order (LIO). It argues that Asian states substantially support the main constitutive and regulatory norms and institutions of the LIO, but they worry that the LIO does not consistently honour these norms. Asians disagree on the centrality of political liberalism, but even Japan and South Korea, the most liberal states, are uncomfortable with strident criticism, punishment and the exclusion of less liberal states. Asians also disagree on the role of US alliances: some are strongly supportive, some are ambivalent and some are negative. Finally, Asians disagree on how they voice dissatisfaction. Japan and South Korea supplement existing norms and institutions as a way of transcending the limitations of the LIO; south-east Asian states promote ASEAN's mediatory role for peace and security above and beyond existing global arrangements; and Indonesia, India and China want to move from being norm takers to becoming norm shapers. The introduction ends with six policy implications.

Southeast Asian States’ Approaches to Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution

This paper conducts a comparative analysis of three cases - Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam - to examine the distinctive features of Southeast Asian states’ involvement in peacekeeping. These cases provide representative insights into the motivations and experiences of regional states that joined UN peacekeeping operations at different historical junctures: Indonesia in the 1950s, Thailand in the 1990s, and Vietnam in the 2000s. By identifying the common and unique aspects of this engagement, the authors argue that Southeast Asian nations’ approaches to peacekeeping are deeply rooted in the values that underpin their foreign and domestic policies. Appealing to these values, Southeast Asian states contribute conceptual innovations to existing peacekeeping models, which are predominantly based on Western perspectives. By generalizing the peacekeeping experiences of Southeast Asian states, this paper fills a gap between broader publications that focus on Asian peacekeeping practices and single-country studies. The research underscores that Southeast Asian states, following a challenging period of decolonization and nation-building in the framework imposed by the Westphalian international relations system, have been trying to infuse their own approaches into the Westernized realm of international interaction. Since the 1950s, several regional states have participated in UN peacekeeping operations. The involvement of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in resolving the Cambodian conflict in the late 1980s and the Thailand - Cambodia settlement in 2008-2011 has stimulated the development of regional peacekeeping practices. By contributing to peacekeeping operations, Southeast Asian states aspire to enhance their regional and even global influence. In certain instances, their engagement in peacekeeping has ideological, cultural or religious motivations, or stems from specific foreign and domestic policy considerations.

How regional organisation survives: ASEAN, hedging and international society

ABSTRACT How can a regional organisation survive in great power contests? This article uses the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the empirical case to address the puzzle. The inquiry is important for three reasons. First, the recent developments in world politics have shown the increasingly penetrative actions of the major powers into regional multilateral organisations. Second, looking at ASEAN, the internal cohesion and solidity of the Association's member countries over the last decade have been challenged by the competition between China and the U.S. Third, the existing literature on ASEAN regional strategic affairs has been focused on hedging as the weaker states’ agential choice to manage their relations with the stronger states. However, there is insufficient explanation of what makes sustainable Southeast Asian states’ hedging possible. Working within the English School theory of IR, this article offers two factors explaining ASEAN’s survival as a regional international society: elite diplomatic culture and great power management. The argument is that ASEAN has developed its ideas and values of intra-regional diplomatic relations and built institutions that can mitigate the damaging consequences of the U.S.–China order contestation. Furthermore, this study promotes an English School perspective on hedging based on the ASEAN case. Arguing against the realist theory of hedging, which focuses on the domestic function of foreign policy strategy, the narrow conception of national interests and the relative distribution of power at the systemic level, hedging works because of viable institutions of the regional international society oriented toward constructing and preserving order .

Go-betweens and competitors. The Japanese residents in Southeast Asia at the crossroads between communities (17th century)

Abstract During the 17th century, the unprecedented opening of Japan to the outside world drew hundreds of Japanese to travel to and settle in Southeast Asia. These Japanese residents, some of whom continued to maintain a strong connection with Japan, acquired a privileged position in their host societies, as merchants, officials, or soldiers. This position enabled them to occupy the central function of go-betweens in the relations that the Southeast Asian states sought to establish with foreign merchants. This paper aims to demonstrate, through a careful analysis of sources and the use of modeling, that the Japanese in Southeast Asia crossed borders in multiple ways. Not only did they move outside the borders of Japan, but through their role as go-betweens they were also at the interface between social, ethnolinguistic, and religious groups. They used this favorable situation to facilitate communication as well as to erect barriers, according to their own interests. Although migrants imported practices from Japan when they settled there, this paper argues that in order to understand the solidity of their settlement and the success they and their children experienced they should be seen as frontier actors rather than Japanese migrants.

Unpacking the hidden state via everyday stateness in Timor-Leste

ABSTRACT This study aimed to discover the sphere of the everyday state by identifying images and practices related to people’s community life in Timor-Leste. This study argues that previous research on the state, including Southeast Asian states, has been built on the power-oriented Weberian notion. Instead of focusing on the centralisation of power at the national level, this study proposes to discover the sphere of the everyday state by emphasising people’s daily experiences, particularly through an analysis of welfare, which is the moral dimension of the state. Based on Timor-Leste’s life in sucos, this study shows the everyday stateness of unveiling the relationship between state images and practices in village life. This study argues that narratives on rewards for ordeals during the Indonesian occupation and elites’ vision for prosperity illustrate what people expect from the state and images of the state at the everyday level. Furthermore, this study emphasises the activities of various public agencies to meet these expectations and indicates the significant role of village councils in managing the level of expectations.

Rise of Constabulary Maritime Agencies in Southeast Asia: Vietnam’s Paragunboat Diplomacy in the North Natuna Seas

The rising tensions in disputed waters in Southeast Asia have caused policymakers to diverge their maritime diplomatic strategy to include maritime constabulary forces. The use of coastguards and other non-military vessels are an emerging trend in the maritime diplomatic strategy of Southeast Asian states, including in the high-profile case of the North Natuna Seas, to which scholars pay little attention. This article contends that (1) contemporary maritime diplomacy in Southeast Asia positions the utilization of maritime constabulary forces (coastguards, maritime law enforcement agencies) as its primary maritime diplomatic strategy; (2) Vietnam’s coercive turn in its maritime disputed areas was a deliberate attempt to balance a coercive-cooperative stance against Indonesia in the North Natuna Seas, following its traditional coercive maritime diplomatic stance against China, and; (3) Vietnam’s utilization of maritime constabulary forces as a measure to solidify its sovereign claims coincided with the benefits of tactical military flexibility and non-escalatory means to achieve its aims in the Natuna Seas. This empirical explanatory research delves into the development of Vietnam’s coastguards and maritime law enforcement agencies by interpreting the secondary data from the Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative between 2021–2022 on cases relating to suspicious maneuvers conducted by the Vietnamese Fisheries Resource Surveillance vessels safeguarding the conduct of Vietnamese IUUF.

Exploring the Feasibility of the Taking Sides Strategy in Southeast Asian Countries -- Malaysia's Response to the US-China Conflict as an Example

Although it has been widely accepted in international relations discourse that Southeast Asian states generally adopt hedging strategies when faced with conflicts from external powers, however, this paper argues that when the intensity of confrontation and conflict between major powers exceeds the capacity threshold of small states, they tend to adopt either direct or ambiguous taking sides strategies in order to maintain their security by actively adhering to or being forced to follow a major power. According to Robert Putnam’s two-level games theory, leadership characteristics, capability threshold, state trust, structural pressure and system stability are the main factors that influence whether a small Southeast Asian country adopts a strategy of taking a side. Malaysia, for example, has adopted either direct or ambiguous taking sides strategies in response to the Sino-US conflict. By siding ambiguously with China or the US at different times, Malaysia has effectively consolidated its economic cooperation with major powers such as China and the US and gained actual economic benefits, reducing the risks and uncertainties posed to Malaysia by the great power game.

The heterarchical life and spatial analyses of the historical Buddhist temples in the Chiang Saen Basin, Northern Thailand

Social hierarchy is the most prominent framework scholars use to examine settlement structure and development in Southeast Asia's pre- and post-state eras. The concept of social heterarchy, an unfixed ranked and diversified form of social structure, is an alternative approach to examining the sociopolitical organization of early settlements in the region. However, applications of heterarchy are limited in archaeological research on the sociopolitical organization and social landscape in Southeast Asian state societies. This paper incorporates space syntax and GIS angular and viewshed analyses to understand how sociopolitical interactions were arranged through the spatial configurations of the historical Buddhist temples in Chiang Saen, Thailand. This paper explores the complex interactions between various historical Chiang Saen social and religious groups through their temple spaces across time. Temple spatial characteristics indicate heterarchical forms of organization—evidenced by the hybrid and nonhierarchical temple spatial patterns characterized by open accessibility and integrated and symmetrical organization of spaces—co-existed with hierarchical relationships from the 13th to 17th century. The approach discussed here provides a better understanding of the multiscale relationships and interactions among sociopolitical groups in the historical communities in Chiang Saen, enabling a broader view that can embrace the co-occurrence of hierarchical and heterarchical forms of governance.

Southeast Asian States Have Their Own Views on the Ukraine War

Southeast Asian States Have Their Own Views on the Ukraine War Jeffrey Reeves (bio) Just as Southeast Asia has emerged as the center of gravity for the countries of the global West's respective Indo-Pacific strategies, so too has the region become a priority area for Western diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the start of the conflict, the United States, in particular, has lobbied Southeast Asian states and the secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn Russia's aggression and to comply with Western sanctions against Moscow. In May 2022, for example, the Biden administration raised the Ukraine war in discussions with Southeast Asian leaders at their summit in Washington and tried to insert language in a joint U.S.-ASEAN vision statement criticizing Russia's militarism, ultimately having to settle instead for more vague language on support for territorial sovereignty and international law.1 Similarly, in 2022, the entire Western cohort of the G-20 pressured then host Indonesia to include language criticizing Russia's invasion in the group's joint statement. According to one European sous-sherpa involved in the statement's drafting, China and India also partially supported this language, which therefore made it possible to include.2 In at least one instance, however, European leaders were unable to bring their Southeast Asian counterparts on side with their criticism of Russia. In a December 2022 joint statement following an EU-ASEAN summit, negotiators failed to draft a common critique of Russia's actions.3 Neither have Western leaders had much success in securing Southeast Asian state support in condemnation of the war at the bilateral level, aside from Singapore, which is unique in the region for its relative acceptance [End Page 55] of Western views on the Ukraine war. Indeed, for all the West's efforts to propagate a distinctly critical narrative of Russia in Southeast Asia, regional media, scholarship, and leadership remain either noncommittal to the idea of Russian censure or sympathetic to what they perceive as Russia's strategic logic. As the Ukraine war passed its one-year anniversary in February 2023, Southeast Asian states were decidedly less interested in the war and in criticizing Russia than before. Although in a March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution eight ASEAN members voted to condemn Russia (Vietnam and Laos abstained), polling now shows that Southeast Asian states lead the world in their disinterest toward the war.4 Large majorities of the public in Thailand (60%) and Malaysia (56%) and sizable numbers in Singapore (44%) and Indonesia (48%) believe that the war is not their business and that their states should not interfere.5 Far from being a region that is sympathetic to Western narratives on the Ukraine war, Southeast Asia stands out for its perceived detachment from the conflict. How can one explain Southeast Asian states' apathy toward the war at a time that stands out in many ways as a high-water mark for Western states' attention? While the diversity within and between Southeast Asian states makes it nearly impossible to answer this question comprehensively in short form, there are several trends and characteristics across the region that provide some degree of insight. First, there is a clear lack of consensus on the origins, strategic direction, and global impact of the Russia-Ukraine war among Southeast Asian states and within ASEAN. Second, most Southeast Asian states remain open to and interested in maintaining economic, political, and social ties with Russia despite Western pressure to limit or restrict engagement. Third, Southeast Asian states are, in general, more cynical about Western intentions toward the war than other states, particularly with respect to Washington's proclivity to use the conflict to justify the further isolation of China and NATO's attempt to use the conflict to expand its influence in Asia. In this essay, the author will draw on polling data, official statements, media, and scholarship from across Southeast Asia to detail regional states' contemporary views on the Ukraine war and demonstrate that Southeast Asian states are generally less concerned about Russia's invasion [End Page 56] of Ukraine than their European and North American counterparts, more critical of the war's...

Navigating great power competition: a neoclassical realist view of hedging

Abstract Contrary to predictions that smaller powers will balance against or bandwagon with external threats, Southeast Asian states are hedging by deepening their security cooperation with both the United States and China. Prevailing accounts of hedging do not adequately explain the persistence of such policy choices given growing threat perceptions of China and mounting bipolar pressures. After considering the limitations of existing theories, this article contends that a neoclassical realist approach to hedging better integrates the domestic and international factors that inform decision-makers’ preferences. It operationalizes this theoretical framework in three case studies: Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. A neoclassical realist approach takes the role of individual perceptions and bureaucracies seriously, without dismissing the significance of variables identified by neorealism, including security threats, treaty alliances, and economic benefits. Ultimately, a more complete and accurate understanding of what continues to propel hedging in Southeast Asian states can mitigate the risks of great power conflict.

Anthony J. Langlois, Sexuality and Gender Diversity Rights in Southeast Asia.

In Sexuality and Gender Diversity Rights in Southeast Asia, Anthony J. Langlois offers new perspectives on the nature of implementation of laws, the necessity of rights claiming and the prevalence of violence and discrimination around the lives of LGBTIQ+ people. This book is a call for new public policy and social norms to be (re)formed in Southeast Asian regions for those who are sexually non-conforming, and hence, are treated as second (read lower) class citizens. On the face of rapid socio-political changes and multiple preventive measures taken by the international human rights regime, the book argues that “most Southeast Asian states do not recognise the need for such rights” (1). However, in response to such incapacitated geo-political frameworks, this book considers many civil organisations and their political participation in rights claiming for the “people of diverse sexual orientation, gender identity expression and sex characteristics (SOGIESC)”. This book also attempts to connect the Southeast Asian LGBTIQ+ rights claiming movements to a larger international human rights regime.

Temple diplomacy and India’s soft power: a cultural approach to diplomacy in Southeast Asian States

ABSTRACT India’s pursuit of a position within the structure of Southeast Asian States has seen its most extensive ‘soft power’ campaign in all probability. One of the most effective forms of these soft power campaigns is its cultural diplomacy invoked through a shared cultural heritage with the Southeast Asian States. This cultural diplomacy takes the form of a multitude of instruments. However, the instrument of temple restoration as a form of cultural diplomacy is rarely analyzed irrespective of its steady presence in the last decades. This article is an attempt to fill in the gaps between the understanding of soft power and cultural diplomacy through temple restorations. The authors in this article examine India’s restoration of temples across the Southeast Asian States as a form of its cultural diplomacy and analyzes the effectiveness of the same as an instrument of soft power. In the first section, the authors examine the concept of ‘soft power’ and India’s efforts in the exercise of the same through the restoration of temples. In the second section, the author analyzes India’s exercise and development of ‘soft power’ with specific reference to how Buddhism enables India to develop its relations with Southeast Asian States. In the third section, the author examines whether India’s cultural diplomacy through its restoration of temples has actually had a positive impact in developing India’s relations with other Southeast Asian States. Finally, the authors analyze whether there is any merit to a continuation of such measures of its cultural diplomacy as an instrument of its soft power.

Political & Cultural Synthesis: A New Paradigm of Southeast Asia

According to Croissant & Lorenz, Southeast Asia as a region is an extraordinarily diverse collection of states, which vary widely in history, demographics, culture, economy, political systems, and the political challenges they face. Geographically, Southeast Asia is divided into an insular or maritime region, comprising Brunei, Indonesia, parts of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste, and a mainland or continental part, including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Malay Peninsula, and Vietnam (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018). Political and cultural synthesis can be seen in the way that Southeast Asian states have adapted to various external influences and internal challenges over time. Political and cultural synthesis can also be seen in the way that Southeast Asian societies have developed their forms of nationalism, identity, and civil society that reflect their diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds. The paper argues that political and cultural synthesis is a key feature and process of Southeast Asia, which is the result of the historical interactions and influences among different religions, cultures, and regions within and outside Asia. The paper analyzes various examples of cultural synthesis in Southeast Asian literature and cinema, and how they reflect and contribute to the diversity and complexity of the region. The text argues that this is a key feature and process of Southeast Asia, which is the result of the historical interactions and influences among different religions, cultures, and regions within and outside Asia. The text analyzes various examples of cultural synthesis in Southeast Asian literature and cinema, and how they reflect and contribute to the diversity and complexity of the region. Southeast Asia is divided into an insular or maritime region, comprising Brunei, Indonesia, parts of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste, and a mainland or continental part, including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Malay Peninsula, and Vietnam.