Southeast Asia Policy Research Articles

Contribution of the Alive & Thrive-UNICEF advocacy efforts to improve infant and young child feeding policies in Southeast Asia.

Evaluating the impact of advocacy for policy change presents many challenges. Recent advances in the field of evaluation, such as contribution analysis (CA), offer guidance on how to make credible claims regarding such impact. The purposes of this article are (a) to detail the application of CA to assess the contribution of an advocacy initiative to improve infant and young child feeding policies and (b) to present the emergent theory of change and contribution story of how progress was achieved. An evaluation applying developmental evaluation and CA was conducted on the Alive & Thrive (A&T)–UNICEF initiative in seven Southeast Asian countries to document the extent to which policy objectives were achieved and identify key drivers of policy change. A contribution story was developed based on these experiences. The advocacy approach, which involved a four‐part process, contributed directly to (a) set the agenda of various actors and (b) create a strategic group; and indirectly to (a) set and maintain the issue on the agenda at all stages of the policy cycle, (b) support the government to carry out a set of critical tasks, and (c) extend commitment. All of this helped to achieve progress towards policy change. External influences were at play. The flexibility of A&T allowed key actors to utilize the positive external influences and address some of the negative ones through developing responsive strategies mitigating their effects. The emerging contribution story supports that A&T–UNICEF initiative contributed to the progress achieved in the participating countries.

Sailing Together or Ships Passing in the Night? India and the United States in Southeast Asia

Sailing Together or Ships Passing in the Night?India and the United States in Southeast Asia Walter C. Ladwig III (bio) and Anit Mukherjee (bio) keywords india, united states, southeast asia, security architecture [End Page 51] executive summary This article examines the significant congruence of U.S. and Indian interests in Southeast Asia and assesses both the prospects and constraints that New Delhi and Washington face in coordinating their policies toward the region. main argument Political leaders and analysts have described U.S.-India relations as a global partnership with the potential to shape the future security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. As is widely acknowledged, the two countries' extraregional interests align most closely in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, this article examines the potential for and limitations of U.S. and Indian cooperation in the region to achieve shared aims. Extensive diplomatic consultations between the two countries have led to a significant convergence in their positions on regional security challenges. Active cooperation, however, remains constrained by a number of factors, including India's need to prioritize foreign policy challenges closer to home, concerns about provoking China, and a discomfort among countries in Southeast Asia regarding the idea of a joint U.S.-India approach toward the region. Due to these limitations, U.S.-India policies in Southeast Asia are expected to continue to operate in parallel instead of becoming a joint endeavor. policy implications • The U.S. and India, which are at the initial stages of a cooperative approach to Southeast Asia, should intensify their diplomatic and military exchanges and establish a dedicated forum to share views and information on political and security developments in the region. • Strengthening the regional security architecture should be a major focus of Indo-U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia. In particular, they should concentrate on assisting the creation of a region-wide maritime domain awareness system, as well as working in parallel to develop the capacity of partner militaries. • Connectivity and infrastructure projects should be a renewed focus of Indian and U.S. efforts in the region, in partnership with like-minded third countries such as Japan. [End Page 52] The transformation in U.S.-India relations from alienation during the Cold War to a robust strategic partnership is one of the most significant geopolitical development of recent decades. In June 2017, at Prime Minister Narendra Modi's first meeting with President Donald Trump, the pair "resolved to expand and deepen the strategic partnership between the two countries and advance common objectives," most notably "promoting stability across the Indo-Pacific region."1 How likely is it that these two countries can actually cooperate and where is such cooperation most likely to happen? Across the subregions of the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia would appear to be an area where the transformation of Indo-U.S. strategic ties would have the most significant implications. For India, Southeast Asia is the most geographically proximate subregion and the focus of its efforts to both "look east" and "act east." For the United States, Southeast Asia historically has been a region where Washington's attention has ebbed and flowed.2 Under the Obama administration, however, both individual Southeast Asian nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole received enhanced attention at the highest levels. A decade ago, the idea of the United States and India working together in Southeast Asia would have appeared far-fetched. Due to a growing recognition of the congruence of their interests in the region, however, the two countries are increasingly articulating common diplomatic positions on key security challenges. Most prominently, the joint statement made after the Modi-Trump summit in 2017 addressed the maritime disputes in the South China Sea and reiterated "the importance of respecting freedom of navigation, overflight, and commerce throughout the region."3 This high-profile diplomatic signal had been anticipated by some analysts who have long speculated about the close fit between the U.S. "rebalance" to Asia and India's "Act East" policy.4 Indeed, according to former U.S. defense secretary Ashton Carter, the United States focusing westward and India acting to its east have resulted in a "strategic [End Page 53] handshake" between the...

Interventions to Improve Micronutrient Status of Women of Reproductive Age in Southeast Asia: A Narrative Review on What Works, What Might Work, and What Doesn't Work.

Objectives Toprovide an overview of nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions that could improve micronutrient status of women of reproductive age. Methods This narrative review has a special focus on Southeast Asia, as the work was undertaken within the framework of the SMILING (Sustainable Micronutrient Interventions to controL deficiencies and Improve Nutrition status and General health in Southeast Asia) project. ResultsIn order for new interventions to become accepted, comprehension and interpretation of potential impact of different strategies by policymakers and non-nutritionists is needed. By presenting a wide overview of strategies, and discussing the context and current consensus on these strategies, the review aims to help with the formulation of new recommendations for national programs in Southeast Asia. ConclusionsCurrent policies in Southeast Asia to improve micronutrient status of women of reproductive age are focused too much on single micronutrient supplementation for pregnant women (iron and folic acid supplements). A more holistic approach, including both nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions, is needed.

Foreign Investment and the Middle Income Trap in Southeast Asia

This article focuses on the post-colonial catch-up by Southeast Asian nations with developed countries. The article offers an analysis of the nature and causes of the middle income trap in Southeast Asia. It discusses various interpretations of this concept, concluding with the dichotomy between laissez-faire and interventionist development strategies. Empirical evidence is provided from the automotive industry in Malaysia and Thailand. Two rival explanations of the lack of strong interventionist policies in Southeast Asia are given, one stressing the weakness of political pressure on national governments, the other linked up with historical patterns of ethnic specialization and division. The argument draws on secondary sources and reflects on implications for the study of Indonesian economic history in the colonial era.

Reenergizing the Russia‐ASEAN Relationship: The Eurasian Opportunity

While Russia’s policy in Southeast Asia (SEA) encounters serious deficiencies, in 2016, plans to raise the Russia‐ASEAN relationship to the level of strategic partnership were announced at the top level. The puzzle is how cooperation between Russia and ASEAN in Eurasia can lay the foundation for their strategic partnership. The article gives insights into Russia’s policy in SEA through the prism of ASEAN prospective plans, traces the increase in bilateral cooperation in Eurasia, and assesses the potential of the ASEAN‐SCO‐EAEU format and its implications for Russia’s policy in SEA. The authors argue that the Russia‐ASEAN strategic partnership will be premised upon their cooperation in Greater Eurasia, which will give a strong impetus to Russia’s policy in SEA. The article identifies the reasons behind premising the planned Russia‐ASEAN strategic partnership on Greater Eurasia’s foundation, the obstacles the parties will have to overcome, and the impact of this cooperation upon Russia‐ASEAN connectivity.

(Un)framing Language Policy and Reform in Southeast Asia

This article explores language policy in Southeast Asia, focussing on two recent state and other institutional reform efforts and directions: one towards English, and the other towards the mother tongues. However, what needs to be highlighted is the bifurcated nature of language policy reforms in the region. That is, these two policy directions are rarely conceptualized together. In terms of implementation, they are mobilized independently as if they are products of completely different phenomena. A set of broad assumptions upon which policies and policy reforms should be based must be articulated. Educational and social justice, nationalism, and global competitiveness saturate discussion on language policies in the region. With a coherent and inclusive framing of this discussion, language policies should unite – not divide – people.

The Rise of China and the Overseas Chinese by Leo Suryadinata

Reviewed by: The Rise of China and the Overseas Chinese by Leo Suryadinata Ja Ian Chong The Rise of China and the Overseas Chinese Leo Suryadinata Singapore: Yusof Ishak Institute, 2017. 278 pp. Leo Suryadinata's The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond is a very welcome addition to the discussion of ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and ethnic Chinese living beyond its borders. Suryadinata makes the case in the book that as the PRC becomes more globally prominent, it is increasingly blurring lines in its treatment of PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese overseas. This claim comes amid allegations of growing PRC efforts to mobilize ethnic Chinese communities abroad to serve its national interests, be they economic, political, or strategic. These concerns are not new and are in fact a throwback to the past. They give the book an added timeliness and importance. For much of the Cold War, ethnic Chinese communities in non-communist parts of Southeast Asia faced the suspicion of being a possible subversive fifth column for the PRC, especially if they seemed left-leaning. Such perspectives diminished as the PRC engaged in economic reform from the late 1970s, eschewed radical revolution, and passed a nationality law in 1980 clearly demarcating non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese abroad from PRC citizens. Recent reports of PRC efforts to lobby and police opinion in foreign countries using members of local ethnic Chinese communities ranging from Europe and North America to Oceania and Southeast Asia have again brought these long-dormant issues to the fore.1 This is an issue on which Suryadinata has previously written, and he provides readers a brief reminder of these themes in Chapter 3.2 [End Page 151] An Awkward Closeness Suryadinata organizes the book into four parts. Part I (Chapters 1–3) discusses the PRC's rise to prominence from the 1980s till the present, changes in ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, and the organization of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO). The OCAO is the government body responsible for managing official ties with ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, be they PRC citizens abroad or ethnic Chinese who do not hold PRC citizenship. Within these pages, Suryadinata introduces his main observation—that Beijing seems to be reverting to its older policy of reducing distinctions between PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese in foreign jurisdictions. The key motivation behind this move, according to Suryadinata, is PRC efforts to advance and protect its interests and concerns overseas. Part II (Chapters 4–8) examines how the PRC responds officially to events outside its borders that affect ethnic Chinese and PRC citizens. Each chapter contains a case where ethnic Chinese come under threat from developments outside China and assess the PRC position. Beijing's reaction to the 1998 anti-Chinese race riots in Indonesia and violence in the South Pacific, Middle East, and Africa indicates a willingness to evacuate PRC citizens, especially those who work for PRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 2014 anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam, triggered by a Beijing-initiated escalation in its maritime dispute with Hanoi, suggests that the PRC is not above placing its citizens overseas in danger for the pursuit of more important interests. However, contrasting PRC responses to incidents involving ethnic Chinese in Malaysia and Myanmar point toward an evolution in Beijing's position. Beijing responded to alleged ill-treatment of its citizens by Malaysian police in 2005 as well as political pressure, even violence, toward ethnic Chinese Myanmar citizens in the Kokang region along the PRC border in 2015 with diplomatic entreaties. Such actions resulted from Beijing's desire to maintain positive official relations with Malaysia and Myanmar. Threats against ethnic Chinese Malaysians in 2015, in comparison, saw the then-PRC ambassador to Malaysia publicly expressing an intention to protect these co-ethnics even though this was tantamount to intervention and divided local opinion. This step appears to portend an effort by Beijing to extend influence over non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese communities overseas, even at the risk of upsetting foreign governments. The next four chapters in...

From Commonwealth Responsibility to the National Interest: Australia and Post-war Decolonisation in South-East Asia

ABSTRACTThis article re-examines the drivers of post-war Australian foreign policy in South-East Asia. The central argument is that the motive of Commonwealth responsibility has not been given sufficient explanatory weight in interpreting Australia's post-war engagement with South-East Asia under both Australian Labor Party and Liberal-Country Party (Coalition) governments. The responsibility expressed by Australian policy-makers for the decolonisation of the Straits Settlements, Malayan Peninsula and British Borneo Territories cannot be adequately understood within a cold war ideological framework of anti-communism. Nor can it be explained by the instrumental logic of forward defence. The concept of responsibility is theorised as a motivation in foreign policy analysis and applied to Australian involvement with British decolonisation in South-East Asia between 1944 and 1971. The article finds that in its approach to decolonisation, Australia was driven as much by normative sentiments of responsibility to the Commonwealth as it was by instrumental calculations of cold war strategic interest. This diminished with the end of Indonesia's ‘Confrontation’ of Malaysia in 1966 and subsequent British commitment to withdraw from East of Suez. Australia's policy discourse becomes more narrowly interest-based after this, especially evident in Australia's negotiations with Malaysia and Singapore over the Five Power Defence Arrangements from 1968 to 1971.

Leo Suryadinata, The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond

华人研究国际学报Vol. 09, No. 01, pp. 105-108 (2017) 书评No AccessLeo Suryadinata, The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond代帆代帆暨南大学华侨华人研究院, 中国 Search for more papers by this author https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793724817000116Cited by:0 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2017, xi+278pp. FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Recommended Vol. 09, No. 01 Metrics History PDF download

Examining the US Rebalance in Southeast Asia after Obama

The Obama administration attempted to build its Rebalance in Southeast Asia on three pillars: economic statecraft, military-security relations, and multilateral diplomacy. The failure of the first and the limited success of the second and third pillars leave ample room for President Trump to make his mark on US policy in Southeast Asia. This article examines the implementation of the Obama administration’s policies and offers policy prescriptions for the incoming Trump administration to build on Obama’s legacy.

Mental health policies in South-East Asia and the public health role of screening instruments for depression.

The World Health Organization (WHO) South-East Asia Region, which contributes one quarter of the world's population, has a significant burden due to mental illnesses. Mental health has been a low priority in most countries of the region. Although most of these countries have national mental health policies, implementation at ground level remains a huge challenge. Many countries in the region lack mental health legislation that can safeguard the rights of people with mental illnesses, and governments have allocated low budgets for mental health services. It is imperative that concerned authorities work towards scaling up both financial and human resources for effective delivery of mental health services. Policymakers should facilitate training in the field of mental health and aim towards integrating mental health services with primary health care, to reduce the treatment gap. Steps should also be taken to develop a robust mental health information system that can provide baseline information and insight about existing mental health services and help in prioritization of the mental health needs of the individual countries. Although evidence-based management protocols such as the WHO Mental Health Gap Action Programme (mhGAP) guidelines facilitate training and scaling up of care in resource-limited countries, the identification of mental disorders like depression in such settings remains a challenge. Development and validation of brief psychiatric screening instruments should be prioritized to support such models of care. This paper illustrates an approach towards the development of a new culturally adapted instrument to identify depression that has scope for wider use in the WHO South-East Asia Region.

Contemporary education policies in Southeast Asia: common philosophical underpinnings and practices

This article examines the various education policies in Southeast Asian countries, highlighting the underlining philosophies and current practices in the region. The conceptual framework of the presentation includes key concepts such as access and equity, unity and identity, quality and relevance, efficiency and effectiveness. Each of these key concepts will be analysed using a framework consisting of key questions, guiding philosophies, policy options as well as issues and challenges. The article reviews policies relating to questions such as “who get access to what kinds of education?”, “how to widen access?”, “how to ensure success?”, “what kinds of education for a multicultural society?”, “how to promote national integration and social cohesion through education?”, “how to improve quality of education?”, “how to manage and administer the school delivery system?”. It draws examples from different countries in the SEA region to illustrate the issues and challenges in formulating and implementing contemporary education policies.

MALAYSIA’S NATIONAL LANGUAGE POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL THEORETICAL CONTEXT

This paper examines the motivations behind Malaysia’s national language policy in theoretical terms to allow the Malaysian narrative to be positioned in an international context. To do this, it applies Spolsky’s (2004) theory of what influences language policy making in contemporary nation-states, namely national ideology, the role of English in globalisation era, the nation’s sociolinguistic situation, and an interest in linguistic minority rights. The paper argues that all factors are relevant in the Malaysian context. However, the domestic sociolinguistic situation only influences policy in so far as Malaysia’s response to its ethnolinguistic minorities is limited to minimal linguistic rights in the education system. This limited acceptance of linguistic diversity continues a tradition of protecting what Malaysian law sees as the supremacy of Malay culture and language. The paper concludes with an invitation to apply this theory in the study of other nations in the region to foster a robust body of comparative data on national language policies in Southeast Asia. Keywords: Malaysia, national language policy, ethnocracy, national identity, language rightsCite as: Albury, N.J., & Aye, K.K. (2016). Malaysia’s national language policy in international theoretical context. Journal of Nusantara Studies, 1(1), 71-84.

Evolution of sustainable palm oil policy in Southeast Asia

AbstractOver the years large areas of primary and secondary forest have been cut or burned down to make way for oil palm plantations, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, the two countries which produce 80.5% of the world’s palm oil. To tackle the many complex sociopolitical issues surrounding the industry, a variety of regulations, treaties and campaigns have been developed by governments and non-governmental organisations (NGO) over the years attempting to create a more sustainable industry, partly in response to pressure from the environmental community. The roundtable on sustainable palm oil is an international non-profit that created the first sustainable palm oil certification scheme. A range of other industry and government initiatives aimed to reduce deforestation due to oil palm expansion were developed and implemented over the years. The emerging themes in the evolution of sustainable palm oil in Southeast Asia include a greater recognition of the complexity of the issue, the importance of ma...

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Russian Abstract: Для России развитие связей с Ассоциацией стран Юго-Восточной Азии (АСЕАН) имеет особое политическое и экономическое значение. Они призваны способствовать созданию благоприятных условий как для обеспечения безопасности РФ и её важнейших коммуникаций, так и для модернизации всего региона Восточной Сибири и Дальнего Востока. Одной из проблем дальнейшего развития отношений Российской Федерации со странами АСЕАН является то, что в бизнес сообществах России и стран Ассоциации нет достаточной информации друг о друге, что позволяет обеспечить участников внешнеэкономической деятельности актуальной информацией в целях продвижения российских экспортных и инвестиционных проектов. В данной работе представлен обзор внешнеэкономической деятельности и торговой политики стран Юго-восточной АзииEnglish Abstract: For Russia, the development of relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has a special political and economic importance. They are designed to help create favorable conditions for the security of Russia and its most important communications, and for the modernization of the whole region of Eastern Siberia and the Far East.One of the issues of further development of relations of the Russian Federation with the ASEAN countries is that in the business of Russia and the Association of the communities do not have sufficient information about each other, thus allowing the participants of foreign economic activity of relevant information in order to promote Russian exports and investment projects. This paper presents an overview of the foreign trade and trade policy in South-East Asia

Introduction: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia in a Changing Era

Introduction: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia in a Changing Era

The Contemporary Chinese Policy in Southeast Asia

Although the PRC has been gradually turning into a genuinely global power recently, her regional interests particularly in SEA are not shrinking. Developing relations with ASEAN in general and its member states in particular is still among the key priorities of the Chinese foreign policy. This is motivated by the interest to ensure safe and controlled buffer along China's border perimeter - "belt of peace, stability and common prosperity". At present, Chinese standing in SEA is firm. Sino-ASEAN relations are based upon mutual pragmatism. The reason for that to a great extent is a tangible trade and economic and investment cooperation. Bilateral relations in political and security as well as defense spheres have been also steadily expanding. Humanitarian ties are closely interwoven, which may help make future ASEAN elites more pro-Chinese. Nevertheless, it has been all the more evident that Southeast Asian nations are seeking to lower their current overdependence on China. Their concern are rising due to China's growing political and military and economic muscles as well as because of increasing Chinese nationalism. Unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea also impede promotion of China's influence there. In this context China turns out to be sandwiched between the necessity to uphold her national interests, on the one hand, and the goal to keep a comfort regional atmosphere for facilitating her relationship with ASEAN, on the other. Moreover, lately there has been another sound factor jeopardizing China's leadership in SEA - Washington's Asia Pacific pivot.

Food Sovereignty and Conceptualization of Agency: A Methodological Discussion

The latest food crisis hit food producers and consumers – mainly in the Global South – hard and refocused attention to the question of global food security. The food sovereignty movement contributes to the growing re-politicization of the debate on ‘how to feed the world’. From an actor-oriented perspective, the article presents a methodological reflection of the concept of food sovereignty in opposition to the concept of food security, both agendas highly relevant in terms of food policies in Southeast Asia. After framing the two concepts against the development politics and emergence of global agriculture following World War II, this paper elaborates on how actors and agency are conceptualized under the food security regime as well as by the food sovereignty movement itself. With reference to these two concepts, we discuss in which ways an actor-oriented methodological approach is useful to overcome the observed essentialization of the peasantry as well as the neglect of individual peasants and consumers as food-sovereign actors.

Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges

New Indonesian President Joko Widodo, who prefers to be known by the portmanteau Jokowi, (1) has declared that he will focus on domestic affairs, particularly improving the country's maritime infrastructure and reasserting the authority of the state, as part of broad reform programme. In these areas, he could be transformative president. However, an activist presidency in these areas, even if intended only as domestic effort, will create unintended foreign policy challenges for Indonesia, because its economic and maritime interests are so closely intertwined with those of its neighbours. Moreover, Jokowi's focus on domestic policy will likely see him delegate management of foreign affairs, including responsibility for addressing these challenges, to several key advisers. Where consensus among these advisers does not emerge, Jokowi is unlikely to intervene to settle the debate and to clarify Indonesia's position, as his predecessor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, often did when confronted with similar challenges. This article first outlines the role that President Yudhoyono played in the conduct of the country's foreign policy in order to illustrate the change in experience and focus that Jokowi represents. Second, it reviews Jokowi's statements on foreign affairs and argues that his views on Indonesia's external relations are almost entirely function of his domestic reform agenda, which emphasizes state strength and maritime affairs. Third, it identifies the key people providing advice to Jokowi on foreign policy, and how they might influence his views. Finally, it explores how this context might affect the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region, highlighting the dilemma of the Indonesian position in the South China Sea. I argue throughout that Jokowi's focus on maritime affairs and questions of state sovereignty could lead to greater tensions with neighbouring states and China; and that his inexperience in foreign affairs could allow these tensions to persist in way they did not under his predecessor, thus diminishing Indonesia's regional leadership role. Yudhoyono's Departure Leaves Void When President Yudhoyono vacated the State Palace in October 2014, he left void in the country's foreign policymaking system. As president, Yudhoyono energetically pursued vision of Indonesia's place in the world as rising power, and of himself as globe-trotting statesman respected and admired by his peers. In his pursuit of this vision, he took great care to cultivate opinion abroad, while minimizing the opportunity for institutional competition over foreign policy among his ministries at home. The presidency was not Yudhoyono's first turn at foreign Throughout his long army career, Yudhoyono demonstrated keen interest in foreign affairs. Early in his presidency, as he strove to position himself as an international statesman and foreign policy intellectual, he adopted and promoted foreign policy vision defined by the country's identity as large Muslim majority democracy. (2) By the start of his second term, he had refined his view of Indonesia's place in the international system as country with a thousand friends and zero enemies and an all directions foreign policy. (3) He sought to improve ties with both the United States and China, but also made show of diplomacy with Iran and North Korea. (4) He pursued warmer relations with neighbouring countries, including Australia, Singapore and Malaysia, resisting demands from the bureaucracy and legislature that he take harder line in various disputes. (5) In implementing his foreign policy agenda, Yudhoyono continued institutional reforms begun by his predecessor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, that consolidated foreign policymaking in the foreign ministry and the State Palace, thereby limiting institutional competition over foreign policy between various ministries. …

Thailand's Economic Integration with Neighboring Countries and Possible Connectivity with South Asia

Thailand's increasing importance as a regional co-production base and as an intra-regional trade and border trade hub is due mainly to recent changes in its economic structure, namely, the lack of operational workers, rises in wages, and increases in outward foreign direct investment (FDI), together with a change of regional policies in Southeast Asia. As a result, improvements in physical connectivity, trade facilitation, energy cooperation, and financing infrastructure play an important role within an ongoing Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework. Extending connectivity to South Asia could also complement the current promotion of regional trade and regional production networks. This paper reviews the current stages of Thailand's intra-regional trade, physical connectivity, trade facilitation, energy cooperation, and infrastructure funding as there are projects planned in these areas that could impact Thailand and its links to Southeast Asia and beyond to South Asia. However, Thailand's political instability impedes the progress and implementation of such projects. The paper also examines the current financing mechanism of Thailand's infrastructure projects that relies heavily on public spending. The authors propose strategies to promote Thailand's physical infrastructure, trade facilitation, and energy cooperation with the mainland countries of Southeast Asia and South Asia.