Different explanations have been presented regarding the recent economic crisis in South Korea. After critically evaluating these explanations, the article modifies and refines the dominant model, the mea culpa paradigm, to develop a political, interactive and integrative explanation of the crisis. The economic breakdown during the Kim Young Sam regime in Korea (1993–98) was mainly due to the Kim government's failure to carry out its well‐intended economic reforms, particularly chaebol reforms. The reasons for the failure of the economic reforms, in turn, consist of a set of political factors, including President Kim's distinctive leadership style encapsulated by ‘decretistic populism’, the chaebôl's effective cultural strategies of agenda denial and an anti‐reform campaign by conservative social forces. In this respect, the economic crisis in Korea is also a political crisis. The article refutes a popular interpretation within Korea that blames democracy for the economic crisis, demonstrating that there is at best a very tenuous relationship between the democratization in the country since 1987 and the economic crisis. To overcome the crisis, the current Kim Dae Jung government in Korea should avoid decretistic populism, forge and maintain a constructive alliance with civil society groups and develop a solid coalition for economic reform.
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