South China Sea Policy Research Articles

Explaining Taiwan's policies in the South China Sea, 1988–99

The current paper discusses Taiwan's policies in the South China Sea during the period 1988–99. These policies are discussed with reference to ‘realist’ and ‘non-realist’ theoretical approaches. The realist position regards Taiwan's South China Sea policies as an outcome of its relations with the People's Republic of China and the Southeast Asian countries. These policies are fashioned and implemented in a coherent way by a unitary state. Two ‘non-realist’ positions are identified. One focuses on influences from domestic political parties and party factions, bureaucratic segments and economic interests. The other emphasizes the impact of transnational alliances, mainly through oil business lobby groups allied with mainland Chinese partners. The investigation sustains much of the realist argument. It is, however, argued that party politics and bureaucratic infighting has had an independent effect on Taiwan's South China Sea policies, while the impact of oil business interests has been limited.

Taiwan's South China Sea Policy

Taiwan's South China Sea Policy

Taiwan's South China Sea Policy

Since the end of the Cold War, the potentially oil-rich Spratly (Nansha) Islands have become a flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific. The Spratlys, which consist of 230 islands, reefs, cays, and banks, are claimed wholly or in part by Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. Even though only about 30 islets in the Spratly Archipelago are above water at high tide, five of the claimants have garrisons stationed or have put up stilted structures on more than 40 islets and reefs.' The dispute involves not only several bilateral conflicts (China vs. Vietnam in 1974 and 1988; China vs. the Philippines in 1995) but also a possible conflict between two groupings: the ASEAN states (Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam) versus the non-ASEAN countries (China and Taiwan). There is a continuous debate in Taiwan over what should be the official position on the Spratlys, that is, whether Taipei should join the People's Republic of China (PRC) in refuting other claimants. Taiwan's diplomatic isolation and its inadequate power projection further complicate Taipei's South China Sea policy dilemma.

Power transition in Northeast Asia: U.S.-China security perceptions and the challenges of systemic adjustment and stability

This article argues that the rise of China and the changing North-east Asian balance of power are creating the classical adjustment problems of Great Power international relations historically associated with power transitions and that three types of misperceptions across five important issues in the Sino-American security relationship are interfering with the prospects of achieving the systemic adjustments required for long-term stability. Power transition and the rise of China are seen as potentially undermining stability in four ways: (1) by generating security dilemmas and arms races, (2) by contributing to increased incidence of conflicting security interests, (3) by aggravating South china Sea maritime disputes, and (4) by undermining Chinese domestic stability in a manner which potentially results in a hostile regime that adopts an aggressive foreign policy coming to power at some point in the future. Systemic adjustment is defined as the process by which major powers peacefully reconcile their opposing interests and is viewed as being an essential feature of stability over the long term. The article argues that three types of misperceptions concerning: (1) salient issues, (2) security interests, and (3) the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy are manifesting themselves in misunderstandings of five security issues that are impeding the systemic adjustment process. These five issues are: (1) the nature of post-cold war Sino-American security relations and international politics, (2) the role of democracy and U.S. human rights in foreign policy, (3) the significance of China’s South China Sea policy, (4) Middle East diplomacy and arms sales, and (5) nuclear weapons and arms control policy. The article concludes with a discussion of policy implications that stresses the importance of consultation and dialogue to reduce misperceptions.