South China Sea Issue Research Articles

The South China Sea and U.S. Policy Options

ABSTRACT Since the summer of 2010, the Obama administration has clearly signaled through a combination of diplomacy and greater military presence that creating rules-based stability in the South China Sea (SCS) is an important U.S. national objective. Washington has become much more involved in the day-to-day security dynamic between China and SCS littoral states—and, while remaining neutral about the merits of respective sovereignty claims, it is not neutral about assertive behavior. This stance has brought the United States to a strategic cul-de-sac when it comes to the complex SCS issues because Washington has little-to-no direct leverage on the most important issues: sovereignty, China's nine-dashed line, and fishing disputes. The article does allow that the administration does have some policy options that might play an important role in achieving its objective of a rules-based regime in the SCS that would eliminate tension and preserve long-term regional stability.

China, ASEAN, US in the South China Sea: Rebalancing the Triangle

China, ASEAN and the US remain the most significant players in the South China Sea. Relationships among the triangle set the tone for the situation in the South China Sea. In recent years, action-reaction cycle in the South China Sea has increased tension in the region, deteriorated relations between China and its neighboring countries, posed challenges for ASEAN in maintaining centrality in the regional security structure, and strengthened US determination to rebalance toward Asia. The South China Sea issue has become the bellwether for how China will rise peacefully and play by established rules, a test case for the US in sustaining its supremacy in the region and a challenger for ASEAN unity. This paper will explore the interests and policy of China, ASEAN and the US in the South China Sea, analyze the interrelationships within the triangle in recent years and envisage its implications for regional stability.

Chinese Perspectives on the U.S. Role in Southeast Asia

The United States is a long-term stakeholder in the Asia-Pacific. China recognizes that the United States is an irreplaceable “security anchor” in the entire region. Basically the U.S. role of “balancer” against any uncertainties in Southeast Asia — indispensible and tenacious — is an integral part of stability, peace, and prosperity at the regional level. Simultaneously Beijing understands the significance of close bonds between the United States and the ASEAN region — Southeast Asia needs the United States to counter-balance a rising China. Yet, in China’s perception the Obama administration’s “rebalancing” moves portend a worrying trajectory for the Sino-American strategic relationship. Diplomatically, in China’s perception, the Obama administration has continually sought to keep China cornered and subdued with regard to the South China Sea issue by aligning with Vietnam, opening new military facilities in the Philippines, and excluding China from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). From a military perspective, the United States has sought to increase its preparedness through the Air-Sea Battle concept, a response to China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy, and moves like selling advanced F-16 C/D jetfighters to Indonesia and establishing a new military base in Darwin, Australia. The ramifications of Beijing-Washington relations extend far beyond their immediate bilateral terrain, and will clearly decide the landscape of the AsiaPacific region in a much broader sense. Any balance of power system will not automatically promote the highly valuable regional economic vigour which has now spread throughout the Asia-Pacific. Enduring economic growth at the very least reduces security concerns even if it does not produce security. China, contributing substantially to regional economic prosperity, will not be alone

Divided or Together? Southeast Asia in 2012

From a regionwide lens, the dominant story of the year was ASEAN. In this forty-fifth year of ASEAN’s founding, this was perhaps one anniversary best forgotten. The failure of the organization to sign a basic communique in the July meeting in Phnom Penh and the limited traction on the code of conduct agreement with China over the contentious South China Sea issue at the East Asia Summit in November showcased the divisions among member states rather than a strengthening regional architecture. The core members of the group, led by Indonesia, had to pick up the pieces to save the organization’s face and minimize the blame game that resulted from the annual July meeting. Diplomatic efforts by Indonesia led to the publication of “ASEAN”s Six Point Principles on the South China Sea” in the meeting’s aftermath, but the

China–Myanmar Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership: A Regional Threat?

This paper analyses the China-Myanmar ‘comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’ in the framework of China's diplomacy in the post-Cold War era and concludes that the partnership has no ‘significant negative impact’ on regional relations. China pursues its partnerships with Myanmar and other states to create a ‘stable’ and ‘harmonious’ surrounding environment, itself a ‘major’ prerequisite for China's peaceful development. The author argues that China has not focused its diplomacy on Myanmar at the expense of other states; rather, he notes that in fact China established a ‘comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’ with three other ASEAN states (Vietnam in 2008, Laos in 2009, and Cambodia in 2010) before it did so with Myanmar in May 2011. The article argues that the scope and depth of China's partnerships with states such as Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are actually above that of its partnership with Myanmar. It also argues that Myanmar's strong nationalism will prevent China from, for example, building a base on Myanmar's soil. The author also asserts that China does not seek to use Myanmar as an ally to weaken or dilute ASEAN or its unity on the South China Sea issue.

Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses

This article reviews Chinese assertive behaviour towards the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea issues in 2011. The article compares and contrasts Chinese diplomatic behaviour in the period before and after the adoption by ASEAN member states and China of Guidelines for the Implementation the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in July. In the first period China aggressively asserted its claims to sovereignty by interfering with commercial fishing and oil exploration activities of vessels operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Vietnam and the Philippines. Both states resisted Chinese actions. The Philippines allocated increased funding for defence modernization, lobbied ASEAN states and shored up its alliance with the United States. Vietnam too protested Chinese action and undertook symbolic steps to defend national sovereignty. In the second period all states moved to contain South China Sea tensions from affecting their larger bilateral relations. It remains to be seen, however, if proposed confidence building measures will ameliorate Chinese assertiveness.

Vietnam's Response to a Rising China: The Re-emergence of the South China Sea Issue

Vietnam's Response to a Rising China: The Re-emergence of the South China Sea Issue

The South China Sea Workshop Process and Taiwan's Participation

Since 1990, 19 Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea have been held. The Workshop, attended by Government and military officials in their private capacities as well as by academics mainly from the littoral States of the South China Sea (SCS) and from the non-SCS countries, is a continuing dialogue process that aims to manage potential conflicts by exploring areas of cooperation among the littoral States in the SCS area. It is also the only regional dialogue mechanism dealing specifically with the SCS issues, where scholars and Government officials from Taiwan and China can meet regularly and exchange views. This article reviews and evaluates the SCS Workshop process and discusses Taiwan's participation in the process. In the concluding section, the adoption of the China-Taiwan South-East Asia Network for Education and Training (SEA-NET) joint project at the nineteenth SCS Workshop, a big step regarding Taiwan's participation in the Workshop process, is discussed. And it is suggested that there likely will be more cooperative measures taken by Taipei and Beijing regarding the SCS area in the future.

Rethinking the South China Sea Issue: A Perspective of Sino‐U.S. Relations

Three essential factors of international politics underlie current controversies regarding the South China Sea: sovereignty, resources and strategy. Before the 1980's, the United States maintained a completely “neutral position” towards this issue for a number of historical reasons. However, when the 1982 UNCLOS III entered into force in 1994, the South China Sea joined Taiwan and the tensions on the Korean Peninsula as one of three potential flashpoints in the Asia‐Pacific region. Since 1994, American foreign policy regarding the South China Sea underwent three stages of development: prevention–deterrence–practice. This article analyzes these changes by focusing on the development of America's Asia‐Pacific security strategy, especially one of its main outcomes: the development of the Sino‐U.S. relationship.From balance of power and geopolitical theories, in the long run, the South China Sea issue may become a global fulcrum between the U.S. and China, which probably will become a global power in the future. Even as a regional power today, it is well known that the Taiwan issue has led to conflict and competition with the U.S. for more than half a century. To avoid falling into the same old trap again as with the Taiwan issue in the past, we must prepare for a rainy day in solving the South China Sea issue, in essence, to find a balance between China's position, which represents a newcomer's demands, and international maritime law, which represents the vested interests of the international system. We need a long‐term perspective to deal with the Sino‐U.S relationship.

Cross-strait interactions on the South China Sea issues: a need for CBMs.

Recent developments in the South China Sea (SCS) and the actions expected to be taken by China and member states of ASEAN in accordance with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS have the potential to further marginalize Taiwan's role in any serious discussion on SCS issues and then deprive Taiwan of its legitimate rights and interest in the area. These developments will also force Taiwan to respond by taking more active actions for the sole purpose of safeguarding its sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in the SCS. This article discusses a number of possible confidence-building measures that could be considered for adoption by China to help engage Taiwan in the regional security dialogue process and enable Taiwan to participate in the planned joint co-operative activities in the SCS. The co-operative actions taken in the SCS area could enhance mutual trust between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea

Introduction On 4 November 2002 ASEAN signed a declaration on conduct in the South China Sea with China, which within ASEAN was regarded as a milestone. China had previously insisted on bilateral negotiations with the claimant states and had avoided multilateralism. This declaration indicated a change in China's approach towards the dispute and vindication of ASEAN's efforts to engage China in dialogue over the issue. The declaration fell short of what ASEAN had been seeking, which was a commitment to a code of conduct but, when seen against the background of prior developments, it was symptomatic of a trend towards adoption of norms in the regulation of the dispute. This article will examine the development of the South China Sea issue in two phases; in the first phase from 1987-98, China's intentions were framed in terms of the recovery of lost territories and exclusive sovereignty over the area. In the second phase from 1999 to the present, China revealed greater interest in the regulation of the dispute and became more receptive to the negotiation of norms of behaviour with ASEAN. The article will identify the shift in China's approach towards the dispute in terms of the factors influencing its receptivity to norms. It will examine the relationship between norms and foreign policy and will seek an answer to the question as to why states in China's dominant position become receptive to norms. The Importance of Norms Norms can be understood as standards or patterns of expected behaviour in particular circumstances and indicate commonly accepted preferences. Norms and rules have been used interchangeably as their meanings overlap but a rule may be regarded as a subset of a norm and an explicit statement of a preference when behaviour becomes obligatory or compulsory. Norms are required before rules and regulations are formulated and indicate areas of common understanding but a rule makes that understanding explicit, clear and precise. Not all norms become explicit and signify expected behaviour in relation to circumstances or conditions where rules may be premature or inappropriate. Kratochwil stressed that norms serve as guides to action, and are problem solving devices for ordering interaction and behaviour. (1) The value of norms lies in the benefit of predictability and the constraint of unacceptable or potentially destructive action from which all would suffer. Competition over scarce resources in international politics may result in a struggle for power and the resort to mutually destabilizing efforts to gain supremacy over others. Norms can reduce the bargaining costs of competition when they become excessive and may express common preferences for cooperation. Predictability, ordered behaviour, and the restraint of harmful action are in the interest of international actors as part of the taming of the Hobbesian state of nature. Norms are derived from the mutual expectations of the actors and offer a means to restrain behaviour to maintain the competition between them within certain tolerable parameters. Their acceptance may result in the exclusion of certain destabilizing methods of individual goal fulfilment which may rely upon force or threat. In this sense, norms may influence the conduct of foreign policy by limiting the choice of means to those considered acceptable, and which would maintain the reciprocity of ordered behaviour from which all benefit. Common norms are invoked and are often taken for granted in the joint development of scarce objects or resources and are inherent in any cooperative endeavour. An implicit or explicit agreement on norms of behaviour is the first step in the negotiation of international regimes regulating specific issue areas for which they serve as a foundation. Norms also will allow parties to negotiate their grievances and search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of common understanding, without the resort to destructive unilateral solutions. …