South-central Europe Research Articles

Subtypes of Hepatitis B Antigen among Israeli Blood Donors

Hepatitis B virus (HBV) strains among Israeli donors have been characterized for determinants d, y, w, and r. Of 60 consecutively positive donors, 78% had determinant y and 22% determinant d. Immigrants to Israel from North Africa, the Near and Middle East, and certain parts of Europe had almost exclusively determinant y of the d-y pair. Among immigrants from North Central Europe, determinant y occurred less frequently; those from South Central Europe had an intermediate level. First-generation Israelis of European background had the same frequency of determinant d as immigrants from Europe, suggesting the home as the most important site of transmission. All 25 HBV strains characterized for w and r, despite a diversity of geographic backgrounds, had only determinant w.

Sardinia and Commercial Reciprocity, 1819-38

EFORE the liberal reforms of 1848 the kingdom of Sardinia had a reputation for being hostile toward foreign trade and for failing to appreciate the potentialities of the excellent harbor and fully developed commercial life of Genoa. This criticism was well deserved for the period before 1838. In that year, however, a revolution in policy occurred during the negotiation of a commercial treaty with the United States. This is an analysis of the reasons for Sardinian commercial isolation before 1838 and for the shift in commercial policy that year. It is based primarily on the record of Sardinian relations with the United States. In 1819 Sardinia considered establishing commercial and navigation reciprocity with the United States and opened a consulate general at Philadelphia. But by 1824 this plan was abandoned in favor of commercial isolation. The negotiations at the time give the clue to Sardinia's failure to facilitate Genoese trade through governmental policy; those of 1838 reveal the reasons for the change. The shortsightedness of Sardinian officials before 1838 was not the result of any dedication to outmoded mercantilist ideas, nor was the shift in 1838 the product of conversion to laissez faire. The issue was one of political rather than economic survival. The problem of the integrity of the small state, wedged between France and Austria, had plagued the Turin government for centuries and almost all action was weighed against security. This concern led to the commercial isolation in the period before 1838. It affected the treaty negotiations of that year, obstructed the fulfillment of the commitments made to the United States in the treaty, and plagued as well the liberal government of Cavour. When in 1819 Sardinia assigned one of the experienced men in her consular service, Gaspard Deabbate, to Philadelphia to negotiate commercial and navigation reciprocity, she did so with a sense of urgency.1 The reason for haste was the peculiar position in which the Sardinian government found itself after it acquired the republic of Genoa in 1815. Since the kingdom already dominated the Alpine passes to Lake Geneva and the excellent roads over them, it was now in a position to assume commercial leadership in south-central Europe. But Genoese ecoX nomic life had already been in decline by the eighteenth century, and the Napoleonic era almost dealt it a death blow. In 1814 the merchants and shippers of Genoa had worked strenuously for the restoration of the republic, hoping thus to recreate the greatness that had once been theirs. When the area was awarded to the king of Sardinia, the Genoese accepted his rule none too graciously. The Sardinian government was challenged with the immediate problem of rehabilitating the economic life of Genoa, not only to serve the best interests of the state, but also to win the loyalty of the Genoese. Many subjects were bringing pressure to bear on the Sardinian government to negotiate commercial reciprocity 1 Marquis de St. Marzano to Gaspard Deabbate, Turin, Oct. 19, 1819, Lettere consoli filadelfia, Archivio di Stato in Torino, Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereinafter cited as AS, MAE).

Seton-Watson and the Treaty of London

IWHEN a biography is written on the late Professor Robert W. Seton-Watson, no doubt the most knowledgeable British private citizen on the affairs of south-central Europe just prior to World War I, a substantial chapter will necessarily be devoted to his tenacious, resourceful, and indefatigable wartime crusade on behalf of the Czechoslovaks, the Rumanians, and the Southern Slavs whom he knew so well and admired with lively, though not uncritical, affection.' The correspondence with his friends printed here illustrates at once that concern and his success in accumulating information on the secret Treaty of London

Economies of Scale in Relation to Agrarian Reforms in Czechoslovakia

The Problem of land tenure has long been of topmost significance throughout the rural areas of Eastern and South Central Europe. From serfdom to very recent times the land ownership pattern was characterized by large estates intermingled with small peasant holdings. Land reforms were begun but thirty-five years ago under the stress of economic and political considerations. In most areas they had resulted in the concentration of the agricultural population on small low income farms. Since the end of the last war the process of Sovietization has brought a reversal of the trend with the introduction of the collective farm. Yet, even with the vigorous support of the Russian masters this policy has been hard to carry through.