South African Law Research Articles

A TALE OF ATTEMPTED MURDER AND HIV … S v Nyalungu 2005 JOL 13254 (T) “

The South African Law Commission (as it was then – hereinafter “SALC”) was commissioned to investigate various aspects of the law as it related to HIV/AIDS. In its 5th and final report (Project 85, 5th Interim Report on Aspects of the Law Relating to AIDS – The Need For A Statutory Offence Aimed At Harmful HIV-Related Behaviour, April 2001 – hereinafter “SALC 5th report”), it dealt with “harmful (ie unacceptable) sexual behaviour by a person with HIV or AIDS that could transmit HIV or expose others to HIV, current measures available to address such behaviour and whether there is a need for statutory intervention” (viii of the executive summary of the report). This note considers the SALC’s recommendations in this regard and the reality that there have been no reported cases of successful prosecution under the common-law crimes for the wilful transmission of HIV, but that the case in point shows a willingness on the part of the courts to accept that such behaviour is dire and will be punished albeit under the guise of some “lesser” offence. Whether the decision is S v Nyalungu ([2005] JOL 13254 (T) (unreported)) has/will made/make it a less daunting task to prosecutecrimes involving allegations of the wilful transmission of HIV/AIDS is yet to be seen.

Investigating the Possibility of Suspending or Terminating a Strike on Account of Violent Conduct: Transplanting Lessons from Australia

South Africa has a history of violent industrial strikes, with authorities seemingly unable to exert control. The existing remedies in the form of an interdict and advisory arbitration awards do not appear to address violence during strikes. Violent and lengthy strikes affect members of the public and have long-term effects on the economy, resulting in loss of employment and poverty. Since South Africa does not have the legal mechanisms to deal with or curb violent strikes, this article submits that lessons could be drawn from foreign law on how to deal with these strikes. In this article, Australia is the foreign jurisdiction from which lessons are drawn. This article commences with a comparative analysis of industrial action between Australia and South Africa to answer the question of whether violent strike action is unique to South Africa. The article establishes that the Fair Works Commission (FWC): Australia’s National Workplace Relations Tribunal can suspend or terminate industrial action that is characterised by violence. It then suggests that part of Australian labour law could be transplanted into South African labour law to combat strike-related violence. The article suggests that the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) should be amended to include a provision that will empower the Labour Court to suspend or terminate industrial action once it turns violent, thus benefitting the economy and preventing job losses.

Language in the context of South African workplace discrimination law

This contribution considers the role of language as a prohibited ground of unfair discrimination in the workplace in South Africa, an area of law that has been somewhat neglected in the literature to date. It starts by setting out the constitutional and legislative framework for the protection of language rights and the prohibition of unfair discrimination based on language as a listed ground. It then, with brief comparative reference to other prominent jurisdictions, explains the potential ways in which an employer may unfairly discriminate against employees based on language, following which it considers the potential grounds for justification of language-based discrimination in the workplace. After consideration of the sparse case law on the topic in South Africa, it highlights a few specific issues regarding language and workplace discrimination, before concluding with some thoughts on potential future developments.

Language in the Context of South African Workplace Discrimination Law

This contribution considers the role of language as a prohibited ground of unfair discrimination in the workplace in South Africa, an area of law that has been somewhat neglected in the literature to date. It starts by setting out the constitutional and legislative framework for the protection of language rights and the prohibition of unfair discrimination based on language as a listed ground. It then, with brief comparative reference to other prominent jurisdictions, explains the potential ways in which an employer may unfairly discriminate against employees based on language, following which it considers the potential grounds for justification of language-based discrimination in the workplace. After consideration of the sparse case law on the topic in South Africa, it highlights a few specific issues regarding language and workplace discrimination, before concluding with some thoughts on potential future developments.

South African and international legislature with relevance to the application of electronic documentation in medicolegal autopsies for practice and research purposes

BackgroundForensic and legal medicine requires all documentation to be recorded in a manner that is admissible in court. Issues surrounding privacy, confidentiality, and security mar the implementation of electronic document systems in medicine. Awareness of current legislature governing record keeping and electronic documentation especially in modern medicine and forensic medicine has not been sufficiently explored. This study explored the current South African and international laws that govern admissibility of evidence, especially relating to electronic evidence, for use in court and research,FindingsEgypt, UK, Canada and the USA have similar legislation to South Africa regarding admissibility of electronic records. The South African Electronic Communications and Transactions Act no. 25 of 2002 defines data and the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 further defines the admissibility of evidence in court and the National Health Act regulates publication of deceased information after death.ConclusionsForensic medicine requires all documentation to be admissible in court and the storage of data thus requires proper custodianship and a high level of security, which can be achieved with modern technology. Modern medicine is evolving and technology can create secure and efficient methods of record keeping which will benefit forensic and legal medicine. Knowledge of the laws regarding admissibility of evidence can assist in creating electronic evidence that is permitted in court and can be used for research.

Personal liability of non-executive directors in South Africa: A global comparative analysis

The South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 (SA Companies Act) contains extensive provisions detailing the circumstances under which directors may be held personally liable for their actions completed while carrying out their duties. These statutory provisions are a partial codification and modernisation of the existing commonlaw provisions that had previously regulated this area of company law. These provisions still apply to the extent that they comply with the Act’s statutory provisions. The common-law tradition in South African company law has its roots in the English common law, which has spawned many other legal traditions, from that applicable in Australia to the tradition that has emerged (and diverged) in the United States of America. This article examines whether, in applying the statutory provisions of the SA Companies Act, the manner in which personal liability may be ascribed to directors would amount to a standard more onerous than jurisdictions with similar legal traditions to South Africa and, as such, render the position of director in South Africa as (comparatively) undesirable. A further examination of whether a director is an executive or a non-executive director is relevant to establish whether liability will ensue and to confirm the position in South African law on this matter. Some of the distinctions between such directors are laid out in the seminal case of Kaimowitz v Delahunt. Overall, this article seeks to ascertain whether the trajectory of South African company law is aligned with the modern forms of the same law that have evolved in its ‘sibling jurisdictions’ (legally speaking). It further seeks to establish whether any variance thereof would result in unintended detriment to the aims of the concerned laws – that is, promoting good corporate governance, and thus attracting good corporate leaders to the Republic.

Regspraak: Troosgeld is deel van ’n reghebbende se afsonderlike boedelbates en nie deel van die gemeenskaplike boedel nie – verpligte deling troos nie

Although a husband and wife married in community of property share by default, if not design, all their patrimonial assets in the common estate, the solatium or compensation received by an injured person as satisfaction for the unjustified injury to his or her personality rights is not supposed to form part of the common estate – simply because it happened to be received in the form of a patrimonial asset. It is meant to be private or separate and for the comfort of the injured only. The purpose of the compensation received as solatium is not to fill a vacuum left by the delict in the injured party’s assets, but to serve as the only mode of solace available to law to provide redress for the wrong. Other than the position where a patrimonial asset of the claimant had been damaged, eg by the negligent car accident caused by the respondent, and where the awarded damages neatly compensate the wronged party for the damage caused, thereby placing the total estate in the same position where it was before the intervening delict, the solatium paid to the injured for the non-patrimonial damages suffered by the delictual inroad on his/her personality rights is not supposed to redress a negative impact on the total estate of the wronged. The spouse of the injured party, even where they are married in community of property, would never have been able to lay claim to those personality traits or attributes of the other spouse. Personality rights, per definition, never form part of the assets of any patrimonial estate and should not be shared simply because the matrimonial property regime happens to be community of property. The legislature correctly stipulated in section 18(a) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984: “Notwithstanding the fact that a spouse is married in community of property – (a) any amount recovered by him or her by way of damages, other than damages for patrimonial loss, by reason of a delict committed against him or her, does not fall into the joint estate but becomes his or her separate property” – emphasis added. This formulation echoes what has been the legal position for ages. Along those lines Hiemstra J in Potgieter v Potgieter correctly held that the amount awarded as contumelia to the injured husband for the harm done to his personality rights by the adultery of his wife and the third party, would not form part of the joint estate but would be his separate property. In so doing, the court precluded the adulteress from further sharing in the spoils of her doing. In the underlying decision by the majority of the supreme court of appeal, however, it was held that section 18(a) should be read to be limited: “The context of s 18 must be read in its entirety, and apparent therefrom is the plain language and words used. [This] … section highlights that delictual damages received by a spouse during the course of a marriage in community of property, which are nonpatrimonial in nature (s 18(a)); and damages for bodily injuries owing to the fault of one’s spouse in terms of s 18(b) must be excluded from the division of the joint estate on divorce” (par 9 – emphasis added). In this case a very significant amount was received by the lady for the non-patrimonial loss suffered by her more than four years before the marriage had been concluded. According to the reading-in exercise of the supreme court of appeal it was not received “during the course of the marriage” and not ringfenced. As a consequence, the court upheld the appeal of the erstwhile husband after a marriage of very short duration (barely two years). He consequently successfully laid claim to fifty per cent of the more than half a million paid as non-patrimonial compensation to his wife, more than four years before he married her in community of property and only after becoming aware of the significant amount of that compensation invested by her. This decision not only flies in the face of logic and the legal principles underlying South African common law; it is in conflict with the latest developments in comparable Continental legal systems sharing the same historical and societal foundations as the South African law. This judgment provides poor consolation and it leaves a deeply imbedded discomfort, because the result is vehemently contrary to the outcome in comparable legal systems for a similar scenario. Dividing the solatium under the pretext of a division of the joint estate diminishes the solace intended for the injured.

The characterisation principle in South African competition law from a German law perspective

The characterisation principle — or the concept of characterisation — is a modern achievement of the South African competition law, with its roots in United States jurisdiction from which it was originally transferred into the South African legal system. Several far-reaching South African court decisions refer to the characterisation principle and make it an essential part. However, the positioning of the characterisation principle in South African competition law is complex. This is shown by the fact that, for example, the concept of characterisation obviously conflicts with the rationale of the per se prohibitions implemented in the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998. This article attempts to analyse the characterisation principle from a German law perspective in order to define its relevance, impact and limitation more precisely in the South African legal system.

The Black Flame (part three): Snyman’s Criminal Law

Part three of this trilogy of papers (entitled after WEB du Bois’s trilogy of novels titled the Black Flame) concludes an extraordinarily prolonged attempt to open a dialogue with the esteemed author and revisor of Snyman’s Criminal Law. The core message of this trilogy is that a small window into a vibrant indigenous criminal law scholarship that is not perpetually northbound-gazing towards Europe has been opened by the latest edition of Snyman’s Criminal Law. The first two parts of this trilogy revealed some of the areas in which the next edition, and South African criminal law scholarship in general, can proceed further into this decolonial direction. This third paper builds on the first two, which focused mainly on the introductory and historical aspects (part one), and the General Part (part two) respectively, by focusing on the Special Part of South African criminal law. In particular, this paper makes decolonial interventions in three areas in which it is argued that the next edition of the book can improve: (i) the taxonomic arrangement of offences; (ii) the total exclusion of African customary law offences from the discussion; and (iii) the complex crime of corruption.

Boekbespreking: JC Sonnekus and EC Schlemmer: Principles of Rights of Real and Personal Security in South African Law

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Problems relating to the formation of online contracts: A comparative perspective

The formation of online contracts has enjoyed considerable judicial and academic attention in American law. Generally, American courts are of the view that the rise of online contracts has not necessitated any changes to the fundamental principles of the law of contract, although commentators argue that the enforcement of online contracts has stretched the requirement of mutual assent beyond recognition. This article engages in a comparative evaluation of these arguments, as well as some proposals contained in the American Law Institute’s Draft Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts. Ultimately, the aim is to identify whether the principles regarding the formation of contracts in South African law ought to be adapted or supplemented to accommodate online contracts. It is found that both legal systems subscribe to fairly lenient formation requirements. The possibility of recognising more stringent assent-related requirements, such as imposing specific disclosure requirements, is investigated. It is concluded that there is little to be gained by insisting on stricter formation requirements for online contracts in general, because consumers rationally choose not to read these contracts. Instead, recognising these concerns may provide the impetus for increased reliance on other forms of control, most notably regulating the use of certain problematic standard terms.

The Conduct of “Price Undertakings” and “Interim Reviews” in the Anti-Dumping Regime of South Africa [Discussion of Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GMBH V International Trade Administration Commission (66248/2014) 2020 ZAGPPHC 141 (14 February 2020)

The administration of anti-dumping investigations is the sole mandate of the International Trade Administration Commission (“ITAC”). This investigation has two stages, the preliminary and final investigation stages, which are accompanied by investigation reports at each stage. The investigation can be terminated or suspended after the preliminary investigation if the offending exporter ceases exports to the Southern African Customs Union (“SACU”) at the dumped prices or revises its prices such that ITAC is satisfied that injurious dumping has been eliminated. Twelve months after the publication of the final determination in the original investigation or the previous review, interested parties can request an interim review of the duty if there are significantly changed circumstances. It is these two aspects of dumping investigations that were the subject of litigation for the first time in South African law in Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GMBH v International Trade Administration Commission (66248/2014) 2020 ZAGPPHC 141 (14 February 2020). This note assesses the novel approach employed by the court in readily construing these aspects of the anti-dumping investigation in South Africa in accordance with the jurisprudence on the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This approach is commendable in light of the ambivalent attitude of South African courts towards the country’s obligations in terms of the multilateral agreements of the World Trade Organization, despite the promulgation of local legislation to comply with these obligations and the constitutional injunction to prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.

Mixing old and new wisdom for the protection of image-based sexual abuse victims

Image-based sexual abuse, more popularly but inadequately referred to as ‘revenge porn’, has emerged as a prolific modern-day plague. This author asserts that, in light of its impact and severity, the criminal law, as opposed to private law remedies, is the preferable legal response to image-based sexual abuse (IBSA). Thus, it is commendable that South African lawmakers have responded to IBSA with criminal sanctions, specifically targeting this phenomenon through s 18F of the Films and Publications Amendment Act 11 of 2019 and s 16 of the Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020. Despite having two acts responding to one problem, these new legislative additions mix admirably with the existing offence of crimen injuria in providing adequate protection for victims of IBSA in South Africa. Where the broadly defined offence of crimen injuria lacks detail, s 18F and s 16 provide more precision. Section 18F and s 16, although not without internal issues, clarify the extent of unlawful conduct, provide clear penalty guidelines, highlight the intolerable nature of IBSA and offer additional support measures to victims of IBSA through protective orders. However, while advantageous, these legislative additions may not respond effectively to all cases of IBSA, especially when s 18F and s 16 are overly restrictive in application. Where the perpetration of IBSA warrants a harsher penalty than what is stipulated in both Acts or where IBSA subtly evades the protection of both Acts, the offence of crimen injuria provides a flexible alternative. It is this mutually supportive interplay that validates the assertion that South African law does provide adequately for victims of IBSA.

Disclosure of corporate political donations and expenditure to shareholders: Why South Africa should follow the United Kingdom’s legislative approach

Whilst corporate political donations and expenditure is legally permissible in South Africa, and whilst some companies may be making such donations and incurring such expenditure for valid reasons, corporate political donations and expenditure is frequently associated with secrecy and poor corporate governance practices within companies. One strategy that some corporate-law jurisdictions have adopted to regulate corporate political donations and expenditure is to require company boards to disclose relevant information about such donations and expenditure directly to their shareholders. However, South African law currently does not require companies to disclose their political donations or expenditure directly to the shareholders, either in the annual financial statements, or in the directors’ report that must be included in the annual financial statements, or in the annual report. Following an examination of key policy considerations relevant to the disclosure of corporate political donations and expenditure to shareholders, and an examination of the legislative approach in the UK, the article argues for the effective disclosure of corporate political donations and expenditure to shareholders under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. It then makes detailed recommendations on how such disclosure requirements could be introduced and implemented in South Africa.

Dismantling South Africa’s scourge – the Constitutional Court rules rape an abuse of power: Tshabalala v S; Ntuli v S

In December 2019, the Constitutional Court handed down a significant judgment in the matter of Tshabalala v S, Ntuli v S 2020 (5) SA 1 (CC), holding that the doctrine of common purpose applies to the common-law crime of rape. The judgment has been hailed as an important contribution to South Africa’s jurisprudence and, particularly, to the judiciary’s promise to address gender-based violence in South Africa at a time when numerous cases of gender-based violence and femicide are facing the courts. This case note argues that the judgment is noteworthy for three main reasons. First, the judgment settles the uncertainty in South African law regarding the concept of instrumentality and the applicability of the doctrine of common purpose to the crime of rape. Secondly, it emphasises that rape is more than a sexual act; it is also an unconscionable abuse of power over the most vulnerable members of society. Thirdly, the concurring judgments centre the lived experiences of black women and acknowledge intersecting power inequalities in our society, thereby advancing the project of substantive and meaningful adjudication in South African jurisprudence.

Slapping down SLAPP suits in South Africa: The need for legislative protection and civil society action

The formation of online contracts has enjoyed considerable judicial and academic attention in American law. Generally, American courts are of the view that the rise of online contracts has not necessitated any changes to the fundamental principles of the law of contract, although commentators argue that the enforcement of online contracts has stretched the requirement of mutual assent beyond recognition. This article engages in a comparative evaluation of these arguments, as well as some proposals contained in the American Law Institute’s Draft Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts. Ultimately, the aim is to identify whether the principles regarding the formation of contracts in South African law ought to be adapted or supplemented to accommodate online contracts. It is found that both legal systems subscribe to fairly lenient formation requirements. The possibility of recognising more stringent assent-related requirements, such as imposing specific disclosure requirements, is investigated. It is concluded that there is little to be gained by insisting on stricter formation requirements for online contracts in general, because consumers rationally choose not to read these contracts. Instead, recognising these concerns may provide the impetus for increased reliance on other forms of control, most notably regulating the use of certain problematic standard terms.

Let the people speak! Resisting the erosion of the right to public participation in the wake of The Federation of Fly Fishers v The Minister of Environmental Affairs

The need for public participation in environmental decisions is accepted in both international and South African law. In the run up to, and just after, the transition to democracy, South Africa was exemplary in many instances in ensuring that participation occurred in a meaningful and broad-based way. In recent years, however, some may question whether the underlying rationale for public participation is still as valued by government, or whether it is being diluted to a mechanistic procedural requirement reminiscent of the past. Disputes about the way in which requirements to give effect to public participation are being implemented have recently surfaced in the courts in respect of several environmental issues. There has been strong public opposition to municipal service delivery regarding waste and water, seismic testing off the South African coast, and law-making activities regarding trout. This article considers the court’s oversight of public participation processes in respect of one of those issues — recent decisions on the introduction of executive regulations. It does so by tracing the particular dynamics regarding the need for public participation in South Africa and assessing the way in which the court has adjudicated public participation disputes in the law-making context. It finds that the court appears to be willing to play its oversight role in a way which is true to the underlying ethos of democratic decision-making in the environmental context, albeit that further opportunities for the court to consider the full range of matters involving participation should be welcomed.

Disposing of property upon death: Contemplating the act of testation performed with animus testandi versus a contractual disposition in terms of a valid pactum successorium

While the fate of assets upon death is generally decided under the law of succession, it does not have to be. In addition to a valid will (testate succession), succession could also be governed by contract, in terms of a valid pactum successorium (currently either a donatio mortis causa or an antenuptial contract containing succession clauses). (Intestate succession, although a third option, is put aside for present purposes.) Both testate and contractual succession require an expression of intention in the form of a legally recognised act. The dispositive act in these two instances shares certain features. In both, the act involves a disposition of property intended to apply upon death and is obligationary. The vesting of rights in both can also only occur upon death, while assets are transferred by the appointed executor who administers the estate. Yet the essence of the dispositive act renders these two forms of succession fundamentally different. Contractual succession, with an agreement as the dispositive act, operates under the law of contract. Since the disposition is contractual, it needs to comply with the requirements for a valid contract, with animus contrahendi as the defining form of intention. Testate succession is governed by the law of succession, with animus testandi being the required intention. Animus testandi turns the dispositive act into an act of testation, which, in turn, renders the document in which it is embodied a will. Although this distinction seems straightforward enough, South African law is yet to reflect it. This shortcoming results in legal uncertainty, which creates new challenges in light of the court’s power of condonation. This article focuses on the different dispositive acts to shed light on the intention associated with each and, specifically, to clearly distinguish between animus contrahendi and animus donandi in a contractual disposition, and animus testandi. Ultimately, a clear distinction between the intentions will enable a better understanding of the applicable act of disposition. Admittedly, the intention will probably remain central in the event of uncertainty, and the surrounding circumstances will still be decisive in determining it. However, it is suggested that an added focus on the act – assessing it in terms of its essence and associated form of intention – will make for a considerably easier investigation than a sole focus on intention.

Abandoning the Spouse, Abandoning the House? Abandonment of Co-Ownership Shares in Immovable Property [Discussion of M V M (10751/2000) [2020] ZAGPPHC 155 (20 March 2020)

The case of M v M (10751/2000) [2020] ZAGPPHC 155 (20 March 2020) (“M v M”) is novel in its finding that the abandonment of immovable property is possible in South African law. It is also novel in finding that the requisite intention to abandon a co-ownership share in immovable property could be inferred from the facts of the case. Past case law concerning the abandonment of immovable property always failed to make a finding of abandonment as the requisite intention could never be established. This approach was consistent with our courts’ unwillingness to infer an intention to abandon valuable property in the absence of clear intention to do so. This case note seeks to critique the decision of the court in M v M in light of a legal framework in which the abandonment of landownership does not appear possible given the principle of publicity. It further seeks to ask if there were other avenues available to the court to reach what was an undeniably just outcome on the set of facts before the court.

Aantekeninge: An update of recent labour law developments from South African courts 2022

This contribution summarises and considers recent South African labour law cases from June 2021 to May 2022. It focuses on several important decisions handed down by South African courts on a range of labour law matters. The cases addressed here were chosen because they establish new standards, expand on existing ones or establish new legal tests. These judgments have a notable effect on labour law and the employment relationship. They are anticipated to be particularly influential in future cases. Although facts have been shortened where possible, findings of reasonableness and fairness are often dependent on the specific circumstances and relevant facts have therefore been set out where necessary. As in the previous update, the labour courts were again tasked to deal with several cases involving Covid-19 related facts, particularly mandatory vaccinations. There was also a significant increase in constitutional court judgments in labour-related matters.