At some stage in this I must confront two things. Firstly, Arendt's distinction between 'race thinking' and 'racism'; and secondly, the shift from creationist to evolutionary thinking in the understanding of the marker 'race'. In the latter it becomes important to distinguish between that which exists as part of a creator's design, and that which has some aspect of the hoary old 'hopeful monster' thesis. Thus the motivations behind Saartjie Baartman before evolution, and the Gypsies and Jews of the Holocaust afterwards, are not the same. Baartman was a case of seeking to justify difference on the basis of created species, the Holocaust frequently invoked failed or faulty evolution. Was Darwinism (the ideology) a marker point in the shift from race thinking to racism? I think Arendt may have some clues! In introducing the Rhodes Journalism Review (RJR) theme issue (August 2000) on the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) inquiry into racism in the media, Commission chair Barney Pityana notes that '... the inquiry was about racism, and not so much about freedom of expression. Much of the commentary and controversy leading to the public hearings had conveniently avoided this matter' (Pityana 2000). Clearly, one could easily dismiss this as a species of formalistic hairsplitting, designed to differentiate between expression and the attitudes that ground that expression. Whether these two concepts are distinct, continuous or identical, is a philosophical and not a legal issue. And in any case, I am not going to make the same kind of argument Pityana claims the newspapers made, because like him I don't think that freedom of expression was the issue anyway. However, I intend to examine the question of why the commission declined to offer at least some working definition of racism in its terms of reference. Pityana (2000) justifies this decision on the grounds that 'the Commission did not want to start with definitions, but sought to examine the narratives of race that were communicated to the South African media reading, listening and viewing public'. Many commentators felt, rightly, that in the absence of some marker or criterion that distinguished racism from other possibilities--like, say, poor training, slipshod practice, or inadequate ethical oversight--it would be possible for the commission to come to quite arbitrary decisions about what in fact constituted racist media reporting. As the response to the Interim report showed, especially with respect to the cultural studies-derived 'analysis' by Claudia Braude, many in the media felt that this is exactly what transpired. However, what seems missing from both the responses and the commission's reports (interim and final) is just what constitutes 'race' as a conception that grounds some kind of action (or its justification or motivation) as 'racist'. In the commission chair's own words, the inquiry was seeking to 'examine the narratives of race' that may have been communicated in the media. Clearly, even if this justification seems to many to have appeared after the fact, Pityana has a point in the sense that there has to be some conception of race present before any individual, group or society can institute racism as a practice or means of identification. In this regard, then, I read the commission as being alive to the distinction between race-thinking and racism, that Hannah Arendt drew half-a-century ago (Arendt 1951). If this is the case, however, then both the interim and final reports are open to the accusation (not necessarily a fair one) that those who produced them have lost sight of the historical and political specificity of particular instances of racism. I will not go into this issue, but instead I will try to make amends for the aporia arising from the commission's failure to confront the reality of race in its terms of reference--and in the responses to and discussion about the commission and its reports. …
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