Source Of Moral Authority Research Articles

‘To Recover His Reputation Among the People of God’: Sex, Religion and the Double Standard in Presbyterian Ireland, c.1700–1838

AbstractThis article explores how Presbyterian religious belief and practice shaped the operation of the sexual double standard in Ireland. It argues that reputation continued to have a public element into the nineteenth century and highlights the role of religion as a locus around which male reputation was validated, restored and safeguarded. Through a system of surveillance, and underpinned by the gossip network, the Presbyterian church courts in Ireland held men to account for lapses in sexual conduct. Presbyterian men, too, were concerned to maintain clear characters. In their efforts to keep sexual indiscretions private and silence their accusers, some men even resorted to bribery, threats of violence and extortion. Others turned to the church courts to validate their reputations, recognising the place and power of the church as a source of moral authority.

A Classroom Exercise Practicing Moral Intent, Judgment and Behavior

This article presents a two-part classroom exercise that requires students first to identify their source of moral authority, and second to use that moral authority to make a moral judgment, establish moral intent, and engage in moral behavior [Jones 1991]. First, students identify their moral authority, or how they determine the morality of an action. Second, students are given an ethical scenario and asked to respond, relying on their source of authority. Thus, students are given practice in employing moral authority to respond to an ethical dilemma and engage in moral behavior.

La autoridad de las Escrituras en la obra de John Locke: el problema de la prueba de la revelación tradicional

AbstractIn this paper we will study the way in which Scriptural revelation authority is sustained in the work of John Locke. First, we will show the recurrence and centrality of the Scriptural reference as a source of moral authority. Second, we will analyze the articulation proposed between revelation and reason. Finally, we will consider the coherence between the validity of rationalistic empiricism in the Lockean epistemology and the acceptation of a revelation’s undemonstrative proof in an empiric-rational way, supported on the divine provenance validated by the existence of miracles.Keywords: Locke, Reason, faith, Scriptures, Latitudinarianism, Skepticism.

Sources of Roman Law

This chapter addresses the origin and development of Roman legal sources — that is, the methods and procedures for establishing new legally binding rules, standards, and norms. The source of a legal norm gives it ultimate validity. Legal sources can be classified in many different ways. In this chapter the classification will be based on the distinction between power (potestas) and authority (auctoritas) because this is probably the most comprehensive way to understand the legal implications of Rome’s transformation from the Republic to the Principate and then to the later Empire. During the Republic, the legal sources produced by individuals or institutions vested with power (popular assemblies and magistrates) were basically the statutes (leges and plebiscita) and the edicts of the magistrates. On the other hand, the legal sources produced by individuals or institutions vested with moral authority (auctoritas) were the legal opinions (responsa) of the jurists and the resolutions of the Senate (senatus consulta). The Principate brought a major alteration in the system of legal sources when the authority of the jurists and senators was subordinated to the power of the emperor. The emperor granted legislative power to the Senate. As result, senatorial resolutions became, in practice, legislation, that is, a source of coercive power instead of a source of moral authority. The responsa of the jurists, however, were submitted to imperial influence, opening the door to imperial rescripts, elaborated by the imperial chancellery under the direct control of the emperor. During the later Empire, all sources of law ended up being mere expressions of the imperial power (imperial constitutions). The authority of jurists and senators ceased to be a constitutional limit on imperial power. Moral authority and imperial power were entirely identified in the person of the emperor, whose will had the force of a statute.

The Life Esidimeni tragedy: Moral pathology and an ethical crisis.

The Life Esidimeni tragedy highlights several ethical transgressions. Health professionals' ethics are put to the test when their own interests are balanced against competing claims. Core values of compassion, competence and autonomy, together with respect for fundamental human rights, serve as the foundation of ethical practice in healthcare. These values are increasingly being challenged by governments and other third parties. The duties conferred on healthcare practitioners require them to act responsibly and be accountable for their actions. Codes in healthcare serve as a source of moral authority. The Gauteng health authorities exerted tremendous power and created a culture of fear and disempowerment among healthcare practitioners. When health professionals choose to support state interests instead of those of patients, problematic dual-loyalty conflicts arise.

SAINT SERGEY OF RADONEZH'S SPIRITUAL HERITAGE AND DESTINIES OF RUSSIA

The article is devoted to the memory of Reverend Sergius of Radonezh whose 700th anniversary Russia is celebrating this year. It reviews the heritage of Reverend Sergius of Radonezh in Russian history, the meaning of his name for the Russians, the spiritual and political role of the Christian Orthodoxy in history. The spiritual heritage of Reverend Sergius of Radonezh survived his life and eventually turned into bottomless source of moral authority for the Russian people. His name is a constant reminder of the moral resurrection of the Russian people after ages of feudal strives and Tatars' yoke, which paved the ground for the consequent political rise of Russia. It proves the rule that political power rests on moral authority. The memory of Reverend Sergius of Radonezh is a good benchmark, which we can always check ourselves against, whether we are living up to it or failed. In any case it will remain the guiding light for Russia.

Human rights and divine justice

This article discusses the view of the Leiden professor Paul Cliteur that human rights are essentially secular and require rejection of God’s will as source of moral authority. Firstly, it analyses Cliteur’s reception of Kant and his claim that an exclusively anthropological grounding of human rights is the only possible one. Next, it investigates Nicholas Wolterstorff’s criticism of Kant’s grounding of human dignity in the rational capacity of mankind and his theistic grounding of human rights in God’s love by the mediating concept of human worth. Although Wolterstorff rightly believes that God’s special relationship with human beings is ultimately the best ground for human rights, his understandings of God’s love and of human worth appear to be problematic. Finally, the article explores the possibility to ground human rights directly in God’s justice by construing creation, the giving of the Ten Commandments and the justification of the sinner as central divine acts of justice in which God has given human rights to all human beings.

The Relationship between Sources of Moral Authority, Political Attitude and Authoritarianism

Individuals with different political attitudes attribute their political tendencies to different sources of moral authority. This study aimed to investigate the relationship between moral authority sources, political attitude and authoritarianism. A total of 128 subjects from two universities participated in this study by completing the Moral Authority Test-Revised (MAS-R) and the Authoritarianism Scale. Respondents were also asked regarding their political tendencies. Findings showed no significant difference of political attitudes in attribution to different sources of moral authority and authoritarianism. There was however a significant relation of authoritarianism with external source of moral authority, but not with principle and self interest sources. This implies that authoritarians relied on external source of authority figures in moral judgment rather than one's own interest or principle issues. The findings were discussed in terms of the characteristics of the sample and sociopolitical sphere of Iran.

Relationship Between Mother, Father, and Peer Attachment and Empathy With Moral Authority

We explored the relationship between mother, father, and peer attachment security, empathy, and moral authority in order to clarify certain problems of previous empirical research on such relationships. A sample of 202 Persian-speaking undergraduate students completed questionnaires pertaining to these constructs. The results revealed that mother and father attachment were significantly correlated with family, society welfare, and equality sources of moral authority, whereas peer attachment security was related only to society welfare and equality sources of moral authority. Out of the empathy subscales, only empathic concern was associated with moral authority sources. Empathic concern was also related to mother, father, and peer attachment, whereas perspective taking was correlated with mother and peer attachment. The combination of empathic concern and mother, father, and peer attachment predicted significant amount of variance of “principle source of moral authority” (including society welfare and equality sources). Findings support existence of a strong relationship between attachment security and the content of moral thought of adolescents, and findings redress an empirical imbalance in research literature on the relation of attachment and morality.

Dianomy: Understanding Religious Women's Moral Agency as Creative Conformity

This essay seeks to contribute to work on moral agency of religious women through the creative naming of a dynamic that is emerging in recent scholarship. Drawing on fieldwork in Iran in 2004, I argue that prominent models of agency based on autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy are unable take into account both religious influence on and individual creativity of women's actions. I propose the neologism, "dianomy," meaning dual-sources of the moral law, to account for moral agency that relies neither exclusively upon the self as a source of moral authority nor exclusively upon religious traditions. Dianomy also attempts to comprehend creative ruptures in obedience to tradition, even when these innovations are unintentional. Such a concept is particularly important in order to correct past tendencies to ignore or even negate feminist politics that do not resist or strategically reform religious norms. With dianomy, tactical moves, actions that are not "freely chosen," and even happy accidents can be studied as productive within traditional religious communities. I call these types of actions, which confound the actions theorized by autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy, "creative conformity."

Names and Reality in Mao Zedong’s Political Discourse on Intellectuals

This essay addresses the topic of the political use of formalized language. In the Chinese historical tradition the ‘correctness’ of language has always been considered a source of moral authority, official legitimacy and political stability. Political language has always had an intrinsic instrumental value, since its control is the most suitable way to express and convey the orthodox State ideology. Formalized language has also served as a device to standardize the range of expressiveness of Chinese intellectuals. Wittgenstein argues that words have the power to set the limit for the ‘expression of thoughts’, because the boundaries of language indicate the boundaries of one’s own world. My focus is on specific forms of power embodied in language practices and discursive formations recognizable in selected texts. This inquiry illuminates various possibilities for normalization and inculcation of formalized language. The internal constitution of selected texts is examined with an eye to the dialogic interaction with the production and reception of Mao’s and post-Mao’s political discourses on intellectuals. Analysis of language formation and use in a comparative perspective considers the socio-historical contexts and reveals a pattern of evolution, involution, and finally devolution of language.

醫乃仁術: 儒家視野下的醫患關係

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文首先廓清了“醫乃仁術”在傳統儒家思想脈絡裏的含義，並指出從來源上說，它迥異於西方生命倫理學主流，而採取了一種獨特的“不離人倫，親親為本”的視角。然而這種視角使得“醫乃仁術”總是被一種歧義所困擾：它既是一種行善原則，也是一種未顧及自主性原則的行善原則，家長主義的陰影無處不在。“醫乃仁術”的歧義成為中國生命倫理學建設的最大瓶頸。面對這種困境，本文試圖在現代西方生命倫理學話語實踐之外，另闢蹊徑，借助關懷倫理學和美德倫理學的最近研究成果，闡發“醫乃仁術”的合理內涵。This essay addresses the ethical implications of the physician-patient relationship from the Confucian perspective, which holds that the physician must regard the patient as a family member to treat the patient properly. It is well known that there are two primary approaches to moral authority in contemporary Western medical ethics. One is internal, and assumes that the good inherent to medicine is the source of moral authority in medical activities. The other is external, and denies that the ends and ethics of medicine can be determined by typical medical activities. It holds that medical ethics should be based on general moral principles, such as autonomy and justice. However, the Confucian model seems to be at odds with both of these approaches. On the one hand, Confucians do not think that medicine constitutes a self-contained domain of activity with its own ethics; rather, medicine is seen as a continuum of familial relationships and ethics. On the other hand, Confucians also hold that the physician-patient relationship should follow the example of the flexible relationships among family members rather than the rigid general principles of autonomy and justice.The Western model is aimed at action, whereas the Confucian view focuses on personal affective relations. The greatest problem with the Confucian model is its notorious paternalism; that is, it appears to fail to pay sufficient attention to the potential conflict between patient and physician about the good, ignoring the issue of patient autonomy. In the modern Western tradition, the model of the physician-patient relationship is based on two self-sufficient agents (patient and physician) who are united in pursuing a certain good, where each is the final source of what is good for him- or herself. However, the real physician-patient encounter demands a deeper commitment between the two than this model suggests. When entering a physician-patient relationship, what the patient seeks is care from the physician, not autonomy. That is to say, the patient first of all trusts the physician. To earn that trust, it is not enough that the physician treat the patient based only on the principle of autonomy or what the patient requires. Rather, a deep attachment – analogous to a familial relationship – must be developed that can serve as the basis of the encounter between the patient and physician. The Confucian physician-patient model, which is rooted in such a relationship, does not contrast but rather complements its Western counterpart.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 564 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Religion and the Media: The Cultural Role of a Church-Based Welfare Agent in a Norwegian Local Community

This article analyses and discusses the mediation of the moral agency of a small church-based (Norwegian) welfare organisation from a media theoretical perspective. The main focus is on the relationship between the welfare organisation and its leader on the one hand and the local newspaper on the other hand. The relationship is conceived and analysed as a trust relationship and seen in the context of the local newspaper's agency manifesting the ideas of the public journalism movement. The article discusses whether the agency of the particular type of welfare organisation as mediated in the (secular) newspaper may contribute to ‘boosting religion’ or, more specifically, whether it might indicate that the church is still interesting as a source of moral authority.

DOES A BELIEF IN GOD LEAD TO MORAL COWARDICE?: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COURAGE OF MORAL CONVICTION AND ACQUISITION

In our seventh and final piece on the theme “Good without God”, Jonathan Ives argues that reliance on God as an external source of moral authority leads to a kind of moral cowardice.

Religion as a moral source: can religion function as a shared source of moral authority and values in a liberal democracy?

Religion as a moral source: can religion function as a shared source of moral authority and values in a liberal democracy?

Relationship of Family Socialization Processes to Adolescent Moral Thought

The author investigated the relationship between salient family processes and adolescent moral thought among a sample of 271 adolescents and their parents. Family-process variables measured were adaptability, cohesion, and parent-adolescent communication; adolescent moral thought was measured by the influence the adolescent participants attributed to sources of moral authority. Perceptions of high family cohesion were associated with the greatest influence attributed to the family as a source of moral authority. Perceptions of high family adaptability were associated with greater influence attributed to all sources of moral authority. Parent-adolescent dyads who perceived high positive communication showed strong parent-adolescent agreement on the levels of influence attributed to all sources of moral authority. The findings (a) support the view that a strong relationship exists between family-socialization processes and the content of adolescent moral thought and (b) redress an empirical imbalance in research literature.

The Paradox of Power in Planning Practice

Planners rely on the protocol of the professional planner to cope with the politics of planning. However, this protocol promises more than it delivers as a source of moral authority, and delivers more than it promises as a source of political power. The protocol simultaneously resolves and reproduces the liberal paradox between freedom and justice. Hence, the ambivalence planners frequently express about their encounters with power on the job may reflect their use of this protocol. Two planning stories drawn from face-to-face interviews illustrate how two practitioners facing similar problems adopt different versions of the professional protocol to justify their actions. Analysis of each tale, using critical and postmodern theory, explores how the professional protocol excuses the exercise of power in ways that obscure the liberal paradox. A third planning story offers an example of how a practitioner handles the inherent tension of professional practice in a liberal society without using the professional protocol either to impose closure or to foster premature reassurance.

Moral authority and reformation religion: On charisma and the origins of modernity

From the late 17th and 18th centuries, much of modern western social and political thought has developed in terms of the contract tradition of govern? ment. Within this tradition, the locus of moral authority has been posited as rooted within society. Jean Jacques Rousseau and Emile Durkheim may be con? sidered two of the foremost expounders of this conception.1 The apotheosis of society in the writings of Durkheim is, in a certain sense, a reformulation of Rousseau's concept of sovereignty rooted in the general will. These assumptions on the source of moral authority are, furthermore, rooted in some of the major intellectual traditions of Western Christian civiliza? tion. We may think for example of Vico's immanent historicist conceptions of natural equity and universal jurisprudence or of the republican tradition of civic humanism, as among its intellectual antecedents.2 The existence of precursors notwithstanding, the notion of moral authority as rooted in society, as a strain of political thought in the Western tradition calls for some inquiry, for a number of reasons. First, this tradition continues to be but one of a number of political traditions which defined the locus of moral authority in very different spheres. In this context Burke's traditionalism or Hegel's World Spirit (or the marxian dialectic of history) exemplify alternative notions of the sources of moral ac? tion.3 Second, the conception of moral authority as resting in the community must be distinguished from the contract-tradition per se.4 That is, the very posit? ing of society in ethical terms adds a moral dimension to the notion of contract which was absent in the Utilitarian followers of David Hume. Third, this notion goes well beyond the concepts of natural law which ?in their various forms ?