Sophistici Elenchi Research Articles

AL-FĀRĀBĪ’S EIGHTH FALLACY EXTRA DICTIONEM AND AVERROES’ CRITICISM

AbstractThis paper aims to introduce and discuss al-Fārābī's (d. 950–1 CE) fallacy from transfer and substitution in his little-studied “On Deceptive Topoi” (Kitāb al-amkina al-muġalliṭa) and the criticism leveled at him by Averroes (d. 1198 CE) for violating Aristotle's claim of the exhaustiveness of his list of fallacies. The first and larger half of this paper introduces al-Fārābī's treatise and its innovations upon Aristotle's Sophistici elenchi. The second half focuses on Averroes’ criticism in his so-called middle commentary (talḫīṣ) on Aristotle's SE and discusses the validity of his arguments against al-Fārābī. As the final analysis will show, Averroes’ criticism does not sufficiently take into account the independence of al-Fārābī's treatise from Aristotle's SE, its disregard for the study of dialectical deception and counter-deception, and its particular focus on the demonstrative sciences. In light of al-Fārābī's innovation his “On Deceptive Topoi” turns out to be a work of great originality drawing on a broad range of source texts.

PROTAGORAS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF GRAMMAR

Offering a re-evaluation of all the available evidence, including passages from Aristotle'sRhetoric,PoeticsandSophistici Elenchi, Diogenes Laertius’ biographical sketch as well as the grammar scene in Aristophanes’Clouds, this article argues that Protagoras’ engagement with grammatical questions must have been more sophisticated and thorough than is often assumed. In Protagoras’ discovery of grammatical gender, formal considerations – most likely inspired by the analysis of personal names – played a more fundamental role than semantic ones, and his typology of πυθμένες λόγων equally presupposes the formal recognition of at least verbal mood, if not also tense.

A 15th-Century Handbook on Aristotelian Logic: The Anonymous Logica “Quadrupliciter”

The present paper offers a description and analysis of a fifteenth century handbook on logic, preserved in the ms. Zwickau, Ratsschulbibliothek XXXIII.I.14, ff. 3r-223v. The volume comprises a set of commentaries on Porphyry's Isagoge (ff. 3ra-35vb); on Aristotle's Categories, including the Liber sex principiorum, introduced in f. 66ra as Postpredicamenta (ff. 36ra-70vb); on De interpretatione (ff. 70ra-92vb); on the Prior analytics (93ra-129rb); on the Posterior analytics (129va-169vb); on books I-IV of the Topics (170ra-200ra); and on Sophistici elenchi (200va-223vb). These commentaries are not included in the several lists and indexes of Aristotelian commentaries currently available, neither separately nor as a whole. With few exceptions, all commentaries of the set follow the same, sctrict pattern: a fourfold division of questions, arguments, objections and answers, usually introduced by the word quadrupliciter, which suggests that the set should be considered as one single handbook compiled by an anonymous master as an repository of arguments available for disputations at the Arts Faculty. Given the extension of the volume, the paper focuses mainly in one section in particular, namely the commentary on the Topics, to analyse more closely certain features that make this work worthy of closer study, with particular attention devoted to the meticulous use of different sources for its composition.

Las falacias "Secundum quid" y del accidente en Aristóteles. Su interpretación ante-predicativa e ilustración por división

A través del reconocimiento del principio de la distinción y su implicación ante-predicativa, las falacias extra-lingüísticas del secundum quid y del accidente propuestas por Aristóteles en los Sophistici Elenchi serán explicadas, probadas, analizadas y resueltas. De esta manera, se postula que las falacias que Aristóteles presenta en dicho libro tienen su raíz en una consideración falaz antepredicativa y no en el paralogismo, lo que abre una nueva forma de analizar las falacias aristotélicas. Con esto, se probará que el análisis de las falacias como paralogismos es posterior, pues se mantendrá la tesis de que la falacia se genera en el nivel de distinción ontológica ante-predicativa y no en el nivel lingüístico del razonamiento. Se propondrá un modelo divisivo que aporta información al modelo inclusivo de la lógica tradicional, esto porque él nos permitirá dar cuenta del principio de la distinción.

ΑΠΟΡΙΑ und ΑΠΑΤΗ in der aristotelischen Dialektik

Both words ἀπορία (difficulty, puzzle) and ἀπάτη (trick, deceit) are regarded here as representatives of the meaning „path, way“. This article focuses mainly on their use as key concepts in the theory of Aristotle’s dialectic and secondly on their use in the practice of Aristotle’s investigations. I argue that the two notions have a special and important role in Aristotle’s conception of dialectic as expressed in the Topics and in the Sophistici Elenchi, according to his view that it is the job of the dialectician to be familiar with the real and the apparent ways of reasoning. Thus, in the Topics Aristotle deals with genuine difficulties (ἀπορίαι), and in the Sophistici Elenchi with fallacies (ἀπάται).

Universal Logic and Aristotelian Logic: Formality and Essence of Logic

The rediscovery of Aristotle’s works on syllogisms in the Latin world, especially the Sophistici Elenchi and then the Prior Analytics, gave rise to sophisticated views on the nature of syllogistic form and syllogistic matter in the thirteenth century. It led to debates on the ontology of the syllogism as studied in the Prior Analytics, i.e. the syllogism made of letters and the four logical constants a/e/i/o, with deep consequences on the definition of logic as a universal method for all sciences and as a science itself.

Scotus on Supposition

Abstract In his commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle’s Organon (Categories, Peri hermeneias, Sophistici elenchi, and Topics) and in his other works, John Duns Scotus shows his knowledge of both the modistic theory of language and the theory of supposition. My contribution sheds some light on the relationship between Scotus’ philosophy of language and the theory of supposition, collecting and commenting on all the passages in which he makes use of it or discusses some theoretical points. I take into special account the almost unknown commentary on the Topics, which is preserved in a Vatican manuscript.

Review of M. Spranzi, The art of dialectic between dialogue and rhetoric: The Aristotelian tradition

In The art of dialectic between dialogue and rhetoric, Spranzi (2011) explores the relation between the art of dialectic and the philosophical search for principles of methods of inquiry. By providing a reconstruction of the tradition of Aristotelian dialectic, she aims at elucidating the ‘‘epistemic significance’’ (p. 1) of dialectic. The reconstruction addresses a limited number of authors, all of which are chosen for their relevance in answering the question as to how the dialectical method may be instrumental in acquiring knowledge. In the first two chapters of the book Spranzi discusses the seminal passages in Aristotle’s Topica, Sophistici elenchi and Rhetorica, as well as the contributions of Cicero, Boethius and several medieval authors. She then discusses the developments in the tradition of dialectic that took place in the Renaissance, devoting three separate chapters to the contributions of Agricola, Nifo, and Sigonio respectively. In the final chapter, she describes the relationship between modern argumentation theory and the Aristotelian tradition of dialectic. Among the authors discussed are Toulmin, Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Walton, and Freeman. As to the methodology of her reconstruction of the tradition of dialectic, Spranzi indicates that she focuses on ‘‘dialectica docens’’ rather than ‘‘dialectica utens’’ (p. 3). This means that she reconstructs only those passages in which the authors explicitly reflect on the relationship between dialectic and the advancement of knowledge and stays away from passages in which the authors explain the technicalities of the dialectical discussion procedure. The actual reconstruction of the tradition of dialectic starts in chapter 1, Aristotle and the art of dialectic. In line with the central aim of her research, Spranzi highlights those passages in the works of Aristotle in which he explicitly reflects on the connection between the art of debate and the pursuance of knowledge. Having explained the central concepts of Aristotle’s Topica, she distinguishes between

Aristotle's Logical Works and His Conception of Logic

I provide a survey of the contents of the works belonging to Aristotle's Organon in order to define their nature, in the light of his declared intentions and of other indications (mainly internal ones) about his purposes. No unifying conception of logic can be found in them, such as the traditional one, suggested by the very title Organon, of logic as a methodology of demonstration. Logic for him can also be formal logic (represented in the main by the De Interpretatione), axiomatized syllogistic (represented in the main by the Prior Analytics) and a methodology of dialectical and rhetorical discussion. The consequent lack of unity presented by those works does not exclude that both the set of works called Analytics and the set of works concerning dialectic (Topics and Sophistici Elenchi) form a unity, and that a certain priority is attributed to the analytics with respect to dialectic.

Aristotle on the fallacies of combination and division in Sophistici Elenchi 4

This paper discusses the fallacies of combination and division as they are presented by Aristotle in chapter 4 of his Sophistici Elenchi. Aristotle's examples are concise, their discussion is unclear, and it is difficult to distinguish the cases of combination from those of division. I analyse the Aristotelian examples and the interpretations offered so far. I show that these interpretations suffer from a major defect: they fail to identify a common characteristic whereby the Aristotelian examples can be classified as instances of combination or division. In my reconstruction of the examples, I repair this deficiency: I give a single pattern of explanation for the fallacy of combination and another (similar) pattern for the fallacy of division. Thus, it is possible to free Aristotle from the following charges: (i) he did not clearly distinguish between combination and division, and (ii) he reduced combination and division to a single fallacy. My explanation of the fallacies uses the notion of scope of an expression: in modern terminology, the fallacy of combination can be described as ‘fallacy of the wide scope’, the fallacy of division as ‘fallacy of the narrow scope’.

Aristotle, the Fallacy of Accident, and the Nature of Predication: A Historical Inquiry

Aristotle, the Fallacy of Accident, and the Nature of Predication: A Historical Inquiry AN|BAL A. BUENO 1. In the analysis of informal fallacies in English-language logical treatises we usually find one called the fallacy of accident and another that is characterized as its converse. The latter is also usually called the fallacy a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, or simply secundum quid. Accident is usually defined as the application of a general rule to a case in which, because of some accidental feature it possesses, the rule does not apply. Sometimes the fallacy is defined in more traditional language as inferring of a subject with an accident that which is known to be the case of the subject only. The converse fallacy is defined as generalizing from an atypical or abnormal instance, or inferring of a subject that which is true of the subject with an accident. This fallacy is sometimes called hasty generalization. ~ The preceding definitions of these fallacies lead to serious difficulties which have been analyzed by some theorists, but their objections have not yet led to a general reassessment of them. 2The main criticisms are the following. ' See Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic, 6th ed. (NewYork: Macmillan, 1982), lO6-7; Henry Byerly,A Primer ofLogic (Harper and Row, 1973),47-48; John Grier Higben, Logic. Deductive and Inductive (NewYork: Scribners, x912), 161; W. StanleyJevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic: Deductive andlnductive (NewYork and London: 19o4), 176-78. ' A discussion of these difficulties maybe found in Aristotle on Fallacies or The Sophistici Elenchi, trans, and ed. Edward Poste (London, 1866), 158. See also H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (Oxford, 19o6,2d ed. 1916;reprint 1931),587-88. C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies (London: x97o), 25-31 . [5] 6 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:i JANUARY i988 1. There are many arguments about which we cannot tell whether the inference moves from a particular or restricted case to a more general case, or vice versa. Let us consider an example:3 A person who thrusts a knife into another person's body is guilty of a crime and should be punished. Surgeons thrust knives into other people's bodies. Therefore, surgeons are criminals and should be punished. This argument may be interpreted in two ways. We can consider the first premiss as a general rule (namely thrusting a knife without any further qualification ) and the second as a more restricted case (thrusting a knife with the intention of curing). Under this interpretation, the inference moves from a broader to a more restricted case, and the argument is a case of the fallacy of accident. But we can also interpret the first premiss as a qualified statement that refers to thrusting a knife with the intention of harming a person, and the second as the general case of thrusting a knife without any further qualification . Now the movement of meaning is reversed, and the argument becomes a case of secundum quid. In view of the fact that many arguments can be construed as one or the other fallacy, the distinction seems artificial. That it is difficult to distinguish between the two fallacies is clearly shown by the fact that a classical example of secundum quid: What you buy at the market today, you will eat tomorrow. You bought raw meat at the market today. Therefore, you will eat raw meat tomorrow. This is cited by I. Copi and by M. R. Cohen and E. Nagel in their well-known logic books as an instance of accident.4 Augustus De Morgan remarked that "this piece of meat has remained uncooked, fresh as ever, a prodigious time."5 The meat may still be fresh, but the fallacy has changed. In fact, many arguments move neither from a general to a restricted case, nor in the opposite direction, but from one special case to another. For this reason both De Morgan and W. S. Jevons proposed a third type of fallacy, namely "arguing from one special case to another special case," or a dicto secundum quid ad dictum secundum alterum quid, but this suggestion has found no acceptance. 6 3 I have borrowed this example and the...

Is “Canis Currit” Ungrammatical?

Summary The main theme of Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi is false but apparently valid reasoning. Aristotle operates with a special class of fallacies depending on features of language. In that connection he touches on many questions of relevance to the grammarian. In their commentaries on the Elenchi, medieval scholars develop the hints given by Aristotle and introduce new problems of their own invention. Thus they discuss the generic use of singular nouns, the scope of conjunctions and modal expressions, suprasegmental phonemes, constructional ambiguities, the tense of participles, and parsing. Discussions of the last-named point revolve around the example canis currit. Canis is an equivocal term. Is it then one constituent of a sentence (one pars orationis) or is it more than one pars orationis? If it is several partes orationis, why is canis currunt ungrammatical? To save the grammatically of canis currit modistic logicians split the modi significandi into modi significandi ‘activi’ and modi significandi ‘passivi’, the latter attaching to the ‘things’ qua conceptualized in a certain way and signified as such by means of words, the former attaching to the words qua significative in some definite way. By letting the active modi significandi be the basis of construction they could save the grammaticality of canis currit. But the solution breaks with the fundamental idea of modistic grammar, the derivation of grammatical categories relevant to syntax from the conceptualized reality, and introduces an explanation of syntax founded on surface categorization of words. There was a reaction against this about 1300. Later Elenchi commentators seem to have lost interest in the subject.

The Stoics on Ambiguity

The Stoics on Ambiguity R. BLAIR EDLOW IN SPITE OF A REVIVALof interest in the Stoic theory of language and logic that followed the publication of Benson Mates' Stoic Logic, 1 there has been no systematic study devoted to the ancient Stoic teaching on ambiguity (~t~tq~t~o~a). One major obstacle has been the scarcity of testimony in the extant tradition. Another has been textual corruption of the most informative doxographical account2 of the early Stoic (or Chrysippean) theory,a This last problem is overcome, however, by a long neglected 1903 dissertation4 containing an edition of Galen's De Captionibus, which includes this significant account. Much of my interpretation of the Stoic doctrine will be speculative. The documents that would provide a foundation for a more detailed study have not survived. Nevertheless , my hope is that by making this doctrine (based on present evidence) accessible to historians of philosophy and philosophers of language, some further ground may be gained in determining the nature of this Stoic teaching. The philosopher may be interested in studying ambiguity on both theoretical and practical grounds. On the one hand, theoretical reflection on ambiguity attempts to systematize and explain for its own sake this pervasive feature of language. Such work on ambiguity is justified simply by the increase in knowledge and insight it yields. On the other hand, there is considerable practical value in reflecting on the notion of ambiguity. It may aid the philosopher not only to recognize and avoid its occurrence in his own reasoning, but also to detect ambiguity in the discourse of others. Ambiguity, of course, is a main cause of argument invalidity.5 x Earlier in the century, Jan Lukasiewicz explored the Stoic theory of propositional logic in "Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des Aussagenkalkuls," in Comptes Rendus des S~ances de la Socidtd des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, XXIII (1930), Classe III, 51-77. 2 This text is most accessible to scholars as fragment 153 in H. von Arnim, ed., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964), II, 45--46 (hereafter SVF). Von Arnim's text is based on the C. G. Kiihn edition of De Captionibus penes Dictionem, in Galen, Opera Omnia, XIV (Leipzig, 1827), 582-598. a It is assumed here that the Stoic doctrine is wholly or at least primarily that of Chrysippus (c. 280-207 B.C.),who is reputed to have written seven treatises (in seventeen books) on the subject of ambiguity (dtp.tpt~o~ct).For the list of titles, SeeSVF II, #14 (which is the same as Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum 7. 193). Von Arnim suggests that the entire discussion of the Stoic teaching that appears in Galen's De Captionibus is probably drawn from Chrysippus' "~e0~ ~qxtp~6o~.t~,"(SVF II, 46n.). 4 Carl Gabler, ed., Libellus de Captionibus quae per Dictionem Fiunt (Rostock, 1903). I am indebted to Professor Phillip DeLacy of the University of Pennsylvania who drew my attention to this work. William and Martha Kneale cursorily dismiss De Captionibus as a "little tract on fallacies" in The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 182; and C. L. Hamblin in Fallacies, University Paperbacks (London: Methuen, 1972), p. 98, in a footnote, without argument questions the status of De Captionibus as a genuine work of Galen. 5 A famous example of a fallacy arising from ambiguity appears in J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. by O. Piest, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Library of Liberal Arts Press, 1957), p. 44: "The only [423] 424 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The study of ambiguity for the Stoics falls under the heading of Logic,6 one of their three divisions of philosophy (along with Ethics and Physics).7 The Stoics' interest in ambiguity, I will argue, is motivated at least in part by their concern to expose and explain certain fallacies, those caused by either an ambiguous premise or conclusion. Discussing ambiguity and fallacy in the same treatise is a common practice in antiquity: Aristotle treats ambiguity in the context of his work on fallacy in Sophistici Elenchi,8 and Galen (although writing nearly four centuries after the Stoics) theorizes about ambiguity in his book on fallacy (De Captionibus). As...

Iacobus Veneticus Grecus: Canonist and Translator of Aristotle

James the Venetian and Greek is slowly emerging from the darkness which has shrouded his name and personality for seven centuries. He now appears as a learned canonist who would be called upon to give advice on important matters, and as the most active and successful pioneer of Latin Aristotelianism in the tweltfh century. He was probably the first to translate into Latin Aristotle's Physics, De anima, Metaphysics, and parts of the Parva Naturalia; he translated anew, after Boethius, the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistici Elenchi; some commentaries on this latter group of works were either written or translated by him; he also rendered into Latin a prologue to the Physics. Ten generations of Latin-speaking scholars and philosophers read the Posterior Analytics almost exclusively in his translation; his versions of the Physics, De anima, three books of the Metaphysics, and some of the Parva Naturalia held the ground almost unchanged for more than a century, and, not substantially revised, for two more centuries. Our philosophical language owes to him many of its technical terms. Hardly anything is known of the circumstances of his life, and only vague hypotheses may be formulated on his possible connections with other learned men of his time, particularly with John of Salisbury. It may well be that his interests developed in the atmosphere of Constantinople, saturated with Aristotelian studies, in or around the university where the pupils of another Graeco-Italian philosopher, Ioannes Italos, were keeping alive and renewing the traditions of the fifth and sixth-century commentators of Aristotle.