Socratic Intellectualism Research Articles

THE SOCRATIC INTELLECTUALISM

The subject of this inquiry is the analysis of the so-called Socratic intellectualism that was put forward by Socrates’ student, Plato, in his dialogue Protagoras. The two leading questions that we shall raise are: how does Plato formulate this position, and can it actually be ascribed to Socrates (as it is traditionally done)? Firstly, we shall address the part of the dialogue in which Plato, through Socrates, lays down this position, while trying to explicate its formulation and the argument that Plato offers for it. Secondly, by looking at the context of the dialogue itself, that is, by trying to see what are the main questions that are raised — what virtue is, can it be taught, and is it the skill that sophists propose to teach — we shall try to show, through a careful reading of the dialogue, that the Socratic intellectualism, a position traditionally ascribed to Socrates, but a radical consequence of sophistical skill that Protagoras proposes to teach, which Socrates unravels through his elenctic method.

LBT, Socratic Intellectualism, and Self-Knowledge

This paper offers a genealogy of the ancient predecessors of Logic-Based Therapy (LBT). While LBT has an apparent affinity with Stoicism, I argue that LBT has a tripartite foundation in Socratic Rational Inquiry, Platonic philosophical psychology, and Aristotelean ethics. Secondly, I argue that LBT could help a client attain self-knowledge and “moral proprioception.” Given that LBT involves an examination of one’s belief system(s) and a recognition of the subconscious faulty premises, it may implement a new, more adaptive understanding. By targeting self-defeating habits of interpreting the world, LBT can give clients a new self-understanding that enables them to interact with others and avoid unfortunate life choices and ways of interacting with significant others. I offer a hypothetical case from fiction pointing to the way LBT could transform the character’s life. LBT may enrich other therapeutic modalities, such as psychoanalysis or psychiatry, but it achieves different goals.

Aristóteles, el socrático. Algunos límites de la crítica aristotélica al intelectualismo socrático

Revista de la División de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales. Es un espacio de difusión de las tendencias de investigación y teorización en el campo de la filosofía en el ámbito nacional e internacional. Circula semestralmente desde el 2006.

The art of the good life

Plato’s Gorgias sees Socrates frequently compare justice to the practice of a techné. This comparison has traditionally been taken to express the so-called doctrine of Socratic intellectualism, according to which knowledge of the good necessarily leads to living a good life. But such interpretations overlook how crucial techn? is to Socrates’ conception of justice — justice is not merely analogous to techn? but governed by the same logos. What we find is thus not so much an argument for a particular moral psychology, as it is an account of an inherent technicity of ethics. This article uncovers Plato’s account of ethics’ relationship with artifice, both in Gorgias and The Republic as well as in the ethical philosophy of Aristotle, suggesting that the question of ethics and artifice has always held high importance in Western philosophy, and that we should regard it with the same importance today.

Sócrates sobre ser bom

The main aim of this paper is to present an interpretation of what Socrates understood by being good for a human being. Starting from the evidence in the Symposium that Socrates himself was a phronimos and sophron person, I seek to show how Socratic ethics is centered on the thesis of the (1) identity of virtue and knowledge, which I articulate with the theme of (2) Socratic ignorance, and (3) the role of Socrates as an educator, to display how Socrates attempted to help people to improve themselves. In order to explore the core of Socratic moral thought, I take into account Penner’s explanation of Socratic intellectualism endorsing his description of what being good for a person means, but not following his conclusions. Then I argue that even if Socrates had held moral beliefs and been to a certain degree wise and virtuous, the moral knowledge, virtue, wisdom or the science of the good that only the gods completely master should not be ascribed to him. Socrates often made profession of ignorance. In the Apology , the knowledge that he admits to having and that makes him wiser than the others is “human wisdom”, that is, the recognition of his own ignorance and, in general, human ignorance about how to live well. Endowed with this self-knowledge, Socrates assumed the educational task to try to free people from the worst ignorance: not to know and to think that you know. Through philosophy practiced as examination by refutation ( elenchos ), he did his best to lead his fellows to self-knowledge, to take care of their souls, to dedicate themselves to phronesis , truth, and perfection of soul, in sum, to be prudent; this is the only way in which a person would do well, be good and happy. Keywords: Socrates, virtue, knowledge, being good.

Socratic Appetites as Plotinian Reflectors: A New Interpretation of Plotinus’s Socratic Intellectualism

Enneads I: 8.14 poses significant problems for scholars working in the Plotinian secondary literature. In that passage, Plotinus gives the impression that the body and not the soul is causally responsible for vice. The difficulty is that in many other sections of the same text, Plotinus makes it abundantly clear that the body, as matter, is a mere privation of being and therefore represents the lowest rung on the proverbial metaphysical ladder. A crucial aspect to Plotinus's emanationism, however, is that lower levels of a metaphysical hierarchy cannot causally influence higher ones and, thus, there is an inconsistency in the Egyptian's magnum opus, or so it would seem. Scholars have sought to work through this paradox by positing that Plotinus is a "paleolithic Platonist" or Socratic. The advantage of this approach is that one may be able to resolve the tension by invoking Socrates's eliminativist solution to the problem of weakness of will, as found in The Protagoras. In the following article, I argue that such attempts are not wrong-headed just underdetermined. They take up the standard reading of Socratic moral intellectualism, namely the "informational" interpretation and, therefore, fail to render a coherent view of Plotinus's moral philosophy. The following paper, in contrast, utilizes a new reading of intellectualism advanced by Brickhouse and Smith, which, when subtended with a "powers approach" to causality, resolves the aforementioned, problematic passage of Enneads.

Alcibiades’ Akrasia: Reason for Wrongdoing?

Abstract I will argue that, due to the level of attention given to comparing and contrasting Socratic Intellectualism with the Republic, the question of the possibility of akrasia in Plato’s thought has not yet been adequately formulated. I will instead be focusing on Plato’s Symposium, situating Alcibiades at its epicentre and suggesting that his case should be read as highlighting some of Plato’s concerns with Socratic Intellectualism. These concerns arise from the following position of Socratic Intellectualism: knowing the greater good will necessarily entail doing good, and will thereby remove the motivational content of prior knowledge of what is good. Through Alcibiades, Plato explores the possibility of a negative reaction to knowledge of the greater good. Importantly, rather than simply arising as a result of being overcome by the passions, Alcibiades’ negative reaction assumes that rational freedom is required to reject the greater good (virtue) in favour of the lesser.

¿Es la ἀκρασία posible en las "Leyes"? Derivas platónicas en torno a un problema socrático1

Platonic philosophy is deeply marked by an epistemological concern. In this context Plato adopts the so called “Socratic Intellectualism”, which implies a strong rejection of the possibility of incontinent actions, weakness of will or akrasia . In this paper I will try to show that Plato himself undertook a revision of that Socratic theory in the Laws , above all because of a profound change in his conception regarding human nature.

Moral Psychology in Plato’s Gorgias

This essay intends to argue for the affinity between the Gorgias and the Republic concerning issues of moral psychology. To this end I will divide my argument into two halves. The first half will show how the Calliclean moral psychology outlined at 491e-492a implies the possibility of conflict within the soul, especially regarding the relationship between epithumiai and shame. It will then argue that Socrates recognizes the appetitive element of the soul in his reply to Callicles but does not explore its consequences in any depth. The second half will contend that thumos – in the form of shame – is represented dramatically, and to some extent theoretically by Plato as one source of human motivation independent from reason, and recognized as such by the Calliclean position. My ultimate goal is to show how Plato raises questions in the Gorgias that hint at the theory of the tripartite soul expounded in book IV of the Republic , even though the answers here remain insufficient. The Gorgias therefore invites its readers to reflect critically on so-called Socratic intellectualism pointing to a more complex conception of human motivation that will be developed in the Republic .

’Aκρασία and desire

Although he does not use the phrase, in Book VII of the Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle contends with the philosophical problem of socratic intellectualism, attempting to unwind the apparent paradox of the ἀκρατής, the man who knows what he ought to do and who fails to do it. As part of this project, he examines the mechanism of the practical syllogism, knowledge in terms of potency and act, as well as ignorance and knowledge. In this essay, I will briefly review Aristotles’ endeavor, emphasizing the role of desire in the practical syllogism. By taking apart the example syllogism he uses, I will argue that desire plays a fundamental role in the deliberative process and functions as a kind of implicit universal premise. In doing so, I will show the interaction between reason and desire and the way in which the latter plays a pivotal part in the conclusion of the practical syllogism. Finally, insofar as desire can be understood as one of the premises of the syllogism and thus a kind of ‘knowledge,’ I will conclude by arguing that moral development consists in reason determining the proper mean for each of the virtues, and that it has an important role in cultivating the emotions, ordering them to the principles of practical wisdom.

Deseos y Valores. El intelectualismo socrático y la tripartición del alma en la República

In the Republic Plato seems to abandon the Socratic intellectualism when he accepts the existence of desires that are independent of the good. Nevertheless, this does not prevent him from still affirming that “every soul pursues the good and for its sake does all that it does”. In order to solve the apparent contradiction I propose in this article to distinguish between desires and values. The desires, generated by the parts of the soul, are closely attached to their proper objects, but the values add to them images of the good and other cognitive elements that transform the desires into acceptable motives for action within the unity of the soul. Therefore I propose to distinguish between the wish of the parts and another kind of volition that operates in the unity of the soul sub specie boni in order to decide between opposed desires which compete with one another.

ARISTÓTELES E A REFUTAÇÃO DO INTELECTUALISMO SOCRÁTICO NA EXPLICAÇÃO DA ACRASIA EM EN VII 1-3

I claim that Aristotle does not make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In these chapters, Aristotle intends exactly the opposite, which is to refute the Socratic thesis that attributes to ignorance the cause of akrasia. I understand that Aristotle’s procedure has two parts whose boundaries are demarcated by the introduction of phusik?s argument. In the first part Aristotle shows some ways of having knowledge that do not produces action in order to contradict the Socratic thesis. In the second part is shown how akratic failure takes place and how it is explained by Aristotelian conception of practical knowledge. Thus, by saying in the conclusion to this second part that Socrates somehow was right, Aristotle does not mean to make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism. Rather, he means that the sentence that conveys the Socratic position by itself could be interpreted as correct, but, despite this, it is an important piece of a complete incorrect theory.

The Myth of Plato’s Socratic Period

Abstract:A hypothesis first proposed in the nineteenth century has since the middle of the twentieth century been approaching mythical status. It is the hypothesis that in the course of Plato’s philosophical ‘development’, he passed through a ‘Socratic period’ in which he was principally devoted to representing the philosophy of the historical Socrates rather than his own. This Socratic philosophy is found in the so-called early dialogues and is sometimes called ‘Socratic intellectualism’. According to the myth, Plato only developed and wrote down his own philosophical position in the middle and late dialogues. In this paper, I challenge the myth, arguing that there is no external evidence to support the initial hypothesis and significant evidence for rejecting it. In fact, Plato was probably in some sense a proponent of Pythagoreanism and a ‘two-world metaphysics’ well before he wrote anything. The claim that, external evidence notwithstanding, the early dialogues actually contain a philosophical position substantially different from that of later dialogues is also unfounded. Although Plato’s thought continually developed within the context of ongoing Academic discussions, nowhere in any of the dialogues is Plato’s ‘otherworldy’ revisionist philosophy absent.

Nihilistisches Geschichtsdenken: Nietzsches perspektivische Genealogie

Nihilistisches Geschichtsdenken: Nietzsches perspektivische Genealogie

Colloquium 7: Plotinus’s Socratic Intellectualism

The Platonic tradition offered Plotinus two, possibly conflicting, explanations of why people do wrong: the Socratic intellectualism of the Protagoras and the Timaeus and the account of the akratic soul in the Republic. In this paper I argue that Plotinus tacitly rejects akrasia, because it suggests that the superior part of the soul is overcome by inferior parts. It thus sits ill with Plotinus’s doctrine of the impassive soul. He prefers Socratic intellectualism instead. Socratic intellectualism holds that all wrongdoing is due to ignorance and hence occurs involuntarily. Plotinus understands ignorance in this context as the failure of the embodied soul to fully actualize its powers, in particular its knowledge of the Forms. This knowledge is needed in order to correctly evaluate our desires that stir us into action. These desires arise spontaneously from the body and hence they occur involuntarily.

Commentary On Van Den Berg

I agree with Robbert Van den Berg that Plotinus endorses Socratic intellectualism, but I challenge his view that Plotinus rejects the phenomenon of akrasia. According to Van den Berg, the only form of akrasia acknowledged by Plotinus is a conditional, or ‘weak,’ akrasia. I provide some reasons for thinking that Plotinus might have accepted complete or ‘strong’ akrasia—full stop. While such strong forms of akrasia are usually taken to conflict with Socratic intellectualism, I argue that Plotinus’s complex, dual-self psychology allows a way in which he, unique among ancient philosophers (and perhaps any thinker in the history of philosophy), could simultaneously endorse Socratic intellectualism and hard akrasia.

FROM IRONY TO ENIGMA: DISCOVERING DOUBLE IGNORANCE AND SOCRATES’ DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

To dismiss the problems of Socratic moral intellectualism as well as Socratic irony (with respect to his claims of ignorance) in the following we shall first discuss how there are different forms of not-knowing in the Platonic dialogues. By referencing various passages throughout Plato’s entire corpus we shall see that like his nuanced understanding of knowledge, Plato also delineated between kinds of ignorance with only one denying virtue and the good life to individuals. This will prove that Socrates does not associate with a reprehensible state when he claims ignorance and thus there is no need to appeal to irony when he makes such avowals of not-knowing. In the second half of this essay I will also suggest that the knowledge to which Socrates appeals is not an “ironic” appeal to human knowledge, as various scholars have argued, but is a sincere appeal to divine knowledge, i.e. immediate wisdom, which all human beings possess and rely on in their daily lives. In other words, Socratic knowing is a kind of enigmatic knowing which must be understood as a pre-theoretical, unexamined or innate wisdom. For Socrates all individuals “possess” such wisdom but in order to do the work that is “properly” human, i.e. the work allowing for virtue, one must enigmatically marry this “knowledge” with recognized ignorance.

Remembering Socrates: philosophical essays

Introduction 1. Socrates's dialectic in Xenophon's Memorabilia 2. Socratic intellectualism in Xenophon and Plato 3. Socrates and hedonism 4. Socrates and Euthyphro: the argument and its revival 5. Did Socrates agree to obey the law of Athens? 6. Aporia and searching in the early Plato 7. Types of definition in the Meno 8. Definition in Plato's Meno 9. Sharing a property 10. Socrates the Sophist 11. Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic 12. The early Christian reception of Socrates

Some Central Elements of Socratic Political Theory

The fundamental concepts of Socratic political theory are statesmanship or the art of politics, and the good of the city. Important scholars have denied that, on Socrates’ view, statesmanship as such is possible. But Socratic intellectualism does not commit him to the view that the methods of politics, such as legislation and punishment, are useless. The Socratic tradition in political theory is rich and varied. Among the dimensions of variation are: the relationship between statesmanship and other arts of rule; what are the limits of reasonable human ambition; and the relationship between the well-being of the city and the well-being of its parts. At the core of Socratic moral and political theory is a commitment to choose what is truly good. Varieties of Socratic value theory arise from the different ways in which this commitment is interpreted, and the range of realms to which it is applied.

Socratic Reason and Socratic Revelation

Socratic Reason and Socratic Revelation MARK L. MCPHERRAN IN MANYLONGSTANDINGand influential interpretations of his views, Socrates is portrayed as a figure of our own Enlightenment: a consummate intellectualist, whose "paradoxical" view that "virtue is knowledge" grounds a moral theory that takes discursive rationality as our only trustworthy guide in life. This version of Socrates--as opposed to what I consider the more accurate one-has him conducting his mission of moral inquiry by one method alone: the "elenctic" examination of belief-consistency by the interrogation of an interlocutor . For this Socrates, then, extrarational religious experiences do not contribute significantly to the pursuit of the "examined life." Hence, it is not surprising that some advocates of this portrait have understood Socrates to have been a kind of atheist or agnostic, and his positive references to divine beings and "signs" are thus construed as examples of his infamous irony.' This portrait, however, results from overlooking and misinterpreting the wealth of evidence for a religious Socrates, a man who takes as his guide in matters great and small (Ap. 4oa4-6) the promptings of a supernatural voice (the daimonion) and who has a special calling to do philosophy because "to do this [philosophizing] has been commanded [prostetaktai] of me... by the god through oracles and through dreams [ek mantei6n kai ex enupni6n] and by every other means in which a divinity has ever commanded [prosetaxe]anyone to do anything" (Ap. 33c4-7; cf. 3oa5). The thesis that we ought to take such textual evidence seriously is one ' See, e.g., L. Versenyi, Holiness andJustice (Washington, D.C., 1982). See also M. Nussbaum, "Commentary on Edmunds," in J. Cleary, ed., Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy [PBACAP] i 0985): 234-35, and A. Nehamas, "Socratic Intellectualism," in Cleary, ed,, PBACAP ~ 0986): 3o5-3o6, who attempt to explain away Socrates' trust in divination. Many commentators, however, elect to underplay, rather than deny, Socratic reliance on the extrarational ; e.g., one finds very little mention of dreams and the daimonion in T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), and G. Santas, Socrates (Boston, 1979). [345] 346 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:3 JULY 1991 worth arguing for in detail, something I cannot do here. ~ Instead, I shall simply assume that a somewhat traditionally religious Socrates is our best historical bet, in order to explore a problem engendered by this assumption,s namely, given that Socrates is not only a rationalistic philosopher, but accepts (in some sense) traditional incursions by the divine, how are we to reconcile the two opposed epistemological commitments implicit in these two aspects of the one man? Again, in his purely intellectualist guise, Socrates informs us (in word and deed) that we must only be persuaded by the best reason (logos), and it is natural to take this as meaning the secular ratiocination provided by Socrates' characteristic elenctic method (employing both syllogistic and epagogic [analogical] reasoning).4 As he puts it at Crito 46b4-6: C Not now for the first time, but always, I am the sort of man who is persuaded by nothing except the reason [t6 log6] that seems best to me when I reason [logizomen6] about the matter. But in our most reliable recreations of Socratic thought, the early Platonic dialogues, the elenchus fails to secure any complete Socratic definitions of the virtues. Socrates himself constantly confirms these results by proclaiming that he is entirely ignorant of expert moral knowledge and is simply "aware of being wise in nothing, great or small" (Ap. 2 lb2-5). This attitude of rationalistic skepticism and the commitment to reason testified to by C are thus very much in striking contrast with the attitude underlying Socrates' reliance on oracles, dreams, and the daimonion. Socrates never explains how he can be sure that he is not the victim of religious hallucinations, and at first glance we may see little rational justification for his religion-based claims. Moreover, his acceptance of theological postulates and extrarational indicators seems to fly in the face of his philosophical grilling, and repudiation, of the religion-based claims of others (e.g., Euthyphro). To defuse this apparent paradox--and thus reconcile the rationalistic, skeptical...