Sociology Of Revolution Research Articles

Toward a Theory of Family and Revolution: Reflections on the Chinese Case

Attempts to theorize about the relationship between family and revolutionary change have been based largely upon the Russian case and have adopted universalistic functionalist and modernization approaches. Three major contrasts in the course of family revolution in China challenge the validity of these interpretations. By placing feminist questions at the center of inquiry and adopting a comparative historical approach to an analysis of the Chinese case, this paper attempts to contribute theoretical refinements to family sociology, sociology of revolutions and feminist theory. The analytic strategy explains distinctive outcomes of precise aspects of the prerevolutionary family systems, the revolutionary processes and the postrevolutionary development strategies. A rudimentary theory of family revolution is proposed to explain the apparent failures and limitations of attempts to establish sexual equality via family transformation without precluding future success as a theoretical possibility.

Edmund Burke and the Sociology of Revolution

A sociological theory of revolution can be found in the writings of Edmund Burke. This is important because modern sociologists of revolution have neglected Burke in surveying their predecessors; because the modern sociology of revolution has evaded some of the key questions about revolution raised in classical political theory; and because many influential writers on Burke have misrepresented and gravely underrated his theory of revolution. This article presents the evidence for Burke's sociology of revolution and offers a revisionist critique of the conventional scholarship in this area.

A Rejoinder to Mann

In reviewing John Dunn on Modern Revolutions and myself on Social Order , Reform , and Revolution, ( Sociology , 7: 1, Jan. 1973, pp. 149-50) Michael Mann applauds Dunn's book and suggests that Dunn is only kidding in his critical remarks on the sociology of revolution. On reading his review of my own book, my initial impression was that Mann must be kidding too. On re-reading it, however, I gathered that Mann was actually serious in his remarks. No author should mind if a reviewer expresses dislike of his work but the reasons for such dislike should not misrepresent the author nor be untenable. As Mann's review does misrepresent my views, I would be grateful for space to reply to his criticisms. (1) Mann summarizes my basic argument as 'reform and revolution are different ways in which the periphery can take advantage of contradictions between (i) different subsystems and (ii) forces and relations of production in any subsystem, to act against the centre and reduce the rate of exploitation'. In the very first chapter, however, reform and revolution are distinguished in terms of their relative institutionalization rather than in terms of their protagonists and it is argued that, in a structurally differentiated society, revolution can be implemented by one or more power centres. Secondly, although they obviously play an important part in more radical social changes (whether reforms or revolution), I do not see contradictions as the only source of change. (2) Mann then proceeds to quote me out of context to the effect that normative order is the key factor in historical materialism. The quotation actually has as referent only Gramsci whose views I earlier allude to as being distinctive, and not Lenin, Marx, or Engels. I also emphasize throughout the discussion of classical Marxism that the economic base is there seen as the primary force in societal dynamics. This misquote has a function, however, since it enables Mann to make a joke about Hegel being turned on his feet again the same joke as has often been made about Gramsci, whose views I was describing, and Lukacs. It is true that I argue that normative factors (which are not to be equated with the superstructure a residual phenomenon) are important in Marxist theory, particularly when it comes to explain social order rather than impending revolution, but I also point out the important differences in this and other respects from functionalism. (3) I am then reproached with the failure, having mentioned Althusser and Granisci, to develop or probe the relations between the economic base and superstructure and the manner in which economic factors are determinant in the last instance. As Mann himself argues in his recent monograph on working class consciousness, Althusser is concerned to establish a multicausal approach to structural dynamics and can be read as showing how the last resort may never arrive owing to an earlier ruptural overdetermination of various contradictions. Gramsci goes further and treats the superstructure as the key factor. Given all this, along with the ambiguity of the base-superstructure distinction, my own argument that the different power systems are irreducible to each other, my concern with all societies and not just those capitalist societies in which the economic centre is dominant, and my belief that the forces/ relations of production concept can be generalized, it would seem that, in developing a multicausal approach, I am in fact following one possible line of development from Althusser albeit not that which Mann prescribes. (4) Later in his review, Mann holds that my use of 'cultural power' to include control over every type of value, belief, or socially derived meaning is vacuous. He also finds it odd that I relate culture to the relations of production. Having been reproached earlier for being insufficiently Althusserian, I suppose one must take pleasure in being more Althusserian than Mann in

Quantitative Studies of the French Revolution

Revolutions have fascinated moralists, political theorists, and historians for centuries. Since 1789, the prevalence of and, perhaps more important, the threat of have been pervasive forces in contemporary society. Social scientists and other students of the human condition have launched inquiries with an extremely wide diversity of objectives and methods; and we feel it necessary, in order to delineate our own approach, to distinguish among the variety of activities commonly collected under the titles of revolution or the sociology of revolution.' Some writers have attempted to discern, beneath the violence and chaos of revolutions and the diversity of revolutionary experiences, a more or less uniform pattern of development, advancing a natural of revolution. Such studies concentrate on the course of events in revolutions once they have begun, rather than, for example, on the patterns of recruitment of leaders and followers into revolutionary movements, or the conditions of social structure before revolutions break out, or the consequences of revolutionary episodes for the history of society. Such work is invariably and necessarily comparative. In the natural approach, is regarded as a species, of which the French, the Russian, and the American might be selected specimens. The object about which generalizations are desired is the class of all revolutions, whose common taxonomically defining elements are sought.2 Other theories and comparative efforts go beyond such attempts to generalize over the class of all revolutions, in order to seek common elements in such broader categories as internal war or conflicts within nations.3 While we

The Sociology of Revolution.Pitirim A. Sorokin

Previous articleNext article FreeReviewsThe Sociology of Revolution. Pitirim A. Sorokin John GriersonJohn Grierson Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 31, Number 3Nov., 1925 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/213896 Views: 24Total views on this site PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The Sociology of Revolution.

The Sociology of Revolution.