In Knowledge and Social Imagery, David Bloor suggests that logical reasoning is radically relativistic in the sense that there are incompatible ways of reasoning logically, and no culturally transcendent rules of correct logical inference exist which could allow for adjudication of these different ways of reasoning. Bloor cites an example of reasoning used by the Azande as an illustration of such logical relativism. A close analysis of this reasoning reveals that the Azande's logic is in fact impeccably Aristotelian. I argue that the conclusions Bloor can legitimately draw from his case study are not controversial and do nothing to make plausible the thesis of logical relativism. The thesis that the knowledge we claim to possess is culturally relative in some philosophically significant sense has gained increasing prominence in recent years. Relativism has for some time been a concern of many sociologists of knowledge and philosophers of science.' More recently it has entered into the heart of debates about the purpose and future direction of philosophy as a whole. The moves toward 'post-analytic' philosophy and 'cultural hermeneutics' prominently include the assertion that knowledge must be viewed relativistically. The relativist claims not just that different cultures or historical eras will know different propositions, but also that there is no culturally transcendent concept of knowledge which will allow objective adjudication of a given knowledge-claim. Not only is a knowledge-claim sufficiently legiti