The phenomenon of heroism is multifaceted, and it can be viewed as representations of collective memory or through the lens of attitudes towards the country and its future. The theoretical foundation of this research is based, on the one hand, on a philosophical analysis of the semantic meanings of the concepts «hero» and «heroism», including variations in different cultures, and it defines the constants of the national semantics of heroism. On the other hand, it relies on the sociological theory of N. K. Mikhailovsky and the theory of social action, particularly the affective (borderline) theory. It also draws on the developments in creative and relational theories (M. Emirbayer, A. Mische), and relational sociology by P. Donati. The empirical part of the study involves the analysis of data from quota-based online surveys with a random sample, conducted by a group of sociologists and philosophers from the Institute of Sociology of the FCTAS RAS, Tyumen State University, and Vernadsky Crimean Federal University at the beginning of 2023. The survey included 1350 respondents from eight federal districts of the Russian Federation. The research results showed that heroes and heroism remain predominantly associated with the Soviet past, when the names, faces, and destinies of heroes were known from childhood, and the entire era was considered heroic. Heroism was ideologically supported and socially constructed during that time. In the present, heroes are usually depersonalised and associated with a group, such as the military or professionals. Post-Soviet generations had difficulty naming a hero on their own, as for a long time there was no social demand for this type of personality and behaviour. Regarding contemporary Russia, half of the respondents expressed positive feelings of pride, hope, and love, while some felt concern, disappointment, and shame. Furthermore, the clustering of responses indicated that feelings towards Russia are variable and not exclusively dichotomous. Respondents could simultaneously express love, disappointment, and hope. As for the future, respondents were much clearer about their own personal future (70% or more) than about the future of the country. The Soviet generation was more optimistic about the country’s future compared to the post-Soviet generations. This, among other signs, may suggest that post-Soviet generations found themselves in a situation where there was not only no demand for heroic personalities but also the state did not articulate a clear vision of the country’s future. Therefore, they have formed their own view of their personal future, which is seen more clearly and independently of the state’s goalsetting, while heroes and heroism are primarily associated with the Soviet past.
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