Society Supplementary Research Articles

And therefore

ABSTRACT This article focuses on ‘therefore’ constructions such as ‘The switch is on, and therefore the lights are on’. We submit that the contribution of ‘therefore’ is to express a dependence as part of the core content of these constructions, rather than being conveyed by conventional implicature [Grice, H. P. 1975. “Logic and Conversation.” In The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy, edited by M. Ezcurdia, and R. J. Stainton, 41–58. Broadview Press; Potts, C. 2005. The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford University Press] or a triggered presupposition [Pavese, C. 2017. “On the Meaning of ‘Therefore’.” Analysis 77 (1): 88–97. Pavese, C. 2021. “Lewis Carroll’s Regress and the Presuppositional Structure of Arguments.” Linguistics and Philosophy; Stokke, A. 2017. “II—Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 91 (1): 127–147]. We argue that the standard objections to this view can be answered by relying on the general projection hypothesis defended by Roberts et al. and Simons et al. [Roberts, C., M. Simons, J. Tonhauser, and D. I. Beaver. 2009. Presuppositions, Conventional Implicature, and Beyond: A Unified Account of Projection; Simons, M., J. Tonhauser, D. Beaver, and C. Roberts. 2010. “What Projects and Why.” Semantics and Linguistic Theory 20: 309–327], leaving our view on solid ground.

Trivializing Conceptual Engineering

ABSTRACT Mark Pinder's (2019. “Conceptual Engineering, Metasemantic Externalism and Speaker-Meaning.” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy. doi:10.1093/mind/fzz069) ‘Speaker Meaning Picture of Conceptual Engineering’ trivializes the method of conceptual engineering, picturing it as too easy to be effective in contributing to solutions to philosophical problems. This article presents an argument for this conclusion, offers counter-replies to Pinder's replies, and paints a highly skeptical alternative picture of conceptual engineering. It also fills out an interpretation of Sally Haslanger's (2000. “Gender and Race: (What) are They? (What) do we Want Them to be?” Noûs 34 (1): 31–55; 2006. “What Good are our Intuitions? Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 80 (1): 89–118) methodology first sketched in Deutsch 2020.

Moral regret and moral feeling(s)

ABSTRACT In cases of apparent moral dilemmas, the feeling of regret reminds us that there were competing, morally significant options. Because Kant denies the existence of genuine conflicts of obligation [1996c. “The Metaphysics of Morals (1797).” In Practical Philosophy, edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor, 353–604. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.013, 6:224], he cannot explain the propriety and phenomenology of regret, or so it is traditionally argued [Williams, Bernard. 1965. “Symposium: Ethical Consistency.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 39: 103–138]. I argue that regret can be modelled as a painful and in-part retrospective version of what Kant calls ‘moral feeling’. Different moral feelings arise in different contexts of moral thought and represent our duties in ways that reflect our normative situations. Regret represents the relation between a past action and a general duty that we imagined fulfilling in a certain way but did not. For beings like us, moral feeling is a subjective condition on our being put under obligation at all. Absence of regret therefore suggests that an agent may no longer be, or perhaps never was, sincerely moved by the moral law.

The ontology of words: a structural approach

ABSTRACTWords form a fundamental basis for our understanding of linguistic practice. However, the precise ontology of words has eluded many philosophers and linguists. A persistent difficulty for most accounts of words is the type-token distinction [Bromberger, S. 1989. “Types and Tokens in Linguistics.” In Reflections on Chomsky, edited by A. George, 58–90. Basil Blackwell; Kaplan, D. 1990. “Words.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXIV: 93–119]. In this paper, I present a novel account of words which differs from the atomistic and platonistic conceptions of previous accounts which I argue fall prey to this problem. Specifically, I proffer a structuralist account of linguistic items, along the lines of structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics [Shapiro, S. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. Oxford University Press], in which words are defined in part as positions in larger linguistic structures. I then follow Szabò [1999. “Expressions and Their Representations.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195): 145–163] and Parsons [1990. “The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects.” Synthese 84: 303–346] in further defining words as quasi-concrete objects according to a representation relation. This view aims for general correspondence with contemporary generative linguistic approaches to the study of language.

Post-perceptual confidence and supervaluative matching profile

ABSTRACT Issues concerning the putative perception/cognition divide are not only age-old, but also resurface in contemporary discussions in various forms. In this paper, I connect a relatively new debate concerning perceptual confidence to the perception/cognition divide. The term ‘perceptual confidence’ is quite common in the empirical literature, but there is an unsettled question about it, namely: are confidence assignments perceptual or post-perceptual? John Morrison in two recent papers puts forward the claim that confidence arises already at the level of perception. In this paper, I first argue that Morrison’s case is unconvincing, and then develop one picture on perceptual precision with the notion of ‘matching profile’ (Peacocke, C. 1986. “The Inaugural Address: Analogue Content.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 60: 1–18) and ‘supervaluation’ (Van Fraassen, B. 1966. “Singular Terms, Truth-value Gaps, and Free Logic.” The Journal of Philosophy 63 (17): 481–495.), highlighting the fact that this is a vagueness account, which is similar to but importantly different from indeterminacy accounts (e.g. Stazicker, J. 2011. “Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy.” Mind and Language 26 (2): 156–184.). With this model in hand, there can be rich resources with which to draw a theoretical line between perception and cognition.

Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?)

Matthew Boyle [(2011). “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 223–241. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x] has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: (A) that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and (B) that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find claim (A) compelling, but argue that its tenability depends on how we view the metaphysics of knowledge, something Boyle does not consider. I argue that in the context of the standard account of knowledge as a kind of true belief – what I call the Belief Account of knowledge – the claim faces serious problems, and that these simply disappear if we instead adopt an Ability Account of knowledge, along the lines of that defended by John Hyman [(1999). “How knowledge Works.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 433–451; John Hyman (2015). Action, Knowledge, and the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press]. I find claim (B) less compelling, and a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest that once we reject the Belief Account of knowledge, and move over to an Ability Account, there is no explanatory role for (B) left to play.

On the Cognitive Role of Singular Thoughts

This paper offers a critical review of the notion of a “singular cognitive role”, which is central to some recent theories of singular thought. According to those theories, whether a thought is singular depends on the role it plays in the subject’s cognitive activity. We compare the two most developed accounts of this type: Crane’s (Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85(1):21–43 2011, The Objects of Thought2013) and Jeshion’s (New Essays on Singular Thought, 105–141, 2010). Both theories aim to capture the notion of a singular cognitive role in terms of mental files. We argue that Jeshion’s theory is much more promising as it provides a more detailed and non-circular characterization of the mental files responsible for singular thinking. We examine the prospects for enhancing that account in light of three major concerns about it present in the literature. First, we discuss whether the weakest aspect of the whole proposal, i.e. the condition for the initiation of mental files, can be replaced without debilitating the rest of the theory. Second, we examine Goodman’s (Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(2): 437–461 2014, The Philosophical Quarterly2015) argument against mental file theories of singular thought and show that it does not affect Jeshion’s account. Third, we argue against Sawyer (Mind and Language, 27(3):264–283 2012) that Jeshion’s notion of a singular cognitive role is in strong opposition to acquaintance-based theories of singular thought and cannot be incorporated into any of them. Thus, the paper concludes that Jeshion’s proposal, despite its shortcomings, is currently the most promising account of a singular cognitive role.

E. Lo Cascio and D. W. Rathbone (eds), Production and Public Powers in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume 26). Cambridge: The Cambridge Philological Society, 2000. Pp. iv + 99. ISBN 0-906014-25-5. £15.00/US$36.00.

E. Lo Cascio and D. W. Rathbone (eds), Production and Public Powers in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume 26). Cambridge: The Cambridge Philological Society, 2000. Pp. iv + 99. ISBN 0-906014-25-5. £15.00/US$36.00. - Volume 92

S. Morton Braund, R. Mayer (edd.): amor: roma Love and Latin Literature. Eleven Essays (and One Poem) by Former Research Students Presented to E. J. Kenney on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday. (Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume 22.) Pp. 208, 2 ills. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1999. Paper. ISBN: 0-906014-19-0.

S. Morton Braund, R. Mayer (edd.): amor: roma Love and Latin Literature. Eleven Essays (and One Poem) by Former Research Students Presented to E. J. Kenney on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday. (Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume 22.) Pp. 208, 2 ills. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1999. Paper. ISBN: 0-906014-19-0. - Volume 50 Issue 1

I–Derek Parfit

Journal Article I–Derek Parfit Get access Derek Parfit Derek Parfit Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 July 1997, Pages 99–130, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00021 Published: 19 August 2015

J. N. Adams: Wackernage's Law and the Placement of the Copula esse in Classical Latin. (Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume, 18.) Pp. vi+98. Cambridge: The Cambridge Philological Society, 1994. Paper.

J. N. Adams: Wackernage's Law and the Placement of the Copula esse in Classical Latin. (Cambridge Philological Society Supplementary Volume, 18.) Pp. vi+98. Cambridge: The Cambridge Philological Society, 1994. Paper. - Volume 46 Issue 2

Brentano's Thesis

Brentano's Thesis Get access Dermot Moran Dermot Moran Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 July 1996, Pages 1–28, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/70.1.1 Published: 30 July 2015

Epistemic Probability

Journal Article Epistemic Probability Get access Colin Howson, Colin Howson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Paul Castell Paul Castell Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 July 1996, Pages 63–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/70.1.63 Published: 30 July 2015

Moral Sentiments, and the Difference They Make

Moral Sentiments, and the Difference They Make Get access Annette C. Baier, Annette C. Baier Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Michael Luntley Michael Luntley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 July 1995, Pages 15–46, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/69.1.15 Published: 08 September 2015

Freedom as an Ideal

Journal Article Freedom as an Ideal Get access Raymond Geuss, Raymond Geuss Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Martin Hollis Martin Hollis Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 July 1995, Pages 87–112, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/69.1.87 Published: 08 September 2015

The Value of a Person

The Value of a Person Get access John Broome, John Broome Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Adam Morton Adam Morton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 68, Issue 1, 1 July 1994, Pages 167–198, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/68.1.167 Published: 08 September 2015

Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought

Journal Article Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought Get access James Higginbotham, James Higginbotham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Gabriel Segal Gabriel Segal Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 68, Issue 1, 1 July 1994, Pages 85–130, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/68.1.85 Published: 08 September 2015

Consciousness, Cognition and The Phenomenal

Journal Article Consciousness, Cognition and The Phenomenal Get access Barrie Falk, Barrie Falk Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Stephen Mulhall Stephen Mulhall Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 67, Issue 1, 1 July 1993, Pages 55–90, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/67.1.55 Published: 30 July 2015

Philosophical Scepticism about Moral Obligation

Journal Article Philosophical Scepticism about Moral Obligation Get access Mark Platts, Mark Platts Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert Black Robert Black Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 67, Issue 1, 1 July 1993, Pages 175–212, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/67.1.175 Published: 30 July 2015

Knowing What I'm Thinking Of

Journal Article Knowing What I'm Thinking Of Get access Ruth Garrett Millikan, Ruth Garrett Millikan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Andrew Woodfield Andrew Woodfield Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 67, Issue 1, 1 July 1993, Pages 91–124, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/67.1.91 Published: 30 July 2015