On the Cognitive Role of Singular Thoughts

Abstract

This paper offers a critical review of the notion of a “singular cognitive role”, which is central to some recent theories of singular thought. According to those theories, whether a thought is singular depends on the role it plays in the subject’s cognitive activity. We compare the two most developed accounts of this type: Crane’s (Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85(1):21–43 2011, The Objects of Thought2013) and Jeshion’s (New Essays on Singular Thought, 105–141, 2010). Both theories aim to capture the notion of a singular cognitive role in terms of mental files. We argue that Jeshion’s theory is much more promising as it provides a more detailed and non-circular characterization of the mental files responsible for singular thinking. We examine the prospects for enhancing that account in light of three major concerns about it present in the literature. First, we discuss whether the weakest aspect of the whole proposal, i.e. the condition for the initiation of mental files, can be replaced without debilitating the rest of the theory. Second, we examine Goodman’s (Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(2): 437–461 2014, The Philosophical Quarterly2015) argument against mental file theories of singular thought and show that it does not affect Jeshion’s account. Third, we argue against Sawyer (Mind and Language, 27(3):264–283 2012) that Jeshion’s notion of a singular cognitive role is in strong opposition to acquaintance-based theories of singular thought and cannot be incorporated into any of them. Thus, the paper concludes that Jeshion’s proposal, despite its shortcomings, is currently the most promising account of a singular cognitive role.