Social Epistemology Research Articles

Made in Languaging; Ecolinguistic Expertise

Made in languaging aims to help ecolinguists with recrafting ideation and human practices. Inspired by Alexander and Stibbe, I turn to how ecolinguistic expertise can favour life-sustaining relations. In approaching normative goals, I start with how knowledge is made, self-sustains and is disseminated. Ecolinguistic analysis of languages, discourse and narratives can thus be enriched by tracing how practices inform languaging. In turning to epistemic agency, I emphasise the following: (1) building corpora popularia, organised bodies, in order to enhance life-sustaining relations; (2) illuminating life from the inside; and (3) developing bioecological awareness. I contend that, while all living beings use coordinative activities to bring forth what appears to us, humans also use wording types and practices. As we use the already known, languaging enables subjecthood, a person’s little worlds, and a group’s common realities. Hence, what appears as (and to) experience is made in languaging. When linked to normative concerns, the resulting middle worlds also offer means of putting knowledge to work. As in social epistemology, one might regard ‘wealth and well-being’ as a marker of public good. Yet, critical work shows, appeal to these values is anthropomorphic. In order to encompass nonhumans and the biogenic, one can reject market orientatation by tracing languaging, and knowing, back to living. In showing benefits of so doing, I contrast two evolving wording types. The case of growthism, I suggest, attests to praxis and contrasts starkly with the ideational value of life-sustaining relations. Yet, in both cases, languaging meshes practices, happenings and the effects of action. The move shows how one can challenge the hypostatisation of ideology by pursuing how epistemic agency can contribute to the future of evolution.

Epistemic Bubbles and Contextual Discordance

AbstractRecent work in social epistemology has drawn attention to various problematic social epistemic phenomena that are common within online networks. Nguyen (2020) argues that it is important to distinguish epistemic bubbles from echo chambers. An epistemic bubble is an information structure that merely lacks information or sources that would be relevant or important to the user. An echo chamber is a structure in which dissenting opinions are, not necessarily absent, but actively undermined, for example by instilling attitudes of distrust towards their adherents. Because of this, echo chambers are thought to be especially difficult to escape. In contrast, according to Nguyen, it is relatively easy to shatter an epistemic bubble: one simply introduces the missing information. In this paper, I argue that it is more difficult to shatter an epistemic bubble than has been recognised in the literature. The reason for this is the relationship between epistemic bubbles and interpretative resources. Despite their epistemic drawbacks, it is comparatively easy to gain knowledge from sources inside one's epistemic bubble because agents within a bubble share common ground. In contrast, it can be very difficult to gain knowledge from sources outside of one's bubble because interlocutors on the outside are less likely to have the shared context needed to facilitate communicative success. I argue that this problem suggests a different way to understand the nature of epistemic bubbles and our prospects for escaping them.

“Understand What the Feelings of the Student Must Be:” Newcomer Youths’ High School Integration Experiences

The present study was grounded in a social constructionist epistemology with an integrative social justice lens. It highlights the perspectives of one group – that of newcomer youth – from a collective case study exploring the phenomenon of school integration across multiple collaborators in one designated high school. As school integration is a central component in the lives and experiences of newcomer youth, this study aimed to provide insights and lessons learned directly from this group as they were integrating into a high school in Western Canada. In line with the epistemology and research design, the research prioritized participant voices with the goal of affecting change within the designated high school. The central research question guiding this study was: How do participants perceive and describe their experiences of integrating into high school? To address this question, semi-structured, qualitative interviews were conducted with 13 newcomer high school students between the ages of 15 and 19. Upon conducting a thematic analysis on the interview transcripts, five salient themes were developed, including (a) the stress of acculturation, (b) language transition, (c) making connections, (d) navigating academics, and (e) renegotiating life. In this manuscript, the inter-relationship between these themes is discussed in a manner that captures the complex, multifaceted process of school integration. Relatedly, implications are presented.

Search Engines, White Ignorance, and the Social Epistemology of Technology

AbstractHow should we think about the ways search engines can go wrong? Following the publication of Safiya Noble's Algorithms of Oppression (Noble, 2018), a view has emerged that racist, sexist, and other problematic results should be thought of as indicative of algorithmic bias. In this paper, I offer an alternative angle on these results, building on Noble's suggestion that search engines are complicit in a racial contract (Mills, 1997). I argue that racist and sexist results should be thought of as part of the workings of the social system of white ignorance. Along the way, I will argue that we should think about search engines not as sources of testimony, but as information-classification systems, and make a preliminary case for the importance of the social epistemology of technology.

On the social epistemology of psychedelic experience

ABSTRACT Both traditional and recent accounts of the beneficial and therapeutic effects of psychedelic experiences tie these effects to specifically epistemic changes, for example the enabling of spiritual or psychological insight, or disruption of problematic beliefs or thought patterns. While these alleged benefits have sometimes been thought to be facilitated by false or even delusional beliefs , recent philosophical discussion strikes a more optimistic tone, arguing that the epistemic risks involved with psychedelic drug use tend to be relatively benign and outweighed by epistemic benefits . In this paper, we seek to nuance this picture by drawing attention to the crucial role played by social factors in determining the epistemic effects of psychedelic experiences. We argue that the very openness of mind and heightened sense of clarity and certainty that is often thought to facilitate the epistemic benefits of psychedelic drug use, also make the user more vulnerable to adverse epistemic influence from the social environment, to a degree not acknowledged in the current literature. Examining the epistemic influences of the social environment is thus important for understanding the necessary precautions of informed consent and overall safe drug use.

Medical residents’ perceptions of group biases in medical decision making: a qualitative study

BackgroundSystematic biases in group decision making (i.e., group biases) may result in suboptimal decisions and potentially harm patients. It is not well known how impaired group decision making in patient care may affect medical training. This study aimed to explore medical residents’ experiences and perspectives regarding impaired group decision making and the role of group biases in medical decision making.MethodsThis study used a qualitative approach with thematic analysis underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology. Semi-structured interviews of medical residents were conducted at a single internal medicine residency program. Residents were initially asked about their experiences with suboptimal medical decision making as a group or team. Then, questions were targeted to several group biases (groupthink, social loafing, escalation of commitment). Interviews were transcribed and transferred to a qualitative data analysis software. Thematic analysis was conducted to generate major themes within the dataset.ResultsSixteen interviews with residents revealed five major themes: (1) hierarchical influence on group decision making; (2) group decision making under pressure; (3) post-call challenges in decision making; (4) interactions between teamwork and decision making; and (5) personal and cultural influences in group decision making. Subthemes were also identified for each major theme. Most residents were able to recognize groupthink in their past experiences working with medical teams. Residents perceived social loafing or escalation of commitment as less relevant for medical team decision making.ConclusionsOur findings provide unique insights into the complexities of group decision making processes in teaching hospitals. Team hierarchy significantly influenced residents’ experiences with group decision making—most group decisions were attributed to consultants or senior team members, while lower ranking team members contributed less and perceived fewer opportunities to engage in group decisions. Other factors such as time constraints on decision making, perceived pressures from other staff members, and challenges associated with post-call days were identified as important barriers to optimal group decision making in patient care. Future studies may build upon these findings to enhance our understanding of medical team decision making and develop strategies to improve group decisions, ultimately leading to higher quality patient care and training.

A nudge in the right direction? Gender-informed support by female business-incubation managers for female STEM-entrepreneurs

ABSTRACT This article critically analyzes the influence of gendered ascriptions and assumptions upon support offered by female business incubation (BI) managers to female STEM entrepreneurs. We draw upon the concept of nudges to illustrate how female managers guide female clients to behave, so as to navigate gendered challenges during the investment-readiness (IR) process. Using an interpretive ontology and social constructionist feminist epistemology, we draw upon in-depth, semi-structured interviews with female BI managers and female STEM entrepreneur clients. The findings illustrate that the gendered BI context encourages gender-aware managers to nudge clients towards behaviours congruent with prevailing masculinized norms, navigating rather than challenging gender-bias, to secure investment.

The Transmission of Cumulative Cultural Knowledge — Towards a Social Epistemology of Non-Testimonial Cultural Learning

ABSTRACT Cumulative cultural knowledge (CCK), the knowledge we acquire via social learning and has been refined by previous generations, is of central importance to our species’ flourishing. Considering its importance, we should expect that our best epistemological theories can account for how this happens. Perhaps surprisingly, CCK and how we acquire it via cultural learning has only received little attention from social epistemologists. Here, I focus on how we should epistemically evaluate how agents acquire CCK. After sampling some reasons why extant theories cannot account for CCK, I suggest that things aren’t as bleak as they might look. I explain how agents deserve epistemic credit for how CCK is transmitted in cultural learning by promoting a central need of their social group: the efficient and safe transmission of CCK. A good initial fit exists between this observation and Greco’s knowledge-economy framework. Ultimately, however, Greco’s account doesn’t straightforwardly account for CCK because of its strict focus on testimony. I point out two issues in the framework due to this focus. The resulting view advocates giving epistemic credit to agents when they act to promote their communities’ epistemic needs in the right way and highlights the various ways in which agents come to do this.

On the discussion of the confrontation between Lamarckism and Mendelism in Russia (Novosibirsk Academgorodok, methodological seminars and social embedding of knowledge)

The article aims at providing grounds for the analysis of the confrontation of scientific views in the context of E. Agassi’s famous thesis: “science is always socially engaged, but it should not be socially dependent”. This socio-epistemological analysis focuses on the clash between Lysenko’s interpretation of the Lamarckian methodology of H. Spencer’s views and representatives of the Russian school of classical Mendelian genetics. A distinctive feature of Akademgorodok in the 1970s-1980s was that almost every academic institute had a person responsible for organizing a specialized scientific-methodological seminar on philosophical and methodological problems of a particular field of knowledge. Recollections of the participants of these seminars and reconstruction of the issues discussed at that time are rich empirical material, providing an opportunity to test modern conceptions in the field of social anthropology, social epistemology, and sociology of science. The revival of genetics in our country began with the founding of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences/SB RAS. It is shown that this confrontation between Lamarckism and Mendelism in 1930s-1960s develops from the denial of the theses of the ideological opponents to the emergence of accompanying interdisciplinary research. At the same time, a special role is given to the specification of the methodological function of philosophy and to those forms of its realization that scientists personally participating in scientific-methodological seminars, were more inclined to associate with “substantive” rather than “sociological” aspects of the description of the situation.

Coordination in social learning: expanding the narrative on the evolution of social norms

A shared narrative in the literature on the evolution of cooperation maintains that social learning evolves early to allow for the transmission of cumulative culture. Social norms, whilst present at the outset, only rise to prominence later on, mainly to stabilise cooperation against the threat of defection. In contrast, I argue that once we consider insights from social epistemology, an expansion of this narrative presents itself: An interesting kind of social norm — an epistemic coordination norm — was operative in early and important instances of specialised social learning. I show how there’s a need for such norms in two key social learning strategies and explain how this need is constituted. In assessor-teaching (e.g. Castro et al., 2019b, 2021), epistemic coordination norms allow agents to coordinate around the content of social learning, i.e., what is to be known and how this is to be done. These norms also allow agents to coordinate around the form of cultural learning in what’s sometimes called strategic social learning (Laland, 2004; Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Heyes, 2018, Chap. 5) and elsewhere. Broadly speaking, this concerns how cultural learning is organised within the social group. The upshot is that the evolution of social learning and social norms are intertwined in important and underappreciated ways from early on. The above matters as it informs our views about the evolution of social norms more generally. Truly social norms emerged to coordinate a plurality of complex behaviours and interactions, amongst them specialised social learning. I substantiate this view by contrasting it with Jonathan Birch’s views on the evolution of norms. What results is a general but cohesive narrative on the early evolution of social norms.

Participant perspectives on action learning in higher education: a framework for learning

ABSTRACT This paper presents a framework which captures the complexity and multi-dimensional process of learning in action learning (AL) on an accredited executive Master’s programme. The framework extends current knowledge by presenting a holistic participant perspective of learning. Underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology, the study supporting the framework’s development adopted a qualitative narrative approach. Data were generated using in-person individual and group interviews with a total of 13 executive-level graduates from four cohorts of the programme. Data were analysed iteratively, culminating in the development of a conceptual framework for learning. The framework provides insight into the depth and richness of learning and change that can occur for participants on programmes adopting an AL approach in Higher Education. It highlights the importance for participants of having a trusted supported space for their learning. Furthermore, it illuminates the role of emotion and the paradox of vulnerability in the learning process. The conceptual framework, which encompasses emotional, social and relational dimensions, extends knowledge of AL by providing a unique and holistic view of participant learning on an AL programme. Additionally, through an enhanced understanding of the learning process as undergone by participants, the research informs academics in facilitating action learning programmes.

Informed Ignorance as a Form of Epistemic Injustice

Ignorance, or the lack of knowledge, appears to be steadily spreading, despite the increasing availability of information. The notion of informed ignorance herein proposed to describe the widespread position of being exposed to an abundance of information yet lacking relevant knowledge, which is tied to the exponential growth in misinformation driven by technological developments and social media. Linked to many of societies’ most looming catastrophes, from political polarization to the climate crisis, practices related to knowledge and information are deemed some of the most imminent and daunting modern threats, evidenced by the latest report of the World Economic Forum, which has named misinformation the most severe short-term global risk. This paper’s epistemic perspective links the properties of today’s information culture and the ways in which it interacts with individual capacities and limitations in current technological and socio-political contexts. Such a position is analyzed through the lens of epistemic principles as a contemporary epistemic phenotype that emerges from an environment of ill-adapted and excessive information inputs and leads to a distinctive type of social injustice that is primarily epistemic in nature. While equity and accessibility are widely discussed as important contributing factors to epistemic discrepancies, other overlooked but fundamental issues underlying epistemic injustices are considered, such as information manipulation, cognitive limitations, and epistemic degradation. To effectively face this elusive threat, we propose an inclusive viewpoint that harnesses knowledge from cognitive science, science and technology studies, and social epistemology to inform a unifying theory of its main impacts and driving forces. By adjusting a modern epistemic framework to the described phenomena, we intend to contextually outline its trajectory and possible means of containment based on a shared responsibility to maintain ethical epistemic standards. In a time of international unrest and mounting civil acts of violence, it is pertinent to emphasize the ethical principles of knowledge systems and authorities and suggest policy adaptations to maintain a social contract based on the shared values of truth and freedom.

Characteristics of Poststructuralism in Jesse Shera’s Social Epistemology

ABSTRACT Jesse Shera (1903–1982) was a twentieth-century American librarian and information scientist. This article discusses Shera’s social epistemology (SE) and its similarities with structuralism and poststructuralism. Previous research on Shera’s SE has clarified its position and influences. John Budd has pointed out that his SE was sociological rather than philosophical, resembling a sociology of knowledge, while Jonathan Furner adduced similarities between Shera’s SE and related areas, such as the sociology of science, and showed that Shera’s SE was influenced by Paul Otlet. Patrick Wilson frames his body of research as an extension of Shera’s SE. Accordingly, I show that Shera’s SE exhibits characteristics of structuralism and poststructuralism. Shera argued that the semantic relationship between two groups of written materials depends on the perceptions of the individuals (or groups) involved, rejecting traditional library classification methodology aimed at a universal classification of knowledge that was the contemporary mainstream. This article discusses the background of Shera’s poststructuralism.

The problems of macroeconomics as institutional problems: complementing the ‘what went wrong’ story with a social epistemology perspective

Abstract After the financial crisis of 2008, many economists expressed dissatisfaction with the state of macroeconomics. They criticised deficiencies in the dominant dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling approach and conceptions of good macroeconomic research behind that dominance. This paper argues that there is a deeper problem in macroeconomics, which remains unaddressed. I connect existing literature critical of the institutions of macroeconomics and of economics in general to the institutional preconditions of effective criticism outlined by the philosopher Helen Longino. I find that as an epistemic community, macroeconomics does not function in a way that adequately supports critical evaluation of established beliefs, norms and practices. This failure may partly explain why many views on macroeconomic modelling, the tenability of which economists questioned after the crisis, were able to persist for so long. My analysis gives additional support to several recent proposals for institutional reforms in economics.

TO THE QUESTION ON THE SUBJECT AND CONTENT OF INSTITUTIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

The paper is devoted to the problem of institutional epistemology as a new interdisciplinary direction in contemporary science. The concept “institutional epistemology” should be connected with the concept “social epistemology”, but it is necessary to remind social epistemology is theory of knowledge of social reality, where in focus of research are society and social interaction. A term “institutional epistemology” is a scientific metaphor, — while, for instance, a term “social epistemology” used in its directed significance. It is not realized parallels between concepts “institutional epistemology” and “institutional ontology”, because they used in different contexts. Institutional epistemology is research of formal and informal aspects of production of social knowledge; a study of a social; epistemologist as a “cognitive manager of knowledge” in contemporary society; research of different ways of constituting social-epistemological knowledge through social institutions elaborating this knowledge

Towards an Epistemology of ‘Speciesist Ignorance’

AbstractThe literature on the epistemology of ignorance already discusses how certain forms of discrimination, such as racism and sexism, are perpetuated by the ignorance of individuals and groups. However, little attention has been given to how speciesism—a form of discrimination on the basis of species membership—is sustained through ignorance. Of the few animal ethicists who explicitly discuss ignorance, none have related this concept to speciesism as a form of discrimination. However, it is crucial to explore this connection, I argue, as ignorance is both an integral part of the injustice done to animals as well as an obstacle to improving their treatment. In order to adequately criticize sustained structural speciesism and injustices towards animals, I develop an epistemological account of ‘speciesist ignorance’. I begin by defining and distinguishing between individual and group-based accounts of speciesist ignorance. I argue that humans, taken as a group, enjoy a position of privilege, which allows them to comfortably remain ignorant of their participation in collective wrongdoings towards animals. Additionally, I point out that speciesist ignorance is structurally encouraged and thereby maintains the dominant view that the human-animal-relationship, as it stands, is just. In sum, this article lays the groundwork for a social epistemology of speciesist ignorance. In particular, it informs further debate about individual and institutional epistemic duties to inquire into speciesism and to inform the public, about the moral culpability of ignorant actions, and about effective animal advocacy and policy which actively rejects speciesist ignorance.

Organization of Knowledge in Light of Egan and Shera’s Social Epistemology and Elias’ Symbol Theory

Knowledge organization or information organization, in a narrower sense, is an area of Library and Information Science (LIS) concerned with activities such as document description, indexing, and classification performed in bibliographic and cybergraphic repositories for their rapid and economic retrieval for use by society. Knowledge organization is an essential second level knowledge product; while a first level knowledge production studies the scientific phenomenon via general social epistemology, especially in the guise commanded by Steve William Fuller’s program. In this second level, knowledge organization studies the problem of mechanisms and existing bibliographic systems and the extent to which they are congruent with the realities of the communication process and the findings of epistemological research via special social epistemology, an academic discipline created by Jesse Shera and Margaret Egan. Additionally, the definition of “symbol” as the essential object of information science is examined, following the theoretical foundation of information developed by Norbert Elias’ “The Symbol Theory”.

Speaking up on attending ward rounds: a qualitative study of internal medicine residents

Attending rounds are a core educational component of learning in teaching hospitals. Speaking up in this context has not been explored among medical residents. We aimed to understand residents’ perspectives on speaking up about their own clinical reasoning during attending rounds. This was a qualitative study performed at a single teaching hospital. We selected a random sample of 45 internal medicine residents among 141 in the training program, among whom 21 accepted the invitation to participate. Semi-structured interviews were conducted over Zoom. We performed thematic analysis within a social constructionist epistemology to develop codes, categories, and themes. Analysis continued until thematic saturation was achieved. We interviewed 21 residents, including 9 interns, 7 junior residents, and 5 senior residents. Residents described factors related to team culture, team dynamics, knowledge and experience, domain of patient care, and structure of rounds that influence speaking up during rounds. We identified four themes that were critical for speaking up: (1) promoting a culture of learning; (2) creating psychological safety; (3) developing self-efficacy; and (4) fostering resident autonomy. Feedback from the attending, particularly nonverbal cues perceived as negative, played a prominent role in preventing residents from speaking up. We identified factors for speaking up among residents during attending rounds. Feedback conveyed during attending rounds influenced the culture of learning, psychological safety, and residents’ self-efficacy, which impacted residents’ motivation to speak up. Ward attendings should be mindful of verbal and nonverbal forms of feedback on rounds.

Epistemic Vice Rehabilitation: Saints and Sinners Zetetic Exemplarism

AbstractThis paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic vice rehabilitation. Its authors Gerry Dunne and Alkis Kotsonis note that, like Quassim Cassam, they remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice. However, unlike Cassam, who places the burden of minimizing or overcoming epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual, Dunne and Kotsonis argue that vice rehabilitation is best tackled via the exemplarist animated community of inquiry zetetic principles and defeasible‐reasons‐regulated deliberative processes. The vice‐reduction method they propose is made up of four distinct yet complementary components: (1) positive exemplarism of epistemic virtue (saints), (2) negative exemplarism of epistemic vice (sinners), (3) direct teaching/instruction, and (4) cognitive apprenticeship. Dunne and Kotsonis argue that this pedagogical intervention appropriately considers learnings deriving from forensic scrutiny of both ideal and non‐ideal interpersonally calibrated zetetic features integral to knowledge acquisition as well as wider societal influences impacting the development of agents' epistemic character. It bridges research on vice epistemology (Cassam's obstructivist theory), social epistemology (corrupted social processes mitigating against vice rehabilitation), virtue epistemology, and moral exemplarism.

Computational philosophy: reflections on the PolyGraphs project

In this paper, we situate our computational approach to philosophy relative to other digital humanities and computational social science practices, based on reflections stemming from our research on the PolyGraphs project in social epistemology. We begin by describing PolyGraphs. An interdisciplinary project funded by the Academies (BA, RS, and RAEng) and the Leverhulme Trust, it uses philosophical simulations (Mayo-Wilson and Zollman, 2021) to study how ignorance prevails in networks of inquiring rational agents. We deploy models developed in economics (Bala and Goyal, 1998), and refined in philosophy (O’Connor and Weatherall, 2018; Zollman, 2007), to simulate communities of agents engaged in inquiry, who generate evidence relevant to the topic of their investigation and share it with their neighbors, updating their beliefs on the evidence available to them. We report some novel results surrounding the prevalence of ignorance in such networks. In the second part of the paper, we compare our own to other related academic practices. We begin by noting that, in digital humanities projects of certain types, the computational component does not appear to directly support the humanities research itself; rather, the digital and the humanities are simply grafted together, not fully intertwined and integrated. PolyGraphs is notably different: the computational work directly supports the investigation of the primary research questions, which themselves belong decidedly within the humanities in general, and philosophy in particular. This suggests an affinity with certain projects in the computational social sciences. But despite these real similarities, there are differences once again: the computational philosophy we practice aims not so much at description and prediction as at answering the normative and interpretive questions that are distinctive of humanities research.