Social Dilemma Situations Research Articles

Culture and cooperation

Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper, we provide an answer by analysing the data of Herrmann et al. (2008a), who studied cooperation and punishment in 16 subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (2000)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.

Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

We analyze an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining high levels of cooperation. Our results are evaluated against the predictions of social preference models.

Acquaintance-based trust model for the evolution of cooperation in business games

Reputation systems have been popular in several online market places involving anonymous players as it can provide crucial information on the trustworthiness of an object or individual player to combat selfish and deceptive behaviors from peers. Individual feedbacks on the quality of past association are the fundamental building blocks of reputation systems. Careful consideration in aggregating feedbacks from different sources is in fact very important in computing a reliable value for trust worthiness to facilitate decision making in a social dilemma situation like that of online market places. In this paper, we are considering a possible improvement to a reputation model like that of eBay, with our interest lying on investigating how the cooperativeness and population of cooperators would evolve if the weight of the feedback source was assigned on the basis of past association between players. We categorize the feedback sources into different types to define an aggregation method for trustworthiness assessment that considers applying a dynamically computed weight to each source of feedback. Our results show that breaking feedback sources on the basis of acquaintance and assigning weight accordingly favor the evolution of cooperativeness in the player society when compared to models which do not classify the feedback sources.

Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks

Many mechanisms for the emergence and maintenance of altruistic behavior in social dilemma situations have been proposed. Indirect reciprocity is one such mechanism, where other-regarding actions of a player are eventually rewarded by other players with whom the original player has not interacted. The upstream reciprocity (also called generalized indirect reciprocity) is a type of indirect reciprocity and represents the concept that those helped by somebody will help other unspecified players. In spite of the evidence for the enhancement of helping behavior by upstream reciprocity in rats and humans, theoretical support for this mechanism is not strong. In the present study, we numerically investigate upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous contact networks, in which the players generally have different number of neighbors. We show that heterogeneous networks considerably enhance cooperation in a game of upstream reciprocity. In heterogeneous networks, the most generous strategy, by which a player helps a neighbor on being helped and in addition initiates helping behavior, first occupies hubs in a network and then disseminates to other players. The scenario to achieve enhanced altruism resembles that seen in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in heterogeneous networks.

Coalition and Dilemma in a Three-person Game

A three-person game with asymmetry of moves is constructed utilizing the interdependent theory and the concept of control studied by Kelly and Thibaut in order to conduct game theoretical analysis of coalition formation. This new game is an extended version of the three-person game introduced by Akiyama and Kaneko. We introduce asymmetry of moves into the original version, which modulates the self control, for considering a situation with different outcome through coalition formation by different strategies. We show that modulating the degree of self control in this game alters the social dilemma situations, namely, changes the blending of the individual rationality and the social rationality. Through the analysis of this game using an evolutionary simulation, we found that there is a possibility to realize a Pareto optimum with the maximum average payoff at a region of the self control parameter.

Stability and Explanatory Power of Inequality Aversion – An Investigation of the House Money Effect

In this paper, we analyse if individual inequality aversion measured with simple experimental games depends on whether the monetary endowment in these games is either a windfall gain (“house money”) or a reward for a certain effort-related performance. Moreover, we analyse whether the way of preference elicitation affects the explanatory power of inequality aversion in social dilemma situations. Our results indicate that individual inequality aversion is not generally robust to the way endowments emerge. Furthermore, the use of money earned by real efforts instead of house money does not improve the generally low predictive power of the inequality aversion model. Hypotheses based on the inequality aversion model lose their predictive power when preferences are elicited with earned money.

Culture and Cooperation

Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (American Sociological Review 2000, pp. 19-51)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.

Coping with power scarcity in an emerging megacity: a consumers' perspective from Hyderabad

Facing rapid urbanisation in developing countries, public utilities' electricity management is challenged by an ever-growing demand and collapsing infrastructures. Economic growth and consumers' related behaviours add to the technical and governance problems. We analyse the ways in which consumers currently deal with power shortages in Hyderabad, India, finding consumers trapped in a typical social-dilemma situation in which individually rational behaviour produces undesirable collective outcomes. Results from a logistic regression show us the key factors, determining household preferences to contribute towards better electricity services provision and the undertaking of collective action in this regard. We find that the ability to contribute is significantly affected by age, social background, backup facilities, inadequate supply and voltage fluctuations. Willingness to cooperate mainly depends on experiences with damaged appliances and past group membership. The paper ends with conclusions for governance, policies, and further research.

The Absence of Cooperation Is Not Necessarily Defection: Structural and Motivational Constraints of Knowledge Transfer in a Social Dilemma Situation

There is a wealth of literature about knowledge transfer in general, but only a small amount deals with cultural and motivational factors of knowledge transfer. The main question of this article is: How can knowledge transfer be supported? First, we present a theoretical underpinning of knowledge transfer as a social dilemma situation. Second, we analyze how a situation of social dilemma can be overcome by means of structural and motivational solutions. Third, we provide empirical evidence from our survey in hospitals. These findings support three of our five hypotheses: direct channels for interaction, organizational culture, and intrinsic motivation are relevant requirements for knowledge transfer. Team size is not a significant factor for transferring knowledge in hospitals. Furthermore, our empirical findings differentiate between providing and obtaining knowledge. The last finding leads back to a modification of the theoretical framework.

Determinants of in-group bias: Is group affiliation mediated by guilt-aversion?

In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of Social Identity Theory’s main findings. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it merely due to group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion moderating the strength of in-group favoring? We induce group membership in a minimal group setting, observe in-/out-group transfers and elicit corresponding beliefs. According to our experimental data group affiliation affects beliefs and explains a substantial part of the bias. Evidence for guilt-aversion is found only when beliefs are elicited before actions.

参加型地域づくりにおける住民階層分化の問題に関する事例研究

‘Popular participation’ has become a cliche used in undertaking community design and development. A variety of participatory tools and techniques have been devised and applied to the local exercises. However, even in the local communities where active group of residents, being authorized by the neighborhood council and provided with administrative supports, carries out forward-looking activities, still there largely exist ‘ordinary’ populaces who don't have positive participation in the activities. This study, taking a case of ‘good’ rural community, has made observations concerning the above- mentioned disintegrated situation. The study site is an agricultural community named Shinoba-ku, which is located in Kakegawa City of Shizuoka Prefecture and was awarded a 2002 Community Activity Prize. In this village, while local leaders put into practice such activities as self regulation of land use, countryside forest management, and putting up hand-made street signs, a majority of the populace have nothing to do with these activities. Under present conditions, the local community confronts with serious communication problems that impede effective and efficient decision making, and social dilemma situations in which private and communal interests are at odds have appeared. The dynamics of the situations are such that the cooperative solutions can never be gained for the good of village renewal in accordance with the existing landscape. In order to enhance chances for successive promotion of community design and development, this study examines the relevance of following two countermeasures; 1) establishment and operation of village web site, and 2) enlargement of “new public space” where collective actions towards creating new lifestyles and public deliberations on social matters are organized voluntarily. The questionnaire survey has revealed that 1) a significant number of ordinary populaces, particularly in active working age, are interested in the village web site, 2) though not yet having involved in the community activities within immediate neighborhood, quite a few number of ordinary populaces express their willingness to participate in voluntary environment conservation activities that are organized at wider level of regional society. These results suggest us further examinations on the practical validity of the countermeasures.

Counterpunishment Revisited: An Evolutionary Approach

Evolutionary game theory has shown that in environments characterised by a social-dilemma situation punishment may be an adaptive behaviour. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this finding but yields contradictory results on the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment if players are allowed to retaliate against their punishers. The present study sets out to examine the question of whether cooperation will still be part of an evolutionary stable strategy if we allow for counterpunishment opportunities in a theoretic model and tries to reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings from the laboratory. We find that the apparent contradictions can be explained by a difference in the number of retaliation stages employed (one vs. many) and even small differences in the degree of retaliativeness.

Leadership by Example and by Pre-Game Communication in Social Dilemma Situations

This paper compares the effects of two leadership styles: leading by pre-game communication and leading by example using an iterated voluntary contribution game. We find that pre-game communication increases the level of individual contributions in the game and has essentially the same impact on the level of individual contributions as leading by example. Yet, followers appear to be more motivated towards achieving a socially optimal outcome in leading by example than in leading by pre-game communication. We also find that the content of pre-game communication has a higher impact on individual decisions than the ex post contribution of the leader. However, false messages cause an erosion of trust: participants decrease their contributions if they have received a false message from the leader in the previous period even though leaders are re-assigned in every period.

Diminished cooperativeness of psychopaths in a prisoner's dilemma game yields higher rewards.

Maladaptive social behavior is one of the defining characteristics of psychopathic personality disorder. Nevertheless, maladaptive social behavior has only rarely been observed among psychopaths in experimentally controlled situations. The authors assessed the behavior of criminal psychopaths from high-security psychiatric hospitals in a computer simulation of a social dilemma situation. The psychopaths showed a markedly higher proneness to competitive (i.e., noncooperative) behavior than did healthy adults from the general population. The odds ratio between defection and being a psychopath was estimated at 7.86 in the sample. The probability to choose selfish instead of cooperative behavior was significantly linked to the following subscales of the Psychopathy Personality Inventory-Revised (S. O. Lilienfeld & M. R. Widows, 2005): rebellious nonconformity, Machiavellian egocentricity, and the total score. On average, the psychopathic participants accumulated higher gain and more strongly exploited their counterpart than did the healthy participants.

From social projection to social behaviour

Social projection is a judgemental heuristic that allows people to make quick and reasonably accurate predictions about others. The first part of this paper presents a review of the status of projection as a highly (though not fully) automatic process, its separateness from superficially similar processes of self-stereotyping, and its implications for intergroup perception. The second part places social projection within the context of the theory of evidential decision making, which highlights the benefits and the liabilities of projection in social dilemma situations. The main benefit is that projection can enhance cooperation within a group by leading individuals to believe that their own behavioural choices will be reciprocated. However, when interpersonal social dilemmas are nested within intergroup dilemmas, differential projection (i.e., strong ingroup projection paired with weak outgroup projection) yields collectively undesirable outcomes.

THEORIES OF COMMITMENT, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY: EVIDENCE FROM LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

Theories of commitment, altruism, and reciprocity have been invoked to explain and describe behavior in public goods and social dilemma situations. Commitment has been used to explain behaviors like water conservation and voting. Altruism has been applied to explain contributions to charities and intergenerational transfers and bequests. Reciprocity has been invoked to explain gift exchange and labor market decisions. This paper describes a set of experiments, which distinguish between these competing theories by testing their comparative statics predictions in a linear public goods setting. Results provide strong support for reciprocity theories over either theories of commitment or of altruism. (JEL C9, D64, H41, C72)

Is Observed Other-Regarding Behavior Always Genuine?

We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a social dilemma situation (a dictator game variant), subjects can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We find that a majority of subjects showing other-regarding behavior when the payoffs of the receiver are known choose to ignore them if possible. This behavior is inconsistent with genuine social preferences. Our model explains other-regarding behavior as avoiding cognitive dissonance: People do not behave fairly because they genuinely care for others, but because they like to think of themselves as being fair. The model can explain our data as well as earlier experimental data.

SOCIAL DILEMMA STUDIES

Very often, each individual continues to do something for his/her individual advantage that collectively is damaging to the group as a whole. The conflict is labeled as “social dilemma” or “social trap” by social psychologists. The phenomenon is very common in individualistic cultures (the West), but does the same phenomenon exist in collectivistic cultures which value cooperation and group goals more than individual benefits? The present authors employed a “replenishable ocean resource paradigm” that they developed on a series of studies in Taiwan and found that selfish behaviors were indeed very pervasive in the East. Several significant factors that affected the degree of cooperation and/or competition were also identified: sanction system, personal motivation, interpersonal relation, and the composition of decision making groups. In brief, it was found that the lower the severity of punishment or the less probability of being caught, the more selfish the subjects' behaviors became. Subjects with the motives to maximize “individual gain” and “relative gain” competed more and did not differ from each other, while “joint gain” subjects competed the least. In addition, decisions made by group of three or five people were more selfish than the decisions made by the individual. The present authors and their associates also compared the behaviors of Taiwan and American students in the social dilemma situation directly. It was found that subjects from two cultures did differ on the cooperative behaviors. Taiwan subjects were more competitive than American subjects in general. Both “probability of inspection” and “degree of punishment” had significant effect on the Taiwanese's behaviors, but only “inspection probability known or not” affected American subjects. In respects to Collectivism/Individualism Scale, Taiwan subjects did not score higher than American subjects on total collective measure, but Taiwan subjects scored higher than American subjects on collectivism toward spouses, parents, and relatives, and scored less than American subjects on collectivism toward colleagues/classmates and friends. Therefore, Taiwan subjects interacting with colleagues/classmates or friends were more selfish than American subjects. General discussion on the meaning, application and cross-cultural implication of this series of studies concludes this paper.

Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)

Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives

Abstract. It is not only the great number of papers written on environment economics that make it worth dealing with this special branch of experimental research, but the environmental problem in all its facets seems to serve as a catalyst for identifying some methodological problems of the experimental method. For this reason, we will not only try to give an overview of recent experiments in environmental economics but also add some thoughts on the methodological implications of this work. We identify three direct connecting factors for the experimental method and environmental economics. First, social dilemmas are, in many cases, at the core of environmental problems. Experiments are able to test theoretical hypotheses for individual behavior in such social dilemma situations. The second connecting factor comes from the field of applied experimental work and can be characterized as the testbedding of institutional arrangements for the solution of environmental problems. The last direct application of experimental methods to environmental economics concerns the individual evaluation of environmental resources.