Social Dilemma Problems Research Articles

Group processes in solving two problems: Face-to-face and computer-mediated communication

In this study, an experiment on communication and problem solving in face-to-face communication and computermediated communication was conducted. The latter was performed in two variants; subjects writing under their own name or subjects writing anonymously. The problems were a Social Dilemma problem and a Criminal Puzzle problem. The theoretical starting point was if, and how, the communication form influences social relations, communication equality and communication processes. A qualitative analysis showed that different problems were related to different patterns of the variables studied. The computer-mediated communication solving the Criminal Puzzle problem induced relatively greater idea generation that was not responded to, while the face-toface communication was associated with relatively more answers. In the Social Dilemma, feedback was relatively more common in face-to-face communication than in computermediated communication. To 'give information about the game' was relatively more common in the anonymous computer-mediated communication than face-to-face situation, indicating that computer-mediated communication is associated with speaker generation of information, but less with responses to the interlocutor. There were no outcome differences or communication equality effects related to communication condition. These results point to the importance of the task related activities in the discussions rather than the importance of medium.

The Effect of an Unfair Treatment in the Resolution of a Social Dilemma

The social dilemma problem has been noticed to be involved in collective action. In this paper I explained a process through which the social dilemma problem involved in collective action is resolved when participants share the heightened sense of unfairness. The heightened sense of being unfairly treated motivates people to take actions aimed at restoring fairness. It also is expected to foster expectations that other people are also motivated to take such fairness-restoring actions. This is because unfair situation people want to redress through a collective action is most likely to be shared by potential participants of the collective action. The sense of being unfairly treated, thus, is expected to promote cooperation in a social dilemma. I tested the effect of unfair treatment in a social dilemma in two experiment, each using a unique type of dilemma. The social dilemma in the first experiment was created in such a manner that expectations that others would also cooperate was to be critical for the participants' decision. The results showed that the experience of unfair treatment affected the participants' motivation and expectations, and boosted the cooperation level. The dilemma used in the second experiment was of such a nature that expectations were not critical for the participants' decision. The results showed that experience of unfair treatment affected only the participants' motivation, but not expectations, and yet boosted the cooperation level.

Management Dilemmas and Decisions

This study assesses the impact of decision framing and the anticipated behavior of others on choosing to cooperate in social dilemma problems. Two hundred and eighty-eight students completed a questionnaire which presented two management scenarios representative of social dilemmas a manager might confront in a business environment. The two scenarios were based on parameters established by a generalized uniform N-person dilemma game. One scenario was described in a give-some context (contribute to the collective good); the other was presented in a take-some context (destruction of an existing collective good). After each scenario, information was presented concerning the response proportion of others, the certainty of the others' response, and whether others were expected to cooperate or defect. All four main effects were significant, as well as the interactions of response proportions by game context and response certainty by response direction. Reliable framing effects were evidenced. Individuals were more willing to contribute to a collective good than to experience some personal loss to avoid the destruction of an existing collective good. Findings raise questions concerning the extent of applicability of prospect theory to social dilemmas.