Event Abstract Back to Event A Computational and Neurobiological Account of Theory of Mind Theory of mind describes our ability to represent the intentions and goals of others, and allows us to optimise our interactions with them. Such strategic decision processes are central to achieving cooperative and competitive equilibria in game theory, and humans are known to acquire the capacity make inferences about others intentions at an early age. However, despite being widely studied, quite how the brain achieves this from a computational perspective remains substantially unclear. We first present a neurobiologically realistic model of theory of mind, based on optimal control theory and game theory. We consider the representations of goals in terms of value-functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value-functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value-function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume the degree of recursion is bounded; players need the opponent?s degree of recursion (or sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inference on the opponent?s sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication using choices in sequential games. Next, we show that this model offers a good account of real subjects behaviour in an experimental 'stag-hunt' game. The stag-hunt game refers to a class of pro-cooperative game (prescribed by the pay-off matrix) in which players choose to either cooperatively catch and share a valuable reward (a stag), or to succumb to a competitive temptation to unilaterally catch a small reward (a hare). We embedded the payoff matrix within a realistic, maze-based hunting game with one other player, and introduced a small discount for the effort involved in catching the prey, parameterised in terms of time taken to make a catch (with the stag being more difficult). Subjects played the game with a computerised opponent who changed her sophistication level (cooperative or competitive) with time. Analysis of the behavioural data supports the model, suggesting that subjects do indeed make inferences about the sophistication of the opponent, and exploit it when making decisions. Lastly, we also show that the model predicts brain activity when concurrently measured with fMRI. Several brain areas, notably the rostral medial prefrontal surface, have been implicated in theory of mind based on previous exploratory studies, although quite what is represented in their activity has been left to speculation. We show that rostral mPFC activity correlates with the entropy of the inferred level of sophistication of the opponent. In contrast the left dorsolateral PFC correlates with the inferred level of sophistication itself. In summary, these data offer support for an theory of mind model that involves inferences about the bounded level of sophistication of other agents, and casts light on the computational function of some of the hitherto enigmatic social brain areas. Conference: Computational and systems neuroscience 2009, Salt Lake City, UT, United States, 26 Feb - 3 Mar, 2009. Presentation Type: Poster Presentation Topic: Poster Presentations Citation: (2009). A Computational and Neurobiological Account of Theory of Mind. Front. Syst. Neurosci. Conference Abstract: Computational and systems neuroscience 2009. doi: 10.3389/conf.neuro.06.2009.03.161 Copyright: The abstracts in this collection have not been subject to any Frontiers peer review or checks, and are not endorsed by Frontiers. They are made available through the Frontiers publishing platform as a service to conference organizers and presenters. The copyright in the individual abstracts is owned by the author of each abstract or his/her employer unless otherwise stated. Each abstract, as well as the collection of abstracts, are published under a Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 (attribution) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) and may thus be reproduced, translated, adapted and be the subject of derivative works provided the authors and Frontiers are attributed. For Frontiers’ terms and conditions please see https://www.frontiersin.org/legal/terms-and-conditions. Received: 03 Feb 2009; Published Online: 03 Feb 2009. Login Required This action requires you to be registered with Frontiers and logged in. To register or login click here. Abstract Info Abstract The Authors in Frontiers Google Google Scholar PubMed Related Article in Frontiers Google Scholar PubMed Abstract Close Back to top Javascript is disabled. Please enable Javascript in your browser settings in order to see all the content on this page.