So-called Islamic State Research Articles

EU-Iran Relations in the Post-JCPOA Period: Selected Political Aspects

After the 1979 revolution, Europe’s policy of engaging Iran differed from the American approach. The circumstances changed in 2002, when the international community learnt about the undeclared nuclear sites at Arak and Natanz, as well as the scale of the Iranian nuclear program. The situation became even more complex when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005. From that moment on, the European Union has changed its attitude toward Iran. Moreover, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had been re-elected under controversial circumstances in 2009, the EU intensified sanctions against Iran, even in such cases when they were divergent from member states’ interests. Bilateral affairs began to normalize after the presidential victory of Hassan Rouhani in 2013. Two years later, the EU and other powers from the P5+1 group signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. Has the signing of the JCPOA had any impact on Iran-EU political relations as far as non-nuclear related issues are concerned? In order to answer this question, one has to analyze their political relations prior to and after the signing of the deal. Selected political aspects are taken into consideration, including proliferation related issues, attitudes toward changes in the Arab world, regional conflicts, especially in Syria and Yemen, combating the so-called Islamic State, humanitarian aid to undocumented Afghan refugees, as well as civil liberties and human rights violations in Iran.

Geological considerations of contemporary military tunnelling near Mosul, northern Iraq

Abstract Members of the so-called Islamic State (IS) have used subterranea in Syria and Iraq as a core part of their control over territories and their military capability. Around Mosul they exploited existing natural sinkholes, caves and tunnels. The use of tunnels and the completion of new ones between 2014 and 2017 impacted the advance of Iraqi and Peshmerga forces in the battle for Mosul. IS created complex tunnel networks using hand tools, power tools and improvised tunnel-boring machines. To avoid detection, tunnels were started in buildings and spoil was hidden in rooms. The tunnels range from those large enough for one person to crouch in to those large enough for a vehicle. The most sophisticated tunnel complexes had dormitories, hospitals, armouries, kitchens, latrines, and command centres complete with CCTV, solar panels, computers, phones, electricity, respirators and ventilation facilitating underground occupation for long periods. IS tunnelled in almost all urban areas they controlled, demonstrating an enormous effort: moving from hand tools to tunnel-boring machines was a logical progression. The size of tunnel-boring machines and the amount of spoil generated defined the type of building they started in and the length of the tunnel they bored. Buildings with tunnels under them risk collapse.

Społeczeństwo XXI wieku wobec zagrożenia islamskim terroryzmem

SOCIETY OF THE 21ST CENTURY AGAINST THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC TERRORISMThe subject matter includes the issue of transformation in the consciousness of the societies of European Union countries, but also communities in other areas of the world, perception of the phenomenon of migration to the territories of native countries, mainly in the European Union. The period of rapid socio-political changes in Islamic states, as well as the outbreak of civil war in 2011 in Syria, was the largest stimulator of migration movements from the Middle East, especially those covered by military operations in Europe. Hundreds of thousands of migrants continued to reach EU countries. Germany widely opened the door of its state and accepted the largest number of migrants. Some countries, such as Poland or Hungary, refused to accept migrants from countries with an Islamic origin. Migration on such a mass scale caused many social problems. The perceived sense of security of the community has deteriorated considerably in the EU countries where the most migrants came. The decline in the sense of security included areas not only of safety for life and health, but also concerns about reducing the level of social status or increasing unemployment. However, the biggest threat to the community of the EU countries, and many other countries in the world was ahuge increase in terrorist attacks, where the attackers came from orthodox Islamist groups. It should be added that the majority of migrants were Muslims. Another phenomenon also affecting the reduction of the level of perceptible security of European societies was the reactivation of political groups that in their ideologies presented the slogans of populism, nationalism, racism, or even fascism. There has been a clear polarization of Western societies, where until now they were arefuge of democracy, tolerance and values for which they fought for years. Undoubtedly, the politics of Erdogan, the president of Turkey, and the president of Russia, Putin, also influencedthestate of security of societies, and tried to influence EU decisions with their actions. Russia, let the annexation of Crimea and activities in Ukraine be left in peace, and Turkey, to force the EU to acceleratethe admission of this country to the EU. Also calling up the so-called Islamic state posed a huge threat to the security of the communities of European Union countries with attacks inspired by this terrorist group.

Public Opinion and the Fear of Terrorism

This essay analyses the role of public opinion in the formation of US and Turkish policy toward the conflict in Syria. The United States and Turkey were chosen because they are key players in the Syrian conflict. In both countries, public opinion played a role in the formation of foreign policy. As North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, they could be expected to act along similar lines. Moreover, despite seemingly different contexts, public opinion in both the United States and Turkey was reluctant to support a more intense involvement in the Syrian conflict. However, there was a visible shift in public opinion after the involvement in Syria started to be framed as a fight against terrorism, mostly referring to the so-called Islamic State and, in Turkey’s case, Kurdish groups.

Tunisian terrorist fighters: a grassroots perspective

ABSTRACTIn a hectic consolidation phase plagued by security, economic and social challenges, Tunisia has stood out as the biggest sender of foreign terrorist fighters to the so-called Islamic State. How do grassroots forces frame the issue in the context of the democratic transition and post-revolutionary consolidating phase? In order to address this question, this article builds on fieldwork visits to Tunisia (including observation of the parliamentary elections in 2014 and background talks) and relies on a set of semi-structured interviews conducted from 2014 to 2017 with Tunisian civil society activists, students and young people, understood as voices representing grassroots. Though viewpoints from the grassroots agree on economic and social grievances as a motivating factor for Tunisian terrorist fighters, more emphasis is drawn to the ideological void filled in by the Salafi discourse after the Arab Spring and the need to replace the Tunisian understanding of Islam related to the Middle Way (el Wasatiyyah) in the political debate.

Theory of an Emerging-State Actor: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Case †

This paper proposes a new theory of non-state actors who engage in irregular warfare to seize territory and govern openly, called emerging-state actors. Emerging-state actors arise in periods of irregular conflict, such as the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The theory tries to answer “what is/was” the Islamic State because emerging-state actors differ notably from other non-state actors and insurgencies in irregular conflict. Causal diagrams as well as key propositions present the theory. Testing occurs against a system dynamics simulation called the “Emerging-State Actor Model” (E-SAM), loaded with the ISIS historical case in Syria and Iraq. Through experiments the simulation confirms evidence of emerging-state actor behavior as well as a range of contingencies showing their applicability. The novelty of E-SAM as a simulation for irregular conflict is its ability to handle multiple forms of conflict including political grievance, terrorism, insurgencies and emerging-state actors. E-SAM can also simulate multiple actors within each conflict: domestic and foreign state actors, local conflict actors, as well as different ethnographic groups. It can be parameterized with scenarios to simulate a variety of scenarios: ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Taliban in Afghanistan and even expatriated ISIS fighters returning to pursue new conflicts such as in Indonesia.

How Islamic Has the “Islamic State” Been?

Two principal views have emerged on the nature and operations of the so-called Islamic State or khilafat. One contends that IS had nothing to do with Islam in both its ideological disposition and practical operations. The other view claims that IS was the embodiment of a Salafist‒Wahhabi version of Islam, and therefore it was Islamic. Whereas the first view recognizes the fact that Islam like any divine faith is open to a range of interpretations and applications, the second perspective has treated Islam as a monolithically adaptable doctrine, ignoring the diversity within the Muslim world. The question is: Was IS Islamic or not, or did it exude a form of political Salafism and Islamism of our time?

From Terrorism to Cyber-Terrorism: The Case of ISIS

Cyber-space is a new battlefield. Physical Activities ranging from a simple greeting gesture to warfare have been cybernized and terrorism does not constitute an exception. From the days of Robespierre to the post 9/11 era, terrorism has been constantly transmuting in context, means and objectives and recently is making its first steps in cyberspace. Exploiting the advantages that this new field of expression, operations and confrontation has to offer like relative anonymity and abundance of easy targets, cyber-terrorism has been added to the cyber-vocabulary. The so-called Islamic State (ISIS) after its phenomenal expansion on the ground has become very active and innovative in the realm of cyber-terror. A number of organizations and individuals have pledged allegiance to ISIS and are employing their cyber-tactics in line with this terrorist organization's cyber-strategy.

Evil™ — Islamic State, conflict-capitalism, and the Geopolitical Uncanny

ABSTRACTTo make sense of so-called Islamic State’s stunning rise to power, and counterintuitive success in captivating media attention and attracting global recruits, commentators often describe the organisation through the lens of ‘the brand’. Such assessments rarely take under serious consideration the world of public relations and marketing. This article, conversely, applies the logic of the boardroom to the battleground of IS, assessing the group as the War on Terror’s corporate competitor for hegemonic control of conflict-capitalism’s global market. To apprehend IS through its Western-facing brand identity is to encounter a monstrous Geopolitical Uncanny-through which Islamic State traps us in the tautological trade of apocalyptic warfare: a captive market ultimately created in our own image. Islamic State positions itself for American consumers as ultimate threat to our very civilizational soul, rendered legible in a localised brand identity that responds to audience expectation: Evil™. IS’ designer apocalypse promises to deliver zero-sum annihilation, and leaves us no other choice than buy-or-die. Yet there is more to the success story of this insurgent start-up than a receptive market. Islamic State’s sales pitch, after all, is industry standard for conflict-capitalism. Every combatant group attempts to project an inflated threat capacity to enemy and competitor; in the global attention economy, imagistic intimidation comprises a causal prerequisite for market visi/viability and product differentiation. Not all organisations, however, meet with such superlative success. Seduced by the shiny veneer of Evil™, American consumers did not simply purchase a designer branded apocalypse; we accepted the image projected as that of sinister authenticity, and in the process-unwittingly invested in Islamic State stock, transforming from customers to shareholders. Herein resides the terrifyingly valuable symbiosis of supply and demand, for the fear by which Evil™ obtains designer brand equity is not that of potential annihilation, but certain recognition-too vivid for direct contemplation.

German Practice With Regard to the Use of Force in Syria

This brief note presents German practice with respect to the use of force in the Syrian conflict. The development of the international rules on the use of force depends to a large extent on the practice and statements of governments. For this reason, governments should carefully consider their justification for the use of force of their own armed forces as well as statements they make with respect to the use of force by other states. The contribution focuses on the participation of the German armed forces in the fight against the so-called Islamic State as well as on the reaction of Germany to the two uses of force by the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom in reaction to the alleged uses of chemical weapons by the Syrian government in 2017 and 2018.

Introduction to Contemporary Art and the Deconstruction of Heritage. Preservation By Other Means: Contemporary Art and Contested Heritage

Introduction to Contemporary Art and the Deconstruction of HeritagePreservation By Other Means: Contemporary Art and Contested Heritage Chad Elias (bio) and Mary K. Coffey (bio) Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. In this article from the Islamic State's digital newsletter Dabiq, the group explains their destruction of ancient artifacts in Nineveh Governate as a means of "erasing the legacy of a ruined nation." Their reference is both to ancient Assyria and modern Iraq. Dabiq, no. 8, March 30, 2015. In recent years, museums and heritage sites in the Middle East have been attacked by Islamist groups, both as symbols of failed nation-states and as expressions of an idolatrous present. There is evidence to suggest that the iconoclastic actions carried out by the Taliban and Da'esh, the so-called Islamic State (IS), are motivated less by a theological adherence to aniconic monotheism than by a desire to violate the fetish-value that artifacts and monuments acquire within the modern "cult" of heritage.1 As Dario Gamboni has noted, "The concept of world heritage suffers from the fact that it amplifies an idea originating in the West and tends to require an attitude toward material culture that is also distinctly Western in origin."2 Indeed, the selective classification of certain sites as worthy of special protection has had the paradoxical effect of turning them into targets.3 This approach to preservation, which is intertwined with global imbalances in power, offers at least one source of motivation for recent acts of "image purification" by the IS. The group's ability to skillfully exploit the possibilities offered by the viral proliferation of digital media certainly complicates the claim that it is operating within a cultural and epistemological frame of reference that is essentially premodern in its attitude to images. Attuned both to the attention economies of click bait and the aesthetics of the video blog, the highly stylized images of iconoclasm produced and circulated by the IS implicate global audiences and institutions in the spectacle of destruction even as they seek to inspire outrage. Viewers are thus caught between the impulse to view these scenes of obliteration (knowing that their political efficacy relies on their digital circulation) and the no-less satisfactory option of ignoring their existence.4 Organizations like UNESCO and the International Council of Museums have consistently framed the attacks on Near Eastern archaeological artifacts as "a blow against the universal heritage of humanity."5 The Institute for Digital Archaeology (IDA) describes its ongoing efforts to reconstruct recently destroyed artifacts in no less expansive terms: "By using digital techniques to map and preserve monuments and other aspects of shared human history, we are able to ensure that nobody [End Page iii] can deny history or dictate that their narrative or ideology stands above the shared story of all humanity and our shared aspiration to live together in harmony."6 Yet the obligatory references to a common patrimony that transcends national boundaries and cultural differences fails to address the fraught historical interconnections between archaeology, museology, colonialism, and state formation, not just in the Arab world but also in any geopolitical context contending with the legacies of colonial and postcolonial dispossession.7 What in fact underlies the celebration of digital archaeology as salvific is the persistence of a largely unquestioned narrative: that preservation bureaucracies always act for the common good. Here again it is instructive to look at how the IDA frames its mission: Digital archaeology represents the natural evolution of classical archaeology, permitting researchers to look at ancient objects in entirely new ways—to uncover hidden inscriptions, invisible paint lines, the faintest palimpsests—and to share these discoveries with the world. Beyond that, digital technologies can put these crucially important repositories of our cultural identity and shared history forever beyond the reach of those who would destroy them.8 The fanfare that surrounds high-profile replicas such as the twenty-foot marble facsimile of Palmyra's Arch of Triumph, unveiled in London's Trafalgar Square in 2016, positions emergent forms of digital reproduction as an effective substitute for material destruction. Produced with the aid of laser scanners and state-of-the-art 3D printers, these marble...

The Threat of Cyber Terrorism and What International Law Should (Try To) Do about It

The Threat of Cyber Terrorism and What International Law Should (Try To) Do about It Heather A. Harrison Dinniss (bio) The specter of cyber terrorism is one that has been both bandied and seriously debated since at least the late 1990s. Certainly, by the end of 2017, it looked as if the era of hackers accessing and manipulating critical infrastructure for political purposes, the most likely mechanism for conducting a cyber-terrorist act, had truly arrived. Electrical blackouts had been caused in successive years in Ukraine,1 North Korean hackers had breached an American energy utility,2 and Russian hackers had penetrated not only a nuclear power plant but had obtained hands-on access to an American energy utility's control systems.3 More disturbingly in an escalation of these types of cyber-attacks, reports emerged of an advanced attack against a petrochemical company with a plant in Saudi Arabia, apparently designed to sabotage the firm's operations and trigger a lethal explosion.4 Similar (non-cyber related) explosions at petrochemical plants in China and Mexico resulted in the deaths of several employees, injured hundreds, and forced evacuations of surrounding communities. While all of the investigators involved in the matter believe the attack was most likely intended to cause a fatal explosion, they have all been tight-lipped about any suspected perpetrator of the attacks and even the company affected. The fact of the compromise of the widely used Schneider Triconex safety controllers raises uncomfortable speculation about who was behind the attack and for what purpose. It is no secret that terrorist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State (IS or its Arabic acronym Daesh) have made great strides in utilizing information and communication technologies (ICTs) for encrypted communications, recruitment, propaganda, and fundraising. However, to date, no terrorist group appears to have utilized these technologies to directly launch an attack. In April 2015, it appeared that this pattern had changed. TV5Monde, a French television network, was attacked, shutting down broadcasting across eleven of the network's channels and hijacking their associated websites and social media accounts. A group calling itself the "Cyber Caliphate," an IS-associated group, claimed responsibility for the attack and made clear links to the terrorist attacks that had shaken France three months previously as well as the Charlie Hebdo killings.5 For a country already shaken by these kinetic terrorist attacks, the message was clearly intimidatory: "The CyberCaliphate continues its cyberjihad against the enemies of Islamic State." Social media profile pictures were replaced by pictures of a masked Islamist fighter. Posts imploring soldiers to save their families were [End Page 43] accompanied by documents said to be identity cards belonging to relatives of French soldiers taking part in anti-ISIS operations.6 French officials proclaimed terrorism and the Paris prosecutor's office opened a terrorism investigation into the attack.7 Only it wasn't. Subsequent forensic investigations led to an advanced persistent threat team dubbed APT28 or "Fancy Bear," widely alleged to be, or sponsored by, Russian military intelligence; despite investigation, the reason for the attacks remains unclear.8 These incidents illustrate some of the many difficulties that the international legal community is faced with in formulating a response to cyber terrorism. First is the lack of an agreed definition of what acts or conduct might be included in the term cyber terrorism. While domestic terrorism legislation generally contains very wide definitions of terrorist behavior,9 international law has no such general definition. Second, the international community has little to no agreement on what to do with acts committed by elements of the state that would amount to terrorism if committed by private individuals or organized groups. Definitions The international legal response to terrorism generally has had a difficult gestation. While states have attempted to agree on comprehensive treaties and reforms since the 1930s,10 entrenched disagreements have instead resulted in a patchwork of sectoral treaties dealing with different types of terrorist acts and specific threats (e.g., the hijacking of aircraft, hostage taking), regional treaties (e.g., the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism), and UN Security Council decisions. The coverage is far from comprehensive even in relation to kinetic threats and has left unresolved...

HAGIOGRAFIE BOJOWNIKÓW ISIS. UWAGI ODNOŚNIE DO MIGRACJI NA TERENY ZAJĘTE PRZEZ TZW. PAŃSTWO ISLAMSKIE

HAGIOGRAFIE BOJOWNIKÓW ISIS. UWAGI ODNOŚNIE DO MIGRACJI NA TERENY ZAJĘTE PRZEZ TZW. PAŃSTWO ISLAMSKIE

How and Why Do Terrorist Organizations Use the Internet?

The article gives general characterisation of the ways in which these organizations use modern communication technologies. Currently, every major terrorist organisation maintain robust media wings, which focus on producing videos, publishing magazines and sharing them with the public via the Web. The empirical system of reference is based on the activity of al-Qaeda, her franchise AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and ISIS (the so-called Islamic State). While analysing the media of terrorist organisations, the Lasswell model was applied. This formula is a standard research procedure used for investigating acts of communication by answering the questions: who, says what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect?. The author also present typology of videos produced by jihadist organisations, characterised the most important and active media actions of terrorist organisations and a typology of recipients of such messages. The article presents a number of reasons why the Internet has become such an important tool for terrorists.

A master institution of world society? Digital communications networks and the changing dynamics of transnational contention

In English School theory, the putative change from an international society of states to a world society of individuals is usually associated with the diffusion of a benign form of cosmopolitanism and the normative agenda of solidarism. Consequently, the notion that world society might enable alternative expressions of transnational politics, independent from international society, remains underdeveloped. Drawing on the literature of contentious politics and social movements, this article challenges orthodox accounts and suggests that the global proliferation of digitally mediated linkages between individuals and nonstate actors constitutes a fundamental challenge to traditional dynamics of interstate communication in the form of the diplomatic system. This provides an opportunity to reconceptualize world society as an alternative site of politics distinct from mainstream international society and generative of its own logic of communication, mobilization, and action. The 2011 events in Egypt and the ongoing digital presence of the so-called Islamic State are used to demonstrate how massive increases in global interaction capacity are transforming the pathways for political contention and collective mobilization worldwide.

ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: FRAGILE STATES AND RISING INSTABILITY

The first part of this article provides an overview of the development of entrenched armed conflicts in Sub Saharan Africa which continue or have resurfaced in 2016. The author (JVdB) aims to expose the underlying causes and nature of the violent contestation by drawing of the works of C. T. Call in order to break open the black box of ‘failed states’ and analyze their legitimacy, capacity and security gaps separately. In addition the author will provide short scenarios of how these conflicts are likely to evolve in the short and medium-term and which (structural) factors will dominate these trends. The second part of this article (by JR) mainly aims at presenting the basic preconditions for the activities of the major terrorist organizations in Africa. With emphasis on the importance of the north-east and north-west regions of this continent in context of terrorist threats. Hence the initial focus was put on Somalia, which as a permanent fragile state remains under the increased influence of the Jihadist organization Al Shabaab, which is an organization with a high potential for increased capacity in the coming years. Next, was sketched out the situation in Egypt, considering, in essence, the activity of the so-called Islamic State in Sinai Peninsula. In this Analysis it also pointed to the intricate internal situation in modern Libya after so-called Arab Spring and international military intervention, where, despite earlier appearances, the terrorist threat was too much positioned, mostly by comprised to the internal conflict between the different Libyan political parties. Finally, efforts were made to illustrate the current terrorist activity in the Mali area, highlighting the importance of Al Qaeda branch AQIM and the situation in Nigeria where Boko Haram group operates.

THE CONCEPT OF ”SECURITY” IN ANNUAL SPEECHES OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 2001

After the WTC attacks in 2001, the international situation and security in the world has changed. The United States and its allies - including Poland – have started a war against global terrorism and got involved in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The economic crisis at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the Arab Spring, the rise of the so-called Islamic State, the war in Ukraine and the refugee crisis have affected the state of security in Poland and in Europe. Since 2014 Poland’s foreign ministers have been forced to react to the most difficult geostrategic situation after 1989. The paper analyses the issue of security in the annual speeches of Poland’s foreign ministers. The research problem is the impact of the international situation on the contents of the ministers’ annual speeches in this regard.

NATO in Europe: Between Weak European Allies and Strong Influence of Russian Federation

AbstractAfter the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially on NATO’s deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe’s security. At the same time, it looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European allies about Russia’s new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a transformed world, with the accent on Europe, that is constantly developing new security conditions while tackling new challenges and threats.

The Invocation of the European Union’s Mutual Assistance Clause: A Call for Enforced Solidarity

After the 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France invoked Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the so-called mutual assistance clause, for the first time since the 2009 Lisbon Treaty introduced it. France wanted its European Union (EU) partners to assist it in fighting the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) group, which was behind the attacks. However, France’s decision to invoke the article, which had previously been seen as merely symbolic with little actual relevance, is puzzling. The reason for this is that France could have also sought assistance through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) much more robust Article 5 or the EU’s solidarity clause, which is specifically designed for responding to terrorist attacks. However, France chose Article 42(7) over the alternatives because it was more flexible and came with less political baggage. It also enabled France to demand that other Member States make additional contributions to its various foreign and security policy actions around the world to alleviate the burden they were placing on it. In other words, it allowed France to call for ‘enforced solidarity’, which went beyond what it could have demanded from its partners in less extraordinary circumstances.

THREE DIMENSIONAL RECONSTRUCTION WORKFLOWS FOR LOST CULTURAL HERITAGE MONUMENTS EXPLOITING PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PROFESSIONAL PHOTOGRAMMETRIC IMAGERY

Abstract. In our paper, we document experiments and results of image-based 3d reconstructions of famous heritage monuments which were recently damaged or completely destroyed by the so-called Islamic state in Syria and Iraq. The specific focus of our research is on the combined use of professional photogrammetric imagery and of publicly available imagery from the web for optimally 3d reconstructing those monuments. The investigated photogrammetric reconstruction techniques include automated bundle adjustment and dense multi-view 3d reconstruction using public domain and professional imagery on the one hand and an interactive polygonal modelling based on projected panoramas on the other. Our investigations show that the combination of these two image-based modelling techniques delivers better results in terms of model completeness, level of detail and appearance.