ABSTRACT The key feature of EU Smart Specialization is experimentalist governance, or the idea that policy principals only partially possess the necessary knowledge for policy design and implementation. Instead, discovering policy priorities, designing instruments, and detecting and correcting errors are the responsibilities of a wide range of innovation stakeholders. However, particularly in institutionally less developed countries and regions, there is often a clash between the requirements for experimental governance and the public policy demand for predominantly procedural accountability. Our central argument is that the experimentation dimension cannot be added to the conventional policy cycle without altering it. This results in a trade-off between experimentation and accountability, leading to four disconnected governance regimes: EDP, design, implementation, and M&E. This paper demonstrates this issue in the case of Croatia’s S3. Using the concept of a dynamic policy cycle, we critically examine different solutions to experimentation and highlight their deficiencies. Our analysis and conclusions are highly relevant for countries and regions adopting experimental policy approaches.