Small Navy Research Articles

Research on the Development of Small and Medium-sized Navy in Southeast Asian Countries

There is no doubt that the entire Asia-Pacific region, especially Southeast Asia, is undergoing a large-scale naval modernization process. However, most analyses of this phenomenon have focused on its scope and nature, especially its possible consequences for peace and stability in the region. Of particular concern is whether we are seeing the beginning of an unstable naval arms race in the region. This is completely grounded, and it is indeed an important research area, which will be discussed in the article. In addition, we also look at the general naval modernization process, and discuss in essence how the country to develop or maintain the navy, as well as the special problems and challenges that the navy often faces in this process, for example, with the current economic growth and international trends, increasing the naval budget and procurement of related potential ship. The purpose of this paper is to review the naval modernization of the six countries in the South China Sea, which can be served as guidance for Taiwan's navy construction.

From the Biafra war to the Liberian crisis: historicizing the contribution of the Nigerian Navy

ABSTRACT The sea has increased in importance as a source of useful resources. The nation that has control of its immediate and external seas is in a good position to choose how much or how little of sea resources it wants. It is the importance of the sea and the sea lines of communication to nations that has made thoughts such as maritime power, sea power, naval strategy … etc significant to them. The paper also examined the naval and constabulary relevance of the Nigerian Navy to its maritime environment. The study relied on primary and documentary data. The documentary data were sourced from books, newspapers and annual reports. The secondary sources used were subjected to textual and contextual evaluations. The primary sources was basically interviews with some important actors in the era. The paper’s study of the Nigerian Navy also identified the roles of a small navy and their importance to the maritime environment.

From the Biafra war to the Liberian crisis: historicizing the contribution of the Nigerian navy

ABSTRACTThe sea has increased in importance as a source of useful resources. The nation that has control of its immediate and external seas is in a good position to choose how much or how little of sea resources it wants. It is the importance of the sea and the sea lines of communication to nations that has made thoughts such as maritime power, sea power, naval strategy … etc significant to them. The paper also examined the naval and constabulary relevance of the Nigerian Navy to its maritime environment. The study relied on primary and documentary data. The documentary data were sourced from books, newspapers and annual reports. The secondary sources used were subjected to textual and contextual evaluations. The primary sources was basically interviews with some important actors in the era. The paper’s study of the Nigerian Navy also identified the roles of a small navy and their importance to the maritime environment.

Small Navy, Big Responsibilities: The Struggles Of Building Indonesia's Naval Power

From its inception, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) has struggled to reconcile its relatively small capabilities with its large responsibilities. This paper argues that significant reforms need to be carried out in order to improve the overall capacity of the TNI-AL and build Indonesian naval power. The Global Maritime Fulcrum vision provides this opportunity, however, it must be sustained by the political leadership in the long term as developing naval power does not happen overnight. To that end, this paper discusses four chief problems that the TNI-AL continues to face today, namely (1) a lack of a comprehensive maritime outlook, (2) stringent budgetary conditions, (3) a continental-oriented command and control structure, and (4) “turf wars” between related agencies in the government. This paper also briefly contrasts and compares Indonesia’s experience with China’s experience with naval development under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Although both countries are arguably different from one another in one way or the other, this exercise serves to highlight three lessons that may be applicable for Indonesia in managing its naval development and understanding the complexity in building its naval power. These lessons include (1) a need for strong and sustained political will in developing naval power and (2) having a clear strategic objective for naval development, and (3) a significant amount of resources are required to build naval power.

Empire Effect Versus Crowding Out Effect: Shipping Productivity in the North Atlantic from 1764 to 1860

While there is a rich literature on the benefits of empire in terms of the provision of key public goods—notably security for international trade—the costs have been downplayed. In this paper, we focus on merchant shipping data between Canada and Britain between 1764 and 1860 to measure these costs. Imperial hegemony would have implied greater security for shippers and this, in turn, would have stimulated investments in productivity. However, we contend that a counter-effect would have operated simultaneously. The provision of greater security meant greater military navies which crowded out merchant navies in terms of availability of capital and labor. We argue that the benefit of the “security effect” has to be weighed against the cost of the “crowding-out” effect. We find that the “crowding-out effect” was larger than the “security effect.” For “security effects” to overpower “crowding out effects,” one had to have a very small navy in absolute terms but a large one relative to other military powers.

The ‘best small nation navy in the world’? The twenty-first century Royal New Zealand Navy

ABSTRACTThe Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) has set itself the admirable goal of being the ‘best small nation navy in the world’. As the RNZN’s fleet consists of just 11 vessels and New Zealand has one of the largest exclusive economic zones in the world, the achievement of that aim is extremely challenging. The RNZN is expected to conduct a wide range of tasks from combat to customs patrols and also needs to be interoperable with other regional players such as Australia and the US. The RNZN is a credible small navy and is generally effective in the roles that it undertakes, but given the projected increase in security challenges that the service is expected to face, it can be argued that the triangular factors of strategic objectives, defence capabilities and defence resources in New Zealand are currently out of synch. New Zealand is an inherently maritime nation and the RNZN is central to both its security and prosperity. It is essential that further investment is committed to the RNZN in order to enable it to fulfil all of the tasks expected of it and to ensure that it can achieve its aim to be the ‘best small nation navy’.

On a New Bearing: The reorganized Royal Australian Navy at war in Vietnam

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) made a modest but important commitment of a single destroyer to the Vietnam War on a rotational basis between March 1967 and September 1971. The contrast between the deployments of the American-designed and built Charles F. Adams class guided missile destroyers and the British-designed Daring class destroyer, HMAS Vendetta, represented the fruition of a small navy being pulled in two different directions. The RAN was undergoing a transitional period, which saw the service increasingly align with the United States Navy. This was a monumental shift in policy, as the Royal Navy had provided a model for the RAN to emulate since its creation in 1911. The Vietnam War offered a clear test of standardization and demonstrated that common ship designs provided a platform for interoperability, but did not guarantee it. The Australian ships were able to make a worthwhile contribution to a predominantly American naval effort, but they faced a number of challenges in achieving interoperability. The basis for successful co-operation was provided by the existence of common procedures and standardized equipment, but was necessarily supplemented by ad hoc measures and impromptu workarounds.

If By Sea: The Forging of the American Navy—From the Revolution to the War of 1812 , and: Commodore Abraham Whipple of the Continental Navy: Privateer, Patriot, Pioneer (review)

Reviewed by: If By Sea: The Forging of the American Navy—From the Revolution to the War of 1812, and: Commodore Abraham Whipple of the Continental Navy: Privateer, Patriot, Pioneer David Head (bio) Keywords U.S. Naval history, Revolutionary War Navy, Commodore Abraham Whipple If By Sea: The Forging of the American Navy—From the Revolution to the War of 1812. By George C. Daughan. (New York: Basic Books, 2008. Pp. 521. Cloth, $30.00.) Commodore Abraham Whipple of the Continental Navy: Privateer, Patriot, Pioneer. By Sheldon S. Cohen. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010. Pp. 232. Cloth, $69.95.) The military history of the American Revolution has been largely land-based, and for good reason: The Continental Navy underperformed its potential, despite the sacrifices and heroism of individuals. In their very different works, George C. Daughan and Sheldon S. Cohen seek a fresh appraisal of the early American Navy. Daughan has produced a broad, synthetic survey of the attempts to build a navy during the War of Independence as well as the new national government's efforts to create a navy appropriate for the new nation. Cohen, meanwhile, focuses on one captain, Abraham Whipple, and his services at sea in the revolutionary era. Taken together, Daughan and Cohen use naval affairs to offer glimpses of the origins, progress, and effects of the American Revolution. Daughan organizes his work around the fundamental naval policy debate of the day: Should America build a large, British-style force capable of blue-water cruising and confronting enemies abroad? Or should it build a small navy capable of guerilla-style attacks on a larger force and designed to operate close to home? According to Daughan, the nation's leaders consistently chose the wrong option, giving America a large navy [End Page 318] when it should have had a small one and a small navy when it needed a large one. When the Continental Congress created a navy, it imitated Britain. The position had its logic. The Royal Navy was the world's most powerful. Thus, the Continental Congress did as the British did: It created separate chains of command for the army and navy; committed to building thirteen frigates and ships of the line; dispatched naval vessels on prestige missions, such as transporting diplomats to Europe; and assigned the navy to raid British commerce. Each of these choices proved costly. Army and navy commanders failed to coordinate. Building thirteen large new vessels was more expensive than anticipated (of course) and simply added to the competition for scarce war materials. John Adams may have enjoyed the dignity of arriving in France aboard a national vessel, but a merchantman would have delivered him just as well. Privateers could have handled commerce raiding. Worst of all, the most talented commanders and the most powerful vessels were often far from the most critical battles. For example, during the Battle of Yorktown, John Paul Jones was in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, not fighting but waiting. He was sent there to take command of the 74-gun America, a vessel that had been under construction since 1776. Jones never did command the vessel. By the time it was finished, the war was over and the government gave her to France. Daughan builds a convincing case that a navy of row galleys, whaleboats, and gun boats could have performed much better. In fact, early in the war, before Royal Navy admiration took hold, swarms of small boats made effective raids on British vessels. These boats allowed the colonists to take advantage of their local knowledge: They could hide in creeks, strike at the enemy, and escape into the shallows. This was precisely the strategy British commanders feared most, but the Continental Congress wanted a large navy. Overall, Daughan offers a strong explanation for the poor performance of the Continental Navy and issues an important challenge for policymakers today: Fight the war you are faced with by using the strategy it demands. Moving into the early republic, Daughan frames the large navy-small navy debate against the formation of parties and the foreign affairs challenges of the Napoleonic Wars. Here he navigates seas well known to early republic scholars. Federalists advocated for a...

My Solidarity Memories from Gdańsk

Like most members of my generation, I grew up with vivid memories of the brutal suppression of workers' protests in Gdansk in December 1970. At that time, the communist authorities ordered the army and the police to open fire on the protesters. About 45 people were killed - most of them secretly buried by the security forces - and about 1200 were injured. It was an entirely avoidable national tragedy and the source of national trauma, leading to the formation of organised opposition and the creation of an underground free trade union movement in Poland. I witnessed this tragedy - the most important formative experience for my generation - while serving in the Polish Navy. During a purge of Polish universities in May 1969, I was conscripted to the navy for two years from the post of medical registrar, while finishing my PhD in the Nephrology Department, Medical School of Gdansk, under a prominent medical scholar, Professor Jakub Penson, who was himself suspended from the position of Vice-Chancellor. Nevertheless, when I was conscripted, Penson found for me through his friends in the army a position in a small navy garrison on the Westerplatte Peninsula in Gdansk and helped me to finish my doctorate while I was serving in the navy. On Westerplatte, I was in charge of a clinic and a small hospital. Some of my patients were university students conscripted for three years' military service as punishment for activity in democratic opposition. I also had under my care soldier-conscripts from Catholic seminaries who were forced to take three years of military service in the Navy Artillery. They were subject to intense 're-education', which was shorthand for brainwashing, involving lectures and parties with local prostitutes, all aimed at 'ideological conversion' of the young clerics. On 15 December 1970, when the clashes between the police and the protesters started in Gdansk, I was on duty at the Nowy Port Garrison, charged with attending the injured policemen. Fighting in the city was very intense, and there were more than 400 injured policemen brought in for emergency treatment. Almost all of them were under the influence of alcohol and drugs given to them by officers before their deployment. While putting them in plaster (to immobilise them temporarily), I could not stop thinking about the carnage they might have inflicted on the protesters. Two days later, army helicopters fired at the workers arriving by trains at Gdynia Shipyard and more people were killed. The navy was not involved in the clashes, and it was a great relief when, after a few more days and a change in communist leadership, there was a political 'thaw'. But there was also a growing concern about the 're-educated' soldiers. When a few warships entered Westerplatte and I had an opportunity to chat with navy crews, I discovered that they were thoroughly brainwashed. Political officers convinced the soldiers that the protests were provoked by German 'revanchists', and that the police and the army defended the 'Polish Gdansk'. Ten years later, I was a university lecturer and director of the Nuclear Medicine Department at the Medical School of Gdansk, busy completing my habilitation (advanced research degree). I had a new boss, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, who was reorganising the Medical School on the Soviet model. In spite of political pressures, we had at the university a small but active group of oppositional critics, mostly young doctors and students, who called themselves 'Young Poland'. They were unofficially allied with underground free trade unions that formed in the late 1970s. When protest started to spread again in spring 1 980, this was a sign of forthcoming upheavals. Indeed, the spring wave of strikes was followed in July- August by a new wave that spread to the Gdansk Shipyard. This time there were no street marches like those that had triggered violence 10 years earlier - only strikes in the factories. …

Exploiting the Value of Small Navies: The Experience of the Royal Netherlands Navy

The capabilities inherent in small naval forces are examined, using the Royal Netherlands Navy as a case study. International partnerships and effective strategies for control of littoral, estuarine and riverine areas are ways in which a small navy can make the most of limited resources.

Rapid Host Nation Medical Deployment

Rapid development of land-based units in Operation Desert Shield/Storm presented critical needs for medical support. Integration of small Navy mobile medical teams in Bahrain and a larger United States Army Hospital unit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, at host nation hospitals presented an innovative method of providing this support. The success of these ventures in convenience and quality of care establishes the host nation interaction with military medical professionals as a workable, satisfying, and important adjunct to standard military medical care.

Confederate Navy Chief: Stephen R. Mallory , and: The C.S.S. Florida (review)

86CIVIL WAR HISTORY to ascertain what his opponent was really up to. Along the way, the author devotes full chapters to the preliminary battles at Brandy Station and Winchester . Many of the accounts from which Wheeler drew his material were published twenty years or more after the battle was fought. Recognizing that such eyewitness histories are sometimes combed with factual errors, the author has taken pains, he says, to identify the inaccuracies and remove them. He uses ellipses generously, to eliminate both the erroneous observations and unneeded words ofhis subjects. Having thus tested and tightened his quotations, he organized them chronologically and tied them together with his own connective prose, which is as admirable for its economy as for its clarity. So unobtrusive is Wheeler's writing, that it tends to blend with the quotations which surround it, creating a text that is almost seamless in its unity—a remarkable achievement indeed, considering that the book actually was constructed more on the model of a patchwork quilt. Unfortunately , the author (or perhaps the publisher) chose not to footnote his sources; therefore, the scholar is required to accept on faith Wheeler's accuracy in the use of his material. Not surprisingly, the author presents nothing new about the battle itself. Nor should the reader expect a fully developed history; the author's connective prose is too spare to provide a detailed account oftactics and troop movements, and the quotations which constitute the core of the book are much too anecdotal and personal to provide real perspective. Rather, the strength ofthe book lies in Wheeler's unerring ability to reconstruct familiar events through the eyes ofthe participants and civilians who were there. Through them the reader witnesses the romantic majesty and foolhardiness ofbattlefield charges, feels the horror ofseeing men being blown apart, and experiences the unspeakable fear, confusion, excitement, and din of the battle. Perhaps no other work leaves the reader with so strong a sense that he has actually experienced, vicariously at least, what it was like to be at Gettysburg on those first four, awful days of July, 1863. Donald E. Reynolds East Texas State University Confederate Navy Chief: Stephen R. Mallory. By Joseph T. Durkin, S. J. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987. Pp. vi, 446. $21.95) The C.S.S. Florida. By Frank Lawrence Owsley, Jr. (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1987. Pp. 210. $15.95) In assessing the failure ofthe Confederacy perhaps historians have ignored the naval policy of Jeff Davis's government. Perhaps historians, like the Davis administration itself, have been too land-oriented. Two recent re- BOOK REVIEWS87 prints of chapters in Confederate naval history may help to redirect our assessment. Joseph Durkin's biography of Davis's secretary of the navy, Stephen Mallory, was first published in 1954. Short on interpretation, but solid in its research, this biography offers an insightful view into the routine operations of the Confederate government. For Jefferson Davis the choice of Mallory to be the Confederate secretary of the navy was an obvious and wise decision. Mallory satisfied the need to have a cabinet member from Florida and he had excellent experience in naval affairs at the national level. By being one of the cabinet officers who remained in office for the duration ofthe war, Mallory gave a continuity to the naval administration which so many other departments lacked. Mallory managed a relatively small navy of 4,800 men and 40 vessels at its zenith. His portion ofthe Confederate budget was only 4 percent and ranked his department just above the executive mansion in available funds. Nonetheless, he had to organize the manpower, direct purchases, and make policy. It was in the last category that he made an undeniable contribution. Mallory recognized that the Confederacy needed to break the Union blockade in orderto maintain trading lines with the outside world. Yet, the Confederacy lacked the means to construct a wooden fleet to challenge the Union Navy. Mallory, drawing on his enthusiasm for ironclads, recommended the construction ofmetal ships; it was to be a momentous decision for the North and the South, and for American naval history. It was he who pushed for the construction of...

Lincoln's Lee The Life of Samuel Phillips Lee, United States Navy, 1812-1897 (review)

BOOK REVIEWS Lincoln's Lee The Life of Samuel Phillips Lee, United States Navy, 1812-1897. By Dudley Taylor Cornish and Virginia Jeans Laas. (Lawrence : The University Press of Kansas, 1986. Pp. xv, 245. $29.95.) Lincoln's Lee is a welcome addition to the still small lexicon of historical biography of the early years of the United States Navy. This wellwritten book is a first-rate study of S. P. Lee, an important but longneglected figure whose career spanned forty-six years, including constant and invaluable service during the Civil War. One wonders why no one had written a biography of Admiral Lee before now? It is this mystery that the authors unravel so successfully. They have mined the rich collection of thousands of personal papers and primary documents in the Blair-Lee collection at Princeton, the National Archives , and the Library of Congress. Cornish and Laas have immersed themselves in this material, as well as in major secondary sources, and they thoroughly know their subject. As a result of this exemplary scholarship S. Phillips Lee emerges as an excellent example of the pre-Civil War naval officer. The poor son of a prominent Virginia family, his grandfather was Richard Henry Lee. Young Phillips Lee obtained a midshipman's appointment at age fourteen through family connections. For the next thirty-five years he served aboard various vessels, learning his profession. In a small navy with a large officer corps where advancement was by seniority only, promotion came slowly. But there were many opportunities for a young officer to experience all his profession had to offer. While still a young man, Lee had already sailed around the world, served in the Wilkes Exploring Expedition and in the Coast Survey, and served with distinction in the Mexican war. Yet with all these accomplishments and a thirty-five year career, Lee was just a naval commander when the Civil War broke out. One advantage Lee did have during those years was his family, namely his inlaws the Blairs, a powerful political family in Washington. In 1843, after a long and stormy courtship, of which her father particularly disapproved, Lee married Elizabeth Blair. Lee soon won over the elder Blair, and for the rest of his life he was a persuasive advoate for his son-in-law at the Navy Department. Blair's lobbying coincided very nicely with Lee's predilection, throughout his career, to ignore proper channels and go over the heads of his superiors to get orders changed. 174CIVIL WAR HISTORY During the early days of the Civil War, Lee came to the favorable attention of Navy Secretary Welles. However, Lee was surprised when Welles chose him, over many other available officers, to command the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron in September, 1862, with the rank of acting rear admiral. For the next two years, Lee's squadron did its job with deliberate efficiency. At its height, Lee commanded over one hundred ships which patrolled the thousands of miles of coast, rivers, sounds, and inlets on the Atlantic Coast between southeastern Virginia and the southern boundry of North Carolina. Lee's knowledge of the coast, from his early days with the Coast Survey, along with his good business qualities and untiring appetite for precise and detailed work, made his blockade effective and profitable. Lincoln's Lee is a valuable addition to the scholarship of Civil War naval history, particularly in its rich and detailed work on the longneglected naval blockade, an area whose standard work is still the century -old study by James R. Soley. It is unfortunate that the authors could not have spent more time on the pre-Civil War navy, whose history has been neglected, especially on its struggle to reform and humanize as well as modernize itself. The authors with their focus too firmly set upon Lee, omit or barely mention such important early naval issues as the campaigns to end the practices of flogging and issuing grog, the battle to make officer promotions based on merit rather than seniority, and the rapidly evolving military technology and steam engineering of this era. Some attention to these topics and perhaps less detail on Lee's numerous business and real...

Advances in Celestial Navigation

ABSTRACTThe traditional celestial navigation, position fixing with the sextant and stars, has not been displaced by the development of the accurate and all‐weather inertial and radio navigation (LORAN, OMEGA, Satellite) systems. The limitations of these electronic navigation systems require celestial navigation as the back‐up on major naval and commercial vessels. Also it is the prime navigation method on many small Navy, Coast Guard, commercial, and pleasure craft. However, marine celestial navigation is not all‐weather, requiring sufficiently clear weather and illumination to see the celestial body and sea horizon simultaneously. In addition sight reduction from the sextant data to obtain line of positions for plotting is a tedious and time‐consuming procedure. Presently potential exists to extend the operating period of sextants to nighttime, and to assist general navigation, as well, with night vision telescopes and low light level TV (LLLTV) cameras. The state‐of‐the‐art in microelectronics indicates it is feasible to develop a relatively inexpensive, small, hand‐held, portable sextant‐computer system that will alleviate the tedium and blunders of sight reduction, and increase navigation accuracy.This paper describes the new day/night digital readout marine sextant, the concepts of the portable sextant‐computer system, the development of the sight reduction computer program, and the remote‐controlled LLLTV camera‐sextant system, which the navigator can operate within the ship to obtain celestial body sightings.