Small Arsenal Research Articles

The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation: Perception and Reality

Nuclear weapons proliferation is at the top of the news these days. Most recent reports have focused on the nuclear efforts of Iran and North Korea, but they also typically warn that those two acute diplomatic headaches may merely be the harbingers of a much darker future. Indeed, foreign policy sages often claim that what worries them most is not the small arsenals that Tehran and Pyongyang could build for themselves, but rather the potential that their reckless behavior could catalyze a process of runaway nuclear proliferation, international disorder, and, ultimately, nuclear war.

What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict

Existing nuclear deterrence scholarship evinces a pervasive “existential bias,” assuming that once a state merely possesses nuclear weapons, it should be able to deter armed conflict. The empirical literature expresses this bias by simply dichotomously coding a state based on whether it has nuclear weapons, thereby treating all nuclear states as equivalent. Thus, whether nuclear weapons deter conflict, and how much is required to do so, is unclear. This article shifts the unit of analysis away from nuclear weapons to postures, hypothesizing that different nuclear postures are distinct and generate differential deterrent power, particularly amongst the non-superpower states which comprise the lion’s share of nuclear powers. I find that an asymmetric escalation nuclear posture uniquely deters conflict initiation and escalation. Not only do small arsenals have little deterrence success, but I find that even assured retaliation postures fail to deter intense conventional conflict. This suggests that the deterrence dividend is distributed unequally across nuclear powers, and that states may need to do more than simply acquire nuclear weapons to successfully deter conventional attacks.

Complete genome sequence of "Enterobacter lignolyticus" SCF1.

In an effort to discover anaerobic bacteria capable of lignin degradation, we isolated “Enterobacter lignolyticus” SCF1 on minimal media with alkali lignin as the sole source of carbon. This organism was isolated anaerobically from tropical forest soils collected from the Short Cloud Forest site in the El Yunque National Forest in Puerto Rico, USA, part of the Luquillo Long-Term Ecological Research Station. At this site, the soils experience strong fluctuations in redox potential and are net methane producers. Because of its ability to grow on lignin anaerobically, we sequenced the genome. The genome of “E. lignolyticus” SCF1 is 4.81 Mbp with no detected plasmids, and includes a relatively small arsenal of lignocellulolytic carbohydrate active enzymes. Lignin degradation was observed in culture, and the genome revealed two putative laccases, a putative peroxidase, and a complete 4-hydroxyphenylacetate degradation pathway encoded in a single gene cluster.

Revealing money’s time value

► This article provides 3 exercises for teaching the time-value-of-money. ► Developing student valuation skills in accounting is important. ► The first exercise uses a video on monetary history to motivate interest. ► The second exercise uses discovery learning methods to teach valuation concepts. ► The third exercise applies valuation concepts to a retirement planning problem. Few accounting concepts are as challenging as valuation and the time value of money. Few are as powerful or useful. Measurement and valuation issues are central to the study of accounting, and developing students’ understanding of basic valuation concepts like the time value of money is critical. The purpose of this paper is to provide instructional resources to help build students’ valuation skills by revealing the (1) power, (2) concepts, and (3) application of the time value of money and basic valuation concepts. Three tools are presented. The first reveals the evolution and impact of financial markets like the bond market and their requisite need for mathematics and the time value of money. The exercise uses a video accompanied with questions that are intended to act as a “hook” to capture student interest in lending and the time value of money. The second tool reveals concepts of bond financing, valuation and the time value of money. It begins with familiar time-value-of-money concepts and logically progresses. Each step uses intuition from prior steps to methodically build concepts in a discovery-learning process. The steps ignore bond terminology until the intuition between cash flows, interest rates, and purchase prices has been established. The third tool has students apply time-value-of-money and valuation concepts to plan and account for personal retirement assets. The exercise demonstrates the applicable usefulness and practical value of the time value of money and basic valuation skills. It can spark use of these concepts to empower fiscal responsibility and self-sufficiency. In sum, the article provides a small arsenal of exercises for delivering time value of money and valuation material. The exercises can be used collectively or individually depending on instructor preference and course parameters.

Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan

As President Obama is in the midst of deciding whether additional U.S.combat forces are needed in Afghanistan in addition to the 21,000 troops recently committed, he must realize that additional armed forces are only a stopgap measure in Afghanistan's downward spiral into an 'undergoverned' failed state. Similarly, as Pakistan's fragile and fractured civilian government continues to appease the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen with Taliban cultural values led by Baitullah Mehsud and others, it comes closer to the concept of a "misgoverned" failed state, possessing a small arsenal of nuclear arms. The problem for the U.S. administration is that neither of these countries can be allowed to fall further into disrepair. At the same time each requires a different and unique approach to the threat of "Talibanization" that faces each country—the control of territory within each country by Islamic radicals seeking to impose their ultraconservative interpretation of shar'ia law onto the general populace. Generally acknowledged is the belief that what has tentatively worked in Iraq, that is, the additional U.S. troops and employment of former Sunni insurgents to help fight foreign fighters associated with al-Qaida, will not work in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. While a regional approach to the conflict in these two countries is warranted, Afghanistan and Pakistan are on two different economic, social, and political playing fields. Hence, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution for the two countries, especially one that draws on the Iraq playbook. In addition to its internal political problems, Pakistan also faces the issue of al-Qaida and Taliban training camps positioned in its literal back yard, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA or Tribal Areas). Resolution of the War on Terror cannot come to fruition without addressing the problems that exist in the Tribal Areas. This largely self-governed terrain has come under Taliban influence and serves as a safe haven for Taliban and foreign-fighter cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and, more recently, large-scale attacks into Pakistan itself.

FRAMING STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

During the Cold War deterrence worked better in practice than in theory. It became an article of faith that great power war was virtually unthinkable because of the consequences, yet this conclusion was reached without ever working through the scenarios. Today, in a world of shrinking great power arsenals and proliferating small arsenals, we may now be moving away from the models which served us well during the Cold War. Lawrence Freedman interrogates the assumptions which underpinned strategic deterrence and casts an eye on a more ambiguous nuclear future.

Do Small Arsenals Deter?

Ward Wilson’s article “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima” provides a startling explanation for the end of World War II in East Asia.1 Wilson argues that, contrary to established wisdom, Japan’s decision to surrender stemmed not from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but from the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan on August 8, 1945. He bases his argument on the following propositions: (1) in the context of the massive destruction caused by the conventional bombing of Japanese cities at the time, the atomic bomb was not qualitatively different; (2) the havoc caused by these attacks did not undermine Japan’s determination to press on with the war in hopes of obtaining favorable terms of surrender; (3) the Japanese leadership’s reaction to the devastation of Hiroshima does not reoect a perception that the atomic bomb was decisive in its effects; and (4) in contrast, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, by eliminating available options for a favorable end, compelled Japan to surrender quickly. Wilson’s analysis concludes that small nuclear arsenals may not deter aggressors. Whereas large nuclear forces may have such a capability (200 weapons is where the author draws the line), “the logic of deterrence may be different where small arsenals are concerned. If destroying one or two cities does not coerce an opponent, then perhaps the threat of limited nuclear retaliation does not deter when the stakes are high enough” (p. 179). In short, small nuclear powers are inherently unstable and, logically (though the author does not state this explicitly), such states can achieve deterrence stability only if they expand their armories. Wilson’s basic argument about the Japanese decision is a plausible one, drawing considerable evidence from archival sources, though it is thin with respect to the Soviet factor, as only a single source is cited (pp. 174–175). I question, however, his inference regarding the requirements of deterrence today. Contrary to Wilson’s claim, the size of a nuclear arsenal does not matter, and more speciacally, small arsenals are adequate for obtaining deterrence. A review of how nuclear powers behave when war is nigh demonstrates that the concept of “assured second-strike capability” based on the capacity to inoict casualties into the millions is a mythical notion that does not accord with histori-

Proteomic identification, nucleotide sequence, heterologous expression and immunological reactivity of the triosephosphate isomerase of Paracoccidioides brasiliensis

An antigen of Paracoccidioides brasiliensis ( Pb) was gel isolated and characterized. Endoproteinase Lys-C-digested peptides of the purified protein, which presented a molecular mass of 29 kDa and p I of 5.8, were subjected to sequence analysis of their amino acids. Searches at databases comparing the sequence of amino acids from the three peptides of the native protein revealed strong homology to triosephosphate isomerase (TPI: E.C. 5.3.1.1) from several sources. The complete cDNA and gene encoding PbTPI were obtained and both contained an open reading frame predicted to encode a 249-amino acid protein that presented all the peptides characterized in the native PbTPI. The Pbtpi gene contained six exons interrupted by five introns. Analysis performed with the deduced PbTPI suggested its usefulness in providing phylogenetic relatedness, as well as evidencing the correlation between the phylogeny provided by the deduced protein and intron positions in the cognate genes. The immunological reactivity of PbTPI was examined. The complete coding cDNA of PbTPI was overexpressed in an Escherichia coli host to produce high levels of recombinant fusion protein with glutathione S-transferase (GST) that had been purified by affinity chromatography. The purified recombinant TPI was recognized by sera of patients with confirmed paracoccidioidomycosis and not by sera of healthy individuals. Thus, recombinant PbTPI can be a valuable addition to the still small arsenal of P. brasiliensis immunoreactive proteins, which could be tested for incorporation into assays for serodiagnosis of the disease.

Refill rate of antipsychotic drugs: an easy and inexpensive method to monitor patients' compliance by using computerised pharmacy data.

In the literature, noncompliance to medication in patients with schizophrenia ranges from 20 to 89%. There is an urgent need for reliable and valid techniques that measure compliance in antipsychotic drug treatment. In this study, we use pharmacy-dispensing records to assess compliance by calculating the refill rate of antipsychotic medication. Refill rates of chronic antipsychotic drug users in 1999 and in 2000 were established by dividing the number of prescribed days by the total number of calendar days that the patient was registered in a pharmacy prescription records database. More than 50% of patients using an antipsychotic drug show a refill rate that is associated with medication compliance (0.9-1.1). The number of daily antipsychotic drug intakes was associated with a divergent refill rate, more than once daily dosing was associated with a significantly elevated refill rate (p < 0.015). The refill rate is a valuable addition to the small arsenal of objective compliance measurement tools. It is an easy to obtain and inexpensive way to estimate (non)compliance. We recommend future studies to medication use in both mental and physical disorders, in order to further specify the actual value of refill rates in clinical practice.

Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-pakistani Conflict: Global Implications of a Regional Power Cycle

This article examines the implications of possession of nuclear weapons for war between India and Pakistan. Existing literature derived from us-Soviet interaction during the Cold War may have little relevance to conflicts between developing nations with small and vulnerable nuclear arsenals. Applying power cycle theory within a regional context, this study explores possible global ramifications of a South Asian nuclear arms race. Power cycle theory suggests that Indo-Pakistani military competition may accelerate shifts in the relative power trends throughout Asia, causing abrupt changes in future foreign policy expectations and security that could ultimately affect the nuclear programs of both Russia and the United States.

Label and Extralabel Drug use in Small Ruminants

The small ruminant practitioner has a small arsenal of approved drugs in the United States, so the practitioner must be familiar with the laws and regulations related to extra label use. Drugs can be used extra label in food animals only under specific circumstances and can be used only for therapeutic purposes. Drugs that are illegal in small ruminants include chloramphenicol; clenbuterol; diethylstilbestrol; dimetridazole, ipranidazole, and other nitroimidazoles such as metronidazole; dipyrone; fluoroquinolones; glycopeptides; nitrofurans; furazolidone; and extra label use of medication in feed. It is also illegal to use any drug that results in residues above established tolerances or safe levels.

The Nuclear turning point: a blueprint for deep cuts and de-alerting of nuclear weapons

Despite the ongoing drawdown of strategic forces under the terms of START, both the United States and Russia maintain large arsenals of nuclear weapons poised for immediate launch. Under the most optimistic current scenarios, these arsenals will remain very large and launch-ready for more than a decade. This book, by a distinguished group of coauthors, critically evaluates the current policy of retaining and operating large nuclear arsenals. It reviews U.S. nuclear doctrine and strategy, and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression by former Cold War adversaries and other countries with weapons of mass destruction. The risks of inadvertent as well as deliberate nuclear attack are assessed. The authors argue that small arsenals (low hundreds) on low alert satisfy all justifiable requirements for nuclear weapons. They present a blueprint for making deep cuts in U.S. and Russian deployments, and for lowering their alert level. They explain the implications of shifting to small arsenals for further constraining anti-ballistic missile defenses, strengthening verification, and capping or reducing the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and Britain as well as the threshold nuclear states. The political challenges and opportunities, both domestic and international, for achieving deep reductions in the size and readiness of nuclear forces are analyzed by the authors and by distinguished experts from other countries. The coauthors are Bruce Blair, Jonathan Dean, James Goodby, Steve Fetter, Hal Feiveson, George Lewis, Janne Nolan, Theodore Postol, and Frank von Hippel. An appendix with international perspectives by Li Bin (China), Alexei Arbatov (Russia), Therese Delpech (France), Pervez Hoodbhoy (Pakistan), Shai Feldman (Israel), Harald Mueller (Germany), and Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana (South Asia).

South Africa and the Affordable Bomb

F.W. de Klerk`s announcement in March 1993 that South Africa has secretly developed a small nuclear arsenal, and junked it, was starting in its candor. The bedrock question is why South Africa developed and built seven fission weapons in the first place. The scientists, engineers, and policy-makers claim that weapons were never intended for military use or integration into the country`s military forces. Instead they claim that the strategy was bombs for political purposes. The strategy was designed to bring Western governments to South Africa`s aid in the event of an over-whelming attack by Soviet inspired military forces then in southern Africa. Shortly after de Klerk became president in 1989, the ordered a halt to the nuclear weapons program in anticipation of acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On July 10, 1991, South Africa became a member of the NPT. The program developing the seven nuclear weapons is discussed in some detail for various phases of the project. 13 refs.