The notion that people are frequently overoptimistic about the future is well known in the judgment and decision-making literature (Armor & Taylor, 2002; Hardman, 2009; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Kruger & Burrus, 2004; Lench & Ditto, 2008; Menon, Kyung, & Agrawal, 2009; Sharot, 2011; Sweldens, Puntoni, Paolacci, & Vissers, 2014; Weinstein, 1980; White, Cunningham, & Titchener, 2011). However, the concept of unrealistic has been questioned recently, both on the basis of terminological confusions and methodological problems (e.g., Harris & Hahn, 2011). Shepperd, Klein, Waters, and Weinstein (2013) address some of the raised criticisms in their review and propose to distinguish between four kinds of unrealistic optimism. In this paper I build on the distinction made by Shepperd et al. (2013) and examine the overlap between unrealistic comparative and overconfidence, which can be conceptualized as unrealistic absolute at the individual level according to Shepperd et al. (2013). The aim of this paper, therefore, is to contribute to the debate by empirically examining comparative and overconfidence and the mutual overlap between these concepts. To achieve this aim I replicated the study of Kruger and Burrus (2004) on a sample of Slovak students. Before proceeding to the description of the research, I will first clarify the terminology used in this paper and possible connections between the concepts discussed.What is Meant by Optimism?One of the first researchers who experimentally demonstrated optimistic bias was Weinstein (1980). He showed that majority of participants believed that negative events are less likely while positive events as more likely to happen to them. Later, Scheier and Carver (1985) observed individual differences in the generalized expectancies and they designed the Life Orientation Test (LOT) to measure this kind of dispositional optimism, which was defined as global expectancy of more positive than negative events in one's life. Whether situational or dispositional, scientific definitions of and pessimism tend to focus on expectancies for the future (Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010). According to Carver, Scheier, and Segerstrom (2010) these definitions are linked to expectancy-value models of motivation, which assume that behavior reflects the pursuit of goals. Pursuit of goals is affected by value of the goal and the expectancy (confidence that the goal can be attained). Thus, optimism and pessimism are broad, generalized versions of confidence and doubt; they are confidence and doubt pertaining to life, rather than to just specific context (Scheier & Carver, 1992). Thus optimists should tend to be confident and persistent in the face of diverse life challenges... Pessimists should be doubtful and hesitant in the same situations (Carver et al., 2010, p. 880).Prevalence of findings that people are generally overly optimistic about their future prospects and that they judge themselves as better on many desirable traits lead Taylor and Brown (1994, 1988) to formulate a positive illusions hypothesis - that unrealistic optimism, overly positive self-evaluation and exaggerated perceptions of control and mastery are characteristic of normal mental thought and even more, that they actually promote mental health and ability to engage in productive work and social relationships. Despite the appeal of the positive illusion hypothesis, the notion that biased selfimage and ungrounded beliefs can be beneficial to mental health was heavily criticized by many researchers (Colvin & Block, 1994; Colvin, Funder, & Block, 1995)1.However, the debate between researchers advocating a positive role of biases and those who favor a perspective more in line with reality is further complicated by conceptual, methodological and terminological issues. For example, people display unrealistic when judging their vulnerability to negative events or the prospect of a positive event occurring (Eiser, Pahl, & Prins, 2001), but they often also show when comparing themselves with other people (Eiser et al. …