Skinner's Radical Behaviorism Research Articles

A NEW AND OLD PANDEMIC – THE BURNOUT SYNDROME

The Burnout Syndrome (SB) is known worldwide, but scientific studies only started from the researches made by the American psychologist Freudenberger. Its concept encompasses three dimensions: emotional exhaustion, depersonalization and low professional achievement. It is currently a student in various fields of human knowledge, from Anthropology to Psychology. The area of Psychology that most researchers BS is the Psychodynamics of Work in which they call it Malaise. However, researchers involving BS under the perspective of Behavior Analysis is scarce in Brazil and in the world. This study aims to analyze BS in several countries, from developed to poor countries, and in this sense supports the thesis that it is a pandemic. It is a study of a theoretical nature, of qualitative, descriptive and bibliographic nature and has as theoretical basis Skinner's Radical Behaviorism

Resolving Barriers to an Applied Science of the Human Condition: Rule Governance and the Verbal Behavior of Applied Scientists.

Rules / verbal behavior governing applied behavior scientists since Skinner have achieved great success resolving challenges experienced by individuals with severe developmental and intellectual disabilities. We extend prior work by Dixon, Belisle, Rehfeldt, and Root (2018, "Why We Are Still Not Acting to Save the World: The Upward Challenge of a Post-Skinnerian Behavior Science," Perspectives on Behavior Science, 41, 241-267) by suggesting that many of these rules, applied inflexibly, are unlikely to resolve significant problems experienced by humans without these same intellectual challenges (i.e., most humans). Particularly, methodological models of human behavior that ignore both private events and advances in relational frame theory and that favor a bottom-up inductive theorizing have not, and we argue cannot, address uniquely human challenges. Instead, we propose alternative rules developed in part within contextual behavior science that are more consistent with Skinner's radical behaviorism than are current approaches and that may expand the scope of applied behavior science. Only by adapting our own public and private verbal behavior as applied scientists can we move toward solving the wide range of challenges within the human condition.

On the Autonomy of Psychology from Neuroscience: A Case Study of Skinner's Radical Behaviorism and Behavior Analysis

The main goal of this article is to discuss the place of psychology in the domain of natural sciences as an autonomous endeavor from neuroscience. However, given that psychology is not a monolithic...

Contingency Horizon: on Private Events and the Analysis of Behavior.

Skinner's radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin's teleological behaviorism and Baum's molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all "mental" phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment-behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.

Transitional probability analysis of two Child Behavior Analytic Therapy cases.

Clinical behavior analysis (Dougher, 1993; Kanter & Woods, 2009) assumes behavior analysis as the fundamental science and Skinner's Radical Behaviorism as the philosophical foundation for clinical psychology. In Brazil, clinical behavior analytic ideas have produced Behavior Analytic Therapy (BAT; Meyer et al., 2010), and more recently, Child Behavior Analytic Therapy (CBAT; Del Prette, 2011). From these theoretical and clinical standpoints, a fundamental issue in therapy is that therapy may produce rule-governed or contingency-shaped changes in client behavior (Skinner, 1974). While much of talk therapy may be seen as the therapist providing rules for clients to follow to change their behavior, regarding contingency-shaped behavior when the client behavior to be targeted for change occurs in session the therapist can provide consequences, thus shaping it as already suggested by Krasner (1962) in therapist as a social reinforcing machine. This shaping process is specified in more detail in Functional Analytical Psychotherapy, or FAP (Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991; Tsai, Kohlenberg, Kanter, Kohlenberg, Follette, & Callaghan, 2009). FAP's basic tenet is that the client's problem behaviors that appear in their daily relationships will also appear in therapy where the therapist can shape behavior through differential and contingent responding. The authors state that generalization occurs due to similarities between the therapy setting and the client's other environments, which implies that improvements achieved in session will generalize to the relationships that take place out-of-session. Therapist contingent responding is key to FAP and may start with general contingent reinforcement of broad classes of behavior relevant to simply to coming to therapy, and then reinforcement is funneled to focus more directly on clinically relevant behaviors relevant to the goals of treatment identified by the client and therapist (Follette, Naugle, & Callaghan, 1996). Recently, researchers have called for the identification of empirically supported principles of change (Rosen & Davison, 2003) and the development and use of novel methodologies in psychotherapy research, such as the direct observation of the therapeutic process instead of the use of randomized controlled trials or other group designs, to identify these change principles. Because contingent responding by definition is a change process that occurs in the turn-by-turn client-therapist interaction in session, it is a mechanism that is well suited to exploration by direct observation of the therapeutic process. It is important to note that contingent responding is a mechanism that is not specific to FAP but is fundamental to BAT and CBAT, broadly defined, and may be seen by behaviorists as occurring in, and potentially important to, all forms of therapy. For example, an early classic process study by Truax (1966) used direct observation of the therapeutic process to explore the use of contingent responding in sessions conducted by Carl Rogers, a therapist well known for espousing the belief that the therapist's behavior should be unconditional as per his humanistic theory (Rogers, 1957) rather than contingent on client behavior as per behavioral theory. Truax, using independent coders blind to the study hypothesis, found that Rogers in fact contingently responded to specific client behaviors with empathy and positive regard, and that these responses functioned as reinforcement as indicated by the fact that the client behaviors responded to in this fashion increased in frequency over the course of therapy. More recently, Busch, Kanter, Callaghan, Baruch and Weeks (2009) employed a similar micro-process analysis to explore the hypothesized change mechanism of FAP. They used the FAP Rating Scale (FAPRS; Callaghan & Follette, 2008) to code client clinically relevant behavior and therapist effective responding to in-session client behavior on a turn-by-turn basis over the course of therapy for a depressed adult client who received three phases of therapy: Assessment, Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT), and FAP. …

SKINNER AS MISSIONARY AND PROPHET: A REVIEW OF BURRHUS F. SKINNER: SHAPER OF BEHAVIOUR

Do we need another book about B. F. Skinner? According to Frederick Toates, the answer is “yes” because “there is still much to be said” (p. vii) about Skinner. In his recent biography, Burrhus F. Skinner: Shaper of Behaviour (2009), Toates attempts to integrate Skinner into the mainstream of psychology by showing areas of commonality between Skinner's radical behaviorism and subdisciplines within psychology such as cognitive, social, and biological psychology. Admirably, although in some instances understandably naively, Toates attempts to demonstrate the power of positive reinforcement to explain myriad complex behaviors, including a fairly lengthy interpretation of religious behavior. In addition, Toates credits Skinner for being ahead of his time on both social and environmental issues. Toates falters, however, in his insistence that behavior analysis still needs and can benefit from cognitive concepts. He nevertheless provides an otherwise objective and sympathetic view of Skinner the person and the behavioral science he helped to create in a book that should be informative for both behavior analysts and those outside the field.

Criatividade, liberdade e dignidade: impactos do darwinismo no behaviorismo radical Carolina Laurenti

A teoria da evolucao pela selecao natural de Charles Darwin influenciou de modo decisivo a filosofia de B. F. Skinner denominada Behaviorismo Radical. Este artigo tem o objetivo de discutir o impacto do darwinismo na elaboracao do modelo de explicacao do comportamento behaviorista radical chamado selecao pelas consequencias. Em primeiro lugar, examina-se como a ideia de selecao e fundamental para elucidar o papel do ambiente na explicacao do comportamento. Em seguida, argumenta-se que a interpretacao skinneriana da origem da variacao comportamental abre espaco para a defesa da possibilidade da criatividade humana. Por fim, discute-se como a substituicao da mente criativa (homem autonomo) pelos processos de variacao e selecao na explicacao do comportamento lanca nova luz sobre o tratamento da liberdade e dignidade humanas no Behaviorismo Radical.

A Comprehensive Science: A Review of Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism.

Of the various scientific literatures that define and describe the products and progress of behavior analysis, one literature addresses the field in its broadest and most abstract characteristics, and in its most far-reaching scope and implications. The literature of radical behaviorism began with Skinner's 1945 paper on “The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms” and continued in various sources throughout his career (e.g., Skinner, 1953, 1957, 1964, 1969, 1974). The first person to address and explore the unique characteristics of the system described by Skinner was Willard F. Day, Jr. (for a collection of papers, see Leigland, 1992). An expanding literature of radical behaviorism has followed, and along with numerous papers, several excellent books have appeared. One of these books is William Baum's Understanding Behaviorism: Behavior, Culture, and Evolution (1994, 2005; Leigland, 2006). Another excellent treatment is Mecca Chiesa's Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science (1994). To these we may add Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism (2008). As comprehensive a treatment as one may find in a single source, Moore's detailed descriptions of Skinner's radical behaviorism in historical, philosophical, and psychological contexts make it required reading for all behavior analysts (along with Baum's and Chiesa's books) and (would that we could only arrange it) for psychologists, cognitivists, linguists, and philosophers as well. The book is organized into sections preceded by an introductory chapter. The first chapter, “Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science,” provides a brief introduction to the field of behavior analysis and to radical behaviorism as the philosophy of science that underlies that field. The chapter also introduces the central themes that appear later in the book, including behavior as a subject matter its own right, the notion of internal causes of behavior and mentalism, and by contrast, “The emphasis that radical behaviorism places on explanations that identify causes at a consistent level of observation and analysis” (p. 8). An example of that emphasis is seen in the following passage, which highlights an epistemological theme found throughout the book: As discussed throughout this book, radical behaviorism is interested in providing comprehensive explanatory statements about the cause's of anyone's behavior. … By virtue of its fundamental concern with verbal behavior and knowledge claims, radical behaviorism is in a unique position: It is based on the science for which it stands as a foundation. Importantly, then, radical behaviorism admits no discontinuity between the behavior being explained and the behavior of explaining it. (p. 9) Of special interest is the source of the causes to be used in the explanation of behavior. A sharp distinction is drawn in the first chapter between behavioral and mental dimensions as sources of causes of behavior, and the distinction and its implications are emphasized at many points throughout the book. A causal explanation based on behavioral dimensions involves “the totality of variables and relations of which the behavior is a function” (p. 6), whereas mental dimensions are invoked “when the explanation includes elements that are not expressed in the same terms and cannot be confirmed with the same methods of observation and analysis as the facts they are said to address” (p. 6). In promoting behavioral over mentalistic explanations of behavior, the principal argument against the latter is also stated clearly and repeatedly in the first chapter, as it is throughout the book, as shown in the following passage: Radical behaviorism is concerned about talk of mental causes and dimensions because it is fanciful to think that there is such a qualitatively different dimension with qualitatively different causes. To state the matter somewhat starkly, there is no such dimension and there are no such causes. They are fictions, talk of which is a product of nonscientific influences. The properties with which the mental causes are supposedly endowed ultimately sidetrack more effective analyses in terms of causal relations in the one dimension in which behavior takes place. …There is no mental life in the sense implied by traditional psychology because there is no mental dimension that differs from a behavioral dimension. (p. 6) The argument against mentalism in this passage includes two components. One of these is a pragmatic argument about effective scientific practices, and the other is an ontological argument about what does and does not exist. The utility of each of these arguments in making a case for radical behaviorism and against mentalism will be examined more fully in the remarks that follow. Thus, the first chapter lays out the major themes and positions that are developed throughout the book. Following the introductory chapter, the book is organized into four sections, each of which will be addressed in the comments below.

Cultural materialism and behavior analysis: Common problems and radical solutions

Brian D Kangas The year 2007 marks the 80th anniversary of the birth of Marvin Harris (1927–2001). Although relations between Harris' cultural materialism and Skinner's radical behaviorism have been promulgated by several in the behavior-analytic community (e.g., Glenn, 1988; Malagodi & Jackson, 1989; Vargas, 1985), Harris himself never published an exclusive and comprehensive work on the relations between the two epistemologies. However, on May 23rd, 1986, he gave an invited address on this topic at the 12th annual conference of the Association for Behavior Analysis in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, entitled Cultural Materialism and Behavior Analysis: Common Problems and Radical Solutions. What follows is the publication of a transcribed audio recording of the invited address that Harris gave to Sigrid Glenn shortly after the conference. The identity of the scribe is unknown, but it has been printed as it was written, with the addendum of embedded references where appropriate. It is offered both as what should prove to be a useful asset for the students of behavior who are interested in the study of cultural contingencies, practices, and epistemologies, and in commemoration of this 80th anniversary.

Variables of which values are a function

The ordinary-language concept of values has a complex history in psychology and in science generally. The traditional fact-value distinction commonly found in traditional scientific perspectives has been challenged by the varieties of philosophical pragmatism, which have similarities to Skinner's radical behaviorism. Skinner's challenge to the fact-value distinction maintained that the phenomena of both "facts" and "values" are a matter of contingencies of environment-behavior interaction, and both phenomena may be observed when a scientist does research or makes recommendations in applied settings based on that research. Some of the processes and variables relevant to an analysis of values as behavioral phenomena are described, and examples of both nonverbal and verbal contingencies are considered, along with implications for the values of an individual and a culture. If the various issues of methodology can be addressed successfully, then behavior analysis will be in the position to move beyond descriptive studies of values, such as those found in humanistic psychology, by providing analyses of the variables of which values are a function.

Um Panorama Analítico-Comportamental sobre os Transtornos de Ansiedade

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar uma análise das variáveis envolvidas nos quadros psiquiátricos denominados como transtornos de ansiedade a partir dos pressupostos teóricos do behaviorismo radical de Skinner. Em primeiro lugar, apresenta-se uma definição da ansiedade enquanto fenômeno clínico e enquanto construto. A ênfase dada pela literatura comportamental nas respostas de evitação e eliminação de estímulos ansiogênicos, e as escolhas por procedimentos terapêuticos padronizados resultantes dessa ênfase são então discutidos tendo em vista a inobservância de outras variáveis ambientais relevantes. Propõe-se que outras relações funcionais podem ser detectadas, além daquelas de esquiva que tradicionalmente são foco da intervenção. Relações respondentes e operantes que compõem o repertório comportamental do cliente que é diagnosticado como portador de transtornos de ansiedade são analisadas, incluindo a interação entre contingências operantes e respondentes, relações de controle aversivo, controle de estímulos, classes de resposta de ordem superior e operações estabelecedoras tais como privação e estimulação aversiva. Por último, um modelo de análise é apresentado de modo a integrar as relações passíveis de observação nos quadros clínicos em questão e possíveis estratégias terapêuticas dele decorrentes são elencadas.

Pragmatic selectionism: The philosophy of behavior analysis.

following presents two sources for the philosophy underlying behavior analysis as it has come to be represented in the tradition of the later B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism--Darwinian selectionism and pragmatism primarily in the Peircean tradition. Both show central organizations according to probabilistic three-term contingencies, but at different levels. Peirce shows key similarities with Darwin, and the later Skinner shows key similarities with Darwin and Peirce. In contrast to his early behaviorism supported by positivism, the philosophy that characterized Skinner's later work was a pragmatic selectionism. Keywords: Darwin, evolution, Peirce, positivism, pragmatism, selectionism, Skinner. ********** To the extent that behavior analysts support Skinner's later views, in contrast to his earlier views, the following presents the underlying philosophy of behavior analysis as a philosophy of pragmatic selectionism. early Skinner (1931/1999, pp. 478-487) traced the reflex back to in a history of physiology that included Marshall Hall and Pavlov. Later, Skinner (1963/1969, pp. 223-226) traced the history of his radical behaviorism from Darwin to Romanes to Morgan to Thorndike, all of whom advanced connections with natural selection, and to others who did not. originator in each series is revealing. advanced an if-then analysis according to a two-term stimulus and response reflex. Skinner (1931/1999) saw that by definition the relation between the stimulus and the response was one of (p. 449); and said, The stimulus is an essential part of a mechanistic theory of behavior, whether the notion is arrived at through observation ... or argued from physical necessity or mechanical analogy, as it was with Descartes (p. 480). In contrast, Darwin advanced an analysis according to a three-term probabilistic contingency of the conditions of life, variation, and selection. Darwin's views soon influenced the views of Peirce and the pragmatists, and notable similarities exist between Darwin, the American pragmatists--Peirce, James, and Dewey--and the later Skinner. Against the background of early behaviorism, a basic outline of Skinner's subsequent pragmatic selectionism follows. Modernism and Its Support for Early Behaviorism S-R behaviorism of the early Skinner fits in with a cluster of ideas referred to as modernism, a period identified as extending from the mid 17th to the mid 20th century (Toulmin, 1983). sciences and their philosophy in the early years of this period were commonly characterized as mechanistic. Later, the term positivism became more current with abstract developments. Early on, in A Tale of a Tub and Battel of the Books attached to it, Jonathan Swift's (1704/1958) satire targeted some of the ideas that were identified with the Moderns. Among the ideas he attacked were the Predestination (pp. 192-193) of the Dissenters, the self-proclaimed superiority of the Moderns in Mathematics (pp. 231-234), their pursuit of a Universal Language (p. 237), and their Positiveness (p. 240). In Gulliver's Travels (1726/1948), Swift returned to the attack on Mathematics (part iii, chap. ii) and the Modernist pursuit of a Universal Language (chap. v). In time, these ideas took on various transformations or branches of meaning in addition to their earlier senses. Predestination became the determinism accepted by almost all philosophers of science. Positivism became a focus on the facts or the elements of experience that had the most certainty. Mathematics became the favored means for establishing the certain relations of these elements. And logical positivists pursued a universal or unified language for science. Scientific modernism often appealed to mechanical metaphors (but typically not to feedback mechanisms in their three-term process of input, output, and feedback) to illustrate if-then connections, e.g., clocks (Boyle, 1686/1996, pp. …

Deixando o preconceito de lado e entendendo o Behaviorismo Radical

O Behaviorismo Radical de Skinner é muitas vezes criticado de forma indevida e até preconceituosa. Muitas destas críticas, na verdade, são críticas da psicologia de Watson e não do Behaviorismo Radical. O entendimento das diferenças entre os modos idealista e materialista de pensar ajuda a esclarecer a maneira de estudar e compreender o comportamento para o Behaviorismo Radical, bem como a sua posição anti-mentalista. O estudo da história da evolução do Behaviorismo é necessário para possibilitar o entendimento das diferenças entre o Behaviorismo Metodológico de Watson e o Behaviorismo Radical de Skinner, bem como das suas respectivas contribuições para a psicologia.

Behavioral science as the art of the 21st century philosophical similarities between B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism and postmodern science.

Since B.F. Skinner's death in 1990, psychologists taking a historical approach are beginning to clear misconceptions of his philosophy: radical behaviorism. Contrary to the belief of many, radical behaviorism, continues to grow and branch into new areas. This paper attempts to explore the history of Skinner's assertions and place them within the context of contemporary western thought. Parallels are drawn between Skinner's science and diverse areas such as evolutionary biology and postmodern philosophy. The social construction of knowledge is one of the many lasting legacies of Skinner's work. Introduction Say what you like as long as it does not stop you from seeing how things are.... And when you have seen this there is plenty that you will not say--(Wittengstein, 1953) For many contemporary thinkers, the idea that Skinner's Radical Behaviorism and postmodernist philosophy of science are compatible would appear ridiculous, or at best superficial. After all both evolved from drastically different historical roots (Andresen, 1992) and some scientists have accused postmodern philosophers of being antiscience (i.e. Holton, 1993). For example, Lyotard's (1979) book The Postmodern Condition enjoys a special distinction for weaving together Postmodern art, with elements of the post structuralism philosophy, and a theory of postindustrial society. While the work has some clear seems, it is considered a good starting point. Lyotard attempts to define the postmodern by contrast to the modern: I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse...making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialects of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or creation of wealth. Although Lyotard's statement holds for some postmodernists, much of postmodernism is not antiscience but rather the natural evolution of thinking following the discrediting of realism (Ross, 1996; Rorty, 1979, 1991). One can contrast the statement above with that of another recognized postmodernist Griffin (1988)physics no longer disenchants our stories; physics itself provides us with a new story which can become a common, unifying story underneath our more particular stories. (p. 15ff). As we will see central tenets of the postmodernism trend were factors that most contemporary sciences adopted in the early part of this century (long before even the word postmodernism was considered) with the notable exception of psychology and linguistics, which still seem to be dominated by realistic thinking and methodology. On the other hand, within psychology, Skinner has been wrongly described to epitomize the logical positivist movement. Some erroneously argued that Skinner was a realist, a theorist indistinguishable from other behaviorists (Paiget and Ingelder, 1969). However, this characterization fails to recognize Skinner's behaviorism as an attempt to what we come to know (Baum, 1994; Lana, 1991, 1995). Far from being a copy theorist, Skinner argued that all thinking is dynamic: even the experimenter's thinking is shaped by organism/environment interaction (Skinner, 1956). In postmodernist terms, Skinner was studying the building of Moscovici's (1987) virtual worlds. Brinker and Jaynes (1988) point out this precisely differentiates Skinnerian behaviorism from other behavioral theories. Few would disagree that B.F. Skinner has contributed much to psychological thinking of the 20th century. Historical recognition of Skinner's work is assured (Lana, 1991) with divergent fields such as anthropology (Glenn, 1988) and behavioral biology (Robinson & Woodward, 1989) readily discuss his writings. However, whether or not Skinner's ideas are fossils (Sutherland, 1990, cf. Richelle, 1995), as some have contended, will be left to history to judge. Our analysis of Skinner's work occurs because currently, the field of psychology must place its work within contemporary views of science, developing a greater contextual awareness of its historical roots (Richelle, 1995). …

Some more similarities between Peirce and Skinner

C. S. Peirce is noted for pioneering a variety of views, and the case is made here for the similarities and parallels between his views and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism. In addition to parallels previously noted, these similarities include an advancement of experimental science, a behavioral psychology, a shift from nominalism to realism, an opposition to positivism, a selectionist account for strengthening behavior, the importance of a community of selves, a recursive approach to method, and the probabilistic nature of truth. Questions are raised as to the extent to which Skinner's radical behaviorism, as distinguished from his S-R positivism, may be seen as an extension of Peirce's pragmatism.

The current status and future direction of clinical behavior analysis: Introduction to the special section.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, when Skinnerian behaviorism had reached its apogee, many behavior therapists in clinical practice employed operant principles in their work with the range of clinical disorders. Behavior therapists prided themselves in the utilization of principles that were derived from well-controlled laboratory experiments. Their empirically based approach commanded a far greater scientific respectability than the rather vaguely defined interventions of psychodynamic and humanistic therapists. However, starting in the early 1970s, cognitive psychology began to develop momentum and many behavior therapists gradually began to shift from a behavioral to a cognitive stance. This movement eventually resulted in a split between two types of behaviorally oriented practitioners. On the one hand, there were the applied behavior analysts who faithfully carried on the operant tradition. They worked mainly with developmentally disabled children and adults or employed behavior modification principles in relatively closed systems such as educational, correctional, and organizational settings. On the other hand, there were the behavior therapists who worked with the range of problems presented by adult outpatients. In their majority, these therapists began to embrace the new cognitive-behavioral perspective, whereas psychotherapists employing Skinnerian principles in the treatment of adult outpatients all but disappeared. This situation changed when in the late 1980s two approaches to adult outpatient psychotherapy were introduced which were both based on Skinner's radical behaviorism: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, 1987) and Functional Analytic Psychotherapy (FAP; Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1987). With the advent of these therapies, a novel form of operant based behavior therapy was born, which during the early 1990s eventually established itself as 'clinical behavior analysis' (CBA). CBA has its philosophical roots in a modernized version of radical behaviorism termed 'functional contextualism' (Biglan & Hayes, 1996) and is geared toward the amelioration of emotional problems that more typically have been the purview of traditional adult psychotherapy. A number of writers have shown how CBA based approaches can be extended to the treatment of a wide spectrum of psychological disorders, including problems as complex as personality, mood, sexual, or substance use disorders (Dougher, 1999; Hayes, Jacobson, Follette, & Dougher, 1994). The beauty of CBA is that it deals effectively with the fundamental theoretical problem of how talking within the therapy session helps ameliorate clients' problems that occur in their everyday lives. By carefully examining the verbal interactions between therapists and clients within a conceptual framework that brings to bear the principles of verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957), rule-governed behavior (Skinner, 1969), and stimulus equivalence (Sidman, 1994), clinical behavior analysts have developed a theoretical basis for adult psychotherapy that is consistent with contemporary radical behaviorism. Thus, for the first time in a long time there is evidence of a renewed rapprochement between basic behavioral science and its application. Over the past several decades, behavior therapy has gradually separated itself from its theoretical and philosophical foundation in behaviorism, which during its beginnings had been its greatest strength. With the advent of CBA, the gap between the basic and the applied branch of the behavioral approach is closing. Thus, CBA holds the clear promise of reestablishing the conceptual integrity of the behavioral approach to psychotherapy. …

Varieties of scientific explanation

Scientific explanations often take one of two forms. The first is instantiation. According to this form, an event is said to be explained when it can be expressed as some particular value of a variable in a general proposition, equation, or law. One example of instantiation in psychology is Stevens' psychophysical law. Another is the matching law in the experimental analysis of behavior. A second form of explanation is a deduction from a covering law. According to this form, an event is said to be explained when its description follows as a valid logical deduction in an argument that has a covering law as one premise and a statement of antecedent conditions as another premise. Examples of covering law explanations in psychology are found in traditional neobehaviorism, which sought to develop laws of behavior so that observed behavioral events could be explained as deductions therefrom. Strictly speaking, neither form of explanation is consistent with behavior-analytic explanations derived from Skinner's radical behaviorism, which emphasize the pragmatic sources and contributions of the verbal behavior regarded as explanatory.

PRAGMATISM, SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY: A REVIEW OF RICHARD RORTY'S OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOLUME 1

Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 is a collection of papers that explores the implications of philosophical pragmatism in several areas, including natural science, mind—body issues in philosophy, and perspectives on liberal democracy and social change. Similarities between Rorty's pragmatism and Skinner's radical behaviorism are explored in each of these three areas. Although some important and interesting differences are found regarding the role of science in social change, most areas show remarkable similarities between the two systematic perspectives.

B. F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism: Historical Misconstructions and Grounds for Feminist Reconstructions

Feminist critiques of traditional psychological approaches have generated thorough feminist revisions most notably in psychoanalytic and developmental theory. Although behaviorism has attracted strong objections from feminist critics, claims of its antithetical positioning vis-A¥-vis feminist theory construction have practically remained unchallenged. A preliminary step in formulating grounds for a synthesis is to clarify the multiple meanings of behaviorism. Specifically, the fusion of Watson’ s methodological behaviorism and Skinner’ s radical behaviorism in the literature must be disentangled in order to address the latter’ s potential as a conceptual framework for constructing feminist theory. Key conceptual features of radical behaviorism that suggest its potential as a vehicle for building a feminist epistemology include: radical behaviorism’ s contextualistic world view, its interpretation of agency, its treatment of private experience and self knowledge, and its understanding of the pivotal functions of the verbal community.

B. F. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism: Historical Misconstructions and Grounds for Feminist Reconstructions

Feminist critiques of traditional psychological approaches have generated feminist revisions, most notably in psychoanalytic and developmental theory. Although behaviorism has attracted strong objections from feminist critics, claims of its antithetical positioning vis-à-vis feminist theory construction have generally remained unchallenged. A preliminary step in formulating grounds for a synthesis is to clarify multiple meanings of behaviorism. Specifically, the fusion of Watson's methodological behaviorism and Skinner's radical behaviorism in the literature must be disentangled in order to address the latter's potential as a conceptual framework for constructing feminist theory. Key conceptual features of radical behaviorism that suggest its potential as a vehicle for building a feminist epistemology include: radical behaviorism's contextualistic world view, its interpretation of agency, its treatment of private experience and self knowledge, and its understanding of the pivotal functions of the verbal community.