A Comprehensive Science: A Review of Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism.

Abstract

Of the various scientific literatures that define and describe the products and progress of behavior analysis, one literature addresses the field in its broadest and most abstract characteristics, and in its most far-reaching scope and implications. The literature of radical behaviorism began with Skinner's 1945 paper on “The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms” and continued in various sources throughout his career (e.g., Skinner, 1953, 1957, 1964, 1969, 1974). The first person to address and explore the unique characteristics of the system described by Skinner was Willard F. Day, Jr. (for a collection of papers, see Leigland, 1992). An expanding literature of radical behaviorism has followed, and along with numerous papers, several excellent books have appeared. One of these books is William Baum's Understanding Behaviorism: Behavior, Culture, and Evolution (1994, 2005; Leigland, 2006). Another excellent treatment is Mecca Chiesa's Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science (1994). To these we may add Jay Moore's Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism (2008). As comprehensive a treatment as one may find in a single source, Moore's detailed descriptions of Skinner's radical behaviorism in historical, philosophical, and psychological contexts make it required reading for all behavior analysts (along with Baum's and Chiesa's books) and (would that we could only arrange it) for psychologists, cognitivists, linguists, and philosophers as well. The book is organized into sections preceded by an introductory chapter. The first chapter, “Radical Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Science,” provides a brief introduction to the field of behavior analysis and to radical behaviorism as the philosophy of science that underlies that field. The chapter also introduces the central themes that appear later in the book, including behavior as a subject matter its own right, the notion of internal causes of behavior and mentalism, and by contrast, “The emphasis that radical behaviorism places on explanations that identify causes at a consistent level of observation and analysis” (p. 8). An example of that emphasis is seen in the following passage, which highlights an epistemological theme found throughout the book: As discussed throughout this book, radical behaviorism is interested in providing comprehensive explanatory statements about the cause's of anyone's behavior. … By virtue of its fundamental concern with verbal behavior and knowledge claims, radical behaviorism is in a unique position: It is based on the science for which it stands as a foundation. Importantly, then, radical behaviorism admits no discontinuity between the behavior being explained and the behavior of explaining it. (p. 9) Of special interest is the source of the causes to be used in the explanation of behavior. A sharp distinction is drawn in the first chapter between behavioral and mental dimensions as sources of causes of behavior, and the distinction and its implications are emphasized at many points throughout the book. A causal explanation based on behavioral dimensions involves “the totality of variables and relations of which the behavior is a function” (p. 6), whereas mental dimensions are invoked “when the explanation includes elements that are not expressed in the same terms and cannot be confirmed with the same methods of observation and analysis as the facts they are said to address” (p. 6). In promoting behavioral over mentalistic explanations of behavior, the principal argument against the latter is also stated clearly and repeatedly in the first chapter, as it is throughout the book, as shown in the following passage: Radical behaviorism is concerned about talk of mental causes and dimensions because it is fanciful to think that there is such a qualitatively different dimension with qualitatively different causes. To state the matter somewhat starkly, there is no such dimension and there are no such causes. They are fictions, talk of which is a product of nonscientific influences. The properties with which the mental causes are supposedly endowed ultimately sidetrack more effective analyses in terms of causal relations in the one dimension in which behavior takes place. …There is no mental life in the sense implied by traditional psychology because there is no mental dimension that differs from a behavioral dimension. (p. 6) The argument against mentalism in this passage includes two components. One of these is a pragmatic argument about effective scientific practices, and the other is an ontological argument about what does and does not exist. The utility of each of these arguments in making a case for radical behaviorism and against mentalism will be examined more fully in the remarks that follow. Thus, the first chapter lays out the major themes and positions that are developed throughout the book. Following the introductory chapter, the book is organized into four sections, each of which will be addressed in the comments below.