International negotiations rarely occur under conditions of perfect or completely symmetric information. In the course of pursuing foreign policy, states withhold certain information and intentionally communicate that which is false or misleading. A particularly common instance of incomplete information is that occurring after a change in leadership. When a new government takes office, the nation’s policy positions inevitably undergo a major transition. A change of leadership while a state is conducting prolonged negotiations over long-term issues is likely to change both their trajectory and outcome. The other party concerned in such negotiations is unfamiliar with the new government and its ways, yet historical interaction has made its own circumstances and preferences commonly known to both sides. This is a situation of asymmetric information. The leadership transition of one state frequently arouses suspicions and feelings of insecurity in others, because they have no way of comprehending the actual policy preferences and positions of the new government. Changes in government leadership have engendered several asymmetric information scenarios in the course of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Around the time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, neither the Soviet Union (USSR) nor the major Western powers had any understanding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. They were suspicious and hesitant, often adopting a wait-and-see stance in their dealings with the new government. Following the Kuomintang (KMT) retreat to Guangzhou, for example, the USSR accordingly moved its Chinese embassy to the Guangdong capital, despite the ostensible bond of communism between the USSR and the Chinese communists. American ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart is another example. Mao Zedong’s ‘leaning to one side’ concept notwithstanding, Stuart remained in Nanjing, and in August 1949 was prepared to visit the Chinese Communists in Beiping. The US knew too little about the Chinese communist leadership to be sure whether or not to broach a relationship with the new regime. It was in January, 1979, shortly after the Cultural Revolution and at the start of the open door policy, when the western world still knew little about the new generation of CCP leaders, that the Vice Premier of the State Council, Deng Xiaoping, and his wife Zhuo Lin accepted an invitation to a formal