Situation In Syria Research Articles

The EU and the Syrian Crisis: The Use of Sanctions and the Regime's Strategy for Survival

The Syrian crisis has from May 2011 and onwards been met by the EU with rounds of tightening sanctions attempting to put pressure on the Syrian regime and the elites surrounding it. Based on a typology for the sanctions and a periodization showing how the measures have proceeded, the article discusses the EU sanctions and to what degree they have influenced the situation in Syria. Furthermore, the article sheds light on regional and international dimensions of EU policies towards Syria and demonstrates how the policies are met with the Syrian regime's ability to adapt to conditions related to changing internal and external challenges. The article concludes that what in the first phases of the EU sanctions against Syria represented a deviation from the traditional pragmatic EU policies vis-à-vis the Middle East, seems during the latest phase to be followed by a more cautious approach, which also takes security concerns into consideration.

Organizations Aid Syrian Refugees, But More Help Needed

War and exile have created a staggering need for mental health care for Syrian refugees of all ages.

Regina Paulose, 'Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes: An Interview with Dr. Hilmi M. Zawati'

In this interview, Dr. Zawati explains that the lack of accurate description of gender-based crimes in the statutory laws of the international criminal tribunals and courts infringes the principle of “fair labelling,” leads to inconsistent verdicts and punishments, and constitutes a barrier to justice. As a result, sexual violence in wartime settings should be prosecuted separately as crimes in themselves, not as a subsection of war crimes or crimes against humanity. He added that the international community should make reform in the international criminal justice system, particularly amending the Rome Statute. Besides the required technical description of gender-based crimes as crimes against humanity and war crimes incorporated in articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, amendments should also be made to Article 13(b) to transfer the authority of referring such crimes to the prosecutor of the ICC from the UN Security Council to the UN Human Rights Council. In the past three years, the Security Council has utterly failed to pass a resolution to stop war and to refer the situation in Syria to the prosecutor of the ICC for the lack of political will on the part of some key players in the Council. Russia and China have vetoed three UN Security Council resolutions on Syria, preventing several attempts by the UN Security Council to take a decision that might have put an end to the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated against Syrian civilians. On the other hand, the ICC prosecutor should be granted more proprio motu powers to investigate gender-based crimes based on information received from individuals, groups, States, intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations.

The “responsibility to protect” our answer to “never again”? Libya, Syria and a critical analysis of R2P

Debates over the use of force for humanitarian purposes have been some of the most profound and fascinating of the international society in the post-Cold War period. A surge of intrastate violence in the 1990s and the lack of appropriate response by the international community led UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his counterparts to vow “never again” and to call for a reinterpretation of how we think about humanitarian intervention. The response was a report issued by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 entitled, “The Responsibility to Protect” (often referred to as R2P or RtoP) which set about to reconceptualize the seemingly contradictory notions of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Adopted by the UN in 2005, much has been critically written about the norm on all sides. However, not until the Libyan civil conflict in 2011 did we see an actual case in which R2P was specifically invoked to justify military intervention, and thus one where we could test its merits. Many argue Libya shows successful application of R2P, while some say its mandate was overextended. Nonetheless, it has prompted comparisons and contrasts to the situation in Syria, where over 100,000 people have died but where military intervention has not been pursued. This paper analyzes the decisions in both of these instances and the resulting deficiencies of R2P that were highlighted by Libya and Syria: first, the continued subservience of humanitarian norms to political concerns, and second, the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding operational aspects of military intervention. Libya and Syria have both wounded the credibility of the norm.

Responsibility While Protecting

In the evolution of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) doctrine, the most significant recent development has been the ‘responsibility while protecting’ (RWP) proposal as put forward by Brazil in September 2011, with a more detailed statement in November 2011. The RWP proposal emphasised the use of force as a last resort, and the need to avoid ‘regime change’; it also argued for closer monitoring of the use of force when R2P was invoked. Brazil’s approach to R2P was influenced by its noninterventionist attitudes deriving from its historical experience of the world. Brazil favoured caution and a focus on the responsibility of the state in relation to R2P; involvement in Haiti from 2004 highlighted the development-oriented approach to peacebuilding that Brazil preferred. The experience of R2P in Libya in 2011 was the immediate occasion for Brazil advancing the RWP proposal, with the situation in Syria also highlighting Brazilian concerns. The Brazilian proposal has been modified to some extent in subsequent discussion within the UN, but the main thrust of the proposal remains; issues relating to R2P such as sequencing and implementation have been clarified but without an overall consensus being achieved. While the Western countries generally favour flexibility in relation to R2P, the BRICS countries and the Global South are generally more cautious in their approach. The reception of the RWP proposal highlights the growing importance of the BRICS countries and the Global South in an increasingly pluralistic world.

Драма Арабского Востока

New upheavals have shaken the Middle East this summer. A small but determined army of Sunni jihadists that had operated in the war-torn Syria suddenly crossed the border into Iraq and launched a large-scale military campaign. In a matter of days the invaders captured the second largest city of Iraq, Mosul, and although heavily outnumbered by the Iraqi army, put it to flight. The militants, known as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, the latter word meaning Syria and Lebanon) and led by an exceedingly tough and ruthless commander Abubaqr al-Baghdadi, are descendants of the infamous terrorist international network Al-Qaeda. Actually, the ISIS members represent the third generation of Al-Qaeda militants who waged the war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan back in 1989-s and later fought the Americans in Iraq in the wake of the U.S. invasion. Lately they joined the Syrian armed opposition that has been trying to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad for about three years. Now that the military situation in Syria appears to favor the embattled president, ISIS has probably come to the conclusion that its priority is not necessarily the ousting of Assad; rather it is the creation of an Islamic state according to the name of their organization. Exactly this seems to be the rationale for their comeback into Iraq. The Sunni jihadists whose ultimate aim is to resurrect the medieval Islamic Caliphate have to confront both the Iraqi Kurds who live in a virtually semi-independent state formation and the Shia Arabs who mostly inhabit the southern part of Iraq. Yet, both communities, although probably capable of protecting North, South and the capital city, are hardly likely to reassert the government authority in the central part of the country. What is necessary is the assistance from abroad. The Shia-dominated Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki, in deep trouble, is looking to both Iran and the U.S. for military aid. Both Washington and Tehran, however, appear reluctant to be seen as wholeheartedly backing the Shia side if only for fear of alienating the mainstream Arab States who are of course Sunni. This is a pretty delicate situation indeed.

Iran’s Foreign Policy and the Balance of Power in the Region

The political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran begins with the idea of (Wilayat Al-Faqih) which is a unique structure of applying the Islamic roles without any interference in the internal affairs of its neighbors and other countries. Iran security constitute gives a significant role to Iran's foreign policy, through defending the country against any potential threats and implementing policies to achieve the national goals set by the Supreme authority of the Imam Khomeini of Iran ,the Council Planning Department and the National Security Council. The foreign policy objectives give priorities for achieving the revolution goals. The success of the central objectives of the Islamic revolution in Iran is enhanced by the strategic location that makes Iran economically significant since 2010, the development of relations with Saudi Arabia reflects the increased sectarian divisions of the Iranian society regarding the central objectives and Iran concerns of the Arab Spring in the region , the situation in Syria and the supporting the Assad regime which became a strategic concern of Iran, and this put Iran in facing of Arab countries, including GCC, and other Sunni Arab states to confront Iran in Syria, these issues make the possibility of improving Iran's relations with the outside world little . Some Iranian scholars believe that Iran is flexible concerning the settlement of the nuclear power of Iran by saying that the Western powers lack flexibility regarding Iran's programs of obtaining nuclear power.

The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the U.N. Security Council: Parameters and Best Practices

Recent developments, including calls (to date unheeded) for the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court), the referral of the situations in Sudan and Libya to the ICC, as well as various demands that the Security Council use its deferral powers under the ICC’s Rome Statute, highlight the importance of the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC. The Security Council (a political body) has sway over the docket of the ICC (a judicial institution) – the power to refer situations’ over which the ICC would not otherwise have jurisdiction, and to defer investigations and prosecutions. While many states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have decried (and some continue to decry) the Security Council’s role vis-a-

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN THE «ARAB SPRING»

A huge wave of mass protests for the last years has lead to a collapse of many longstanding traditional regimes in some Arab states (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen). In other states (Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco) a serious aggravation of political situation occurred. Many experts in Russia as well as abroad share an opinion that the phenomenon of the “Arab revolution" or the so cold "Arab Spring" has the same basic pattern: after the beginning of unrest in North Africa and the Middle East the Islamist political parties, organizations and groups are gaining strength, popularity and influence. The main content of the article is focused on the analysis of religious, political, socio-economic and other aspects of the contemporary ideology and practice of the radical Islam, its threats and challenges. The current situation in the region has favored the creation of a new political alliance in the Greater Middle East. Now the US administration's policy in the Middle East is aimed at the advancement of the of the radical Islam front to Iran, North Caucasus region and Central Asia. This policy corresponds to the global strategic interests of the U.S. regional partners including Petro-Islamic States, Turkey and even Israel. Analyzing the situation around Syria the author notes that the steps undertaken by the members of the new regional alliance to eliminate B. Assad - another victim of the "Arab Spring" – can, first of all, aggravate an extremely unstable situation in Syria, and, secondly, create a real perspective of the radical Islam advancement right up to the borders of the Russian Federation.

Reflexe syrského konfliktu v České republice

This study deals with the responses to recent Syrian conflict in the Czech Republic. The authors introduce particularly activities inside Syrian diaspora, actually formed during the time of communism. Syrians citizens living in the Czech Republic are not homogeneous, which is similar to the situation in Syria. In our country we can find both people loyal to the regime of Ba'ath Party and Bashar al-Assad, and also members of opposition that in fact has divided into two groups, since the mid-2012. The authors introduce reactions of various subjects from the Czech Republic.

Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People

During the civil wars in Libya and Syria, the rebel opposition groups were recognized by some as “the (sole) legitimate representative of the people” of these States. This paper, using the situation in Syria as a case study, examines what it means to recognize a group as “the legitimate representative of a people”, while the State’s government is still in place. It shows that with regard to recognition statements wording is all important, and that the Syrian Opposition Council has been recognized in at least six different capacities of varying legal significance. The paper sets out the difference between the “legal” and the “political” act of recognition and finds that recognition as “the legitimate representative of a people” is a purely political act. Although four normative criteria for the status of “legitimate representative of a people” can be identified, what is lacking are clear standards for their application. The paper outlines the consequences of political recognition and examines its legality in terms of international law and its suitability as a political tool.

War for Goodness Sake! How the Bosnian Experience Highlighted the Flaws of Humanitarian Intervention

Even though the humanitarian intervention debate took place in the 90s the current situation in Syria and the much publicised deadlock within the United Nations Security Council demonstrate that the issue of humanitarian intervention is still as divisive as ever. By examining what many restrictionist critics of the concept have identified as flaws in humanitarian intervention this dissertation demonstrates how they are expressed in reality and shows the resulting negative effects in both the short and long term. This paper has achieved this through detailed examination and analysis of the literature surrounding humanitarian intervention, the Balkans war, and the humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main conclusion drawn from this paper is that the flaws identified by the restrictionist critics result in situations that prevent humanitarian interventions from achieving their long term goals of securing long term peace and prosperity in the affected region. This paper argues that until the propagators of humanitarian intervention acknowledge and move to rectify these flaws, any future humanitarian intervention will be undermined in the same way as all major humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War.

Demarcating new boundaries: mapping virtual polycentric communities through social media content

The proliferation of social media has led to the emergence of a new type of geospatial information that defies the conventions of authoritative or volunteered geographic information, yet can be harvested to reveal unique and dynamic information about people and their activities. In this paper we address the identification and mapping of global virtual communities formed around issues of specific national interest. We refer to these connected virtual communities formed around issues related to a specific state as the polycentric virtual equivalent of that state. Identifying, mapping, and analyzing these virtual communities is a novel challenge for our community, and this is the subject we pursue in this paper. We present these communities relative to established conventions of statehood, address the harvesting of relevant geographical information from social media feeds, and discuss the challenge of visualizing such information. In order to do so we use the current geopolitical situation in Syria as a demonstrative example.

The Responsibility Doctrine

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgments They would like to thank Shadi Hamid, Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, and Anne-Marie Slaughter for their useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are their own. Notes 1. Important sources on emerging and established powers jointly fulfilling “responsibility” include: Richard N. Haas, The Opportunity (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen, The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century,” Final Paper, The Princeton Project on National Security, September 27, 2006, http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report.html; Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, Stephen John Stedman, Power and Responsibility (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009); Michael Schiffer and David Shorr, eds., Powers and Principles (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009); Steven Weber and Bruce Jentleson, The End of Arrogance, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 2. “Barack Obama's Inaugural Address,” New York Times, January 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?pagewanted=all. 3. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Remarks by the President at the U.S./China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” July 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-uschina-strategic-and-economic-dialogue. 4. “The National Security Strategy Report,” May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 5. For an eloquent encapsulation of this essential idea, see Anne-Marie Slaughter's remarks in “We're in for a Heck of a Ride,” CNN, September 7, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/07/opinion/opinion-roundup-obama/index.html. 6. U.S. Department of State, Remarks by Geoffrey Pyatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “U.S.–India Strategic Partnership: A Way Forward,” Press release, April 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2012/188935.htm. 7. Samuel Charap, “Reset This,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/12/reset_this?page=0,2. 8. U.S. Department of State, Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, at the National Convention Center in Hanoi, Vietnam July 23, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm. 9. “China Has ‘Ample Capacity’ to Avoid Hard Landing,” China Daily, July 19, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-07/19/content_15600176.htm. 10. U.S. Department of State, speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, “Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations,” Washington, DC, July 15, 2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm. 11. Michael Lewis, “Obama's Way,” Vanity Fair, October 2012, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/10/michael-lewis-profile-barack-obama. 12. “Mitt Romney's Analysis of Barack Obama's Libyan Policy,” radio interview transcript, Hugh Hewitt, March 21, 2011, http://www.hughhewitt.com/transcripts.aspx?id=e3bf5a59-b9c6-4a10-846b-f573a9a9d74d; Andy Barr, “Sarah Palin ‘Profoundly Disappointed’ by Obama's Libya Speech,” Politico, March 28, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/52106.html; Charles Krauthammer, “Obama and Libya: The Professor's War,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama_and_libya_the_professors_war/2011/03/24/ABPjvmRB_story.html?wprss=rss_homepage. 13. President Reagan kept a plaque with this favorite quotation on his Oval Office desk. “Reagan the Man,” The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Library, http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan-the-man.aspx. 14. Edward Truman, “The G-20 is Failing,” Foreign Policy, April 12, 2012, http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=2089 15. President Obama's remarks on the TPP make it clear China is welcome to join if it adjusts its practices. “Obama Says He Would Welcome Discussions with China on Joining TPP,” China Trade Extra, November 17, 2012, http://chinatradeextra.com/201111162382363/China-Trade-Extra-Documents/Text-Document/obama-says-he-would-welcome-discussions-with-china-on-joining-tpp.html. 16. U.S. Department of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, “Remarks at a United Nations Security Council Session on the Situation in Syria,” at the UN in New York, January 31, 2012, http://m.state.gov/md182845.htm. 17. U.S. Senate, “New START Treaty Floor Speech,” Press release, December 15, 2012, http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=329022&; U.S. Senate, “Isakson Will Vote to Ratify New START Treaty,” Press release, December 21, 2010, http://isakson.senate.gov/press/2010/122110newstart.html. 18. Closed-door meeting with US officials, July 2012. 19. James Mann, The Obamians, (New York: Viking, 2012), pp. 191–196. 20. Congressional Research Service, “Iran Sanctions,” by Kenneth Katzman, (Washington, DC, October 15, 2012), pp. 17–18, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf. 21. The White House, “President Obama Addresses the UN General Assembly,” video, September 23, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/President-Obama-Addresses-the-UN-General-Assembly#transcript. 22. U.S. Department of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, “Remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace China Conference,” March 7, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/185402.htm. 23. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Remarks by President Obama,” speech in Prague, April 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered. 24. Michele Kelemen, “Clinton Steps Up Calls For A Halt To Violence In Syria,” NPR, February 25, 2012 http://m.npr.org/story/147384716. 25. “International Condemnation of Russia–China veto on Syrian Crisis,” Al Arabiya News, February 5, 2012, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/05/192615.html. 26. “International Condemnation of Russia–China veto on Syrian Crisis,” Al Arabiya News, February 5, 2012, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/05/192615.html., for all quotations in this paragraph. 27. Security Clearance (blog), “A Conversation with Clinton and Panetta,” CNN, August 16, 2011, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/a-conversation-with-clinton-and-panetta/. Additional informationNotes on contributorsNina HachigianNina Hachigian is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. She is the co-author of The Next American Century: How the US Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise and worked on the staff of the National Security Council under President ClintonDavid ShorrDavid Shorr is a program officer at the Stanley Foundation

Tadmor's Ghosts: Postscript on Syrian Art

The situation in Syria has continued to deteriorate. The government has increased its aggression against the people, and outside elements with unclear motives have joined the opposition. On 21 August, the people of Ghuta suffered a chemical attack, and over a thousand died dreadful deaths. Despite his assertion in a cocky interview with Charlie Rose that he has not deployed his chemical arsenal, Bashar Al Assad is now apparently cooperating with the UN investigating team. Meanwhile, artists continue to respond to the violence with images, cartoons and films.

Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People

During the civil wars in Libya and Syria, the rebel opposition groups were recognized as ‘the (sole) legitimate representative of the people' of these States. This paper, using the situation in Syria as a case study, examines what it means to recognize an opposition group as ‘the legitimate representative of a people’, while the State’s government is still in place. It is shown that with regard to recognition statements wording is all important and that the Syrian Opposition Council has been recognized in at least six different capacities of varying legal significance. The paper sets out the difference between the ‘legal’ and the ‘political’ act of recognition and finds that recognition as ‘the legitimate representative of a people’ is a political act. Although four normative criteria for the status of ‘legitimate representative of a people’ can be identified what is lacking are clear standards for their application. The paper outlines the consequences of political recognition and examines its legality in terms of international law and its suitability as a political tool.

A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a judicial body that has been created as a politically independent judicial institution to prosecute the most serious international crimes. However, the political independence of the Court has been questioned considerably in the past decade because of the relationship between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has the power to refer or defer situations to the Court, and the ICC. In this work, I argue that in analyzing the relationship between the UNSC and ICC it is evident that clashing political and judicial interests have done a disservice to the implementation of international justice. I will focus on the two instances of referrals so far approved by the UNSC and highlight some of the political aspects that seem to be hindering and delaying, in spite of international pressures for UNSC attention, a referral of the situation in Syria.

Syria and the Evolving Politico-Strategic Dynamics in the Gulf

The present paper deals the situation in Syria and the concerned fall outs in the region, particularly when the instability escalates. Various scenarios have been built up in order to magnify the possible future consequences. The role of the region and extra-regional players and their possible motives and intentions are also underlined.

Unease grows over Syria's chemical weapons

The worsening situation in Syria, 17 months into its political crisis, is heightening international fears over the nature of its chemical-weapons programme and the security of its stockpiles. Though Syria's efforts to develop chemical weapons are shrouded in secrecy, it is thought to have the largest arsenal in the Middle East and probably the fourth-largest in the world. The possibility that chemical weapons could be used against Syrians or foreign forces, or that the security of weapons or nerve agents could be compromised and fall into the wrong hands, is causing considerable alarm, particularly in the region.

Whither 'Arab Spring?

Since December 2010, the ‘Arab Spring’ has featured techniques of civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies, as well as the use of the new social media to organize, communicate, and raise awareness in the face of state attempts at repression and censorship. In the case of Tunisia, Egypt, and - most dramatically - Libya, the protests have actually led to the departure of long-established regimes, whereas the situation in Syria and Bahrain remains unsettled to date.