Sino-Russian Relationship Research Articles

Assessing the Changing Sino–Russian Relationship: A Longitudinal Analysis of Bilateral Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Period

The Sino–Russian relationship is of fundamental importance to the global order. Following the question of how this relationship has developed over time—whether it has strengthened, weakened or remained constant—we present a quantitative analysis of its evolution between 1992 and 2019. To this end, the study develops an original index, the Bilateral Cooperation Intensity (BCI) Index, aimed at measuring bilateral (Sino–Russian) cooperation and considering specific (military, economic, political) dimensions. While our findings verify the assumption that China and Russia have indeed strengthened their cooperation in a progressive manner, with no apparent setback following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the results do not corroborate the claims of dramatic change frequently presented in the literature.

Sino–Russian Partnership in the ‘Asian Supercomplex’: Choices and Challenges for India

China’s relationship with Russia has been on an upward trajectory since the late Soviet period, with the strategic partnership growing steadily since the end of the Cold War. Built on political-economic-strategic convergences, the two sides benefit from their cordial engagement, both at the bilateral and multilateral level, without the obligations associated with an alliance relationship. This alignment has ensured that despite the asymmetric nature of this relationship characterised by China’s rise, the partnership has gone from strength-to-strength. This has particular implications for Indian foreign policy, which has been dealing with an increasingly aggressive China that is now considered a leading security challenge. The development of the Asian supercomplex has accelerated India’s already growing engagement within a regional security complex that is critical for its own security and its future positioning in the international system. Due to implications for India-China ties under conditions of Asian supercomplex, as the Sino-Russian partnership continues to gain strength, its ramifications will reverberate across the whole spectrum of Indo-Russian ties. The article will track the development of Sino-Russian relationship and how it reflects in the emergent regional security complex, before examining the challenges and choices for Indian policymaking in the context of its ‘special and privileged strategic partnership’ with Russia.

Fragmented Cooperation: The Role of State-Owned and Private Companies in Sino-Russian Energy Collaboration

Abstract: Observers tend to interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian relationship in terms of strategic, purposeful cooperation driven by national interests and power-political considerations. The search for power and security, as well as balancing against the United States, have increasingly been pushing China and Russia closer together. The energy realm offers a distinct picture of the Sino-Russian relationship. The pace of cooperation has varied and depended on key domestic players in particular sectors. As a consequence, success stories have been accompanied by major setbacks. Energy cooperation encompasses both a meteoric rise of oil cooperation and the muddling through of gas cooperation. The foundations for close ties in the energy realm were laid well before the post-Crimean acceleration of Sino-Russian cooperation. More often than not, however, parochial interests of dominant state-owned and private enterprises rather than strategic considerations have driven this cooperation. Looking through the prism of energy cooperation, I emphasize the complexity of Russia and China as actors in international politics instead of approaching them as rational and unitary players.

The Eurasian security system: a preliminary framework for understanding the emerging Sino–Russian relationship

AbstractAfter the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sino–Russian relations have rapidly become a hotly debated topic within the fields of strategic studies and international relations. In this article, we propose a preliminary theoretical model for analysing the Russian–Chinese relation as acomplex security system. By security system, we mean a system consisting of two or more elements (states) with shared and interdependent security concerns and interests. From the shared understandings of security of the elements, the system emerges with its emergent attributes and properties. After providing its theoretical and conceptual framework based on recent ideas in complex system theories, the article narrates how the Eurasian security system began to develop after the restructuring of global and Eurasian security architectures following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the following decades, China and Russia developed mutually homogenous sets of perceived security threats and interests, and later in the post 2014-era, these interests converged to establish the Eurasian security system.

The Future of Sino-Russian Relations in the Russian Far East: A Stable but Not Impervious Equilibrium

Abstract This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the nature of Sino-Russian relations by applying a multi-vector framework to examine the tenability of the so-called strategic partnership between Russia and China in the Russian Far East (RFE). Addressing a growing body of literature that seeks to move beyond single-factor evaluations of the dyadic relationship, I embrace the principles of analytic eclecticism, borrowing from Voskressenki's (Alexei D. Voskressenski, Russia and China: A Theory of Inter-State Relations [London, 2003]) multifactor framework to advance an argument for intertwining the three dominant international relations research traditions—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—to conduct a more comprehensive evaluation of the current equilibrium in the RFE, rather than assuming in advance the most pertinent lens. This in turn allows for more effective application of international relations theory to Sino-Russian studies. To accomplish my aim, I incorporate data pertaining to economic, geopolitical, and ideational factors. From these data, I find that the relationship in the RFE is in a state of stable equilibrium, with the most important vectors contributing to the balance for each side at present, geopolitical considerations for Moscow and ideational concerns for Beijing, being conducive to cooperation. The short-term potential for conflict is thus minimal, but a shock in the form of increasing Chinese nationalist hostility toward Russia or continued territorial belligerence by Russia internationally would severely endanger the status quo. By applying a similar approach to other dimensions of the Sino-Russian relationship, scholars can gain greater traction in assessing the robustness of the continually evolving bilateral partnership between these two large and important neighbors.

Distrust in the heartland: explaining the Eurasian “Organization Gap” through the Russo-Chinese relations

The concept of Eurasia is one of the most important elements of geopolitics, dating back to the beginning of the last century, and whose development owes much to the works of geographers and political thinkers alike. Nevertheless, although comprising a big portion of the planet’s political space, this region suffers from a relative ‘organizational gap’, especially if compared with neighboring regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia for instance. This paper contends that the lack of an overarching political arrangement in Eurasia owes much to particular aspects of the Russia-China relationship, which encompasses Great Power aspirations and competing organizational schemesin the region. Different views about Eurasia itself, associated with a quest for leadership in regional institution-building, put both Russia and China on competitive tracks, essentially obstructing the formation of a broad political design in the broader continent. To substantiate our point, the present work applies certain concepts from historical institutionalism, whose mechanisms enabled a thorough evaluation of patterns of inception, continuation, and change of political institutions, alliances and principles affecting the Sino-Russian relationship over time, as well as its effects on Eurasia’s ‘organizational gap’ per se.

Chinese–Russian distance interpreting landscape: a local perspective

This paper discusses the Chinese–Russian interpreters’ views on the adoption of distance interpreting (DI) technology in the local Russian context. From the intergovernmental to the people-topeople level, the Sino-Russian relationship has been developing as a strategic partnership. Due to travel restrictions and other pandemic containment measures, the demand for virtual communication technology and remote interpreting has been on the rise, which highlighted a variety of implications for the interpreting profession. We present the results of a series of interviews with Chinese–Russian interpreters from Moscow and Chelyabinsk, Russia (n=6), accompanied by a small-scale online survey (n=26). The exploratory study focuses on the interpreters’ experience with technology, and on their perception of DI in general and video remote interpreting in particular. The results suggest that the common DI scenarios in the local Chinese– Russian interpreting market (Chelyabinsk region) include video-mediated and over-the-phone consecutive interpreting in business and education settings. The study also reveals an overall positive attitude to the DI technology among the surveyed interpreters, despite such reported challenges as psychological discomfort, connection problems and technical difficulties on the clients’ part, which often lead to new responsibilities of an interpreter.

Russia and China between cooperation and competition at the regional and global level. Introduction

ABSTRACT The steady intensification of Sino-Russian cooperation over the past few years has triggered a surge in scholarly interest. However, in light of the far-reaching geopolitical implications of the Sino-Russian rapprochement, most studies of Sino-Russian dynamics are not only conducted from the disciplinary perspective of International Relations (IR), but also continue to be embedded in realist assumptions and power-political perspectives. This special issue seeks to advance the scholarly knowledge on the Sino-Russian relationship by making the case for expanding the scope of analysis theoretically, disciplinarily and empirically. This introductory article first sets the context by providing a historical overview of key developments in Sino-Russian relations. Following an in-depth review of the IR-dominated literature, it then substantiates the claim that there is a need to broaden the scope of analysis in order to move beyond the IR realist perspective that predominates the literature on the Sino-Russian relationship. Together, the articles in the special issue add new insights to the literature by analyzing the depth of the relationship; scrutinizing Russian discourses on China, in both historical and contemporary contexts; exploring the limitations and dilemmas of the relationship; and paying specific attention to the agency of the countries “in-between”, from Central Asia to Mongolia.

A Friend in Need? The Sino-Russian Relationship Under the Coronavirus Crisis in Twitter: a Russian Perspective.

The paper focuses on the COVID-19 as a stress test to the Sino-Russian strategic partnership: has it driven Russia and China closer together, farther apart, or made no difference? Employing content analysis of official Russian discourse as expressed by the Kremlin, the Government, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), both via their official web pages (104 online publications) and Twitter accounts (260 tweets), this study focuses on the Russian twiplomacy as a more suitable mean to reflect the real-time changes of an evolving crisis. The analysis demonstrates that the Sino-Russian relationship extends beyond the “axis of convenience.” It does not, however, correspond to the support expected from a consolidated (comprehensive) strategic partnership, nor does it achieve the intensity of soft balancing (vis-à-vis the USA) in a particularly polarized and politicized international context.

The Sino-Russian Relationship and the West

Western observers exaggerate the negative implications of Sino-Russian cooperation for Europe and the US, as well as the West’s ability to weaken this relationship.

The Russia–China entente and its future

The ‘strategic partnership’ between Moscow and Beijing is already more than two decades old and continues to evolve toward more consolidation, a trend which the coronavirus pandemic will only serve to accelerate. Its current state can be characterized as a quasi-alliance, or entente. The article first examines the Russia–China cooperation in the two most crucial areas—geo-economic and military. Then, it asks the question whether Moscow and Beijing could be on the verge of forming an alliance. The article proceeds to analyze the Russian–Chinese interaction in the areas of Eurasia where both of them have significant stakes and intersecting interests: East Asia, the post-Soviet space (with the focus on Central Asia), and the Arctic. Finally, the author draws up several scenarios envisioning the future of the Sino-Russian relationship.

The Sino-Russian Relationship: Fellow Travellers in the West-dominated World

A decade ago, Beijing's relations with Moscow were of marginal interest to China scholars. Topics such as growing Sino-American interdependence-cum-rivalry, engagement with East Asia or relations with the developing world overshadowed China's relationship with its northern neighbour. Scholars preoccupied with Russia's foreign policy did not pay much attention either, regarding the Kremlin's policy towards China as part and parcel of Russia's grand strategy directed towards the West. The main dividing line among those few who took a closer look ran between sceptics and alarmists. The former interpreted the post-Cold War rapprochement as superficial and envisioned an imminent clash of interests between the two states. The latter, a minority, saw the prospect of an anti-Western alliance.

Russia’s Eurasian past, present and future: rival international societies and Moscow’s place in the post-cold war world

ABSTRACTThe failure of post-Soviet Russia to integrate into the West became evident with the 2014 Ukraine crisis, leading Moscow to accelerate its declared “pivot to the East”. However, the increased dependence on China carries its own risks, such as the danger of becoming Beijing’s junior partner. For an erstwhile superpower that continues to declare and prize its autonomy in international affairs, this is a particularly unappealing prospect. Thus, it remains to be seen whether a genuinely balanced partnership can exist between both countries. This article uses insights from Adam Watson’s pendulum theory to explore Russia’s post-2014 Eurasian predicament. We argue that the rapid rightward swing of the pendulum in the Euro-Atlantic order following the end of the Cold War has proven indigestible for Moscow. The article then moves to discuss the Sino-Russian relationship in the context of the emerging Eurasian space. It concludes that the growing disillusionment of Russian leaders with the West since the 2000s, along with the normative convergence between Moscow and Beijing, has led to a closer partnership between the two. Yet the partnership is also riddled with a number of insecurities on Moscow’s side that could undermine the long-term prospects for cooperation between Russia and China.

Russia's Strategic Partnerships with China and South Korea: The Impact of THAAD

Russia's Strategic Partnerships with China and South Korea:The Impact of THAAD Anthony V. Rinna (bio) keywords Russia, South Korea, China, Strategic Partnerships, Thaad [End Page 79] executive summary This article analyzes the effects of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system on Russia's strategic partnerships with China and South Korea. main argument Russia opposes THAAD's placement in South Korea and has begun to cooperate with China on missile defense. But despite this cooperation, THAAD's effects on Russia's relations with South Korea have been limited compared with China's. Whereas Beijing retaliated economically, Moscow remains keen to develop closer trade ties with Seoul. The pursuit of strategic partnerships with China and South Korea has encouraged Moscow to maintain balanced relations with both countries even while facing a mutually contentious issue. policy implications • Because the Sino-Russian relationship is a strategic partnership as opposed to a full-fledged alliance, Moscow is able to cooperate with Beijing on issues of mutual interest without being in complete lockstep. • South Korea's policies toward Russia, more so than Japan's policies, have diverged from those of the United States in crucial respects. As a result, Russia tends to view its relationship with Japan through the lens of the U.S.-Japan alliance, whereas it has a more independent relationship with South Korea. • Given that South Korea is a particularly important player in Russia's bid to develop its Far Eastern region, Moscow is unlikely to allow THAAD to derail its growing economic relationship with Seoul. [End Page 80] Escalating tensions between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States prompted Washington and Seoul in 2013 to discuss deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In spring 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that THAAD was fully operational in the ROK. The decision to deploy THAAD there met with opposition from Russia, with Moscow expressing skepticism regarding the effects that the system could have on Northeast Asia's regional security environment. In September 2016, Mikhail Ulyanov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, lamented that THAAD's deployment in South Korea would simply provoke the DPRK to take further measures against the United States.1 Russia's deputy defense minister Alexander Fomin has stated that, short of an outbreak of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, THAAD could ignite or perpetuate a regional arms race.2 Not only have senior Russian officials expressed fears of the potential negative consequences for regional security, they have also decried the potential impact that THAAD could have on arms control agreements between Russia and the United States. Russian lawmaker Viktor Ozerov, then chairman of the Security and Defense Committee of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian parliament), has asserted that THAAD's deployment could serve as an impetus for Russia's withdrawal from the 2011 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).3 The People's Republic of China (PRC), an increasingly salient partner of Russia, has echoed Russian apprehensions about THAAD's deployment. In particular, Chinese and Russian officials have repeatedly condemned the impact that THAAD will have on regional stability, as well as the potential of its radar capabilities to challenge Chinese and Russian missile systems. This specifically includes the ability to peer into the air, land, and sea beyond the Korean Peninsula and detect activities such as missile tests as well as [End Page 81] distinguish between real nuclear warheads and decoys.4 The PRC and Russia vowed to implement a coordinated response to THAAD's installation in relative proximity to their borders. This professed intention to cooperate on security comes at a time when they have already grown closer on a broad range of issues. As part of this cooperative relationship, Russia's policy positions on Korean security have largely coincided with China's—namely on the absolute need to avoid military conflict to resolve the North Korean security crisis. Their agreement on policies regarding Korean security has concurrently placed Moscow and Beijing in disagreement with Washington. At the same time, Russia...

Introduction

Introduction Brian Franchell (bio) The Sino-Russian relationship has progressed considerably since Mikhail Gorbachev called for creating “an atmosphere of good-neighborliness” with China in 1986.1 The delivery of ten Russian Su-35 fighter jets to China in late December 2017 is a testament to this, especially considering that 30 years ago nearly two million troops were amassed along their shared border.2 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the two countries have gradually improved relations, developing their defense relationship in the 1990s, jointly declaring the establishment of a partnership of strategic coordination in 1996, and resolving the border issue in 2008. Yet the pivotal moment occurred in 2014 with the onset of the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions that pushed Russia toward strategic dependence on China, eliminating any flexibility it previously had. The momentum in the relationship has only continued since then. Although there are clear checks on the depth of the partnership, discussed in the essays in this roundtable, the common interests behind this intensification of cooperation seem to be increasing. There is considerable agreement among experts about the trajectory of positive Sino-Russian relations, as well as the causes of closer cooperation between the two countries across numerous energy, economic, political, and security issues. There is less agreement, however, about the implications that heightened cooperation might have for the global system and regional relations. This roundtable offers a spectrum of perspectives in response to these questions, including from the key states involved (China, Russia, and the United States), as well as on what closer Sino-Russian cooperation means for neighboring countries in Central and Northeast Asia. In the first essay, Angela Stent looks at U.S. policy objectives toward Russia on the issues of Syria, North Korea, counterterrorism, cyberthreats, and sanctions and examines the degree to which the trajectory of [End Page 2] Sino-Russian relations might affect these objectives. She stresses that across these issues there are no significant points of contention that the United States might exploit to drive China and Russia apart. The two countries’ suspicion of the United States and mutual desire to forge a new international order drive the partnership. Closer cooperation will likely hinder the realization of U.S. policy objectives, and the United States must be careful to avoid policies that further bind the two countries together. Providing a historical context for the relationship, Yu Bin assesses the trajectory of Sino-Russian relations over the past three hundred years. He observes that the two countries have moved from a relationship characterized by volatility to a more pragmatic and institutionalized coexistence. Touching on the Chinese perspective, Yu characterizes the strategic partnership as a dynamic and flexible one that moves beyond the conventional concept of zero-sum geopolitics. For Yu, the direction of the two countries’ relations with the West will be a critical determinant as to whether the partnership moves toward a true alliance. Alexander Lukin provides a Russian perspective on the relationship, arguing that the Sino-Russian rapprochement is the result of the countries’ shared geopolitical views. China and Russia desire both to counter the West’s dominant influence in the global system and to encourage the development of a multipolar world. Western policies intent on preserving a preeminent position have only served to accelerate the deepening of Sino-Russian cooperation, though the formation of an alliance is unlikely. Any attempt to drive a wedge between them to counter China’s rising influence would fail because of their mutual interests. Lukin asserts that the United States must forfeit its hegemony and join Russia and China to find new principles that suit a multipolar world order. Turning to Central Asia, Tomohiko Uyama compares Russia’s and China’s activities and influence in the region, noting that each country’s individual engagement is much more significant than their bilateral cooperation. Russia exerts unrivaled influence in the political and security realms, and a de facto division of labor is forming, with China taking an increasingly prominent role in economic engagement. The United States’ engagement with Central Asia has been mostly unsuccessful, in part because of its emphasis on Afghanistan. This contrasts with Japan’s greater success in engaging the broader region...

Sino-Russian Cooperation from the Perspective of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Sino-Russian Cooperation from the Perspective of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Hiroshi Yamazoe (bio) This essay assesses the implications of relations betwen China and Russia for the U.S.-Japan alliance, taking into consideration the impact of the Sino-Russian partnership as well as the challenges that each country poses. Differences in interests and the nonbinding nature of the strategic partnership currently prevent the relationship from becoming a formal alliance. Still, China and Russia have overlapping interests and their cooperation is growing, a trend that is unlikely to be slowed by the policies of other states. This essay imagines the impact of the partnership on the U.S.-Japan alliance in three scenarios in order to better understand what situations the United States and Japan want to avoid. The general finding is that, while the United States needs a long-term strategy for countering Russian challenges in limited areas, the U.S.-Japan alliance should develop even longer-term and more comprehensive efforts to counter China’s challenges without expecting a quick victory or exacerbating Sino-Russian collaboration. The Current Status of the Sino-Russian Relationship: Nonbinding Cooperation From the viewpoint of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Sino-Russian cooperation in the military sphere is of key concern. Russia’s transfer of military hardware aids China’s military buildup (Su-35 fighters and S-400 surface-to-air missiles are recent examples). Chinese capabilities have been growing on their own, but some dimensions (such as jet engines) still depend on Russia and benefit greatly from Russian transfers. Meanwhile, Sino-Russian naval exercises have been developing in sophistication and political messaging. However, the experience that the two countries gain jointly has only slightly increased the vast experience each has been acquiring individually. The exercises in the Baltic Sea in July 2017 and around Vladivostok and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in September 2017 [End Page 32] included new elements such as submarine rescue and passage through the Sea of Okhotsk. Still, Ethan Meick assesses that Sino-Russian military-to-military cooperation, though achieving a higher level, has not yet developed into a comprehensive, alliance-like security relationship.1 What concrete joint actions by China and Russia, then, could realistically undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance? Sino-Russian joint opposition to U.S. initiatives in missile defense has gained significant attention, but this opposition will not deter the United States and its allies. Debates in South Korea or Japan are not changed by Russia aligning itself with China against missile defense programs in Asia. Moreover, other states are not joining the Sino-Russian chorus against the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system. Finally, China never hesitated to criticize THAAD from the outset, even without Russia also objecting, just as Russia does not hesitate to criticize NATO’s missile defense program absent China’s input. Other differences concerning international norms also distinguish the two countries. Russia is more assertive in attempting to establish international norms on information space. Meanwhile, since 1972, it has continued to observe the maritime safety customs of the Incidents at Sea Agreement, despite tensions with U.S. forces in Europe, and this shared U.S.-Russian custom has implications for China’s behavior in maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.2 In 2004, Russia also joined the Proliferation Security Initiative, an effort that China does not support. In the context of both the advances in Sino-Russian cooperation and these differences in each country’s individual positions, one other important feature of the strategic partnership is its nonbinding nature. This relationship is different from an alliance in which allies commit to each other’s defense in the event of a contingency. Moreover, as one expert points out, unlike balancing or bandwagoning, strategic partnerships do not prevent states from pursuing similar partnerships with others.3 One can even argue that Russia and China cooperate because of mutual mistrust. The 2008 resolution of their border demarcation, for instance, was [End Page 33] far less costly than the kinds of military confrontations they experienced during the Cold War era.4 In today’s maritime domain, Russia could choose to support some of China’s claims, but it does not...

In search of the ‘Other’ in Asia: Russia–China relations revisited

ABSTRACTThis paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.

Sino-Russian Relations: The Impact of Central Asian Energy Resources

Abstract The following paper strives to (1) present the reader with the results of my preceding book on the subject (Eder 2014) and to (2) review the trends that had been predicted therein. It provides a concise analysis of the Sino-Russian relationship’s history, an account of post-Soviet regional energy projects, and an analysis and interpretation of the mainland Chinese discourse on the impact of the Central Asian energy issue on this relationship. The issue has been broadly discussed as a possible source of friction since the global financial and economic crisis. Chinese authors predicted that a great deal of co-ordination and compromise would be needed because of Russian sensitivities but conveyed confidence that their country’s ‘inevitable’ expansion of crucial energy relations would be manageable. The book thus predicted a successful handling of competing interests in the short term but still foresaw a challenge to the ‘strategic partnership’ through the gradually shifting power balance. Over the last 18 months, China has advanced even faster and more comprehensively than anticipated and already overshadows Russia. Now undergirded by a more substantial political strategy, it quietly but resolutely pushes Moscow (and all its schemes of post-Soviet re-integration) aside. Managing ensuing frustrations and more blatant counter-measures will likely test the resolve and aptitude of Chinese policy-makers earlier than expected.

Russia-China relations in the post-crisis international order. By Marcin Kaczmarski.

The Sino-Russian relationship has featured numerous twists and turns over the century since revolutions transformed the domestic politics and foreign policies of both countries. Today, ongoing changes in China and Russia, and at the global level, are creating an opportunity for innovative analysis of the relationship between these two major powers. Marcin Kaczmarski's account meets that need well. And given the growing focus for each country on diplomatic relations with the other, it is timely and refreshingly up to date, covering events to the end of 2014. Kaczmarski addresses an International Relations puzzle, namely why Russia has not responded to China's rise by either hedging or counterbalancing, which suggests that the Kremlin does not see China as a threat. Current interpretations of the relationship see it either as an ‘axis of convenience’ (Bobo Lo, Axis of convenience, Brookings Institution Press, 2008; reviewed in International Affairs 85: 2) or as a strategic partnership. Instead, Kaczmarski argues that we have been witnessing a ‘peaceful power transition’ (to be understood as a ‘socially constructed phenomenon’, p. 3) between Russia and China, one feature of which is a growing asymmetry between the two countries in many areas. He sets out to demonstrate this by a comprehensive analysis of the relationship's bilateral, regional and global dimensions. An important theme running through the book is the importance of energy diplomacy.

WHEN IMPORTERS TURN TO EXPORTING OIL AND GAS — THE SHALE GAS HYPE AND CERTAIN GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES LIE AHEAD IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

The Middle East, the world’s only major source of low-cost oil, will remain at the core of the long-term prospects of the world oil market. The IEA went too far referring to the “shale hydrocarbon revolution born in the USA”. For the time being, the global energy landscape has not been turned upside down. It is China’s soaring energy consumption rather than the US’ rising production that will fundamentally shift the world energy order. Some analysts claim that the Sino-Russian relationship will truly shift global energy boundaries: pipelines are turning east. Global oil prices may fall if and when significant volumes of additional Iranian oil return to the market. A new petroleum frontier in the Eastern Mediterranean complicates the manifold conflicts, but opens up new chances for cooperation. There are huge opportunities created by the discovery of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean — not least for countries that are short of both money and energy. Developing these opportunities will require cooperation, and could be both a lucrative and politically rewarding confidence-building measure.