Single Rulebook Research Articles

EU Recovery and Resolution Framework: Financial Assistance between Banking Group Members

The European Commission’s draft Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution includes a framework for intra-group financial assistance in financial groups. This paper examines the nature of banking groups and the policy arguments for and against a regulated framework for intra-group support. Further, the article explains the procedure itself and outlines issues which may arise in its practical application. Finally, the article studies the relationship between intra-group financial assistance and bank supervision, capital and liquidity requirements and structural ring-fence of retail banking. The article concludes that even if group support is regulated at EU level, divergences in supervision and prudential regulation which can occur under the proposed “single rulebook”, may pose obstacles to group support at cross-border level.

The locus of financial regulation: home versus host

If the G's are the world's steering committee, the step from G7 to G20 deepened the democratic legitimacy of this committee. However, it also shifted influence to a group that share little else other than economic power: they have diverse experiences, challenges, cultural perspectives and starting points. This is particularly the case in the field of financial regulation, where action across these countries in recent months—despite all the language of global regulation—is increasingly local. The prospect of the new global being quite local has dismayed some. But it need not. This article challenges the dichotomy of more global versus more local. It argues that financial internationalism—greater cooperation by nations for the benefit of all—is better served by institutions that help to integrate diverse systems than those which try to enforce one-size-fits-all approach to very different economies. International banks persuaded regulators of the benefits of home country regulation and a level playing field for bankers. But the benefits accrued largely to the banks in the boom and proved an avenue for contagion during the crash. Host country regulation may prove a safer way to regulate financial systems, in particular by allowing regulation to be more responsive to national economic conditions and cycles. It is likely that a shift back to host country regulation will act as a drag on international capital flows. The instinct of economists is that the cost of this is uncertain, suspect and conditional, especially when compared to the costs of financial crashes. Host country regulation does not mean there is no role for international institutions, such as the newly minted Financial Stability Board. Instead, it suggests a more nuanced role, potentially encompassing the policing of international market infrastructure, financial protectionism, information free flow between regulators and the convergence of regulatory principles and the consolidation of regulatory instruments. An informed and collegiate process of integrating different financial systems will be a more resilient system than one which tries to apply a single rule book across inherently different countries.

Conflicts of Interest in Investment Services: The Price and Uncertain Impact of MiFID's Regulatory Framework

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) lays down organizational and conduct-of-business rules on conflicts of interest of investment firms and banks providing investment services. It is easy to predict that, as a consequence of the home country control principle (investments firms and banks will have to comply with their own home country rules wherever they conduct their business within the EU), the MiFID will lead to de facto complete harmonisation of the rules on conflicts of interest: Member States will refrain from enacting further rules on conflicts of interest so as to avoid to put domestic firms at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis EC firms. This chapter inquires into this prospective uniformity, making two points. First, the uniformity will be more apparent than real, because in the absence of rules preventing a firm from acting in the presence of a conflict of interest and/or of rules dispensing it from the general fairness and honesty obligations where certain procedural or disclosure rules are complied with, there will be ample scope for ex post review of the firm's behaviour on the basis of such general obligations. It will be impossible, however, to ensure uniform EU-wide interpretation of such a fuzzy concept as fairness. The second point is that the uniform rules on conflicts of interests will lower the degree of investor protection in at least some Member States (namely, Italy) where regulation would be most needed in light of the lower degree of competition in the financial services industry, the lower level of investor education, and the unimpressive record of the financial services authority. The paper concludes that while the lack of real harmonisation is certainly an unintended result of MiFID, the fact that in some Member States investor protection may decrease due to the harmonisation process is best grasped in light of the objectives of EC securities regulation. Under the EC Treaty, the main purpose of harmonisation of financial services has traditionally been market integration. Investor protection is just an instrumental end, something to be pursued in order to attain market integration. But the two objectives may well conflict, and when they do, market integration easily prevails. Not only is market integration the real purpose of harmonisation under the Treaty, it is also the definite objective of the interest groups that favour EC regulation in this area, i.e. continental players from the main financial centres, whose quest for a single rulebook and a single set of rules is easy to understand. Local players, in good as well as in bad jurisdictions, are obviously, if not myopically, happy with the more lenient rules to which the various participants agree at the EC level. Leniency inevitably follows from the fact that investors' needs differ from country to country and that the securities industry is the only effective lobby. The final outcome is a diminution of legal protection for retail investors in bad jurisdictions - who are precisely those who most need such protection.