Single-party Governments Research Articles

Coalition Governments and Sovereign Debt Crises

This article examines the domestic politics of sovereign debt repudiation. I contend that countries that are governed by a coalition of parties are less likely to reschedule their debts than those under single-party governments. I test this argument using cross-national data from 1971 to 1997 in 48 developing countries. My results show that ceteris paribus, the probability of debt repudiation is lower when there is a multi-party coalition rather than a single-party government in power. The effect of multi-party coalitions on sovereign defaults is quantitatively large and roughly of the same order of magnitude as liquidity factors such as debt burden and debt service. These results are robust to numerous specifications and samples. I complement my statistical findings with an examination of the Argentine default in 2001. I find that both the timing and the political circumstances under which the repudiation of the country's sovereign debt occurred correspond to the conditions identified in this paper.

Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities

The level of revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. Despite a flourishing literature on, for example, the technical or procedural determinants of such forecast errors, little is yet known about how political stratagems may affect forecast errors. In the present paper, we analyse whether differences in the level of government fragmentation are useful in explaining local government tax revenue forecast errors—controlling for various other factors. Using data on 242 Flemish municipalities for the period 1992–2002, we find that two-party governments are more optimistic than single-party governments. In contrast to our initial expectations, governments with at least three parties are significantly more careful (or less optimistic) in their revenue projections than single- or two-party governments.

Institutions and Development

In late-century Africa, domestic reformers and the international community prescribed political reform as a means for securing policy reform. They sought to put an end to single party and military government and introduced multiparty politics. Using a principal agent framework, the author assesses the logical validity of these efforts. And employing a game theoretic approach, he traces the impact of political reform on political stability. He employs a panel of data from both African and global samples to measure the impact of reform on the economics and politics of Africa. The evidence suggests that reform has measurably curtailed the opportunistic use of politcal power, failed to influence the formulation of macro-economic policy, and increased the likelihood of political disorder. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Determinants of tax innovation: The case of environmental taxes in Flemish municipalities

The setting of new taxes is a notably visible act that has potential political costs. This paper explores the setting of new environmental taxes across the 308 Flemish municipalities over the period 1991–1999. We find that first adoptions of a green tax are much less likely to occur during election years but are more likely if ones' peers/neighbours (defined both geographically and ideologically) already have the tax. In addition, whilst left-wing governments are more likely to set new taxes and coalitions are more likely to set the tax than single-party governments, the greater the fragmentation of the municipal government, the lower is the likelihood that a new tax will be set.

Time Horizons Matter: Coalition Governments, Replacement Risk and the Size of Government in 96 Countries, 1975-2000

This study examines how coalition governments affect the size of government, measured by total central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Existing studies suggest that multiparty governments spend more because they have a larger number of parties, greater ideological fragmentation, and more veto players. We demonstrate that coalition governments have shorter time horizons than single party governments and use that finding to motivate a model which shows that coalition governments have greater incentives to increase government spending. Results from several empirical models that are estimated using a sample of 96 countries between 1975 and 2000 provide strong statistical support for the aforementioned theoretical prediction. The estimates that we obtain remain robust in separate subsamples of OECD and non-OECD countries. We also find that alternative political explanations for the level of government spending such as the degree of legislative fragmentation, government partisanship, the number of veto players, and electoral systems (Majoritarian and Proportional Representation) do not have a statistically significant impact on central government expenditure.

Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention

In this paper, I develop a career concerns model of government policy choice within a dynamic optimal stopping framework to predict the degree of surfing (opportunistic timing) and manipulation (politically motivated economic intervention) under alternate institutional structures. Among other results, I find that the likelihood of opportunistic elections rises with exogenous economic performance, with longer maximum term lengths, with future electoral uncertainty, and with economic volatility but diminishes in the value of office-holding; manipulation increases with the maximum term length and with the value of office-holding but decreases with exogenous economic performance and with economic volatility. The model suggests that single-party governments should be highly opportunistic in calling elections and that countries that allow opportunistic election timing should experience less economically distortionary political intervention than their fixed-timing counterparts.

Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe

The comparative record of cabinet stability shows interesting variation across the three most consolidated post-communist democracies: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Whereas each cabinet has been remarkably stable in post-communist Hungary, no cabinet has survived in its original composition in Poland. The cabinets that have been formed in the Czech Republic show a mixture of stability and instability: the conservative coalition government formed after the 1996 Czech elections collapsed after a little more than a year in office paving the way for early elections. In contrast, the single-party government formed by the Social Democratic Party (CSSD) after the 1998 polls has proved to be stable. In this article it is argued that cabinet stability both within and across the states can be consistently explained by the theory of dominant and central players.

Electoral alliance and implemented redistribution: an interpretation on non-competitive politics of Japan

This article shows that a pre-election alliance between the ruling coalition parties with different ideological motivations may result in bias toward the large size of government. In equilibrium, the reelected coalition government implements a redistributive policy that is greater than the median voter's preference. The results can explain why the Japanese coalition government, which colludes for winning elections, has frequently implemented more diffuse fiscal policies than the previous single-party government.

Electoral systems and the effects of political events on the stock market: The Belgian case

Efficient stock markets react to news. News about future economic policies can be derived from political events such as elections, the formation of new governments, changes in the composition of governments, etc. However, the news content of these events depends on the electoral system. In the American electoral system, characterized as it is by majority representation and single–party governments, elections generate news to the extent that the results are unexpected. In countries with proportional representation, governments are frequently multi–party coalitions whose composition is difficult to predict from the election results. These results therefore contain much less information about future policies. Our results, obtained for the Brussels stock market, support this distinction. Furthermore, the ideological composition of the government also matters; these effects support a rational partisan approach.

Popper versus Schumpeter: srovnání dvou neklasických teorií demokracie

The author compares the non-classical theories of democracy develop- ed in the 1940s by two originally Austrian thinkers (Karl R. Popper and Joseph A. Schumpeter). He points out that most of the conclusions derived by Popper from his non-classical theory of democracy, especially in the 1980s, could also be derived from Schumpeter's non-classical theory. Such conclusions are ignored by people who recommend a proportional system of representation, multiparty systems and a broad coalition government as a 'better' model of democracy than the Westminster model, characterised by a majority electoral system (plurality), a two-party system and single-party government. In exploring the differences between the concepts put forward by the two Austrian thinkers, the author stres- ses the contrast between Schumpeter's theory of the irrationality of the political behaviour of the masses and Popper's thesis that the people's retrospective judg- ment on policies implemented and politics conducted may be competent. The author argues that some contemporary theories and conclusions of recent empi- rical studies are closer to Popper's view than to Schumpeter's. Sociologický casopis, 2003, Vol. 39, No. 1: 11-36

The Budget Process in New Zealand: Has Proportional Representation Made a Difference?

In New Zealand, as in most countries, the budget is at the heart of the political process. This paper examines the impact of the introduction of a mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system in the mid-1990s on budget decision-making by focusing on two dimensions. First, it seeks to compare the budget process across five distinct periods of government. Second, it examines changes to two distinct stages of the budget process: the executive phase and the legislative phase. The evidence suggests that the move from single-party majority government to other governmental forms has made the formulation of the budget a more open process, and has increased the number of actors involved. However, Treasury ministers remain dominant, while the primary cabinet cleavage continues to be between them and spending ministers, rather than between coalition partners or between those partners and parties providing support on confidence and supply. To date, there has been no significant change to the legislative phase of the budget, little recourse to the financial veto provisions, and no serious threats to the capacity of governments to secure parliamentary endorsement for their budgetary intentions.

Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution

An important agenda power in parliamentary democracies is the discretion over the dissolution of parliament. We argue that variation in constitutional rules and the political environment will systematically affect the frequency of early elections. We hypothesize that dissolution will be more frequent under single-party governments, when the head of state plays an insignificant role, when neither parliament nor the cabinet can inhibit dissolution, when minority governments are in power, when the head of state can dissolve unilaterally, and later in the constitutional term. Using standard logistic and Cox-proportional hazard techniques, we test these expectations in a pooled time-series setting against observations of most OECD parliamentary democracies for the years 1960–1995. We find that parliamentary dissolutions are more frequent earlier in the constitutional term, under minority governments, when the head of state plays an insignificant role, and when the parliament or the cabinet is not involved.

SOUTH EUROPEAN ELECTION WATCH - The Return of the Portuguese Right: The 2001 Local Government Elections and the 2002 Legislative Elections

This report analyses the 2001 local elections and the 2002 legislative elections in Portugal. The results of the local elections were not an objective disaster for the Socialists. However, due to deteriorating political and economic circumstances, Prime Minister Guterres tendered his resignation. The legislative elections which ensued spelled the end of Socialist Party rule, and the victory, albeit without an absolute majority, of the centre-right party, the PSD. The elections also led to the formation of a coalition government, after 15 years of single-party government. Nevertheless, the alternation in power, as well as the change in government type, did not represent a fundamental shift in voting behaviour, as indicated by national and district party results.

Politics and Unemployment in Industrialized Democracies

This paper provides an empirical appraisal of the influence ofpolitics on the evolution of unemployment rates in 13industrialized democracies (12 European Union countries andthe U.S.) from 1960 to 1999. We conduct new tests ofopportunistic and partisan business cycle models, using richerdata and more general specifications than previous studies. Incontrast to most previous studies, we pay particular attentionto the importance of labor market structure in conditioningthe influence of politics on unemployment. We also investigatethe relationship between political stability and economicstability. The results suggest the existence of partisan effects, withhigher unemployment rates prevailing under ``right'' partiesthan ``left'' parties. There is more support for ``rational''partisan models that embody transient partisan impacts thanfor models with permanent effects. We find evidence that unionpower is associated with higher average unemployment rates,but that centralized bargaining institutions tend to lowerunemployment rates. The evidence also suggests that morefragmented coalition governments are associated with higherunemployment rates than single party governments.

Coalition government and satisfaction with democracy: An analysis of New Zealand's reaction to proportional representation

Abstract. Following approval of a referendum in 1993, New Zealand replaced its first–past–the–post electoral system with proportional representation (PR). Although support for PR was initially high, less than a third expressed support for the new system a year and a half after its implementation. We examine two explanations for this decline. One theory assumes that dissatisfaction with the new system is the result of a growing alienation with politics, exacerbated by an unpopular coalition government that voters neither expected nor desired. Another theory assumes that evaluations of the new system are mediated by a preference for coalition or single party government. Our results indicate that a preference for single party government, guided primarily by partisan self–interest, has the largest impact. Nevertheless, negative evaluations of the performance of the coalition government helped contribute to a loss in support for PR suggesting that government performance can affect citizen's evaluation of political institutions, particularly when systems undergo radical change.

Outfoxing leviathan: campaigning down Mexico way

AbstractThis paper is concerned with the end of 71 years of single party government in Mexico. The paper explores the ways in which the opposition harnessed modern campaign techniques to the opportunities presented by democratisation to secure regime transition. A number of campaign features, such as the stress on personality and negative campaigning, have attracted considerable criticism, but the author argues that there are grounds for believing the 2000 election to have been a unique election, and that competition should be more clearly structured around parties and issues in the future. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications

The Mexican Presidential and Congressional Elections of 2000 and Democratic Transition

The article examines the presidential and congressional elections of July 2000 in Mexico. The elections brought to an end more than 70 years of single party government and the culmination of a gradual democratisation process stretching back at least a decade. The long term decline in the bases of support for the regime and the changing institutional rules for elections and parties are described by way of contextualising the campaign itself and its leading protagonists. While the new rules of the game guaranteed free and fair elections, issues of internal party democracy and negative, personality‐based campaigning do not paint a universally rosy democratic picture. Analysis of the election results demonstrates how the opposition was able to move beyond its traditional geographic confines and challenge across the country. However, voters did not give an unambiguous victory to Vicente Fox; his alliance does not possess a majority in either house of congress. Divided government and developments in the party system are considered as two key issues that will shape Mexico's democratic future.

Coalition Politics and the Limits of State Feminism in Chile

ABSTRACT Studies of government agencies for women identify a series of factors necessary for a high level of commitment to feminist policy. These include strong grassroots pressure, a highly statist political culture, an organizational structure that facilitates cooperation with other government agencies, international norms, and political will on behalf of government leaders (Friedman 2000; Stetson and Mazur 1995). In Chile on the eve of democratic transition in 1989, all of these factors were in place. Since then, however, Chile's government agency for women, the National Women's Service (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer SERNAM), has not proven to be a strong advocate of feminist policies. This study turns to the literature on coalition theory to explain why this is the case. The level of commitment to feminist policy within a women's agency varies depending on whether a government is controlled by a single party or a multiparty coalition. In a single-party government, the agenda of a particular ministry w...

Coming to Play or Coming to Win: Participation and Success at the Olympic Games

This paper investigates the post-War Summer Olympic Games in order to determine the economic and political determinants of national participation, and of female participation in particular. Success at the Games (i.e., medal counts) is then analyzed in two ways, from the individual level and the national level, showing similar results. Female participation is rising over time, augmented primarily by larger nations. There is a significant and measurable advantage to larger nations (both in GDP per capita and in population) in terms of participation and success at the Games. Furthermore, there are undeniable advantages to being the hosting nation, and to being a neighbor to the host. Equally striking is the fact that while there is no evidence of a bias of Communist and single-party governments to send more athletes to the Games, once there, the athletes of these nations perform exceptionally well. There is support for the hypothesis that colonial links make a difference, imparting a mixed blessing from the past. Predictions for participation and gold, silver and bronze medal counts by nation for the 2000 Sydney Games conclude the paper. JEL O10, Z10

Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition, And Interstate Dispute Escalation: Evidence from Parliamentary Systems, 1946-89

Research on the `democratic peace' has received considerable attention in the last few years. Democracies, though, are often thrown together when examining the propensity of different regime types to become engaged in international conflict. Yet, democratic governments vary dramatically across nation-states. Whether it be presidential versus parliamentary, or multi-party versus single-party, democratic states clearly differ in the structure of their governing institutions. This article examines the relationship between government type, domestic political opposition, and the threat, show or use of military force. The analysis finds that Western parliamentary governments are rarely involved in militarized interstate disputes, but when they are they tend to be the targets of aggression by non-democratic states. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that these democratic governments are much more likely to reciprocate disputes when their opponent is a non-democracy. Reciprocation, though, also tends to be influenced by the type of government in power during a dispute. Coalition democratic governments, rather than single-party governments, are much more likely to reciprocate militarized disputes. In fact, the findings suggest that coalition governments are more likely to reciprocate disputes in general, and particularly more likely to reciprocate with the actual use of military force. The results also suggest that the level of polarization of a parliamentary government tends to decrease the probability of dispute reciprocation.