Single-party Dominance Research Articles

Electoral Malpractice in Malaysia: The Methods and Costs of Entrenching Single-Party Dominance

Electoral Malpractice in Malaysia: The Methods and Costs of Entrenching Single-Party Dominance

How opposition parties sustain single-party dominance

When elections are free and fair, why do some political parties rule for prolonged periods of time? Most explanations for single-party dominance focus on the dominant party’s origins, resources, or strategies. In this article, we show how opposition parties can undermine or sustain single-party dominance. Specifically, opposition parties should be central in explaining single-party dominance in countries with highly disproportional electoral systems and a dominant party whose vote share falls short of a popular majority. Employing a quantitative analysis of Indian legislative elections as well as a paired case study, we show that opposition coordination plays a crucial part in undermining single-party dominance.

How does single party dominance influence civil society organisations' engagement strategies? Exploratory analysis of participative mainstreaming in a 'regional' European polity.

A raft of United Nations Treaties, European Union Directives and domestic laws oblige governments in 180 + countries to apply the Participative Democratic Model of mainstreaming equalities to public administration by involving those targeted by equality initiatives at all stages in their design and delivery. Notwithstanding Participative Democratic Model’s deeply political nature, extant work has overlooked how governing party turnover influences civil society organisations’ (CSOs) strategies. Here, this lacuna is addressed using a negative ‘extreme case study’ research design involving qualitative accounts from civil society organisations in Wales, a ‘regional’ European polity characterised by one-party dominance. The findings reveal how the absence of turnover distorts the Participative Democratic Model in relation to diverse factors including: strategic bridging, extraparliamentary politics, cognitive locks and party institutionalisation. Inter alia, the wider contribution of this analysis lies in showing the importance of turnover to effective engagement, the ‘pathologies’ associated with one-party dominance and the need for adaptive civil society strategies tailored to prevailing electoral politics and governing party turnover in liberal democracies.

Does electoral competition affect public goods provision in dominant-party regimes? Evidence from Tanzania

Does electoral competition improve public goods provision in dominant-party regimes? In such regimes, localized electoral competition does not threaten dominant parties' hold on power. Still, I argue that competition can promote improved local public goods provision because of the ruling party's desire to generate overwhelming governing majorities. Studying Tanzanian districts, I show that greater local electoral competition leads to substantially greater access to local public goods. Moreover, at least one important mechanism linking electoral competition to public goods outcomes is the dominant party's propensity to target more competitive districts with greater government resources. The findings demonstrate that, even in a country with imperfect elections characterized by single-party dominance, greater electoral competition can generate better public goods outcomes.

Transforming India: Challenges to the World’s Largest Democracy

Sumantra Bose's study of Indian politics begins with the proposition in his introduction that “India has moved inexorably from single-party dominance and a relatively centralized union and toward a multiparty democracy that reflects the nation's diversity of communities.…” (p. 6) Bose argues that the continued strength and diversity of Indian politics is due to a system that has accommodated popular struggles from below by ordinary people. He attributes this to the “regionalization” of Indian politics as local parties have emerged over the past two decades to represent particular local interests far better than the once-dominant and -centralized Congress Party. The book is organized to follow the progression of Bose's argument on regionalization. The first chapter (From Independence to 1989) covers the period of Congress Party hegemony, which fragments due to its inability to represent the increasingly assertive demands of important constituent elements. The second (The Transformation since 1990) focuses on the emergence of competitive regional parties, a period which also coincides with the adoption of market reforms in the early 1990s. The remaining three chapters are a set of case studies to show the struggle of three local political forces to represent the demands of politically disadvantaged groups.

The Politics of Mafia Violence: Explaining Variation in Mafia Killings in Southern Italy (1983–2008)

Violence perpetrated by organized crime nowadays represents a major threat to state stability, both because it directly challenges political institutions, targeting officials and using terrorist techniques, and because severe inter-group conflict strongly affects human security. Though it is a distinctive feature of illegal markets and a constant strategy of Mafia-like groups, the occurrence of violence is localized in time and space. The article aims to explain temporal and spatial variation in Mafia killings focusing on its political determinants, as organized crime is deeply embedded in the political system. The analysis shows that there is a clear link between the structure of the political markets and the severity of violence. In particular, the fragmentation of the political market is negatively associated with the strategy of criminal groups to exploit violence. By contrast, single-party dominance and bipartisanship lead to an increase in homicides since these organizations have few opportunities to access the political arena. Outcomes are assessed through the analysis of monthly homicides reported by police forces in Italian provinces from 1983 to 2008.

Blasphemy, Holocaust Denial, and the Control of Profoundly Unacceptable Speech

Many new democracies exhibit a disturbing lack of electoral competition. All too often, the first party to hold office creates a network of power and patronage that chokes off meaningful political challenge. These strong party democracies, with power often being held by the inheritors of the political mantle of those that led the opposition to prior authoritarian rule, exhibit a tendency toward the three “C's” of associated with the lack of accountability: clientelism, cronyism, and corruption. Such strong-party regimes and their associated pathologies present relatively new constitutional courts with a distinct set of controversies that necessarily bring the judiciary into conflict with consolidating political power. This article explores the form that judicial responses to the excesses of political dominance might take. Three courts are selected as exemplars of such responses. In the first instance, the Colombian Constitutional Court repudiated the attempt of President Uribe to amend the constitution to permit a third term in office, despite the lack of reasoning to support the rejection of a largely procedurally proper constitutional amendment. In the second, the South African Constitutional Court has scrupulously avoided any frontal confrontation with the current African National Congress government, instead casting its repeated rejection of government efforts to insulate itself from accountability in narrow procedural rulings or in rulings based on other, non-politically charged sources of law. Finally, there is the Thai Constitutional Court which, while providing the strongest jurisprudential defense of its intervention, appears an active ally of one partisan camp as the country hovers on the brink of civil war. Rather than offer any off-the-rack solution for the difficult realm of constitutional courts as democracy falters, this Article examines the relation between the issues presented to such courts and the fundamental absence of electoral challenge and accountability. To the extent these courts navigate this difficult terrain, the Article concludes, the decisive feature will likely be the ability to contribute to the establishment of a competitive electoral system able to constrain single-party dominance.

Multiparty Competition, Electoral Institutions and Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance: Under What Conditions Do Opposition Parties Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions under Dictatorship?

Multiparty Competition, Electoral Institutions and Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance: Under What Conditions Do Opposition Parties Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions under Dictatorship?

Has changing the party in power in Japan made a real difference?

Japan's triple disaster of 11 March 2011 partially eclipsed the events of August/September 2009, when over fifty years of single-party dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party were ended, and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan took power. This article assesses the new government's first two difficult and chaotic years in power, made all the more so after defeat in the upper house elections of July 2010. In addition, the triple disaster sorely tested Prime Minister Kan Naoto, and created confrontation between him and the nuclear power industry, backed by powerful politicians. The new government, inexperienced and poorly led, made serious errors, but it also had positive achievements. Local initiative helped disaster recovery, but severe structural problems in central politics and government remain.

Why the CCM won't lose: the roots of single-party dominance in Tanzania

This paper provides an empirical investigation of the factors contributing to single-party dominance in Tanzania. Despite the fact that Tanzania has had a multi-party democracy since 1995, the party which governed during single-party rule, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has won the vast majority of seats in the National Assembly in the first four multi-party elections. In order to understand the CCM's grip on power, this article analyses the results of a survey conducted amongst subsistence farmers in Tanzania, which provides information on farmers’ livelihood conditions, access to media and political views, and hence provides insight into the preferences underlying voting behaviour. It discusses the dominant reasons for CCM support, as well as the characteristics of farmers who are more likely to support an opposition party. It concludes by discussing possible policy options for enhancing political competition in Tanzania.

Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance and Nominal Consensus-Building: On Political Dynamics of the Constitutional Amendments in Egypt and the Electoral Reforms in Yemen

Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance and Nominal Consensus-Building: On Political Dynamics of the Constitutional Amendments in Egypt and the Electoral Reforms in Yemen

The formation of cognitive locks in single party dominant regimes

‘Cognitive locks’ are ideational path dependencies in policy making (Blyth, 2001). This article argues that one source of cognitive locks is the presence of single party dominant regimes. Single party dominant regimes exist where a single party has managed to control the process of executive formation for an unusually long period of time. Because of their long tenure in executive office, dominant parties are often in positions to implement strong cognitive locks on their political societies. Not all cognitive locks are the same, however. Rather, how the dominant party behaved, either as a ‘distributional coalition’ or as an ‘encompassing organization’ (Olson, 1982) and how it subsequently incorporated ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1970) to accommodate multiple interests, strongly influence the scope of the dominant party’s cognitive lock. These observations are utilized in two brief case illustrations derived from well-known cases of single party dominance.

Dominant Party Regimes in Canada and Australia: Going the Way of the Dodo Bird?

Dominant party regimes – in which one and the same party controls government over an extended period of time, whether alone or as the major player in a coalition – are not as anomalous in Western democracies as it may appear to casual observers, especially if the subnational jurisdictions of federations are considered alongside national party systems. In our paper, we probe the incidence of dominant party regimes in the federally-organized parliamentary democracies of Canada and Australia. Although extant literature indicates that Europe provides a more favorable political environment to single-party dominance than Westminster systems, both countries have experienced phases of regular alternation in government as well as dominant party regimes (for instance, Social Credit and Conservative dominance in Alberta and Ontario, and Country/National Party dominance in Queensland). In the paper, we ask whether single-party dominance is now a phenomenon of the past and, if so, why this is the case. An original dataset comprising all national and subnational election results and government formation outcomes in the two countries since January 1, 1901 (the date of the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia) as well as a dataset of government episodes of varying length – defined by the identity of the sole or largest government party – are the empirical basis of our study. Our data indicate that single-party dominance occurs more often in the Canadian provinces than in the Australian states and that it may flourish under a variety of conditions. We also find that dominant party regimes mostly appear to be a thing of the past. Explaining the increasingly rare occurrence of single-party dominance requires the consideration of a number of structure and agency-related explanatory factors.

Foundations of Political Stability in Senegal

This research paper explores the evolution of the Senegalese government immediately after independence and the various factors contributing to its remarkable stability. It begins with a brief look at Senegal’s history, both pre-colonial and colonial. The research then discusses the foundations of the Senegalese government structure and party system from just before independence to 1978. The highlighted elements of the story are the role of political parties and single-party dominance, Senghor’s platform based on African socialism and négritude, and the formation and failure of the Mali Federation. This work also features party building, social groups that influence politics, the urban-rural cleavage, and some constitutional development. The focus of the research is on Léopold Sédar Senghor, the key figure in the stable governmental establishment in Senegal. It explores his relations with other key figures including Lamine Guèye, the facilitator of socialism’s rise in Senegal and a major party leader, and Mamadou Dia, once a friend of Senghor’s and his Prime Minister, who attempted a nonviolent coup; he was foiled and jailed in 1962. The various clans of Senegal (based on heredity) and the Islamic Brotherhoods, powerful religious organizations that have much sway over their members’ political attitudes, also play an important role. This paper concludes with an exploration of Senghor’s dynamic leadership as a foundation for political stability in Senegal, focusing on two major events: the disintegration of the extremely short-lived Mali Federation and the resulting independence of Senegal, and Dia’s attempted coup and resulting arrest. The constitution was amended after Dia’s jailing in 1962 to remove the post of prime minister, leaving the president as the sole head of government, and increasing Senghor’s power and influence. The remainder of the research after the failed coup consists of exploring the ways in which Senghor made his party completely dominant and his role and contributions as president.

Malaysia's 2008 General Election – Transition from Single-party Dominance?

Leading theories of transitions from single-party dominant systems begin with economic crisis, the party's loss of patronage resources, and elite-level defections. The multiparty elections that are then held exert no independent effect, but instead register neutrally the party's decline and the democratization of politics. This paper, however, shifts attention from the dominant party to citizens and elections in non-crisis conditions. It argues that on key dimensions citizens assess the dominant party's legitimacy or worthiness of support. Further, where they grow critical of its policy outputs, they scrutinize more closely its conformity to procedures. And as they anticipate that their voting preferences will be thwarted by electoral manipulations, they vote in protest, perhaps producing a “liberalizing electoral outcome.” Elections, then, do not simply indicate the dominant party's decline. By deepening alienation, they help citizens to cause it. Analysis is set in Malaysia, long an exemplar of single-party dominance, but recently a case in which the government was dealt a striking electoral setback.

Transition from Single-Party Dominance? New Data from Malaysia

Leading theories of transitions from single-party dominant systems begin with economic crisis, the party's loss of patronage resources, and elite-level defections. The multiparty elections that are then held exert no independent effect, but instead register neutrally the party's decline and the democratization of politics. This article, however, shifts attention from the dominant party to citizens and elections in noncrisis conditions. It argues that citizens assess on key dimensions the dominant party's legitimacy or worthiness of support. Further, where they grow critical of its policy outputs, they scrutinize more closely its conformity to procedures. And as they anticipate that their voting preferences will be thwarted by electoral manipulations, they vote in protest, perhaps producing a “liberalizing electoral outcome.” Elections, then, do not simply indicate the dominant party's decline. By deepening alienation, they help citizens to cause it. Analysis is set in Malaysia, long an exemplar of single-party dominance, but recently a case in which the government was dealt a striking electoral setback.

The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance

Why do authoritarian dominant parties, once established, continue to win elections or lose power? Employing a time-series cross-national analysis of election outcomes and two country case studies, the author shows that dominant parties endure despite poor economic performance, voter demand for new parties, and sufficiently permissive electoral institutions. Instead, the author demonstrates that dominant parties continue to win when they can politicize public resources, and they fail when privatizations put the state’s fiscal power out of their reach.The argument has implications for the fate of dominant parties, transitions to democracy in competitive authoritarian regimes, and the study of incumbency advantages and electoral fairness in comparative politics.

Why dominant parties lose: Mexico's democratization in comparative perspective

Part I. The Macro Perspective: 1. A theory of single-party dominance and opposition party development 2. Dominant party advantages and opposition party failure, 1930s-90s Part II. The Micro Perspective: 3. Why participate? A theory of elite activism in dominant party systems 4. The empirical dynamics of elite activism Part III. Implications: 5. Constrained to the core: opposition party organizations, 1980s-90s 6. Dominance defeated: voting behavior in the 2000 elections 7. Extending the argument: Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan.

The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?

Advocates of consensual political institutions, i.e. institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties, claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs. To date, however, there exists little research – either theoretical or empirical – that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties' policy declarations. We develop a multiparty spatial model with policy-seeking parties operating under proportional representation, in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power-sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party. We determine parties' optimal (Nash equilibrium) policy positions and conclude that power-sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations; in fact, policy positioning under power-sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single-party dominance. Consistent with previous research, however, we find that power-sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs. Our results have implications for parties’ election strategies, for the design of political institutions, and for representative government.

Fragile Stability: State and Society in Democratic South Africa

This article adopts a ‘state-in-society’ approach in order to take account of the impact of the transition to democracy in South Africa on social groups and their engagement with the state. The article suggests that democratic consolidation involves not only building a new state but also new interfaces between state and society. We use the term ‘fragile stability’ to characterise the contradictory nature of South Africa's transition a decade after apartheid: society is stable in that the non-racial regime is fully accepted as legitimate, but the immense social problems which were apartheid's legacy remain a threat to social order. The article shows how state authority and capacity have been regenerated from a position of severe weakness at the time of the transition, to a situation today where it has substantial capabilities in exercising basic functions such as policing, border control and taxation. However, we argue that in many other social arenas, both stability and fragility have increased. Drawing on other articles in this special issue, we discuss the different patterns in which the contradictory combination of stability and fragility has evolved. The macro-economic situation has been both stabilising and destabilising, but different policies have been responsible for each. We suggest that single-party dominance of the political arena, the continued salience of race relations, black economic empowerment, militarism and corruption are arenas where the same social or political processes have both promoted stability and added to the potential for destabilisation. In gender relations, HIV/AIDS and land reform, stabilisation has been limited, as linkages between state and society have not been successfully established. We conclude that despite its tenuous nature, fragile stability nonetheless represents an ‘equilibrium’ that is likely to persist in the short- to medium-term, because the social forces and political organisations needed to move the society to a different position – either crisis or thoroughgoing consolidation – have not yet emerged.