Single Non-transferable Vote Research Articles

The endogenous change in electoral systems: The case of SNTV

Electoral systems shape party systems by constraining voters’ choices, but the choices voters make may also compel political parties to change the electoral system. Thus, an electoral system changes endogenously if the voters’ choices it induces vary over time, and political parties are motivated by the voters’ new choices to modify the electoral system. This article applies this logic to explain the change in the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system. When SNTV fosters the formation of a dominant-party system, the ruling party needs to maintain steady economic growth so that enough resources can be turned into private goods to satisfy the majority of voters. But economic growth necessarily increases the anonymity of the voters, and hence the difficulty for the dominant party to garner votes using this strategy. The demise of one-party dominance and the shift in government power then urge some parties to replace SNTV with other electoral systems. This hypothesis is confirmed by the electoral reforms in Japan and Taiwan.

Toward a Two-Party System or Two Party Systems?

This article examines whether electoral reform in Japan replacing a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system with a parallel mixed system has led to two-party competition in single-member districts (SMDs) in House of Representative elections from 1996 to 2005. While nationwide figures suggest declining numbers of effective candidates and losers, distinguishing SMDs by levels of urbanization reveals that this trend is largely limited to urban areas. Instead of converging toward a two-party system as many proponents of electoral reforms had anticipated, elections under the SMD portion of the new system have witnessed the emergence and continuation of two distinct patterns of competition: urban constituencies featuring contests between two major parties, and rural constituencies dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The persistence of the latter pattern diminishes the prospect of power alternation.

Change and Continuity in the Personal Vote after Electoral Reform in Taiwan

Taiwan's new mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system should promote far lower levels of personal voting than its old single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. Since personal voles are conventionally contrasted with party votes, this should lead to more partisan politics. However; I argue that personal voles must be disaggregated into two distinct types. Intra-party personal voters favor a particular party and simply pick one candidate over other party nominees. Extra-party personal voters do not like the party, and pick the candidate despite his or her party affiliation. In this paper; I argue that Taiwan's electoral reform has reduced overall personal voting by eliminating intra-party personal votes. However; there are clear continuities in extra-party personal votes. One implication of this is that Taiwan should expect less, not more, partisan politics in its future.

Party Strategy or Candidate Strategy

Under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV), political parties are faced with the strategic problem of matching the number of candidates to their vote total. Running either too many or too few candidates may lose a seat that could otherwise have been won. Many studies have confirmed that Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) solved this strategic problem relatively well and ran close to the optimal number of candidates. Each of these studies makes the standard unitary actor assumption that the LDP can be understood as if it were a single individual maximizing its total number of seats in the Diet. Even though these unitary actor models have produced an impressive account of LDP nomination policy, I argue for an alternative decentralized model based on candidate strategy. The primary mechanism producing the optimal number of LDP candidates per district is not strategic decision-making by the party headquarters, but competition among strategic candidates. Political parties are organizations and therefore capable of unitary action, but parties are also arenas for competition among factions and candidates. The LDP was not a coherent organization but rather an open arena for candidate competition.

Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's LDP

For years, scholars and pundits have blamed Japan's single, non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system for the factions that divide and organize the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In January 1994, Japan abandoned SNTV, and the first election under the new rules occurred in October 1996. If SNTV did in fact sustain the factions, it makes sense that the factional structure ought to weaken under the new rules. In this paper, we provide an informal model of what the old factional exchange between leaders and followers was like and investigate the extent to which the terms of this exchange, and hence the characteristics of Japanese factionalism, have begun to change under the new rules. We expect and find the largest decline in factional leaders' role in the area of nominations, and the slightest changes, at least in the short run, in the allocation of posts. On the other side of the exchange, we find that followers appear less willing to march to their leaders' tunes in LDP presidential elections.

Politics of Social Policy-Making in South Korea an Japan

Until recently, welfare politics in Korea and Japan tended to be dominated by conservative forces "from above." This paper investigates the formation and domination of such forces from above, with a focus on the interaction between institutional arrangements and strategic maneuvering by political actors which, I argue, constitutes the politics of (social) policy-making. The notion of the politics of social policy-making aims to provide a more politically and institutionally sensitive framework than the pluralist analysis of policy-making. Korea and Japan share some crucial institutional legacies of the "developemental state" and "group-coordinated market economies." At the same time, attention should also be paid to different institutional configurations, such as a strong presidential system and first-past-the-post voting in Korea and a parliamentary system and single non-transferable vote in Japan. The main research question is, what are the similarities and differences in the politics of social policy-making between these two countries?

The Impact of Taiwan’s 2008 Elections on Cross-Strait Relations: A Game-Theoretical Analysis

As an index case of Third-Wave democracies facing existential threat, Taiwan's elections entail important implications for study in comparative politics and international relations. In 2008, three important elections help define the course of Taiwan's democratic development and its relationship with China: the January legislative election, the March presidential election, and a controversial referendum on Taiwan's United Nations entry. This article employs theory to analyze the impact of Taiwan's 2008 elections on cross-strait relations. It develops an game by examining each principal player's preferences regarding each election. It analyzes Beijing's possible reaction to the potential outcomes, and then examines the actual election outcomes against the model and offers observations on the prospect of cross-strait relations. Overall, the model predicts that cross-strait relations after the 2008 elections will present a historic opportunity, which can be seized or squandered, depending on political leadership. Key words: China-Taiwan relations, Democracy - East Asia, East Asian politics Introduction: The Internal-External Nexus The year 2008 marks a turning point in Taiwan's democratic political development and cross-strait relations. A key reason for this prospect is the momentous elections that took place in this year. On January 12, a parliamentary election was conducted under a new, mixed electoral system that selected candidates from single-member districts (SMDs) through the firstpast- the-post (FPTP) method and from lists nominated by political parties. Taking the so-called Duverger's Law (i.e., that a correlation exists between the plurality method and a two-party system) 1 at its face value and hoping to emulate other states that have adopted a mixed electoral system (e.g., Japan),2 many analysts hoped this new electoral system would contribute to a more healthy electoral competition between the two centrist parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). They also hoped this new system would reduce the influence of fringe candidates and money politics that became somewhat common under the old system of single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts (MMDs). On March 22, 2008, the presidential election, featuring the KMT's and the DPP's former chairmen, decided whether Taiwan's voters wanted a leader who will solidify the Taiwan or one who promises to improve the economy and ease crossstrait relations. That the identity issue became a key issue in these elections,3 as it had been in recent years, was an important reason why Taiwan's elections entail implications for its external relations, particularly vis-a-vis China and the United States, and for regional stability.4 The electoral link between Taiwan's domestic politics and its external relations was further accentuated by the two referenda regarding the issue of Taiwan's entry into the United Nations that were conducted on the same day as the presidential election. The DPP-sponsored referendum called for the country's entry into the UN under the name Taiwan. Not to be outdone by the DPP, the KMT sponsored a referendum calling for the country's return to the UN under flexible means. Various powers opposed the DPP's UN referendum, most significantly the United States, Taiwan's chief security backer.5 Chinese officials expressed their concerns that crossstrait relations during the lead-up to the March 2008 presidential elections might enter a high danger period. Passage of DPP's UN referendum would constitute a step toward a declaration of de jure independence of Taiwan.6 For China, such a declaration would be considered a major incident as defined in its Anti- Secession Law (ASL), and would call for a response using non- peaceful means.7 The United States, while stating that it did not oppose Taiwan's holding referenda, tried hard but to no avail to dissuade the DPP government from conducting the most controversial UN referendum, and, failing that, to appeal directly to voters. …

THE INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE IN JAPANESE LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 1960–1990

This article shows how the incumbent advantage common in legislative elections worldwide has been tailored by Japanese political institutions – namely, the single non‐transferable vote (SNTV) and institutionalised factionalism within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for the period 1960–1990. The author finds that, under the SNTV rule, the importance of incumbency in Japanese lower house elections varies both from a cross‐sectional viewpoint and cross‐temporarily. In regards to the cross‐sectional aspect, incumbency is more important for candidates of LDP non‐mainstream factions and candidates without LDP affiliation than those of the LDP mainstream factions in all major aspects of electoral achievement – total votes, voting percentage and winning a seat. After 1980, the margin of such a difference nevertheless shrank in terms of winning more votes, due to LDP factional reform in the late of 1970s. Such reductions, however, have not been significant enough to be reflected in terms of voting percentage and winning a seat.

Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms

This article presents evidence that electoral institutions affect the geographic distribution of both candidate electoral support and government resources. The author exploits two electoral reforms in Japan to identify the effect of institutional incentives: (1) the 1994 electoral reform from a multimember single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with a single-member district (SMD) component and a proportional representation component; and (2) the 1925 electoral reform from a predominantly SMD system to a multimember SNTV system. Using several new data sets, the two main findings of this article are that (1) Japanese representatives competing in multimember SNTV districts had more geographically concentrated electoral support than those competing in SMDs and that (2) intergovernmental transfers appear to be more concentrated around Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) incumbents' home offices under the multimember SNTV system than under the MMM system. The findings in this article highlight the connection between institutions and geographic patterns of representation.

Electoral Systems Today: The Curious Case of Afghanistan

Abstract: On 18 September 2005, nearly six and a half million Afghans voted in the freest and most competitive legislative elections they had ever experienced. The election vividly demonstrated that vibrant and meaningful elections can be conducted even under the most unpromising circumstances. But the Afghan elections also showed that designing appropriate institutions tailored to the needs of an emerging democratic society remains the greatest challenge. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system came about by a path of muddled missteps, and it was a disservice to the millions of Afghans who deserved a clear and transparent tool to craft their first democratic parliament.

Electoral Systems Today: The Politics of Reform in Japan and Taiwan

Abstract: For decades, Japan and Taiwan had combined developmentalism with electoral competitions held under the single nontransferable vote (SNTV), a peculiar system responsible for their perennial one-party dominance. When the cost of maintaining this system became too high to bear, some politicians of the ruling party began to promote a mixed formula that assigns a high percentage of seats to be elected by first-past-the-post (FPTP), hoping to cultivate a new system that prolongs their political powers while the old regime is collapsing. This has happened in Japan in the past decade, and will most likely appear in Taiwan in the future.

The Operation of the single non-transferable vote system in Vanuatu

The Republic of Vanuatu is one of the few democracies today that uses what is known as the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) – a method of election which in theory achieves a degree of seat/vote proportionality. Anglo-French Condominium authorities prior to independence adopted the SNTV to avoid the emerging dominance of the Melanesian Anglophones and protect minority Francophone interests. Two political parties emerged after independence in 1980, but they splintered after a decade and since 1991 Vanuatu has experienced a period of political instability involving 18 coalition governments. Studies of other countries’ experience with SNTV suggest that party factionalisation occurs frequently, but Vanuatu did initially achieve a degree of proportionality in outcomes and post-1991 instability owes its origins to factors other than the electoral system. In particular, the re-emergence of Vanuatu's traditional Melanesian bigman system of politics at independence has been a major factor contributing to the increasing fractionalisation.

Does ‘Contextual Rationality’ Really Advance the Study of Rational Nomination Strategies under the Single Non-Transferable Vote?

The concept of ‘contextual rationality’ proposed by Browne and Patterson seems to advance our understanding of rational nomination strategies under the Single Non-Transferable Vote. The plausibility of this concept hinges on the assumption of perfect information. However, perfect information not only cannot be obtained in practice, but is also impossible to obtain if we follow Browne and Patterson's approach. What their approach provides is a post hoc rationalization for parties' nomination strategies rather than a priori criterion against which whether parties make rational decisions can be judged. This approach therefore may be helpful to the study of whether parties are punished for inappropriate nomination strategies, but is far from providing the rationale for them.

Counting Candidates: an Alternative to the Effective N

Counting the number of `real' candidates in elections is complicated by the frequent presence of individuals who win a small percentage of the vote and have no realistic chance of winning the election. Increasingly, researchers have solved this problem by using the Laakso—Taagepera `effective N', originally devised to count numbers of political parties (usually in the overall electorate). We argue that when counting candidates in individual districts, the focus should be on viability and that the effective N is therefore inappropriate. We discuss the concept and measurement of candidate viability and propose two alternative measures. We illustrate the use of these counting rules by re-analyzing and updating Reed's (1990) analysis of the number of candidates in Japanese elections under the Single Non-Transferable Vote. In contrast to Reed, we find lower numbers of candidates, more rapid learning of strategic behavior, and closer adherence to the theoretical upper limit of one more candidate than the district magnitude ( M + 1).

Japan's Multimember SNTV System and Strategic Voting: A Rejoinder

Five major claims are made in our paper on strategic voting within the context of Japan's multimember single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system (Fournier and Kohno, 2000). Two claims deal with the reconciliation of Steven Reed's (1990) and Gary Cox's (1997) important work on extending Duverger's law to the Japanese case, and three claims deal with the informational effects of partisan labels on strategic voting.

Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of Embedded Institution. Edited by Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 495p. $74.50.

Under an electoral system of single nontransferable vote (SNTV) with multiple-seat districts, each voter can cast only one vote and only for one candidate, surplus votes cannot be transferred between candidates, and seats go to those candi- dates with the plurality of votes. Initially crafted by Japanese oligarchs in 1900, this unique system was continuously em- ployed for Japan's lower house elections till 1995, with a brief interlude during the Allied occupation. The SNTV system has been in use in Taiwan since World War II and was adopted in Korea during the Fourth and the Fifth Republic (1973­88). It is ironic that academic interest in this electoral system should increase just when it is being abandoned in its birthplace, Japan, in a fin-de-siecle political act that also ended political dominance of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

Electoral Reform and the Fate of Factions: The Case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party

For years, scholars and pundits have blamed Japan's single, non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system for the factions that divide and organize the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In January 1994, Japan abandoned SNTV, and the first election under the new rules occurred in October 1996. If SNTV did in fact sustain the factions, it makes sense that the factional structure ought to have weakened under the new rules. In this article, we provide an informal model of what the old factional exchange between leaders and followers was like and investigate the extent to which the terms of this exchange, and hence the characteristics of Japanese factionalism, have begun to change under the new rules. We expect and find the largest decline in factional leaders' role in the area of nominations, and the slightest changes, at least in the short run, in the allocation of posts. On the other side of the exchange, we find that followers appear less willing to march to their leaders' tunes in LDP presidential elections.

Can Duverger's Law be extended to SNTV? The case of Taiwan's legislative Yuan elections

Duverger's Law relating the single-member plurality system and the two-party system has recently been extended to the single nontransferable vote (SNTV), a system used in Japan prior to 1994 and in use in the Republic of China on Taiwan. The extended Law suggests that in districts in which there are M winners, there will be M+1 viable candidates. Our analysis of the four Legislative Yuan elections in Taiwan since 1986 offers support for this extension in districts with small magnitudes, but it also confirms that the larger the district magnitude, the more likely it is that the number of candidates will be greater than M+1. We explain this result on the basis of the lower reliability of information when the number of candidates is large and on the deceptive nature of small vote percentages. Evidently as a direct consequence of the larger numbers of candidates, the larger the district magnitude the more proportional the electoral results tend to be, albeit up to a point, due to differential degrees of organization among the political parties in Taiwan.

Falling into a Niche: Institutional Equilibrium Between Plurality and Proportional Representation for Large Political Parties

Scholars of electoral systems (e.g., Duverger 1954; Rae 1967) argue that a combination of electoral system and district magnitude provides the strategic incentives for political party competition. All electoral sys tems reward large parties with a disproportional seat bonus, with this bonus being more pronounced in plurality/majority systems. Thus, large parties invariably wish to compete in majoritarian systems while smaller parties seek a proportional system of seat allocation. This study shows that an institutional "niche" develops in some party systems where the second-largest party prefers the current electoral system over either a more proportional or more majoritarian system. Specifically, I illustrate how parties in Irish, Tasmanian, Australian House, and Australian Senate elec tions occupy such an equilibrium. Vote transfers create a seat bonus that does not exist in either more proportional or more majoritarian systems (e.g., the Single Non-Transferable Vote).

The Cost of Intraparty Competition

Many scholars have argued that money politics in Japan has been driven in part by the imperatives of intraparty competition under the single, nontransferable vote (SNTV) system used for lower house elections until 1994. However, to date, no one has undertaken a systematic, quantitative study of campaign expenditure in Japan. In this article, the authors exploit the intraelection reports—which are believed to be accurate accounts of spending during the brief official campaign—to investigate how Japanese candidates adapted their last-minute expenditures to SNTV. The authors show that candidates spent more when they faced more intraparty competition. The results for Liberal Democratic Party candidates suggest that intraparty competition boosted campaign-period spending by approximately 4% to 18%. The authors also find evidence that the spending appears to be reactive, with candidates increasing their expenditures to counter higher spending by other candidates and especially spending by copartisans.