Single Non-transferable Vote Research Articles

The Political Impact of Electoral System Change in Japan and New Zealand, 1996

In 1996, both Japan and New Zealand adopted new electoral systems with strong similarities, though also significant differences. In each case the new electoral system entails the election of most MPs by single-member plurality, while the remainder are elected from lists. The aims of the reform were less clear, and more party-driven, in Japan than in New Zealand. In Japan there is no evidence as yet that `money politics', or the importance of the individual candidate, have disappeared. The new systems have had an effect on the internal life of the parties, especially on candidate selection. The change in the New Zealand system, as could have been predicted, has led to a great increase in proportionality, but the new Japanese system is actually less proportional than the previous single non-transferable vote electoral system. The effect on the New Zealand political system will be major, but the extent of the impact of electoral system change in Japan is not yet clear.

Single Non-Transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral System

Research Article| July 01 1997 Single Non-Transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral System Eric P. Moon Eric P. Moon Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1997) 37 (7): 652–668. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645514 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Eric P. Moon; Single Non-Transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral System. Asian Survey 1 July 1997; 37 (7): 652–668. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2645514 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1997 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Single Non-Transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral System

Research Article| July 01 1997 Single Non-Transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral System Eric P. Moon Eric P. Moon Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1997) 37 (7): 652–668. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645514 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Eric P. Moon; Single Non-Transferable Vote Methods in Taiwan in 1996: Effects of an Electoral System. Asian Survey 1 July 1997; 37 (7): 652–668. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2645514 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1997 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Is the Single Nontransferable Vote Superproportional? Evidence from Japan and Taiwan

Theory: The traditional view of the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system has been that it is superproportional-tending to produce larger seat bonuses for small parties than for large parties-because small parties face easier nomination and vote division problems than do large parties. A contrary view is that SNTV privileges governing parties by giving them superior access to particularistic policy benefits, which are useful in stabilizing both nominations and vote divisions within parties. Hypotheses: By the latter view, SNTV should lead to subproportional resultswith larger seat bonuses for large parties than for small parties-to the extent that governing parties are large. Methods: In this paper, I operationalize and test these competing claims at the district level, using both cross-tabulations and probit analysis. Results: Although there is a sense in which SNTV is superproportional, I show that two large governing parties (the LDP of Japan and the KMT of Taiwan) have been significantly more efficient at securing as many seats as possible out of a given maximum number of winnable seats, than have their respective oppositions.

Strategic Imperatives of Japan's SNTV Electoral System and the Cooperative Innovations of the Former Opposition Parties

Single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral systems create severe collective-action problems for political parties. If multimember districts are used, large political parties must run the optimal number of candidates in each district and divide the vote equally between those candidates. Failure to do so will cost a party seats. In Japan, the former parties of the non-Communist opposition cooperated in all national elections from 1971 to 1990. In their efforts to cooperate, these parties as a group faced collective-action problems. To compensate for these problems, these parties modified their methods of cooperation. The widespread nature of these innovations in cooperation rebuts the common assertions that the Japanese opposition acted irrationally or incompetently.

In the absence of vote pooling: Nomination and vote allocation errors in Colombia

Electoral systems vary in the degree to which candidates and parties may pool their votes to maximize seats won. The Japanese single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system allows no vote pooling. Hence parties may commit errors in nomination and vote allocation. List proportional representation (PR) also may limit the amount of vote pooling among lists. If a party is internally fragmented, as in Colombia, list PR may even resemble SNTV. Thus we can compare Colombian error rates to Japanese. The Colombian Liberal Party is less error-prone than the country-specific literature implies; however, the Colombian case suggests that an absence of vote pooling can be costly to parties even under PR systems.

Duncan Black and Lewis Carroll

After evaluating the stature of Duncan Black as one of the founders of the modern theoretical study of politics, we show how frustrated Black was by the lack of recognition accorded to his work, especially in the UK. This led to considerable difficulty in getting his work published. In particular, his work on a like-minded predecessor, C. L. Dodgson (`Lewis Carroll'), remains in part unpublished. In it, Black withdraws his earlier assertion that Carroll's work on proportional representation and tennis tournaments was `trivial', in favor of detailed analysis of Carroll's contribution, which Black praises extravagantly as being one of the most important contributions ever to Political Science. We conclude by relating Carroll's theorem of 1884 on the proportionality of what is now called Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV) to the modern literature.

The Politics of Electoral Reform in Japan

The Japanese electoral system has been distinctive in its use of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). Under SNTV three to five members were elected from each constituency based on a simple majority of votes. However, a series of corruption scandals damaged confidence in the political system, and undermined the one-party dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party. As a result, in March 1994 the national parlia ment (Diet) passed new measures transforming the electoral system into a mixed-member system, combining single-member districts and PR party lists. Campaign funding laws were also reformed. This article explores the politics behind these developments.

Erratum: Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan

Erratum: Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan

Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote

Previous investigations of strategic voting equilibria in mass electorates have looked only at single-member districts. I shall investigate such equilibria in multimember districts operating under the single nontransferable vote system. What appear to be the most natural equilibria conform to the M + 1 rule, according to which strategic voting in M-seat districts produces exactly M + 1 vote-getting candidates in equilibrium, any others having their support totally undercut. This result provides the beginnings of a formal underpinning for Reed's recent extension of Duverger's Law to the Japanese case. The model also generates specific and empirically testable hypotheses concerning the exceptions to the M + 1 rule that one ought to expect in equilibrium. I test these hypotheses with Japanese data. Finally, the model also reveals a type of strategic voting that is specific to multimember districts. I use Japanese data again to explore the empirical importance of this kind of strategic voting.

Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan

L'article decrit les problemes que pose le systeme de vote unique non-transferable utilise au Japon et a Taiwan pour les elections nationales. Il etudie les consequences de ce systeme electoral pour les grands partis politiques, notamment le parti democratique liberal du Japon et le Kuomintang de Taiwan. Il souligne la frequence des erreurs imputables a ce systeme a partir des donnees issues des elections japonaises de 1958 a 1990 et des elections a Taiwan de 1980 a 1989