Single-member District Systems Research Articles

Electoral Systems and Geographic Representation

AbstractWho gets represented in legislatures, and how does this depend on electoral institutions? Others have asked this question from the perspective of gender, race, and class. We focus on space, asking whether MPs disproportionately come from some places rather than others and how this depends on electoral rules. Using data on over 13,000 legislators in sixty-two democracies, we developed a new measure to determine whether the spatial distribution of MP birthplaces matched the spatial distribution of the citizens they represented. Contrary to received wisdom, single-member district systems do not have more geographically representative parliaments than multi-member district systems, while mixed-member systems perform significantly better than both. We attribute the higher spatial representativeness of mixed-member systems to the contamination effects in their single-member tier. We present evidence for this explanation from a within-country analysis of elections in Italy, the UK, and Germany.

Japanese prime ministers and party leadership

This article shows what were/are the features of Japanese prime ministers as party leaders, as well as how and why these features have changed over the last 20 years. It focuses on three dimensions: party centralisation, internal cohesion and leadership security. On party centralisation, the electoral reform of 1994 introduced a single-member district system into the House of Representatives, or Lower House. This reform ended intra-party competition within the LDP that had existed under the multi-member system and since then the party has become much more centralised. On internal cohesion, the electoral reform has provided the prime minister with a powerful instrument to control the party: the power of endorsement. On leadership security, prime ministers like Koizumi Junichirō and Abe Shinzō were successful in restraining rebels and securing their leadership by effectively using the power of endorsement along with the power of appointment. However, a considerable number of prime ministers in the 21st century have had short tenures of about one year. While the personalisation of politics has made the position of popular prime ministers more secure, it has made unpopular prime ministers highly vulnerable.

The Evolution of New Party Systems: Voter Learning and Electoral Systems

How do new party systems evolve over time? This article argues that party system evolution requires the solution of coordination problems that voters face in early elections; this happens through a learning mechanism. Elections reveal information to voters, who update their beliefs about party viability and the distribution of voters’ preferences and adjust their behaviour. The institutional setting, however, strongly conditions the pace of learning. Restrictive electoral systems (single-member district) accelerate learning through the harsh penalties they impose on miscoordination, while permissive ones (proportional representation) prolong it. Testing the argument on a district-level dataset in new democracies provides ample support; voters learn to cast fewer wasted votes over time and this happens faster in single-member district systems. The findings point to a trade-off between consolidation and representation; while party system evolution is facilitated by restrictive electoral systems, the presence of distinct social groups in the political arena is better served by permissive ones.

District magnitude and electoral mobilization: how uneven electoral systems shift the focus of campaign efforts by political parties

AbstractThis paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

Electoral regimes and the politicisation of foreign trade in national elections

Under what conditions will political parties emphasise trade policy during national elections? While research shows the importance of domestic politics in driving trade policy, little attention has been directed towards its electoral salience. This study posits that electoral rules affect politicians’ incentives to politicise foreign trade. In single-member district systems, where the seats-votes elasticity is high, political parties have strong incentives to cater to voters. In contrast, proportional representation systems generate stronger incentives for parties to accommodate to industry interests. The winner-take-all nature of plurality rules thus generates stronger pressures for parties to politicise trade policy. The argument is empirically supported through an analysis of party election platforms in 32 countries from 1961 to 2016. These results indicate that electoral regimes affect not only trade policy, but also its elite-driven attention in national elections.

Voter reaction to legislator dissent across political systems

Research shows that legislators who dissent from the political line of their party are rewarded among constituents. This raises concerns about future party cohesiveness and, in turn, parties’ ability to govern and voters' ability to hold parties accountable. However, nearly all studies are conducted in single-member district systems, such as the United States and United Kingdom, which are generally considered most-likely settings for observing such effects. In this note, we conduct a country comparative study of voter reaction to legislator dissent across single-member and multi-member district systems (US, UK and Denmark). Building off existing theories, we argue that voters in multi-member districts also reward legislator dissent but that the reward is significantly weaker. We support this argument with observational and experimental data. Our results suggest that concerns regarding party governance and accountability associated with legislator party dissent extend to—but are less pertinent in—the more widespread multi-member district systems.

How electoral reform alters legislative speech: Evidence from the parliament of Victoria, Australia 1992–2017

Does changing single-member district (SMD) systems to proportional representation (PR) systems affect politicians' behavior? Previous studies, which have utilized cross-sectional or temporal variation in electoral systems, fail to estimate their effects. In contrast, we employ a difference-in-differences design and text analysis to estimate the causal effect of an electoral reform on politicians' issue attention. In particular, we estimate the causal effect of the electoral reform in the Parliament of Victoria in Australia, which changed the electoral systems of the Legislative Council from SMD to PR while holding the system of the Legislative Assembly constant. We analyzed a newly collected dataset of legislators' inaugural speeches from 1992 to 2017 using a topic model. The results show the electoral reform increased politicians’ attention to new economic issues but did not decrease attention to local interests such as promoting primary industries.

Is democratic nomination good for women's candidacy? Examining the case of Taiwan

ABSTRACTIn order to understand why women tend to be under-nominated even though they are more likely to be elected compared to men in Taiwan, this study focuses on the nomination systems of two major political parties. The country provides a critical case of inter-party and intra-party comparison for women’s nomination, as the two major parties diverge in their practice of candidate selection. Further, the electoral reforms from the SNTV (Single Non-Transferable Vote) system to the SMD (Single-Member District) system have led parties to alter their strategies in selecting women candidates. With the nomination dataset compiled over the past 20 years, this study finds that more centralized nomination is more conducive to women’s candidacy, even under different electoral systems. Under the old SNTV system, the more centralized KMT (Kuomintang) nominated more women candidates than did the decentralized DPP (Democratic Progressive Party). Under the new SMD system, women’s representation as a whole actually increased in Taiwan, which runs contrary to the general expectation, compared to the multimember-district system and so the SMD tends to inhibit women’s representation. The growing centralization in the major parties after the electoral rule changed to the new system, has enhanced women’s candidacies, but the higher male incumbent advantage is a hurdle still to be overcome in the long term. This study argues that although electoral rules have altered the parameters of party competition, party nomination are critical factors for explaining changing women’s representation.

Understanding Legislative Speech in the Turkish Parliament: Reconsidering the Electoral Connection under Proportional Representation

AbstractWe aim to address two weaknesses of the growing literature on legislative debate and legislative behaviour. First, most studies on legislative speech focus on the role of party unity and individual dissent on speech-making behaviour and largely ignore the role of legislators’ own calculations regarding their electoral vulnerability. Secondly, research on legislative behaviour that studies mechanisms other than legislative speech usually explores the role of electoral incentives where there is Single Member District (SMD) or open list system, and largely neglects closed list proportional representation systems with multi-member districts. We suggest that, similar to SMD and single transferable vote systems, the electoral vulnerability of individual legislators provides incentives to nurture a personal reputation and signals their efforts to their constituents and party leadership. Using a novel dataset of parliamentary speeches in the Turkish Parliament (2007–2011), we demonstrate that legislators who are electorally more vulnerable participate more in legislative debate, and are more likely to deliver constituency-related speeches.

Review of Electing the House: The Adoption and Performance of the U.S. Single-Member District System

Review of Electing the House: The Adoption and Performance of the U.S. Single-Member District System

Malapportionment and democracy: A curvilinear relationship

This article examines electoral malapportionment by illuminating the relationship between malapportionment level and democracy. Although a seminal study rejects this relationship, we argue that a logical and empirically significant relationship exists, which is curvilinear and is based on a framework focusing on incumbent politicians' incentives and the constraints they face regarding malapportionment. Malapportionment is lowest in established democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes with an overwhelmingly strong incumbent; it is relatively high in new democracies and authoritarian regimes with robust opposition forces. The seminal study's null finding is due to the mismatch between theoretical mechanisms and choice of democracy indices. Employing an original cross-national dataset, we conduct regression analyses; the results support our claims. Furthermore, on controlling the degree of democracy, the single-member district system's effects become insignificant. Australia, Belarus, the Gambia, Japan, Malaysia, Tunisia, and the United States illustrate the political logic underlying curvilinear relations at democracy's various levels.

How Competitive Should a Fair Single Member Districting Plan Be?

Abstract Partisan unfairness is easily detected when the statewide vote is equally divided between two parties. But when the vote is not evenly divided, even the determination of which party is disfavored becomes controversial. This article examines the ideal fair outcome in a two party single member district system when the statewide vote is not equally divided. It is shown that equal voter empowerment, implied by readings of the First Amendment (Shapiro v. McManus and Whitford v. Nichol), requires that the fraction of seats be proportional to the fraction of the statewide vote. However, strict proportionality conflicts with the single member district system, so alternative approaches are explored. Generalized party inefficiency and voter effectiveness are defined and shown to encompass many possibilities for an ideal fair seats-votes function. The best choice is fundamentally determined by the degree of geographical heterogeneity of voters of like mind. Based upon historical election results, it appears...

Legislative Equilibria and Economic Policy under Alternative Electoral Rules

This paper develops a game theoretic model in which S incumbent legislators simultaneously allocate effort between producing non-excludable public goods, targeting local goods to particular geographic constituencies, and engaging in rent-seeking. The game’s equilibria are determined by both the profile of the electorate and the electoral institution in place. Closed-List Proportional Representation (CLPR) is characterized by a fundamental collective action problem which leads to high levels of shirking among incumbent legislators. Single-Member District (SMD) systems are effective at resolving this collective action problem when voters are highly responsive to public good provision. Open-List Proportional Representation (OLPR) systems are effective at resolving this collective action problem when voters exhibit low responsiveness to public policy. Indeed, OLPR generates high levels of policy effort in electoral contexts where both CLPR and SMD systems are characterized by high rent-seeking. The model provides a wide range of implications for future empirical studies of the relationship between electoral institutions and economic policy.

Components of partisan bias originating from single-member districts in multi-party systems: An application to Mexico

We extend the estimation of the components of partisan bias—i.e., undue advantage conferred to some party in the conversion of votes into legislative seats—to single-member district systems in the presence of multiple parties. Extant methods to estimate the contributions to partisan bias from malapportionment, boundary delimitations, and turnout are limited to two-party competition. In order to assess the spatial dimension of multi-party elections, we propose an empirical procedure combining three existing approaches: a separation method (Grofman et al. 1997), a multi-party estimation method (King 1990), and Monte Carlo simulations of national elections (Linzer, 2012). We apply the proposed method to the study of recent national lower chamber elections in Mexico. Analysis uncovers systematic turnout-based bias in favor of the former hegemonic ruling party that has been offset by district geography substantively helping one or both other major parties.

The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout

A substantial body of research examines whether increasing the proportionality of an electoral system increases turnout, mostly based on cross-national comparisons. In this study, we offer two main contributions to the previous literature. First, we show that moving from a single-member district system to proportional representation in multimember districts should, according to recent theories of elite mobilization, produce a contraction in the distribution of mobilizational effort across districts and, hence, a contraction in the distribution of turnout rates. Second, we exploit a within-country panel data set based on stable subnational geographic units before and after Norway’s historic 1919 electoral reform in order to test various implications stemming from the contraction hypothesis. We find significant support for the predictions of the elite mobilization models.

Holding Individual Representatives Accountable: The Role of Electoral Systems

Voters are reluctant to sanction representatives for individual misconduct if they have to balance candidate-level and party-level factors in their choice, but this trade-off is affected by the electoral system. Our general theoretical model explains why individual accountability can empirically occur in single-member district (SMD) systems but is expected under less restrictive conditions using open-list proportional representation (OLPR). The latter not only decouples party and candidate choice but also makes seat allocation more vote elastic. For a thorough empirical test of our argument, we draw on real-world evidence from state-level elections in Bavaria, Germany, which are held under an unusual mixed-member system. Exploiting a recent public scandal involving one-third of representatives, we examine how electoral punishment of the same candidates by the same voters differs across electoral rules. Drawing on difference-in-differences as well as matching/regression estimators, we show that electoral punishment is substantially larger under OLPR than under SMD systems.

Gender quotas in single-member district electoral systems

Conventional knowledge on the effectiveness of gender quotas for enhancing women's political participation has, to date, been unanimous on the superiority of quotas in proportional representation (PR) systems. Yet this view overlooks the many possible alternatives to implementing gender quotas in single-member district (SMD) systems. This paper studies gender quotas (or temporary special measures) in SMD electoral systems. Drawing on case examples from Uganda, France, India and elsewhere, we refute the myth of the incompatibility of quotas in SMDs. Our research investigates and presents multiple ways in which quotas can be successfully implemented in SMDs.

Gender Quotas in Single-Member District Electoral Systems

Conventional knowledge on the effectiveness of gender quotas for enhancing women's political participation has, to date, been unanimous on the superiority of quotas in proportional representation (PR) systems. Yet this view overlooks the many possible alternatives to implementing gender quotas in single-member district (SMD) systems. This paper studies gender quotas (or temporary special measures) in SMD electoral systems. Drawing on case examples from Uganda, France, India and elsewhere, we refute the myth of the incompatibility of quotas in SMDs. Our research investigates and presents multiple ways in which quotas can be successfully implemented in SMDs.

The relationship between federal budget amendments and local electoral power

The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we investigate whether politicians use resources from the federal budget to maintain and expand their political capital. Second, we examine whether such strategy is rewarded by voters. Do they vote for politicians who assist their municipalities through federal expenditures? We use data from legislative elections in Brazil, a country that does not use a single member district system to form its Chamber of Deputies. We use a regression discontinuity approach by exploring the results of close elections for the Chamber of Deputies. Our findings indicate that politicians tend to favor municipalities that were important to their elections and that voters support candidates who have brought resources to their localities.

Electoral geography and redistributive politics

This paper offers a new electoral geography perspective on two stylized facts that do not fit easily with our current understanding of the implications of electoral rules for electoral politics and social policy: (1) proportional representation (PR) electoral rules are not always associated with more generous social spending. In some cases, we observe comparatively high levels of social spending in majoritarian single-member district (SMD) systems. (2) Contrary to our theoretical expectations, national two-party competition occurs rarely, even under SMD rules. Here, I demonstrate the importance of electoral geography through a series of analytic examples that are based on a simple model of electoral politics, and in which all possible combinations of electoral boundaries, rules, and voter locations are manipulated.