Voter reaction to legislator dissent across political systems

Abstract

Research shows that legislators who dissent from the political line of their party are rewarded among constituents. This raises concerns about future party cohesiveness and, in turn, parties’ ability to govern and voters' ability to hold parties accountable. However, nearly all studies are conducted in single-member district systems, such as the United States and United Kingdom, which are generally considered most-likely settings for observing such effects. In this note, we conduct a country comparative study of voter reaction to legislator dissent across single-member and multi-member district systems (US, UK and Denmark). Building off existing theories, we argue that voters in multi-member districts also reward legislator dissent but that the reward is significantly weaker. We support this argument with observational and experimental data. Our results suggest that concerns regarding party governance and accountability associated with legislator party dissent extend to—but are less pertinent in—the more widespread multi-member district systems.