Suez Crisis Research Articles

“¿Cuándo saltaré por los aires?” El miedo a una guerra atómica entre la Crisis de Suez y los misiles cubanos a través de cuatro obras de ficción angloamericanas: On the Beach, Red Alert, Alas Babylon y Fail-Safe

espanolDesde la Crisis de Suez de 1956 hasta la Crisis Cubana de 1962, las tensiones entre Estados Unidos y la Union Sovietica no dejaron de crecer, hasta el punto de que la guerra era una posibilidad cotidiana. Aunque el gobierno estadounidense y algunos expertos ofrecieron un discurso tranquilizador y disenaron ejercicios de Defensa Civil para calmar a la poblacion, varios novelistas reflejaron los miedos a una guerra nuclear y a sus consecuencias. A traves de un analisis cultural de cuatro novelas escritas por cinco autores angloamericanos entre 1957 y 1962 podemos seguir el rastro de dichos miedos, comprenderlos mejor y entender de que modo influyeron a su epoca EnglishFrom the Suez Crisis of 1956 to the Cuban Crisis of 1962 the tension between the Western and Eastern Blocs rose continuously, and war was a constant possibility. The American Government and some experts offered reassuring explanations and Civil Defense exercises in order to calm the population, however some fiction authors gave voice to the fears of a Nuclear War and its consequences. Through a Cultural analysis of four novels wrote by five Anglo Americans between 1957 and 1962 we can track those fears, understand it, and realize how they influenced their own time

Years in Cultural Studies: 1956

In intellectual histories of cultural studies, the year 1956 usually figures as a "big bang" moment. Centered on the geopolitical flashpoints of the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis, it was the year that catalyzed the British new left, and thus, the story goes, provided a new front of political critique that would serve as the jumping-off point for the nascent formation of cultural studies in Britain. This article presents a brief overview of this conventional pre-history of cultural studies in Britain. It then departs from this familiar story to outline several other notable "big bang" moments happening elsewhere in 1956 with resonance across literature, global labor history, the visual arts, and the women's movement. These other moments each arguably have considerable bearing on the articulation of cultural studies in Britain, and their examples provide a more globally diverse and textured frame for re-situating the emergence of cultural studies at mid-century beyond the narrow focus on new left politics.

Венгерский мятеж и Суэцкий кризис 1956 г.: пределы и возможности американской дипломатии

В истории международных отношений периода «холодной войны» особенно выделяется 1956 г. В этот год параллельно, практически день в день, развивались два острых международных кризиса, один — в Восточной Европе, другой — на Ближнем Востоке. У венгерского мятежа и Суэцкого кризиса были независимые друг от друга причины возникновения. Общим для них было то, что в обоих случаях свою роль сыграла вовлеченность в них Советского Союза и Соединенных Штатов Америки. Степень этой вовлеченности различалась. Для американской политики времен президента Д. Эйзенхауэра характерным были заявления, что успеху американской дипломатии в Венгрии, нацеленной на «отбрасывание коммунизма», якобы, помешала англо-франко-израильская агрессия против Египта, предпринятая ближайшими союзниками США. В статье доказывается, что администрация 34-го президента Соединенных Штатов придерживалась прагматического подхода, не собираясь оказывать помощи венгерским мятежникам, а ограничиваясь пропагандистскими мерами. А гнев лидеров республиканцев в Вашингтоне вызывали возможные последствия тройственной агрессии в отношении кампании по перевыборам Д. Эйзенхауэра в должности президента, но отнюдь не мнимые расчеты на победу мятежников в Венгрии.

The transcultural Ottoman table

Claudia Roden writes about the Egypt she grew up in – a mixed cosmopolitan world with long-established communities of Armenians, Greeks, Italians, Syrians and Lebanese, as well as French and British expatriates. Roden was born in Cairo in the Jewish community that was itself a mosaic of people who had come from all over the Ottoman Empire. Roden recounts her experiences of collecting recipes from communities who were leaving Egypt after the Suez crisis in 1956 and her nostalgia and determination to preserve a culture that disappeared, and which had few written recipes. This led her to research the cooking of Middle Eastern countries and becoming interested in the cultural and historical background of the food. She focuses on the sophisticated cuisine that developed in ex-Ottoman countries, and Lebanon in particular, emphasizing the importance of transcultural exchanges and memories around the table.

Norman Kirby: army surgeon who parachuted into Suez

When Norman Kirby was training with the Parachute Regiment during the Suez crisis of 1956, he received some sound advice: to practise operating with fewer and fewer instruments. As a...

1950'lerin İkinci Yarısında Orta Doğu'da Soğuk Savaş: Batı Müdahaleciliğine Karşı Sovyetler Ne Tepki Gösterdi?

This study aims to look from the Soviet Union’s perspective to the attempts of western capitalist states intending to maintain their domains in the period, in which the Suez Crisis and the Eisenhower doctrine dominated the region; to reveal how the Soviet Union assessed the developments and to clarify its position. The Soviet Union responded to the West with an anti-imperialist policy. In this context, this policy of the Soviet Union against the interventionist policies of the western capitalist states in the Middle East defending the independence and sovereignty of states in the region constitutes the main research problem of this study.

French Newsreels and the Suez Crisis: How to Make a Failure Look like a Positive Outcome

The four French newsreels companies touched on cautiously and relatively late with the Suez Crisis. Initially they contented themselves with mentioning diplomatic moves, maintained that Britain had seized the initiative and that France was merely giving it support to guarantee the liberty of navigation. Only Actualités françaises, considered a semi-official magazine because the state owned 60% of the capital, adopted a warlike stance. The approach changed with the Israeli offensive in the Sinai, not knowing how the French government would react, the newsreels put the emphasis on other on-going problems, notably the Hungarian revolution and its crackdown by the Soviet army. Pathé, lest bellicose of the newsreels, kept silent on the topic for a month and, after the retreat of the English and French troops, screened a few images without commentary. Gaumont wavered between enthusiasm for the French intervention in Egypt and approval of the withdrawal. Éclair, a small company that needed public monetary assistance and Actualités françaises backed the operation up to the end. In 1956 television sets were rare in France, only newsreels offered visual information. According to the cinema they used to visit, spectators had a fairly different idea of the Suez affair but it was always clear that France had fought for liberty and that it was not responsible for a forced depart.

Disrupt and deny: spies, special forces, and the secret pursuit of British foreign policy

The history of covert action is—as Rory Cormac notes in this book—difficult to research and write. Governments of all political hues conceal their involvement in clandestine operations, official papers are heavily weeded before they are released to public scrutiny and the fragmentary evidence on covert operations encourages conspiracy theorizing (p. 242). In Disrupt and deny, Cormac has produced an enthralling, well-written and authoritative history of Britain's role in covert operations from the Second World War to the present day, relating it to the UK's conduct of foreign policy during this era. Cormac's core argument is that covert action has been utilized by Britain to maintain its position on the international stage in spite of the end of empire, economic retrenchment and military overstretch. Successful covert operations (such as those conducted against Sukarno's Indonesia during the Borneo ‘confrontation’ of 1963–6) and failed ones (most notably the botched efforts to overthrow Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt prior to the 1956 Suez Crisis) have been instigated by successive governments to preserve what is left of the UK's status as a world power (pp. 57–8, 242–3). In this respect, intelligence and special operations conducted by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS) are as much a means of maintaining British power as the UK's permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its nuclear deterrent. At times, covert action has been conducted in conjunction with allies, most notably of course the United States. On other occasions, they have been carried out unilaterally. While much of the popular and media attention focuses on paramilitary operations, the deniable use of propaganda and other means of influencing opinion (notably the bribery of foreign politicians) have also been frequently employed as part of a process of secret diplomacy.

‘Words are cheaper than bullets’: Britain’s psychological warfare in the Middle East, 1945–60

ABSTRACTPsychological warfare, the use of propaganda to aid military operations, acquired prominence in British strategy in the early Cold War Middle East. This article argues planning made limited progress until the 1956 Suez crisis. Suez produced optimism about propaganda’s ability to address threats from Egypt, the USSR and the Yemen. In Oman, Aden and Cyprus, psychological warfare was practiced to demoralise enemies, bolster allies and counter smears about British conduct. Only mixed results ensued though, and doubts about the military’s involvement in propaganda lingered. Psychological warfare endured because it was a cheap option that might sometimes work, and could induce opponents to surrender rather than fight on.

Concealing Collusion: The Suez Crisis, Political Memoirs and Official Secrecy, 1956–1969

Abstract The Suez crisis in 1956 has long been recognised as a watershed in British history—precipitating the fall of Anthony Eden’s government, accelerating the end of empire, and underscoring how weak Britain had become on the international stage, especially in relation to the United States, which emerged from the episode as undeniably the senior partner in the ‘Special Relationship’. Less understood is the important role that the crisis played in weakening the foundations of official secrecy in Britain, especially what might be described as the social underpinnings of secrecy. This article explores how sensitive details about Suez eventually came to light in the period 1956 to 1969, despite concerted and sometimes cunning efforts by the Whitehall machine to prevent disclosure. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which suggests that socialist parliamentary firebrands like Michael Foot proved the most difficult to control, it is argued that the greatest challenge to secret-keepers came from senior conservative politicians writing memoirs—chief among them Eden himself—who were headstrong, not easily intimidated, and unafraid to bypass rules and codes of discretion to vindicate their careers. Fascinatingly, memoir writers not only ignored legal mechanisms such as the much-feared Official Secrets Act, but, against the backdrop of profound social and cultural change, they also dismissed attempts by mandarins to exploit gentlemanly bonds and loyalties, which in the past had been an effective method of promoting self-censorship by members of the elite.

‘An Unfortunate Lack of Ideas’: NATO’s ‘Out-of-Area’ Debate and the Syrian Crisis of 1957

In the late 1950s, following the Suez Crisis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debated what role it might play in the Middle East. NATO’s Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak lobbied for NATO to be adapted to the new realities of a global Cold War and play a more active role in the Middle East. With the Syrian Crisis of 1957, Spaak saw an opportunity for NATO to take on a larger role and, in so doing, dispel anxieties about the alliance’s future post-Suez. Ultimately, these efforts were quashed by two NATO members—the United States and the United Kingdom—who had active interests in the region. Spaak lost the struggle for a larger ‘out-of-area’ role for NATO, an outcome that helped set the limits of NATO, both in terms of geography and the power and role of the NATO Secretariat. These debates also reflected simmering anxieties about the purpose and structure of NATO, not unlike those arguments later advanced by Charles de Gaulle in his bid to remake the alliance.

From colony to oil producer: US oil companies and the reshaping of labor relations in Libya during the Cold War

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the labor relations the US government and American oil companies introduced in Libya between the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the rise of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime in 1969. It argues that labor policies played a crucial role in American Cold War efforts to place Libya in the Western bloc and assure access to its oil resources. Like in other contexts, the American government relied on anti-Communist trade unions, in particular the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), to oppose radical forms of labor organizing. Bini examines the ways in which Libyan oil workers resisted the forms of segregation and discrimination introduced in oil camps and company towns, by demanding the right to redefine labor relations through trade unions, and establishing ties with other trade unions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. This article shows that despite American efforts to repress Libyan trade unions, in the second half of the 1960s oil workers were a crucial force in redefining international oil politics. During the Six Day War of 1967, they constituted one of the main forces behind Libya’s support of oil nationalism and set the stage for the emergence of Qaddafi’s regime in 1969.

The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 and Its Linkage to the Algerian War of Independence

The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 and Its Linkage to the Algerian War of Independence

India’s role during the 1956 Suez Crisis: Between peacemaking and postcolonial solidarity

ABSTRACTThe 1956 Suez conflict was not inevitable. The involvement of an impartial third party had offered an exit ramp for the main protagonists. Largely forgotten today, India strove to reconcile the interests of the Westerns powers with Arab nationalism. Displaying creativity and perseverance in attempting to arrest the sudden deterioration in security in its extended neighborhood, India’s unceasing but responsible support for a weaker Arab state in the backdrop of determined Western coercion is a useful illustration for contemporary policymakers who are attempting to craft a sustainable approach towards a tumultuous West Asia. Using previously unused archival documents, this paper adds to the small literature on India’s involvement in this crisis by offering the first detailed account of India’s attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in those fateful months of 1956. By doing so, this article also reveals interesting facets of India’s approach to conflict management and regional stability in the 1950s, a role that was predicated on not just promoting strategic restraint between antagonistic states but also enabling conflict resolution options that preserved the vital interests of competing actors.

Egypt in Middle East policy of the USSR (1957-1961)

The article examines Soviet-Egyptian relations from the beginning of 1957 (the completion of the Suez crisis) to the Autumn 1961, when the XXII Congress of the CPSU took place. The Egyptian vector of Soviet foreign policy is sufficiently studied in modern historiography. Soviet-Egyptian relations were the object of study of such researchers as A. Vasilyev, A. Fursenko, Y. Primakov, S. Sinayskiy, M. Gat, J. D. Glassmen, R .Ginat, I. Ginor and others. However, today far from all aspects of the problem are examined, especially concerning 1957-1961. The purpose of this article is to fill in the some gaps in modern historiography. We need to highlight the Egyptian factor in the policy of the USSR regarding the Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese crises of 1957-1958; the supply of arms to the Arab States during that period; economic and cultural cooperation between countries. The aim of the article is analysis the policy of the Soviet Union regarding Egypt from the end of the Suez crisis, which radically strengthened the interaction between the two powers, until the XXII Congress of the CPSU (October 1961), which fixed the final normalization of Soviet-Egyptian relations. After the Suez crisis, the USSR significantly expanded the range of cooperation with Egypt. The aim of the Soviet Union was to consolidate and strengthen its influence in the Arab world on the wave of propaganda success after the Suez crisis. In general, the Khrushchev leadership managed to achieve the set tasks. Moscow focused on exporting arms and expanding economic assistance. Because of the emerging of the United Arab Republic and the Panarabist and anti-communist policy of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in the late 1950s, the ideological contradictions between the two states had worsened. Despite ideological disagreements with the President of the United Arab Republic, during the series of Middle Eastern crises of 1957-1958, the Kremlin invariably took the side of Arab nationalists to protect them from the actions of other states. The volume of military and financial and technical assistance to Cairo has also steadily increased, despite any ideological contradictions. Due to the new wave of socialist transformations in Egypt, the disintegration of the UAR and the beginning of the persecution of Communists and Kurds in the Iraq, the disagreements gradually came to naught, was recorded by the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961.

The Special Relationship: The US, Great Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal

The United Kingdom had ruled nearly the whole world. It is said that the sun never sets on the British Empire. The emergence of World War I and II weaken the power of Britain as a dominate colony of the world. However, by the end of WW-II, the US emerged as the newly famous, powerful country in the world. During the WW-II, the UK and the USA developed close cooperation. The relationship of both countries developed to such an extent that the Prime Minster W.D. Churchill called it the Special Relationship between UK-USA. The special relationship between both nations continued after the end of WW-II. It was believed that the bond of relationship is so strong that it cannot be rifted. It was right considering the close cooperation between both countries during the WW-II and aftermaths. However, the incident of the Suez Canal in 1956, completely changed the scenario. The tension between both states appeared over the Suez Crisis. This historical analysis is made to understand to what extent the special relationship was strong? Moreover, what went wrong during the Suez Crisis that shattered the special relationship between UK-USA. Was the Suez debacle of 1956, served as the litmus test paper in examining the special relationship?

Interpreters as technologies of care and control?

AbstractThis article investigates aspects of intercultural communication in institutional interaction with refugees in Britain following the 1956 Hungarian uprising. Their arrival, against a backdrop of Cold War politics and the ongoing Suez crisis, constituted Britain’s first test as a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees. While accounts of displaced persons in 20th century Britain mention communication problems, the impact of interpreters on the early phases of refugee reception can be better understood only through systematic research into their lived experiences and those of their interlocutors: this should include social attitudes and recruitment practices. The use of non-professional interpreters in the period concerned is examined in relation to the metaphor of the interpreter as a technology of care and control, which also serves as a broader critique of post-war refugee treatment in Britain. Contributing to the growing body of interpreting scholarship that explores the sociology of agents and structures in the translation process, the article focuses primarily on the actors concerned with translatorial activity in the many reception camps set up at that time. Artefacts from the National Archives and accounts from the field help identify institutional approaches to mass population displacement, and related discourses about (and by) interpreters.

Khrushchev and Kennedy

What are the risks to global security when a disrupter rises to lead a nuclear-armed superpower? Imagine a leader who publicly vows “to smash [adversaries] in the teeth”; or who issues an off-hand nuclear threat to a foreign adversary while talking to a group of school teachers, saying “we have rockets which can land precisely at a preset target 13,000 kilometers away. This, if you want, is a warning ….”1 Two generations ago the world’s most volatile saber rattler was in the Kremlin. Nikita S. Khrushchev had threatened the use of nuclear weapons against France and the United Kingdom in the Suez Crisis of 1956; he demanded a re-drawing of the postwar settlement over Berlin in 1958; and he had loosely but energetically mentioned the possibility of protecting the Castro revolution with a nuclear attack from the USSR in 1960. John F. Kennedy came to office knowing Khrushchev had a record of nuclear bluster, but he was uncertain of what lay behind it all. How much of these statements were bluff, and how much a product of an aggressive, unyielding position? The conventional wisdom among most seasoned Kremlin watchers was that behind the scenes Khrushchev was actually a moderating force in Soviet foreign behavior. His fiery performances reflected not merely a personality quirk but an effort to appease a hardline faction in the Kremlin and the military. Building upon this analysis, President Kennedy believed that if Nikita Khrushchev received the respect and attention denied him by the hyper anti-Soviet Eisenhower administration, the Soviet leader would not only dial down the volume, but could beat back the hawks around him, permitting international relations to achieve some sort of calmer equipoise.

POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND EGYPT IN THE PERIOD OF GAMAL ABDEL NASSER AND NOURI AL-SAID (1955-1958)

The research point out on the most prominent issues that emerged in the Arab region following the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950's, which both Iraq led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Said and Egypt led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser had his own position. Furthermore, the issue of political differences between Egypt and the Western countries that led to the tripartite aggression against it in 1956 and the position of Iraq, as well as the position of Egypt from the revolution of July 14, 1958 in Iraq.

The Diplomat: Lester Pearson and the Suez Crisis, by Antony Anderson

The Diplomat: Lester Pearson and the Suez Crisis, by Antony Anderson