Simple Trade Model Research Articles

Trade and the allocation of talent with capital market imperfections

Trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s has been associated with a sharp increase in the skill premium in both developed and developing countries. This is in apparent conflict with neoclassical theory, according to which trade should decrease the relative return on the relatively scarce factor, and thus decrease the skill premium in skill-scarce developing countries. We develop a simple model of trade with talent heterogeneity and capital market imperfections, and show that trade can increase the skill premium in a skill-scarce South that opens up to a skill-abundant North, both in the short run as well as in the long run. We show that trade has two effects: it reduces the skilled wage, and therefore drives non talented agents out of the skilled labor force. It also reduces the cost of subsistence, thereby allowing the talented offspring of unskilled workers to go to school. This compositional effect has a positive effect on the observed skill premium, potentially strong enough to outweigh the decrease in the skilled wage. In our framework, trade liberalization may trigger an increase in the skill-premium in both the North and the South.

A simple model of quality heterogeneity and international trade

This paper develops a trade model with firm-specific quality heterogeneity in markets where firms face the threat of imitation and engage in limit-pricing strategies. Firms producing high-quality (high-price) products export, whereas firms producing lower-quality (lower-price) products serve the domestic market. Trade liberalization raises the average domestic markup and increases the number of products consumed in each country. However, the impact of trade liberalization on the average export markup depends on the nature of liberalization. Although the presence of markups renders the laissez-faire equilibrium suboptimal, trade liberalization increases national and global welfare.

International Trade and the Adaptation to Climate Change and Variability

This paper has three messages mainly, which are observed in a simple model of climate change, international trade and regional adaptation. First, trade can be viewed as a kind of adaptation to climate change and variability, as trade can help to reduce direct impacts of global climate change on a region’s welfare. In particular, the less affected and the richer nations are, the more they can profit from moderating the impacts of global climate change through trade. Second, if regions are rich enough to adapt optimally to climate change, the resulting allocation of adaptation measures is Pareto-efficient. In this case funding of adaptation, which is an element of international climate policy, does not make sense from an economic perspective. Third, since the regions of the South typically lack the resources for adapting optimally to climate change, because of terms of trade effects, it might be in the self-interest of the industrialized nations to fund adaptation in the developing part of the world. However, providing financial assistance for adaptation can be Pareto-improving only, if the benefits of funding, i.e., damages, which are moderated through adaptation, are big enough, and hence, if the recipient’s own expenditure for adaptation is low. If not, the paradoxical effect of recipient immiserization through tied transfers can occur.

A Simple Trade Model with an Optimal Exchange Rate Motivated by Discussion of a Renminbi Float

We present a model of combined inter-spatial and inter-temporal trade between countries in which there is a fixed ex-change rate with a surrender requirement for foreign exchange generated by exports. The model incorporates inter- temporal intermediation services, which may or may not be liberlized across countries. We use numerical simulation methods to explore the properties of the model, since it has no closed form solution. In this model, when services re-main unliberalized there is an optimal trade intervention, even in the small open price taking economy case. Given monetary policy and an endogenously determined premium value on foreign exchange, an optimal setting of the ex-change rate can provide the optimal trade intervention. We suggest this model may have loose relevance for the current situation in China where services remain unliberalized and tariff rates are bound in the WTO and a free Renminbi float is under discussion.

Intermediated Trade *

This paper develops a simple model of international trade with intermediation. We consider an economy with two islands and two types of agents, farmers and traders. Farmers can produce two goods, but to sell these goods in centralized (Walrasian) markets, they need to be matched with a trader, and this entails costly search. In the absence of search frictions, our model reduces to a standard Ricardian model of trade. We use this simple model to contrast the implications of changes in the integration of Walrasian markets, which allow traders from different islands to exchange their goods, and changes in the access to these Walrasian markets, which allow farmers to trade with traders from different islands. We find that intermediation always magnifies the gains from trade under the former type of integration, but leads to more nuanced welfare results under the latter, including the possibility of aggregate losses.

Pricing and investment of cross-border transport infrastructure

We develop a simple two-country model of international trade in which the transportation cost between countries is endogenously determined by pricing and investment decisions of cross-border transport infrastructure. We evaluate alternative regimes of pricing and investment, i.e., free access (e.g., public road), pricing by two governments, and private operation. We also examine the effect of integrating operation. It is shown that investment rule in free access regime is inefficient. On the other hand, the investment rule is efficient if infrastructure charge is levied either by the government or by the private operators. We obtain the welfare ranking of alternative regimes under specific functional form, show how the welfare results depend on pricing policies.

Indirect network effects and the impact of trade liberalization: A note

In this note, we examine how trade liberalization affects production structure in the presence of indirect network effects (hardware/software systems). For these purposes we construct a simple two-country model of trade with two incompatible hardware technologies. It is shown that, given that both types of hardware exist before trade liberalization, liberalization and increased intra-industry trade in software products may reduce the variety of hardware technology via intensified network effects. It is also shown that, contrary to the findings of previous studies on intra-industry trade, some consumers may become worse off as the result of trade.

Taxing tourism: enhancing or reducing welfare?

Using a modified simple general equilibrium model of international trade, the theoretical construct proposed by this research note shows that taxing tourism may increase or decrease economic benefit depending on the destination's market power. Yet, from a social point of view, taxing tourism can be welfare-enhancing, as externalities of rapid tourism growth should be internalized. Therefore, a social rather than a private optimum should be pursued via taxing tourism in order to guarantee sustainable tourism. From political economy perspectives, however, the actual taxation policies may not be welfare-enhancing, as they heavily depend on the political system and power relations in the destination.

A Simple Model of Trade with Heterogeneous Firms and Trade Policy

We build a Chamberlinian-Ricardian two-country-two-sector model with heterogeneity of firms in terms of fixed costs and analyze the effects of trade policy. We consider efficiency gaps between countries in marginal and fixed costs, a monopolistically competitive sector in which every new entrant faces increasing fixed costs of production. It is shown that an increase in a unilaterally imposed tariff increases the number of firms of the tariff-imposing country and decreases the number of firms of the tariff-imposed country, possibly reverting the position of net importer to net exporter of varieties. A small tariff is likely to be beneficial to the tariff-imposing country when fixed costs are low in both countries and the tariff-imposing country is relatively efficient in terms of fixed costs.

A simple model of service trade with time zone differences

This note proposes a two-country model of service trade that captures the role of time zone differences as a determinant of trade patterns. It is shown that the utilization of communication networks induces dramatic change in industrial structure due to firms taking advantage of time zone differences.

Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International Trade

By considering a model with identical firms, Krugman (1980) predicts that a higher elasticity of substitution between goods magnifies the impact of trade barriers on trade flows. In this paper, I introduce firm heterogeneity in a simple model of international trade. I prove that the extensive margin and the intensive margin are affected by the elasticity of substitution in exact opposite directions. When the distribution of productivity across firms is Pareto, the predictions of the Krugman model with representative firms are overturned: the impact of trade barriers on trade flows is dampened by the elasticity of substitution, and not magnified. (JEL F12, F13)

Can Growth of a Trading Partner Harm a Country?

Can growth of a trading partner harm a country? This paper seeks to answer this question through the use of an eclectic trade model which is similar in flavour to Markusen (1986). This paper makes two contributions. First, it develops a simple and tractable model of international trade based on a combination of imperfect competition, comparative advantage, and identical but non-homothetic preferences in a three country framework. Second, it uses this framework to consider the possibility of losses from partner-country growth in a free-trading environment. We find that the presence of nonhomothetic preferences in particular, leads to a home bias in consumption which dampens any negative welfare effects when a country's trading partners grow.

INAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY What Is in It for the Rich?

In this paper, we investigate incentives, other than altruism, that developed countries have for improving developing country technologies. We propose a simple model of international trade between two regions, in which individuals have preferences over an inferior good and a luxury good. The poor region has a comparative advantage in the production of the inferior good. Even when costly adaptation of the technology to the poor region's characteristics is required—making the technology inappropriate for local use—there are parameter configurations for which the rich region has an incentive to incur this cost. It benefits from a terms-of-trade improvement and from greater specialization in the luxury good. Indeed, there are cases where the rich region would prefer to improve the poor region's technology for producing the inferior good rather than its own. We apply our model to the Green Revolution and provide a quantitative assessment of its welfare effects.

Institutional Quality and International Trade

Institutions—quality of contract enforcement, property rights, shareholder protection, and the like—have received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet trade theory has not considered the implications of institutional differences, beyond treating them simply as different technologies or taxes. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a simple model of international trade in which institutional differences are modelled within the framework of incomplete contracts. We show that doing so reverses many of the conclusions obtained by equating institutions with productivity. Institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage imply, among other things, that the less developed country may not gain from trade and factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade. Second, we test empirically whether institutions act as a source of trade, using data on U.S. imports disaggregated by country and industry. The empirical results provide evidence of “institutional content of trade”: institutional differences are an important determinant of trade flows.

R&D policies, trade and process innovation

We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.

Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and Trading Volumes*

We develop a simple model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that is consistent with a number of stylized features of the data. In particular, the model predicts positive as well as zero trade flows across pairs of countries, and it allows the number of exporting firms to vary across destination countries. As a result, the impact of trade frictions on trade flows can be decomposed into the intensive and extensive margins, where the former refers to the trade volume per exporter and the latter refers to the number of exporters. This model yields a generalized gravity equation that accounts for the self-selection of firms into export markets and their impact on trade volumes. We then develop a two-stage estimation procedure that uses an equation for selection into trade partners in the first stage and a trade flow equation in the second. We implement this procedure parametrically, semiparametrically, and nonparametrically, showing that in all three cases the estimated effects of trade frictions are similar. Importantly, our method provides estimates of the intensive and extensive margins of trade. We show that traditional estimates are biased and that most of the bias is due not to selection but rather due to the omission of the extensive margin. Moreover, the effect of the number of exporting firms varies across country pairs according to their characteristics. This variation is large and particularly so for trade between developed and less developed countries and between pairs of less developed countries.

Currency Areas and International Assistance

This paper considers a simple stochastic model of international trade with three countries. Two of the tree countries are in an economic union. Comparisons are made between equilibrium welfare for these two countries under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Within the model it is shown that flexible exchange rate regimes generate greater welfare. However, we then consider comparisons of welfare when the two countries also engage in some international assistance in order to share risk. Such risk-sharing is limited by enforcement constraints of cross border assistance. It is shown that taking into account limited commitment risk-sharing fixed exchange rates or currency areas can dominate flexible exchange rate regimes reversing the previous result.

Pricing-to-Market in a Ricardian Model of International Trade

We study the implications for international relative prices of a simple Ricardian model of international trade with imperfect competition and variable markups, providing a tractable account of firm-level and aggregate prices. We show that both trade costs and imperfect competition with variable markups are needed to account for pricing-to-market at the firm and aggregate levels. We also show that international trade costs are essential, but pricing-to-market is not, to account for a high volatility of tradeable consumer prices relative to the overall CPI-based real-exchange rate.

Modeling Cultural Barriers in International Trade

AbstractThe paper presents a model that analyzes the role of cultural differences in international trade. The decision to study foreign cultures and languages is incorporated into a simple trade model, which captures basic properties of cultural and language barriers. First, cultural costs differ from physical ones in that they can be eliminated by learning. Secondly, learning a language has economies of scale, thus smaller countries tend to invest more into learning. Thirdly, learning decisions within one country impose an externality on trading partners, since learning by one party makes communication easier also for the other one. This implies that learning decisions are in general inefficient, and the paper derives the connection between the equilibrium and optimal outcomes. Finally, because of the substitutability of learning among countries, a policy where a country subsidizes learning in the other nation—“cultural protectionism”—can be rationalized. Under certain conditions, such a policy can improve the welfare of both countries, in contrast to the case of regular export subsidies.

Long‐run Lunacy, Short‐run Sanity: a Simple Model of Trade with Labor Market Turnover*

AbstractIt is often argued that international trade is all about long‐run relationships. In this paper, we argue that this view is flawed when factor markets are characterized by turnover. Toward that end, we provide a simple dynamic model of trade with labor market turnover and show that the relationship between the economy's short‐run and long‐run behavior is more complex than in traditional trade models. For example, in the short run, the economy may produce outside of its long‐run frontier. We show that focusing on long‐run relationships can lead one to draw faulty policy conclusions, while focusing on its short‐run behavior restores sanity. The implication is that in the presence of factor market turnover, international trade issues can only be understood by studying the entire dynamic path of the economy. Long‐run relationships should be ignored.