Abstract: A specialist in Russian history and politics reexamines the prevailing conventional wisdom that only a few Russians in Moscow and St. Petersburg resisted the attempt coup in August 1991. Press accounts at the time indicate a higher level of opposition across the country than is generally assumed, along with significant levels of resistance and subversion, but the structure of broadcast media fostered an impression of activism in the captials and apathy elsewhere. Compared with other coups and coup attempts in the twentieth century, Russians evinced an unusual willingness to face down a military takeover. The conclusion considers reasons for downplaying the significance of opposition in historical memory and its impact on the prospects for democracy in Russia. Key words: August 1991, coup, democracy, media, protest, Russia ********** Whether perestroika was in flux or at the end of its life by summer 1991, it was decisively terminated by the August 1991 coup. The dominant narratives about August 1991 suggest that an ill-conceived and poorly executed attempt to seize power failed because of its leaders' incompetence, their serious miscalculations of public opinion, or Gorbachev's failure to support political allies whose actions he had previously endorsed. The interpretation presented here--that the forces bent on restoring order and preventing further devolution of central power were defeated by a combination of direct opposition, resistance, and subversion--now amounts to a revisionist approach. Yet, in the context of the breakdown of democratic regimes in the twentieth century, Russians' opposition to the August 1991 coup provides a striking example of resistance to forces that more often succeed in suppressing democracy. (1) Considering the August 1991 events in a comparative context has not been the standard approach. Russians have difficulty accepting that they are not unique. Whether in the form of Moscow as the Third Rome (accompanied by assurances that there would not be a fourth), Stalin's repackaging of the world socialist revolution for a single country, Berdyaev's insistence that all countries are unique but Russia is more unique, (2) or the persistent folk wisdom that Russia is a strana zagodochnaia (indicipherable or puzzling country), Russians continue to believe that Russia is exempt from generalizations derived from social science. Many of the specialists studying the country share and reinforce that view. Ukraine's in December 2004 provoked yet another round of breast-beating by the Russian intelligentsia, decrying the Russian inability to overcome the masses' slavish desire for a strong leader. Yuri Levada, comparing the events in Kyiv with the neostagnation in Russian political life, stated that there would be nothing comparable in Russia in the twenty-first century. (3) This sort of pronouncement should give us pause. As Levada himself acknowledges, the events of the twenty years following Mikhail Gorbachev's March 1985 election as general secretary overturned practically every law and prediction regarding Soviet politics. Shortly before Gorbachev came to power, the U.S. government's (and MacArthur Foundation's) favorite Sovietologist, Seweryn Bialer, concluded the politics chapter for the Center for Strategic and International Studies' After Brezhnev project by predicting more stagnation: In summary, I anticipate no fundamental changes during this decade, despite intensive and divisive discussion concerning economic reforms, a number of organizational policy initiatives, experimentation with economic structure, and significant political conflict. (4) Given the rapid, dramatic, and far from linear changes of the past two decades, we should all be reticent in offering sweeping predictions about politics and society even one or two, much less ten decades hence. Rather than being a basis for pessimism about Russia, Ukraine's Orange Revolution can provide additional perspective on the events of August 1991, further encouraging us to view that experience in a comparative context. …