Signal Of Social Status Research Articles

Social status signalling in white-crowned sparrows: an experimental test of the social control hypothesis

Abstract. Some winter flocking passerines possess variable plumage that functions to signal social status. The social control hypothesis has been proposed to explain why subordinate birds do not cheat by displaying the brighter signal of dominant birds. This hypothesis assumes like-versus-like aggression between dominants and suggests that cheating is prevented by an increase in the number of interactions that cheaters encounter with legitimately dominant birds. The presence of like-versus-like aggression in white-crowned sparrows, Zonotrichia leucophrys, was assessed by simultaneously introducing an adult and immature male, members of the highest and next to lowest ranking age-sex classes, respectively, into four aviaries containing resident adult and immature males. Contrary to the social control hypothesis there was no difference in the amount of aggression resident adults directed against introduced adults and immatures. Furthermore, resident adult males did not initiate aggression against other resident adult males more often than against resident immature males. Adult residents behaved the same regardless of whether they were the more or less common age class among residents. Social control is unlikely to be responsible for the evolutionary stability of social status signalling in white-crowned sparrows, and a review of other studies reveals little evidence that it controls cheating in any species.

TOWARD AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF FASHION

Competition for rank within animal societies is an innate drive recognized in sociobiological and evolutionary theory. In human societies, fashion signals social rank or status. We extend standard economic theories of competitive and noncompetitive markets to analyze fashion by including the status‐seeking incentive. In the competitive case, the conditions under which fashion cycles occur are examined. In the noncompetitive case, producers of fashion services discriminate between customers intertemporally to sustain the fashionability of their services. Unlike the standard models of fashion that populate marketing textbooks, our theory of fashion does not require that demand curves slope upward.

THE COST OF DOMINANCE AND ADVANTAGE OF SUBORDINATION IN A BADGE SIGNALING SYSTEM.

EvolutionVolume 35, Issue 3 p. 441-454 ArticleFree Access THE COST OF DOMINANCE AND ADVANTAGE OF SUBORDINATION IN A BADGE SIGNALING SYSTEM Sievert Rohwer, Sievert Rohwer Department of Zoology and Washington State Museum, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 98195Search for more papers by this authorPaul W. Ewald, Paul W. Ewald Department of Zoology and Washington State Museum, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 98195Search for more papers by this author Sievert Rohwer, Sievert Rohwer Department of Zoology and Washington State Museum, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 98195Search for more papers by this authorPaul W. Ewald, Paul W. Ewald Department of Zoology and Washington State Museum, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 98195Search for more papers by this author First published: May 1981 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.1981.tb04905.xCitations: 108 Corresponding Editor: H. M. Wilbur AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume35, Issue3May 1981Pages 441-454 ReferencesRelatedInformation