Sidney Hook Research Articles

Remembering Sidney Hook

A review of "The Disputed Legacy of Sidney Hook," by Gary Bullert, Lexington Books, 2022, pp. 339, $95.28 hardcover.

Bernard Bailyn on the Craft and Art of Historical Writing

Bernard Bailyn on the Craft and Art of Historical Writing

Shedding Light on the “Eclipse” Narrative: Some Notes on Pragmatism in the Twentieth Century

Shedding Light on the “Eclipse” Narrative: Some Notes on Pragmatism in the Twentieth Century

The Events of N.O. Lossky's "History of Russian Philosophy" and the Debate Around it in the 1950s

The article presents the main stages of the N.O. Lossky's work on the book "History of Russian Philosophy", starting with the emergence of his interest in the works of Russian philosophers when writing an article for the journal "The Slavonic Review" about Vladimir Solovyov and his followers; preparing lecture courses on Russian philosophy for reading at foreign universities (including lectures on Slavic philosophy delivered at Stanford University in 1933) and ending with the publication of the book in the USA, England and France and his work on the future Russian edition. Particular attention is paid to the debate that arose after the publication of the book in America (1951) in the 50s and unfolds on the pages of American journals. The main claims of American critics (Sidney Hook, John Somerville, George L. Kline, etc.) to the content of the book are the uneven presentation of Russian philosophers teachings, the sketchiness and the absence of representatives of some schools of thought. N.O. Lossky's book also became the subject of discussion in the publications of the Russian migr about Lossky's author's vision statement of the development of Russian philosophy and its specifics. As it follows from the correspondence of N.O. Lossky with D.I. Chizhevsky and with publisher A.S. Kagan, it was also planned to publish the book with additions in Spanish and German publishing houses. Up to and including 1956, N.O. Lossky continued to work on the Russian-language "History of Russian Philosophy", which was given to Russia for publication by his son Boris Nikolaevich Lossky only in the early 90s (it was published in 1994). New materials found in the Paris archive of N.O. Lossky (Lossky's text "Philosophy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia", S. Hook's review "They Looked to the West") complement the debate both about N.O. Lossky's "History of Russian Philosophy", and about the nature of Russian philosophy.

Black Universals and Alain Locke's Notion of Value

Black Universals and Alain Locke's Notion of Value

Charles Olson and American Modernism: The Practice of the Self by Mark Byers

Reviewed by: Charles Olson and American Modernism: The Practice of the Self by Mark Byers Steven Shoemaker Charles Olson and American Modernism: The Practice of the Self. Mark Byers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 224. $80.00 (cloth); $76.00 (eBook). This carefully researched, insightful, and provocative study of Charles Olson's development as an American modernist of the period following the Second World War seeks to place Olson in a new context and thereby grant us a fresh understanding of his work. Rather than concentrating his attention primarily on immediate poetic precursors (and still-living contemporaries) like Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams, Mark Byers focuses on the New York scene that gave birth both to abstract expressionism and to radical experiments in new music. Further, Byers considers these aesthetic developments in relation to the postwar, and post-Marxist, soul-searching of thinkers on the Left who sought a way forward after the political and social upheavals wrought by worldwide conflict. Byers's innovative approach is to place Olson's work alongside the work of painters like Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, Barnett Newman, and Adolph Gottlieb, as well as composers like John Cage and Morton Feldman. At the same time, he attends to the critics and thinkers who were both critiquing the current state of art and culture and helping to imagine new artistic and [End Page 440] social possibilities, including Clement Greenberg, Harold Rosenberg, Dwight MacDonald, and Sidney Hook, as well as Frankfurt School émigrés like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. To this already full roster he adds twentieth-century scientists Werner Heisenberg, Paul Dirac, and Erwin Schrödinger—shapers of the "new physics" who shook the epistemological certitudes that had underpinned both scientific inquiry and the Marxist historical imagination. In Byers's reading, a widespread sense of skepticism and radical questioning ran through every aspect of postwar culture and led to a search for new forms of political agency, and, indeed, for a new "practice of the self" suitable to the times. During the war, Olson had worked for first the Office of War Information and then the Democratic National Committee, but by 1945 had begun to withdraw from political life (9). One of Byers's central areas of concern is the question of what political agency might look like after such a turn, or even "retreat," into private life. The question sparked intense debate not just for Olson, but for many artists and thinkers of the period. The technological rationality of Germany's National Socialism had come to seem like a perverse fulfillment of the dream of Enlightenment "reason" and "progress," thus calling into question the whole Enlightenment narrative that had been so central to the development of European culture. At the same time, the Marxist faith in the historical inevitability of socialist revolution seemed no less wrongheaded and useless in the face of the actual events of recent world history. Amid this loss of faith in the ideals of "civilization" and in grand narratives more generally came an upsurge of interest in the individual rather than the class or the tribe. Writers and artists turned away from the dream of collective political action, as well as from the sorts of aesthetic commitments with which that dream was associated. Subsequent critiques of abstract expressionism as "the official style of postwar American capitalism" have questioned the triumphalism, imperialism, and devotion to self-interest of this political, cultural, and artistic moment, but Byers wants to provide a corrective to such critiques, to show that they have often "drastically simplified the fate of 'I' in the United States in the years immediately following the Second World War" (11). Byers argues that beginning around 1945 "the first person subject was increasingly regarded as the site of radical political agency by the new independent left; a transitional formation cutting its ties with orthodox Marxism and the ambitions of the New Deal state" (11). In this reading, the Maximus of Olson's The Maximus Poems embodies a "radical 'practice of the self'" that "charts a sophisticated alternative to the Enlightenment humanist subject widely critiqued in the immediate postwar period" (19). Further, Olson's construction of such a figure positions him...

Their Dialectics and Ours

This paper chronicles a “missed connection” between the young Herbert Marcuse and his American contemporary, the philosopher Sidney Hook, and finds an unexpected complementarity in their efforts to reinvigorate the Marxist tradition against the backdrop of Stalinism. It examines the two philosophers’ first exchange in the early 1940s, by which time Hook had abandoned both his political and intellectual radicalism. Finally, it shows that the terms of Hook’s objection to Marcuse’s critical theory prefigured the tradtional left’s resistance to Marxist-humanism following the dissemination of Marx’s early manuscripts two decades later.

The Case for Cleaning House: Sidney Hook and the Ethics of Academic Freedom during the McCarthy Era

Sidney Hook set the terms of debate on Communism, higher education, and academic freedom in the postwar United States. His view that Communists lacked the independence necessary for teaching and research—a view forged in the heated debates of New York City's radical left in the 1930s—provided the rationale for firing Communist professors across the country in the late 1940s and 1950s. Relying on close readings of underutilized archival sources, this article explores the development of Hook's thinking, charts his impact on key players in the period's higher education establishment (such as philosopher John Dewey and the American Association of University Professors), and outlines the way his writings helped lead to faculty dismissals at the University of Washington and New York University. The article also highlights the work of students and professors who challenged Hook's anti-Communist position, revealing a rich and often neglected mid-century discourse on academic freedom.

Sidney Hook's Pragmatic Anti-Communism: Commitment to Democracy as Method

In recent years, opposition to Communism has emerged as Sidney Hook's central philosophical legacy in the eyes of scholars and historians, who tend to ignore all of Hook's pre-Cold War philosophical contributions. Furthermore, critics who treat Hook's anti-Communism often accuse him of abandoning pragmatism for dogmatism in his later career. In this essay, I argue that Hook's long-standing fight against Communism should be understood as an unwavering application of the democratic method in line with his mentor John Dewey's understanding of pragmatism as well as the commitment to scientific empiricism espoused by earlier pragmatists C. S. Peirce and William James.

THE UNENDING CONVERSATION: KENNETH BURKE AND RICHARD MCKEON'S AESTHETIC PRAGMATISM, 1920–1960

Historians of pragmatism have long overlooked Kenneth Burke and Richard McKeon. This has not been without good reason. At first glance, the two read more like critics than adherents of the tradition. Yet placing Burke and McKeon's writings from the 1920s to the late 1950s in the context of their development reveals a shared project aimed at reforming pragmatism. While pragmatists such as John Dewey and Sidney Hook alleged a conceptual fidelity between the scientific method and democratic processes such as public debate, Burke and McKeon questioned this link. Metaphors drawn from science, they believed, blinded pragmatists to the nature of communication. Due to this oversight, pragmatists ignored the ideological ambiguity that surrounded terms like “science” and “democracy” during the mid-twentieth century. Burke and McKeon sought to fix this omission. Pragmatists, they argued, needed to trade the language of science for a terminology drawn from a source more attuned to the power of communication: the arts. By advancing this case, Burke and McKeon crafted an aesthetic form of pragmatism—a variant of the philosophy that, ultimately, contemporaries would barely recognize as such.

Pragmatismo, marxismo e democracia: a negligenciada contribuição de Sidney Hook

O presente artigo discute as contribuições teóricas do filósofo norte-americano Sidney Hook a fim de buscar insumos para a construção de uma teoria democrática crítica. O retorno à obra desse controverso e negligenciado intelectual público se justifica por sua tentativa de articulação, ainda nos anos 1930, de duas correntes pensadas como opostas: o marxismo e o pragmatismo. Tais correntes são a base de sua proposta de democracia, fundada no autoverno com efetivo livre consentimento. O texto está estruturado em quatro seções. Na primeira delas, apresentam-se a vida e a obra de Sidney Hook. Na segunda, exploram-se as raízes pragmatistas do autor e a forma como ele constrói suas ideias a partir deste legado. Na terceira seção, abordam-se os elementos que o autor busca no marxismo e as suas críticas aos continuadores da tradição. Por fim, exploramos as ideias políticas de Hook, com foco em sua concepção de democracia, que parece ser simultaneamente radical e conservadora.

Reading that Isn’t Reading

writers enough energy and coherence to make possible a sustained confrontation with the new sensibility.” I never met Howe, though I corresponded with him briefly. Although I criticized his vaporous socialist agenda, I felt an affinity with him because I too disliked the “new sensibility” and also because our nonpolitical enthusiasms were the same: the poetry of Robert Frost, the ballets of George Balanchine, the paintings of Edouard Vuillard—and the baseball playing of Willie Mays! Like Howe the New York intellectuals were mainly essayists. “If to the minor genre of the essay the New York writers made a major contribution,” Howe says, “to the major genres of fiction and poetry they made only a minor contribution.” Edmund Burke once asked: “Who now reads Bolingbroke?” Today one might ask: Who now reads the essays of Irving Howe, Lionel Trilling, Irving Kristol, Sidney Hook, Alfred Kazin, Mary McCarthy, Elizabeth Hardwick, and Daniel Bell—to name some of the most prominent New York intellectuals? Howe surmised the work of the New York intellectuals would not last because their writing “was always in response to something. That was the sense of the essay that we all did. And that’s why none of us is likely to survive.” He may have been right. Yet the essays of the New York intellectuals will always be of interest to historians, since these writers wrestled with political and cultural questions that preoccupied this nation in the sixties, seventies, and eighties.

On Sidney Hook’s “The Ethics of Suicide”

Previous articleNext article No AccessOn Sidney Hook’s “The Ethics of Suicide”*Robert B. TalisseRobert B. Talisse Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 125, Number 2January 2015 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/678376 Views: 169Total views on this site Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref © 2015 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Jennifer White What can critical suicidology do?, Death Studies 41, no.88 (May 2017): 472–480.https://doi.org/10.1080/07481187.2017.1332901

James Burnham, Sidney Hook, and the Search for Intellectual Truth: From Communism to the Cold War, 1933–1956

On September 11, 1987, the National Review devoted the majority of its issue to the memory of James Burnham. The former Trotskyist, who had been a part of the publication since its inception in 195...

Realism, pragmatism and the public sphere: Restraining foreign policy in an age of mass politics

This article explores the links between classical realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr or Arthur Schlesinger Jr, and early pragmatists such as John Dewey or Sidney Hook. Arguing that the question of how to save the creative potential of democracy from the stifling homogeneity of modernity was at the heart of both schools of thought, it treats Early Pragmatism as a window through which perhaps the most crucial question of Classical Realism may come to life: How to make publicity a vehicle of foreign-policy restraint in an age of mass politics?

Royce and Bernstein on Evil

This article has a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it aims to reconstruct Josiah Royce's views on evil. On the other hand, it intends to examine these Roycean views within the framework of Richard Bernstein's work, particularly his books Radical Evil: a Philosophical Investigation and The Abuse of Evil. I conclude that, despite some shortcomings regarding his notion of evil, Royce's philosophy should be recovered as a classical voice in order to fight against the abuse of evil.Realization of the evil men can do and have done to men is integral to any intelligent appraisal of human history. -Sidney Hook(1974, 30)1. IntroductionOn the first pages of The Abuse of Evil, Richard Bernstein relates how after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, evil unexpectedly became a concept of immense political significance. Just a few days before then, he had finished writing Radical Evil: A Philosophical Investigation where a very old philosophical, theological, and practical issue is examined, namely the problem of evil. Though universal in its scope, Radical Evil mainly refers to the intellectual (and political) history of Europe turning on the atrocity of the Nazi Holocaust. The core of his interpretation is grounded in two related axes: on the one hand, the enormous impact of Auschwitz on philosophy, and on the other hand, the impossibility to accept a healing theodicy. Unsurprisingly, Bernstein's research is focused exclusively on European thinkers.However, as Bernstein writes, the political and intellectual context abruptly changed after 9/11, particularly in America, where evil became practically synonymous with terrorism.1 Consequently, after 9/11, war against evil and war against terrorism acquired the same meaning. In the face of this new situation, a philosophical investigation on evil centered only on Auschwitz without making reference to terrorism would be regarded as incomplete by contemporary (especially American) readers. Thus, Bernstein wrote The Abuse of Evil as a complement to Radical Evil. Despite the vastness of the topic, one could say that the former was a philosophical project serenely written (a historical and philosophical balance where the horror of the twentieth century and Auschwitz plays the central role). By contrast, The Abuse of Evil is an intellectual response to the immediate challenges of the present as well as an attempt to rethink evil within this new frame. Another major difference between both books is related to their respective sources: in The Abuse of Evil Bernstein relies mainly on classical pragmatism, America's native philosophy, rather than on European thinkers.Why does Bernstein turn to classical pragmatism in this time of terror? He thinks that the new circumstances were favourable to a political American monster. In other words, one of Bernstein's theses is that absolutism, a political consequence of the war against terror, corrupts both politics and religion. Such absolutism is grounded in Christian fundamentalism, which in Bernstein's opinion is one of the central of America. Classical pragmatism (or pragmatic fallibilism, as he labels it) constitutes another fundamental American mentality, too. Bernstein accurately relies primarily on Dewey and James (but also Peirce and Mead are within this vein looking for a political (and religious) alternative to fundamentalism.Although Bernstein's account of this clash of mentalities is coherent, there is a classical American figure that is lacking in his reconstructive approach: Josiah Royce. For both Radical Evil and The Abuse Of Evil, Royce's philosophy arises as a relevant work in connection with Bernstein's purposes. First, taking Radical EviTs issues and developments, Royce's philosophy is connected with Bernstein's contemporary pragmatism to the extent that both deal explicitly with the problems of evil and theodicy as well as with their links with German idealism. Second, within the frame of The Abuse of Evil, Royce thinks that face to face interaction (what he calls wise provincialism) constitutes an indispensable political element (here Royce's viewpoint converges with the other classics', namely Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey). …

Editor’s Note

Editor’s Note David Granger Greetings and welcome to the latest edition of Education & Culture. You will find in this issue a healthy portion of instantly recognizable Deweyan themes, but in many instances with a new, sometimes surprising twist. Below I will highlight a few elements of these creative variations on the familiar. Some of you might recall that our lead article, Jim Garrison’s “Making Meaning Together Beyond Theory and Practice,” had its first life as the 2012 Dewey Lecture. In this piece, Garrison examines the popular Deweyan theme of the relationship between theory and practice. Yet unlike many authors, who look to Dewey in arguing for the necessity somehow to bridge theory and practice, Garrison points out that Dewey in fact prompts us to see theory and practice (like many other seemingly ubiquitous dichotomies) as “subfunctions within the larger function of making meaning, knowledge, and value in our lives.” Thus the emphasis here is really on creation rather than construction, especially as the latter term is currently used in education to denote the process of artificially making engaging and useful something that is otherwise uninteresting and not useful. Our next piece is Gary Bullert’s “The Committee for Cultural Freedom and the Roots of McCarthyism.” In this offering, Bullert situates the Committee for Cultural Freedom (CCF), of which Dewey was a founding member, within its historical-geographical milieu so as to revisit and scrutinize popular allegations that Dewey and his cohorts (namely, Sidney Hook) contributed to the red-scare hysteria and repressive anti-communism of the 1940s and 1950s, in part through efforts to expel communist party members from the teaching profession. After examining the issue in its many and complicated facets, Bullert concludes, among other things, that the CCF in fact “offered a responsible alternative to the excesses” of McCarthyism. Traversing some allied ground, Cherilyn Keall, in “The Paradox of Freedom: John Dewey on Human Nature, Culture, and Education,” explores the meaning of Dewey’s provocative (and to many confusing) claim that human nature both does and does not change. Here we are provided with an opportunity to revisit another popular dichotomy and see what it looks like through a Deweyan lens. In doing so, Keall argues, we find that Dewey understands human nature to have two interrelated facets, one that changes, due to our embeddedness in diverse, ever-evolving cultures, and one that does not, resulting from the innate needs that we all share through our similar constitution as human beings. As a result, human freedom, an issue fundamental to the work of all manner of educators, must be conceived with an eye to the inexpugnable stability and precariousness of human nature. This is followed by Victor Rodriguez’s intriguing look at what he calls “Radical Dewey: Deweyan Pedagogy in Mexico, 1915–1923.” Rodriguez chooses this particular time period because it predates the appropriation of Dewey’s ideas by Mexico’s revolutionary government, prior to which his writings were popular among [End Page 1] socialists, radical pedagogues and progressive-minded teachers. Yet little scholarship to date has looked closely at or taken seriously this earlier, and at times very creative, application of Dewey’s work, focusing instead on the better known subsequent state project experiment with Deweyan schools in the mid-1920s. Rodriguez attempts to amend the record on this important topic. The pressing issue of healthcare is then taken up in Danielle Lakes’ very topical piece “Engaging Deweyan Ethics in Healthcare: Leonard Fleck’s Rational Democratic Deliberation.” Here, Lake makes the case that a form of ”open dialogue between citizens,” developed and utilized by author Leonard Fleck, a close reader of Dewey and former member of the Hillary Rodham Clinton Task Force on Health Reform (1993), deserves serious attention as a vehicle for making possible meaningful healthcare reform. As Lake explains, “It is my hope that Fleck’s rational democratic deliberation could begin to build a foundation for further cooperation, for greater education about the various and complicated bioethical situations we must confront and, finally, for establishing working solutions that are amenable to adjustment.” “Reconstructing Deweyan Growth: The Significance of James Baldwin’s Moral Psychology” is Jeff Frank’s thoughtful attempt to make Dewey’s...

The Committee for Cultural Freedom and the Roots of McCarthyism

Among the most controversial aspects of John Dewey's career as a public intellectual was his conflict with the Communist Party and its various front groups. John Dewey and Sidney Hook co-founded the Committee for Cultural Freedom that directly exposed that pretense of the Popular Front, which excluded the Soviet Union from the list of totalitarian states. In the process, Dewey became embroiled publicly with Corliss Lamont and privately (to a large degree) with Franz Boas. Besides policy toward the Soviet Union, the New York Teachers' Union's decertification emerged as a central issue. In the process, Dewey exhibited both intellectual integ- rity and courage by opposing threats to both academic freedom and the democratic process.

The Frankfurt School in Exile

Reviewed by: The Frankfurt School in Exile Hinrich C. Seeba The Frankfurt School in Exile. By Thomas Wheatland. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009. xxi + 415 pages. $39.95. From the theoretical critique of instrumental reason to living in counter-cultural utopias, from insistence on aesthetic autonomy to mass culture as a channel for democratization, from "negative dialectics" (as Adorno's most famous book is entitled) to rebellion against the commodification of culture, from bourgeois elitism, complete with contempt for falsches Bewusstsein of the less educated, to popular proletarianism—the Frankfurt School provided the mantra for a politically engaged generation that needed a theoretical framework for rebelling against their fathers, especially when, in the case of Germany, many of these fathers had been Nazi collaborators or worse. Anyone who is seriously interested in the originally Marxist criticism of mass culture and its manipulative aesthetics should read at least some of the self-contained chapters of Thomas Wheatland's The Frankfurt School in Exile. Readers will be fascinated to learn, for the first time in an in-depth analysis, about the affinities and controversies between the New York Intellectuals of the 1930s and the exiled Frankfurt School's Critical Theory, as it was discussed, often adopted, and eventually rejected, among others, by the editors of the journal Partisan Review and by the leading American Marxist of the time, Sidney Hook, who as a student of John Dewey had developed his own brand of Pragmatic Marxism. But this book is not so much a discussion of the philosophical legacy as it is a detailed contribution to the institutional history of how European philosophy was practiced under adverse circumstances, after the mostly Jewish members of the Frankfurt Institut für Sozialforschung (founded in 1923 by Felix Weil, whose merchant family's wealth provided the annual operating costs of 120.000 marks) were forced into exile by the Nazis. The study concentrates on Columbia University as a host to the members of the Frankfurt School from 1934 until Max Horkheimer (on doctor's orders) and Theodor W. Adorno moved to California in 1941, and on the institutional conflicts surrounding the adoption of social theory in the American academe. The author, Thomas Wheatland, an assistant professor of German history at Assumption College in Massachusetts, emphasizes that he is not a critical theorist but merely a historian of Critical Theory. Even though he wants to stay clear of both philosophical and ideological controversies, he was able to give a nuanced, often captivating account even of slight theoretical and ideological differences in the interaction of German exiles and American intellectuals. He is clearly indebted to Martin Jay (Dialectical Imagination, 1973) and to Rolf Wiggershaus (Die Frankfurter Schule, 1986), but in contrast to both of them he concentrates on the often contentious interactions of the Horkheimer circle with mostly empiricist American scholars, especially at Columbia University. While the question of possible Communist infiltration was first [End Page 636] raised by Lewis Feuer in a provocative article of 1980, the clandestine Marxist leanings of the Institute (and their failure to publicly condemn Stalinist terror), to be sure, had been under scrutiny for some time. More interesting, at least to the author of the present study, than the ideological debate following Feuer's accusation is the fact that Columbia's Sociology department, represented by Robert Lynd, invited the Frankfurt School in 1934 because it needed the international and the interdisciplinary outlook the exiles from Frankfurt would provide, as the latter in turn needed an institutional home for their continued work, especially as the ongoing Studien über Autorität und Familie (collectively authored, and completed in 1936) coincided with Lynd's emerging research interest in the family. The story of the Frankfurt School in exile is full of ironies, as this book makes evident without delighting in the obvious failures. Horkheimer, who directed the successful studies in the proto-fascist nature of the authoritarian character, was personally most authoritarian in running a tight ship. He kept the members of the Institute under strict orders not to divulge their Marxist penchant or to engage in political action, yet they needed to collaborate with Marxist Pragmatists and to engage even in positivist...

“GUILT BY ASSOCIATION” AND THE POSTWAR CIVIL LIBERTARIANS

In recent years, the constitutional freedom of association has assumed a relatively low profile. Today, the most extended discussions of the right consider it as a second-order countervailing claim in civil rights cases involving questions of identity and the right to exclude. This article provides a brief overview of the right at a time when it was one of the most widely discussed, first-order constitutional rights, and when those discussions centered not on the right to exclude but on the question of “guilt by association.” The article provides a sampling of the way that right was considered in the immediate post-World War Two years in the writings of some of the era's most prominent civil libertarian thinkers – Leo Pfeffer, Milton Konvitz, Robert Cushman, Henry Steele Commager, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and Sidney Hook. These writings demonstrate that doctrinal development concerning the right was driven by its implication in two of the major political issues of the day: domestic security at the height of the Cold War and civil rights. The article concludes by arguing that, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the ongoing fight against terrorism, free association questions are likely to assume renewed prominence. It argues further that, in a contemporary context, those thinking about the most pressing freedom of association questions would profit by looking less to the more recent discussions of the right as a matter of the right to exclude, and more to the highly-relevant discussions of “guilt by association” by the currently less well known mid-century civil libertarians.