I BELIEVE that most readers will easily see through Franklin Kalinowski's misstatement of the arguments in my article. For example, Kalinowski consistently restates my analysis as if it were made from a viewpoint of teleological determinism, which is a position I explicitly reject in the text. On the other hand his interpretation of ecological constraints is based on an implicit assumption of teleological determinism in that it assumes an ecological crisis is inevitable. I make it clear in an extended footnote that we are neither justified in assuming the inevitable failure of technology and political forces to solve the current ecological problems nor justified in assuming their inevitable success. Whether or not the problems will ultimately be solved is an empirical question which can only be answered in the future. At this point in time the choice between the optimistic and pessimistic views can only be made on normative grounds. The present available evidence does not logically entail acceptance of the pessimistic view for the short-run period with which my analysis is concerned. My analysis makes no conclusions about what will occur in the long run. Both ecological collapse and a successful proletarian revolution are possibilities, but neither is asserted as a certainty. One of my central points is that in the short run we are highly unlikely to see a successful proletarian revolution. In the meantime the radical cause is best served by efforts aimed at developing interim radical goals and strategies. This is beyond the scope of the present article, but it is a task on which many radicals are currently working. Ronald Perrin's comments explicitly assume that conditions are now ripe for a proletarian revolution. His conclusions are based on a different interpretation of Marxian thought than the one I used in the analysis of the New Left. The hidden premise in Perrin's argument is the assumption that only his interpretation of Marxian thought is correct. On the other hand I explicitly acknowledge that more than one interpretation is possible. That raises the question of whether Perrin's or my interpretation represents the The answer to that question is that I do not know, nobody else does, and it doesn't really matter anyway. Interpretations of are almost as numerous as interpretations of Christianity. Trying to determine the substance of the Marx is as fruitless a task as trying to determine the Plato, the Machiavelli, or the Rousseau. Because of the controversy surrounding all these figures, many scholars have spent decades trying to give the definitive word on their nature. Differences of opinion always remain, however, because it is necessary in each case to make basic assumptions about motivation, missing data, and conflicting data. There is always more than one plausible assumption which fits the data. Differences in these assumptions color the rest of the analysis. In the analyses of controversial thinkers this typically results in two or three plausible interpretations of their true nature and what they really mean to say. In the case of there is a holistic interpretation which sees a Hegelian and revolutionary theme throughout the writings, and there are dichotomous interpretations which either differentiate an early Hegelian from a later scientific or a democratic from a revolutionary Marx. Because the underlying data on is neither complete, especially in regard to motivations, nor free of conflict, it is impossible to give a definitive answer as to the nature of the An alternative approach to that of vainly searching for the Marx on which to base one's argument is to select one of the plausible interpretations which
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