"THE DEVIL TO PAY!": Saltpeter and the Trent Affair Harold B. Hancock and Norman B. Wilkinson Early in the Civil War a talented young chemist and businessman, Lammot du Pont, accepted the task of secretly buying British saltpeter for the United States government. An essential ingredient in the manufacture of gunpowder, the compound was desperately needed for the Union war effort. Du Pont's important mission, however, was unexpectedly complicated by the famous Trent Affair in November, 1861. One interesting version has it that Du Pont played a crucial role in subsequent events, first causing Secretary of State William H. Seward to submit to British diplomatic demands and then himself pushing the nation to the brink of transatlantic war in completing his assigned task. Examination of this interpretation in the light of available documentary evidence is appropriate to a fuller understanding of a significant episode in the diplomacy of the Civil War.1 The ingredients and composition of gunpowder in the 1860's were little changed from the formula devised six centuries earlier by Roger Bacon: 75 per cent saltpeter, chemically KNO3, or potassium nitrate, with sulphur and charcoal, in equal or slightly varying proportions of 12 and 13 per cent each, completing the mixture. India had supplied most of the world's saltpeter since the early 1600's. Its saltpeter trade was under British control, purchases from suppliers in Calcutta usually being arranged through brokers in London or Liverpool. Shipments to other countries could be shut off just as swiftly as word could pass 1 For published accounts of the alleged causal connection between Lammot du Pont and Trent Affair diplomacy see George H. Kerr, Du Pont Romance ( Wilmington , Del., 1938), pp. 87-93, and Otto Eisenschiml and E. B. Long, As Luck Would Have It: Chance and Coincidence in the Civil War ( Indianapolis, 1948), pp. 47-66. See also Note 28 below. While old and partisan, the standard account of the international incident remains Thomas L. Harris, The Trent Affair (Indianapolis, 1896); but see also Ephraim D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (New York, 1925), I, 203-243. Recent studies of special aspects of the crisis include Norman B. Ferris, "The Prince Consort, 'The Times,' and the 'Trent' Affair," Civil War History, VI ( 1960), 152-156, and John Sherman Long, "Glory-Hunting off Havana: Wilkes and the Trent Affair," ibid., IX (1963), 133-144. 20 from Whitehall to the port officials in Calcutta and other Indian shipping points.2 E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, America's leading powder producer, had obtained its saltpeter in this manner since its first mill had been erected in 1802 on the banks of Brandywine Creek near Wilmington , Delaware. The company's purchases in 1860 amounted to 23,169 bags, and in 1861 totalled 26,194 bags, roughly one-third of all saltpeter imported into this country for those years.3 Sharing in the general belief that the war with the seceding Southern states would soon be over, the company had canceled all its saltpeter orders on April 22, 1861. But early in May it reversed itself and placed a standing order of 125 tons per month until further notice. Between April and December prices rose steadily from eight cents to fifteen cents a pound, and as the year ended speculators in saltpeter who had laid in large stocks were refusing to sell because they anticipated further price increases .4 In the spring Henry du Pont, head of the powder company, notified his cousin, Captain Samuel Francis du Pont, commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, that there was a six-months supply of saltpeter at the Brandywine mills or enroute from India. Dealers were not anxious to dispose of their stocks, since the market was rising and larger profits were hoped for.5 Captain du Pont passed on this information to the chief of the navy's Bureau of Ordnance, Captain Andrew A. Harwood. Harwood relayed the message to other officials in his department , noting that the subject was "of great importance in both a military and economical view." Several weeks later Harwood stated that the War Department reported a stock of 3,800,000 pounds of...
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Mar 26, 1997
Subhash C Mehta + 2
Open Access