Many of the foundations to the question about ‘what law is’ rest on the shaky ground of state of nature theory. The idea is that we must give up some rights to avoid the alternative account of having no state, and be at the risk of having no rights. It is common ground to think at the very least some laws are preferable to no laws, but a more clear picture on how a state could derive its authority, might give insight to an analysis of the nature of law. I argue that the law developed gradually and necessarily with the state, and that this conception of law can solve certain problems surrounding the role of different lawmakers, the connection between law and morality, and other problems. It is the view of this paper that there is a teleological guiding force between human organization and the concept of law. I argue that the concept of teleology need not contain serious metaphysical commitments. A naturalist is not precluded from this view. I draw a distinction between absolute and conceptual teleology. Next this paper evaluates historical and genealogical approaches to argumentation. I look at the groundbreaking work done by Nietzsche and Foucault and contrast it with approaches taken in the past. I find that the distinction is smaller than Foucault himself might have thought. I also contemplate where state of nature theorists fit into this type of reasoning. Ultimately, this paper aims at reframing the debate between natural law and legal positivism.