A key problem in the study of voluntary action (voluntary participation, citizen participation, discretionary participation, social participation, common interest ac tivity, citizen involvement-all approximate synonyms as used here) is definition. While the struggle for greater definitional clarity as an important step toward developing adequate theories of voluntary action has brought about some agreement on what the definitional issues are, there has been little agreement on how to resolve them (e.g. Pennock & Chapman 1969; Smith, Reddy & Baldwin 1972: Part One; Meister 1972). The approach used here follows the line of Smith, Reddy & Baldwin (1972). Voluntary action is the action of individuals, collectivities, or settlements insofar as it is characterized primarily by the seeking of psychic benefits (e.g. belongingness, esteem, self-actualization) and by being discretionary in nature [not determined primarily by biosocial factors (physiological compulsions in their socialized forms), coercive factors (sociopolitical compulsions backed by a threat of force), or direct remuneration (direct, high-probability payment or benefits of an economic sort)]. This definition is rooted in the motivational theory of Maslow (1954), conforms fairly well to common sociological usage, is broad but not all-inclusive of human social behavior, defines voluntary action positively as well as negatively, is applicable at all major levels of system reference (shifting from individual motivation to a concern for goals as aggregated motivational intents at collectivity and settlement levels), applies fairly well across the usual disciplinary boundaries and intradiscipli nary compartments, is broadly connotative and analytical rather than narrowly denotative, is a matter of degree, not a qualitative distinction, and is not rooted in a particular limiting common sense paradigm of a single kind of voluntary action (e.g. cult, movement). The behavior of any actor (individual, collectivity, settlement) can be described in terms of the relative extent to which it is rooted in voluntary intentions (motiva tions or goals), biosocial factors, coercive factors, and direct remuneration. Nearly