The Honey Encryption Algorithm is a novel encryption scheme designed to encrypt messages using low-entropy keys, such as passwords. When an incorrect key is used for decryption, it returns a honeyword—a fictitious message intended to mislead attackers into thinking they have accessed the correct data. However, in password-based authentication systems, a usability issue arises when legitimate users accidentally input their password in a way that results in a honeyword. This study addresses the problem of typo-safety in Honey Encryption Algorithm by employing Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) models combined with Damerau-Levenshtein distance metric to generate honeywords that are less likely to be typed by legitimate users, while still being effective against adversarial attacks. The Enhanced Honey Encryption Algorithm achieved a typo rate of 29%, with only 4.57% of typos producing a honeyword candidate. In comparison, the original Honey Encryption Algorithm using a Take-a-Tail method had a 71% typo rate, with 27.71% of typos resulting in honeyword candidates. A password survey was conducted on 100 participants, asking them to re-enter 20 passwords under timed and environmental constraints for ecological validity. Both algorithms were tested using honeyword sets generated from a set of passwords sourced from the phpBB password list. The Enhanced Honey Encryption Algorithm’s 29% typo rate and 4.57% honeyword rate indicate a lower probability of legitimate users’ typos resulting in a honeyword, resulting in a significant improvement in usability in password-based authentication systems.
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