When adopting Russia's current constitution in a nationwide referendum on December 12, 1993, Russian electorate also voted in favor of offering conscientious objectors (COs) an alternative to traditional military service. As stated in Article 59 (3) of constitution, the citizen of Russian Federation whose convictions and faith are at odds with military service . . . shall have right to substitution of an alternative civil service for military service.1It was ten years later, however, beginning on January 1, 2004, that Russian conscripts would be offered alternative otherwise guaranteed by constitution. Moreover, members of Duma declared that this part of Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen (ch. 2 of constitution) should have duration of alternative service exceed that of traditional service-from a standard twenty-four months to thirty-six or even a full forty-two months (for those performing civil service within military and nonmilitary sectors, respectively).2The adoption of new law, which still leaves Russia open to criticism of discrimination, has clearly been a difficult and painful process for Russian policymakers. In this article, I trace origins of law and explain why it appeared when it did and why it appeared in shape that it did.The study proceeds in four main steps. First, drawing on what is a rapidly expanding body of literature, I briefly outline relevant theories on social learning. Employing a basic distinction between and complex learning, I explain how cognition may reflect two principally different processes of policy transformation-one in which means change, but underlying assumptions remain intact and one in which means change as fundamental values and belief systems are altered.3Second, I go over process leading to adoption of law. Well before 2002, strong pressure existed to pass legislation on issue but, as demonstrated here, various Duma majorities prevented this for more than eight years. Domestically, main source of-the pressure was Article 59 (3) itself, continued neglect of which was a constant reminder for critics of relatively illiberal nature of post-Soviet Russia.4 Internationally, it was primarily generated by Russia's membership application to-and subsequent acceptance into-the Council of Europe (CoE). The central role played by this organization is explained not only by strong human rights dimension of its work, but also because it remains only major European security organization of which Russia has actually earned membership.5Third, I link first two sections, offering answers to puzzles raised earlier. I suggest that law on alternative service is primarily product of a simple learning process. Although there seems to have been a growing recognition among Russian politicians concerning importance of meeting international standards of conduct, particular norm underlying offer of alternative service clearly has not been fully internalized. In fact, it seems that there was a conscious effort made to ensure that law meets a minimal interpretation of letter of earlier commitments only. The members of Duma, simply put, were more concerned about interests of Russia than about those of COs.This, I argue in final section, does not necessarily represent a failure on part of either domestic critics or international community. It marks a step in right direction, even if a small one, and should be welcomed. Once introduced, even for instrumental reasons, human rights norms often gain wider acceptance through a gradual process, raising their legitimacy and making it less likely that they will be rolled back.LearningThe underlying theme of this study is norm socialization. Depending on level of internalization, norms will have a constitutive effect (that is, define identity of actor) as well as a regulative effect (that is, shape behavior of actor). …