Serial Cost Research Articles

Numeracy: Open-Access Publishing to Reduce the Cost of Scholarly Journals

Each fiscal year, as academic librarians throughout the United States prepare materials budgets, a national “groan” ensues. Regardless of their format (i.e. print or digital), serial subscription costs are escalating, in the process impacting the role of the library in advancing scholarly communication . This paper examines some of the economic issues concerning open-access (OA) journal publishing. The importance of quantitative literacy is suggested for librarians and academics seeking a better understanding of alternatives to traditional journal subscription models and to anyone considering ventures into OA publishing. Quantitative literacy is essential for managing alternatives to the rising cost of scholarly communication. The OA movement is gaining traction at the national level, following mandates from the National Institutes of Health and at some large research universities that host institutional repositories. Science faculty has been engaged in scholarly communication OA models since the 1970s. More broadly, discussions in academe have focused on OA and its impact on peer review, promotion and tenure, intellectual property rights, and measures of institutional and faculty productivity. Studies concerning the OA movement’s economics are most commonly reported in academic librarianship literature, a trend that may serve as a barrier to a broader understanding of OA’s role in scholarly communication. This paper provides background information on the crisis in serials costs and suggests that metrics favor OA models publishing models. A concluding proposal concerning library-funded OA serial collections is offered as a catalyst for further discussions.

Sticker Shock and Looming Tsunami: The High Cost of Academic Serials in Perspective

Recession is currently causing a resurgence of the academic serials crisis. Profit-mongering by commercial publishers is once again denounced as the key driver of the crisis. However, a critical analysis of institutional and bibliometric data does not reveal excessive corporate greed in recent years; instead, it suggests that the present hurdles stem largely from years of inadequate budget allocations to academic libraries and from a publishing frenzy fuelled by simplistic methods of evaluating faculty productivity. To prevent what is likely to be the publishing equivalent of a tsunami in the next few years, universities and research institutions urgently need to re-emphasize quality over quantity in the publishing process, and they must find ways to include peer-reviewing efficiency among their criteria for productivity and impact. Achieving these goals will require concerted efforts by researchers, librarians, and publishers.

Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization

The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009–1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245–275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178–201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

Contracts, Cost Sharing and Consistency

Under a contract, agents are not only held to honor the allocation as prescribed by a cost sharing mechanism but also a full description of allocated units and costs once production falls short. For agents leaving the cost sharing problem by taking their demanded units and prepaying the corresponding bill, a contract allows for a reformulation of the cost sharing problem to serve the remaining agents. Consistency requires invariance of cost shares relative to any such reduced cost sharing problem. Under consistency, the proportional mechanisms uniquely satisfy additivity and positivity of cost shares. Exchanging positivity by equal treatment characterizes the set of mechanisms which propose proportional shares for only those agents in the maximal indifference set for some preordering on the rest of nonnegative numbers. This includes egalitarian and average cost sharing. The latter is further characterized by the properties linearity. Under R-consistency, a mechanism is supported by at least one reasonable contract, which meets upperbounds. The class of additive and R-consistent mechanisms is isomorphic to the class of consistent and monotonic rationing methods. Consequently serial cost sharing is R-consistent, whereas Shapley-Shubik is not. Examples are given how the extensive literature on consistent monotonic rationing can be inferred to study and characterize cost sharing mechanisms.

Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Fair Pricing of Resource Usage

We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are drawn according to some probability distribution. The cost paid by an agent for a resource it chooses is the total demand put on the resource divided by the number of agents who chose that same resource. So, resources charge costs in an equitable, fair way, while each resource makes no profit out of the agents. We call our model the Fair Pricing model. Its fair cost mechanism induces a non-cooperative game among the agents. To evaluate the Nash equilibria of this game, we introduce the Diffuse Price of Anarchy, as an extension of the Price of Anarchy that takes into account the probability distribution on the demands. We prove: Towards the end, we consider two closely related cost sharing models, namely the Average Cost Pricing and the Serial Cost Sharing models, inspired by Economic Theory. In contrast to the Fair Pricing model, we prove that pure Nash equilibria do exist for both these models.

Return on Investment: Libraries and Student Retention

Using data on libraries collected by the Association of Research Libraries (ARL) and the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL), as well as fall-to-fall retention rates obtained from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), this study employs statistical measures of association to analyze the relationship of both library expenditures and number of professional library staff to student persistence. The strongest relationships found were those between student retention and total library expenditures, total library materials costs, and serial costs for institutions categorized as baccalaureate colleges within the Carnegie Classification System. The most significant relationship between persistence and number of library professional staff was discovered to occur at doctoral-granting institutions.

Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case

Two agents jointly operate a decreasing marginal returns technology to produce a private good. We characterize the class of output-sharing rules for which the labor-supply game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It consists of two families: rules of the serial type which protect a small user from the negative externality imposed by a large user, and rules of the reverse serial type, where one agent effectively employs the other agent's labor. Exactly two rules satisfy symmetry; a result in sharp contrast with Moulin and Shenker's characterization of their serial mechanism as the unique cost-sharing rule satisfying the same incentives property [Moulin, H., Shenker, S., 1992. Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 60 (5), 1009–1037]. We also show that the familiar stand-alone test characterizes the class of fixed-path methods under our incentives criterion [Friedman, E.J., 2004. Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing. Econ. Theory 23, 643–658].

A decision analytic model of prostate cancer screening using prostate-specific antigen and digital rectal exam

5155 Background: PSA-based screening has been widely adopted in the US although a mortality benefit has yet to be demonstrated. The disutility of screening and quality of life of men diagnosed and treated after screening are critical issues in assessing its benefit and harm. The purpose of this model is to estimate the effect of one-time screening for prostate cancer using Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA) and DRE (digital rectal exam) on life expectancy (LE) and Quality Adjusted Life Expectancy (QALE) in the context of current diagnostic and treatment practice. Methods: A semi-Markov state transition simulation describes the relevant health states. Two strategies were compared: 1) Screening - single screening PSA and DRE; 2) No Screening - patients diagnosed after developing symptoms. Markov cycle length was 1 year. Transition probabilities and utility weights were developed from review of the literature and expert opinion. Sensitivity analyses were performed on all parameters. A PSA threshold of 4 ng/mL and age 65 were used for the base case. The model was created using TreeAge software. Results: For our base case, a single screening conferred a LE benefit of 0.37 y (15.86 vs 15.49 y) and a QALE benefit of 0.20 QALYs (15.62 vs 15.42 QALYs). Predicted 10 y cancer specific survival for screen-diagnosed men was 95.7% vs SEER 97.7%. The model predicted 9.5% of screened patients would have metastatic disease at diagnosis vs 5% in SEER (4% unknown stage); in unscreened men, this rate was 18/100,000 vs 15/100,000 in SEER. Sensitivity Analyses of Utilities (SA): The single screen model was relatively insensitive to SA of utilities: a 20% single cycle toll on one-time PSA screening disutility was required to eliminate the benefit of screening. The disutility of positive PSA with negative biopsy slightly affected QALE: a toll of 0.25 QALYs decreased QALE from 15.62 to 15.61 QALYs. Conclusions: Our model reveals a modest benefit to one-time screening for prostate cancer. This one-time screening model is relatively insensitive to utility SA; however, the importance of incorporating psychological effects of PSA screening in recurrent screening is to be determined. The impact of serial screening, lead time, PSA threshold, and cost effectiveness on LE and QALE is being analyzed. No significant financial relationships to disclose.

An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule

This paper proposes an experimental test to evaluate the performance of the serial cost sharing rule, originally proposed by Shenker [Sigmetrics, 241–242 (1990)] and then analyzed by Moulin and Shenker [Econometrica 60, 1009–1037 (1992)]. We report measures of the performance and efficiency of the serial mechanism by comparing the choices and payoffs attained by the subjects to the expected equilibrium allocations. Experimental evidence shows that learning is needed for the subjects to converge to the equilibrium strategy. However, in terms of efficiency, the serial mechanism leads to almost efficient allocations.

Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units

This paper characterizes serial mechanisms for the cost sharing of an excludable public good that is available in multiple units. We show that serial mechanisms are the only voluntary mechanisms that satisfy coalition strategy-proofness and consumer sovereignty.

A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks

In this paper we define the weighted serial cost sharing rule for the cost allocation problem. We apply this new rule to the problem of sharing delay costs in a PERT network. This rule belongs to the Core and is the Weighted Shapley Value for a particular game. Furthermore, we present a characterization of this rule and a polynomial algorithm for its calculation.

Consistent Cost Sharing

A new concept of consistency for cost sharing solutions is discussed, analyzed, and related to the homonymous property within the rationing context. The class of additive and consistent mechanisms is isomorphic to the class of consistent and monotonic rationing methods. Consequently average and serial cost sharing are consistent, whereas Shapley-Shubik is not. Average cost sharing is the only strongly consistent element in this class. Examples are given how the extensive literature on consistent monotonic rationing can be inferred to study and characterize cost sharing mechanisms. A new class of incremental mechanisms is discussed of which the consistent elements correspond to consistent piecewise linear rationing methods.

The Serial Property and Restricted Balanced Contributions in discrete cost sharing problems

We show that the Serial Poperty and Restricted Balanced Contributions characterize the subsidy-free serial cost sharing method (Moulin (1995)) in discrete cost allocation problems.

The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project

We examine the asymptotic behavior of two strategyproof mechanisms discussed by Moulin for public goods – the conservative equal costs rule (CER) and the serial cost sharing rule (SCSR) – and compare their performance to that of the pivotal mechanism (PM) from the Clarke–Groves family. Allowing the individuals’ valuations for an excludable public project to be random variables, we show under very general assumptions that expected welfare loss generated by the CER, as the size of the population increases, becomes arbitrarily large. However, all moments of the SCSR’s random welfare loss asymptotically converge to zero. The PM does better than the SCSR, with its welfare loss converging even more rapidly to zero.

Pricing and Publishing Models of Electronic Journals

There has been a crisis in scholarly communication since the late 1980’s due to the spiraling costs of scientific journals. Libraries were the first to experience the effects of the breakdown as they struggled to keep up with the exploding volume and cost of journals in Science, Technology, and Medicine (STM). As the cost of serials in major libraries soared, libraries were forced to cancel millions of dollars worth of subscriptions. Most pricing and publishing models were created to offer a constructive response to this issue. The aim of these initiatives is to transform scientific journal publishing into a market-aware and fiscally responsible enterprise. There are many pricing and publishing models for electronic journals. This paper has explained the following models: TULIP, PEAK, SPARK, BioOne, HighWire Press, Project MUSE, JSTOR, PubMed, and EPIC.

Tradition and Protean Nature--Journals and Scholarly Communication: A Review Essay

Since the advent of scholarly publishing many years ago scholars have relied upon the existence of rationalized venues for their scien tific research and scholarship. Indeed, professional life, if not exist ence, may well depend upon a foundation free of destructive intru sion or philistine interests. As libraries have attempted to cope with rising costs of serials and library service, journals have seen massive increases in costs along a long spectrum of economic measurement. Stresses and concerted attempts at keeping the economic whirlwinds from blowing away the temple of knowledge have left many librar ies holding their own, only to wonder within the inner sanctum what remains to be seen. Not long ago a masterful and deeply committed attempt to meet at least some of academe's needs led to a rebirth, in nearly Alexandrine terms, of scholarship, at least as it manifested itself in journal form. Many journals have inhabited the shelving ranges of many libraries only to be lost, in a purely illusory sense. Dusty and lost to memory, titles such as Mind and the American His torical Review were relegated to a shadow life on shelves and in li brary facilities not often visited. Today such is no longer the case?and for very excellent reasons. If the above scenario is a little overdrawn, it remains closer to the truth than not. As JSTOR has grown in use and more titles have been added at specific intervals, the richly layered database

Cost allocation schemes: An asymptotic approach

We use the asymptotic approach to the cost allocation problem. In this way, we find the limit of linear solutions on discrete cost allocation problems which define solutions on continuum cost allocation problems. Particularly we analyze the Shapley–Shubik method, the discrete Aumann–Shapley method, the serial cost sharing method and the pseudo-average cost method.

Snap, crackle and ultimately pop? The future for serials

This paper had as its brief, for the concluding session of the 2005 UKSG conference, to overview issues within the conference, and hopefully within an entertaining framework. Readers of this article should therefore also refer to the UKSG web site at http://www.uksg.org/events/previous.asp#2005conf for my PowerPoint presen tation which contains a significant amount of pictorial material. Topics covered include the recurring historical nature of the 'serial crisis', the open access movement, the costs of serials at both the 'front end' and 'back end', institutional repositories and the relationship of the academic book in elec tronic form to serial trends.

An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods

This paper compares three collective choice procedures for the provision of excludable public goods under incomplete information. One, serial cost sharing (SCS), is budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous and strategy proof. The other two are “hybrid” procedures: voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PCS) and with no rebates (NR). PCS satisfies all these properties except strategy proofness, and NR satisfies all the properties except for strategy proofness and budget balance. However, PCS and NR do not exclude any potential users, and they do not require equal cost shares, thereby overcoming the two main sources of inefficiency with SCS. We characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the hybrid mechanisms and conduct laboratory experiments to compare the performance of the three mechanisms. We find that PCS produces significantly more efficient allocations than either SCS or NR.

Bayesian serial cost sharing

Shared productive facilities often entail incomplete information regarding attributes such as production costs, production quality, user lists, user preferences, etc. We formulate the notion of Bayesian cost share games to model such environments and find that many of the desirable features the serial cost-sharing rule enjoys in nonstochastic settings also extend to Bayesian frameworks. We also introduce the concept of normal goods to cost-sharing games and demonstrate that normality further strengthens the serial rule's appeal.